MOVILH-IZATION: HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN THE QUEER SOCIAL MOVEMENT INDUSTRY IN SANTIAGO DE CHILE

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Introduction

I almost didn’t meet Juan Ríos. After several failed attempts at scheduling an interview with MUMS (Movimiento Unificado de Minorías Sexuales or United Movement of Sexual Minorities) through the organization’s website, I had become convinced that my precious few weeks of fieldwork might be wasted waiting for a response that would never come. Fortunately for me, while wandering the side streets of Santiago between interviews, I accidentally found myself in front of their unassuming headquarters, tucked away a few blocks off of La Alameda, the city’s famous central thoroughfare. Throwing caution to the wind, I rang the bell of the converted colonial house and was warmly greeted by a volunteer secretary. After inquiring about the possibility of an interview he looked at me and said, “Oh, you want to talk to Juan. Él es el movimiento.” “He is the movement.” “Sube,” he gestured. “Head upstairs.”

Juan is an affable man, in his late 40’s, with hair that has just started to gray around the temples. He works as a university professor as well as the keeper of MUMS’ library, an extensive collection of books, newspapers, magazines, posters, and audio and video recordings documenting the life of Chile’s queer social movement industry (SMI) since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship in 1990. This one-of-a-kind library is housed in one room of MUM’s headquarters, piled to the ceiling with materials, organized in a way only Juan understands. Juan may not be the movement, as the secretary suggested, but he comes close, having been intimately involved from its very conception, from the last few
years of the Pinochet dictatorship to the present day.

My interview at MUMS that day was the first of many with activists from Santiago de Chile’s so called *diversidad sexual* (sexual diversity) movement, a name that will be explored in depth in Chapter 1. It was also my first indicator that the movement was deeply divided, and that most activists placed the blame on one organization, Movilh (*Movimiento de Liberación e Integración Homosexual* or Movement for the Homosexual Liberation and Integration), and its director, Manuel Tapia. Movilh styles itself as the oldest queer rights social movement organization (SMO) in Chile and, while it is technically true that the name Movilh has existed since just after the return to democracy in 1990, today’s Movilh is a different organization than the one originally founded, and the original group is now referred to by many as “Movilh Histórico.” This conversion from Movilh Histórico to today’s Movilh has created ruptures in Santiago’s queer social movement industry (SMI), as activists who were once members of Movilh have left to form new groups, including those discussed in this thesis.

According to my interviews, this rupture is due in large part to personal tensions with Manuel Tapia, Movilh’s current president and one of the initial founders of the group, which was originally horizontally organized. In general, the activists I interviewed (with the exception of Movilh’s representative, Jorge González) bear a notable animosity toward Tapia. This ill will seems due to a general perception that 1) he hijacked the horizontal leadership of Movilh to claim leadership for himself, 2) Tapia’s Movilh is concerned almost exclusively with the rights of gay-identified, masculine, upper class men, leaving the rest of the queer community in the margins, and 3) Movilh and Tapia collaborate with the *gobierno de turno* (whichever government is currently in
charge), regardless of the politics of said government.

Juan Ríos was not the only activist to express hostility toward Manuel Tapia and his organization. In fact, the only queer activist who did not have something negative to say about Tapia was Jorge González, one of Movilh’s spokespeople and the first openly gay elected official in Chilean history. Mario Rodríguez, one of the spokespeople for Acción Gay, was open about his feelings toward Movilh, referencing what he referred to as a politics of “selling-out” to whichever government is currently in power. Most notably, he raised the example of Mr. Tapia rising to give a standing ovation at the passage of the controversial Ley Antidiscriminación (Anti-discrimination Law), by right-wing president Sebastián Piñera.

Representatives from MUMS, OTD and CUDS Chile also mentioned Mr. Tapia’s standing ovation. It clearly stands out, to them, as an example of the “sell-out” politics of which they accuse Movilh. However, I believe that this divide is motivated by more than basic political differences. Semi-structured interviews with representatives from six prominent SMOs, including Movilh, reveal a complex process of individual and group subjectivity negotiation, bound up with notions of class, race, gender, and their relationships with normative hegemonic masculinity. This thesis will argue that at the root of this division is an effort on the part of some queer SMOs to maintain hegemonic masculine control of Santiago’s queer SMI through the deployment of hegemonic forms of masculine and cultural capital and the desexualization of the movement.

While the mention of Mr. Tapia’s standing ovation across a variety of SMOs is interesting per se, it also calls into question the motivations of the activists who

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1 Jorge González is the concejal, roughly translated as a city councilperson, of one of the most affluent neighborhoods in Santiago.
mentioned it. Its sheer uniformity and ubiquity suggests that the standing ovation has become a sort of buzzword for some queer SMOs in Santiago. As such, it is important to remain skeptical about the portrayal of these and other events by individual activists. Enmity toward Movilh is undoubtedly politically advantageous for some of the SMOs in this study, as it allows them to form a cohesive group identity in the way in which they differ from Movilh. Data collected in interviews is inherently biased, whether consciously or unconsciously, by the memories, lived experiences, and political interests of both the interviewee and the interviewer. The interviews presented in this study are no exception, and should be not be read as ‘truth,’ but rather as portrayal of the current reality of queer organizing in Santiago de Chile through the eyes of selected activists.

Through three case studies, based on recently conducted semi-structured interviews and previously collected sociological data and scholarly work, this thesis aims to demonstrate that, although Santiago’s queer SMI may appear to be experiencing a moment of aperture and growth, it must be viewed through a more critical lens. Chilean scholars and activists have convincingly argued that the SMI has been dominated by hegemonic masculine influences since its birth. This thesis will argue that, rather than combatting this masculine domination, recent social and legal efforts on the part of certain SMOs have in fact served to reinscribe it.

There is a diverse and growing body of literature on gender and sexuality and its relationship with activism in Latin America. While this literature varies greatly in regional and theoretical focus, some particularly notable examples follow. Norma Mogrovejo (2000) provides the often forgotten perspective of lesbian activists in a case study of Mexico, in which she explores the tensions between the two biggest influences
on Mexican lesbian activism: the transnational queer movement and the Mexican feminist movement. Rafael de la Dehesa’s much cited work (2010) lays bare the selective relationship of Mexican and Brazilian queer activists with their respective governments, exploring the ways in which activists chose to engage with, or not to engage with, state actors and political parties. Jordi Díez (2011) explores the complexities of interaction between the Argentinian state and the lesbian and gay movement, one of the most successful examples of legalized queer citizenship in Latin America. Jafari Allen’s article (2012) addresses sexual activism through the lens of erotic subjectivity, analyzing the ways in which queer black Cubans innovated new forms of participation in the public sphere during Cuba’s special period. Most recently, Cymene Howe’s case study of Nicaraguan sexual rights activism (2013) has provided crucial insights into both the challenges and successful of this type of activism in machista contexts, as well as the growing transnational nature of queer activism in Latin America.

Methodology

The data presented in this study are the result of a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with activists in Santiago de Chile from June 1 to June 23 of 2013. While my initial sample contained interviews with activists within a variety of social movements, including many smaller queer SMOs, I have chosen to limit this study to the data from six queer SMOs: Movilh, MUMS, Acción Gay, CUDS Chile, Fundación Iguales, and OTD. My initial findings indicate that these six groups represent the largest
and best organized groups in Santiago’s queer SMI\(^2\), as well as those with the most impact in the public sphere. While further research should include voices from small SMOs as well, this thesis is interested in representing the opinions and actions of queer SMOs who have had a marked impact in the public sphere and public discourse.

My search for contacts began in April of 2013 through the use of Twitter and Facebook. Using search terms such as “LGBTQ Chile” and “gay Chile,” I compiled an initial list of ‘virtual’ contacts. By taking advantage of the private message features offered on these social media platforms, I was able to contact representatives from Movilh, Fundación Iguales, and OTD while still in the United States. Once in Chile, I relied largely on snowball sampling to build my network. For example, I made contact with Acción Gay, CUDS Chile, and MUMS (as well as other SMOs and activists not included in this study) with the help of these initial contacts.

I conducted one semi-structured interview with one representative from each group. The only exception was the interview with OTD, conducted with a group of three activists at the same time. These representatives were chosen by the organizations, and thus clearly represent people who largely toe the party line of each group. Further research should attempt to include the voices of a wider variety of official representatives, as well as SMO members without official roles. Nonetheless, the assignment of representatives by each SMO has allowed me to assume that their opinions, at least on organizational matters, represent those of the SMO each representative has been chosen to speak for. Given the short period of fieldwork, it was

\(^2\) Given that Santiago is home to a third of Chile’s population, and as a consequence the city is the center of Chile’s queer SMI, the conclusions presented in this thesis may also be indicative of larger trends in the queer SMI of the country as a whole. Nonetheless, this thesis attempts to clarify when conclusions are being drawn about Santiago, and when they concern the country as a whole.
necessary to access as much information about organizational politics as possible, as quickly as possible.

Interviews ranged in length from 45 minutes to three hours, depending on the willingness and availability of each interviewee. All interviews were conversational in nature, starting with a series of basic questions about an individual’s name, age, gender, and other identifying characteristics. After these initial questions, interviewees were asked broader questions about their histories of activism and histories within the organizations they represented. Finally, each interviewee was invited to elaborate on any point s/he felt was significant or had been left out of my interview questions. In this way, my interviewees helped me to add to and improve my questionnaire. For this reason, and because of the uncontrolled nature of the ensuing conversations in each interview, these data should only be taken as indicative of general trends and ideas within the movement. Further, and more standardized, interviews should be conducted to confirm and improve my initial findings.

It should be noted that, with the exception of OTD, all the representatives interviewed in this study were men. Additionally, of the three OTD representatives I interviewed, only one was a cist-gender woman. The other two OTD representatives were trans* men, a distinction which will be important throughout the thesis in discussions of access to masculine capital. Interestingly, most of these male representatives went out of their way to express to me that Chile’s lesbian movement was either underground or had disappeared entirely, a perception that I discovered to be completely erroneous. Although this will be problematized throughout this study through discussions of hegemonic masculine control of the SMI, this study should not be taken as
an exhaustive study of the entirety of Santiago’s queer SMI, but rather as an exploration of the hegemonic masculine control thereof. Further research is necessary on Santiago’s lesbian and feminist movements, which appear to be both intertwined and to have been sublimated by the very hegemonic masculinity explored in this work.

Chapter 2, in addition to interview data, is supported by frequency analyses of media coverage surrounding the Ley Antidiscriminación (Antidiscrimination Law). Articles were taken from one right-wing newspaper, El Mercurio, and one left-wing newspaper, El Ciudadano, which has a smaller readership. Although left-wing newspapers are not as widely read in Chile as right-wing newspapers, after consulting with Chilean informants I chose El Ciudadano as my representative left-wing newspaper, as it provided the most data for my particular code. According to Fundación Iguales representative Rodrigo Pérez:

In Chile we have 5 Chilean TV channels, that aren’t even that Chilean, and we have two widely distributed newspapers. Both of these [types of] media are marked by a conservative lens, which represents a historic trend in Chile, even 23 years after the dictatorship. Both of them are very Catholic and conservative.  

This analysis utilizes newspaper articles from roughly one year before the passage of Chile’s Ley Antidiscriminación to (March 1, 2011 – November 15, 2013. Additionally, Chapter 2 presents an analysis of media coverage of the Ley Antidiscriminación focusing specifically on articles published after the passage of the law (July 12, 2012 to March 10, 2014) in an attempt to present the most current data possible on the media coverage surrounding the law, as well as its passage and implementation.

I collected newspaper articles from El Mercurio and El Ciudadano using the code “Ley Antidiscriminación” For phase 1 of the analysis, all articles analyzed were published

3 All translations mine unless otherwise indicated
between March 1, 2011 and November 15, 2013. *El Mercurio* produced 117 articles for “Ley Antidiscriminación.” Of these articles, roughly every fifth was coded, resulting in a sample size of N=24 articles. *El Ciudadano* produced 42 articles for “Ley Antidiscriminación,” of which every other article was coded, resulting in a sample size of N = 21 articles.

For phase two of the analysis, focusing specifically on the *Ley Antidiscriminación* since its passage, articles were again collected from *El Mercurio* and *El Ciudadano*. *El Mercurio* produced a total of 46 related articles, while *El Ciudadano* produced 14. In an effort to maintain relatively equal sample sizes, every third article from *El Mercurio* was coded, resulting in a sample size of N=16. All articles from *El Ciudadano* were coded, resulting in a sample size of N=14. It is important to note that this sample overlaps with the previous analysis of the *Ley Antidiscriminación*. This is intentional, as while the first phase of analysis presents a general picture of the overall prevalence of each SMO in media coverage, the second phase of the analysis allowed me to draw conclusions specifically about changes in media coverage since the law’s passage.

Each article was coded for mentions of the names of each SMO in question and analyzed in terms of each individual SMO; any mention of a specific SMO was given a “1” in that SMO’s column, while any that were not mentioned received a “0”. For example, an article that mentioned only Movilh would receive a “1” in the Movilh column, and “0” in all five other columns. This process was completed four times, once for each set of data (two from *El Mercurio* and two from *El Ciudadano*). A marked preference for one (or more) SMOs over the others in the study was interpreted as an indicator of SMO dominance in the media coverage of the *Ley Antidiscriminación*. 
On anonymity

According to IRB protocol, all participants in this study were asked to give oral consent before participating in any interviews. Part of this oral consent contained a anonymity clause. In accordance with this requirement, I have done everything in my power to protect the anonymity of my contacts in Santiago’s queer SMI, by randomly assigning them pseudonyms and omitting specific details about their personal lives. It is my hope that by protecting the anonymity of the participants in this study, they will be protected from public scrutiny. This same practice has been continued with the names of all the activists in this study, whether or not I interviewed them personally. The only real names used in this thesis are those of major, national politicians and public figures whose actions are a matter of public record. Nonetheless, it is not my intention to diminish the personal agency of these activists. Each one of them, without exception, is involved in waging a battle for queer citizenship in a cultural context that is just beginning to support their cause. Their efforts deserve to be commended and recognized, even if their real names cannot be used.

What’s in a name?: a note about terminology

For the sake of clarity, I have chosen to use the term “queer social movement industry” to describe what North American readers would most likely recognize as the LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer or Questioning) movement, united under the acronym as an umbrella term while still maintaining specific group identities. While I am aware that the politics of queer and LGBTQ organizing (in the United States) are in many ways quite different, for the purposes of this study it is most important to maintain the distinction between different forms of organizing in Chile, while still respecting the propensity of many interviewees to use the terms LGTBI (Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex) and *diversidad* interchangeably when speaking about the Chilean movement.

Although the acronym LGBTQ is perhaps more familiar to US readers, there is a strong tendency toward the use of the acronym LGBTI among Chilean activists. Many interviewees used ‘LGBTI’ and *diversidad* interchangeably in their casual speech. As such, I will maintain the use of ‘queer social movement industry’ when speaking from my own perspective of the movement as a whole or of queer activism in the abstract, and will respect the usage of ‘*diversidad*’ and ‘LGBTI’ when presenting information gathered in the field. Regardless of the terminology used by a given activist or SMO, before we can hope to understand the current reality and potential future of queer rights in Chile, we must first examine the history of the movement.

**Chile’s Stonewall**

The year 1973 means something to virtually every Chilean. On September 11th of that year, democratically elected socialist president Salvador Allende was ousted from his office in a violent coup d’état that culminated in the military firebombing of *La Moneda*, the presidential palace in downtown Santiago. This day is, for some, the day that General Augusto Pinochet saved Chile from the threat of total collapse under socialist rule and restored order with a firm hand. For others, it marks the first day of a bloody and oppressive military dictatorship that would last until 1990 and do away with Allende’s dreams of social equality and wealth redistribution. However, for a small group of Chileans, 1973 also marks the first public protest for the rights of non-heterosexuals and against police brutality directed at *locas* in Santiago: *Las locas de la Plaza de Armas* (the *locas* of the Plaza de Armas), often referred to by activists as the “Chilean Stonewall.”
Loca is a difficult term to translate to English. Scholars often substitute “queen,” but loca is to some extent a Latin American social category without an obvious equivalent in Anglo culture. Additionally, loca is the feminine form of the adjective meaning ‘crazy,’ inscribing both femininity and mental instability on the bodies it is used to describe. Roughly, locas are gay identified men who walk the line between transvestitism and overt female identification. They are, as in the United States, marginalized by much of the gay community for their almost total rejection of hegemonic masculine identity. In the 1970’s, locas were generally associated with sex work, although this is not necessarily the case today; currently, there is a tendency to use the word as a catch-all term for all markedly “feminine” gay men.

Santiago, like most Spanish colonial cities, was built around a Plaza de Armas, a central plaza that originally contained the most important structures of the colony, such as the cathedral and the barracks. Today, Santiago’s Plaza de Armas serves many purposes, such as performance space for street artists, typical meeting place, and tourist attraction. In 1973, as it does to a lesser extent today, it also served as a hub for loca sex workers.

In an interview with Víctor Hugo Robles in his book Bandera Hueca, one loca who was present at the protest, known only as Raquel, describes the situation as follows:

At that time there were three groups of maricas (faggots) who congregated in the center of Santiago. There were the ones in the Plaza de Armas, the ones on Huérfanos street, and the ones on the Alameda. The ones that met on Huérfanos were the most beautiful locas, that ones that got themselves all done up, the cuicas (high-class women). The ones on the Alameda were just OK, like middle class, and the ones in the Plaza de Armas, which were us, we were the poorest and the lowest (Robles 2008:13).4

4 Although difficult to express in an English translation, it is of note that Raquel continually employs female pronouns, such as nosotras (we women) when speaking of herself and the other locas. While not the focus of this paper, it is important to note that this does not mean that Raquel necessarily identifies as a woman.
These locas, momentarily putting aside their differences, were the locas who took over the Plaza de Armas on April 22, 1973. There is some debate, over four decades later, about whether the protest was intentionally organized or if it resulted from a natural build-up of tensions between the locas and the police who regularly persecuted and physically attacked the locas. Regardless, sensationalist newspaper coverage over the next few days makes it clear that, intentional or not, the protest succeeded in establishing a discourse of queer protest (although by no means a positive one) in the mainstream Chilean media. The mainstream leftist newspaper El Clarín published the following headline about the protest: “Maracos (faggots) made an ostentatious display of their sexual deviances in the Plaza de Armas.” This was followed by an article that read:

Yeguas sueltas,⁵ locas perdidas,⁶ hungry for publicity, acting on impulse, met to demand that the authorities give them space and respect for their sexual deviances. Among other things, the homosexuals want legislation passed so that they can marry and do whatever they want without any persecution by the police. Imagine what could happen. It’s no wonder that one old man proposed dousing them all with paraffin and throwing a lit match at them (Ibid.:15-16)

Not five months later, General Pinochet seized power of the Chilean government. The Pinochet dictatorship was characterized, especially in the first few years, by intense violent repression of all opposing viewpoints, resulting in the torture, death, and/or disappearance of thousands of Chileans. This climate of fear almost immediately did away with Chile’s formerly vibrant culture of street protest. It is no wonder that the spark provided by Las locas de la Plaza de Armas did not ignite a queer rights revolution in Chile as Stonewall did in the United States. Nonetheless, queer activism did not

⁵ Yeguas sueltas, literally ‘wild mares,’ is difficult to translate to English, but can be read as analogous to loca in its implication of a lack of self-control (and sexual control) on the part of the protestors
⁶ The addition of perdidas, ‘lost,’ to the already pejorative locas further underscores the perception that locas walk the earth in a sort of sexually crazed state
completely die out during the dictatorship; it simply changed its approach.

**Nothing to see here…**

Although records are understandably spotty, there is evidence of some queer organization during the dictatorship. Given that street protest was an impossibility even for straight Chileans, queer activism under Pinochet took the form of small, clandestine meetings focused more on study and self-acceptance than on creating vast societal change (Contardo 2011). It should be noted that, under the oppressive climate of the regime, even these meetings were risky, as so-called ‘illicit association’ was regularly and violently punished by the military government. The first such group, Grupo Betania, was initially started by gay-identified Christian men seeking to reconcile their sexuality with their faith. After this ideological focus produced a fissure in the group, in 1981 those that remained renamed themselves *Movimiento Integración* (Integration Movement). One former member explains to Contardo:

> We organized it as cells of 12 people who would get together to study, review, and discuss the problems facing homosexuals in their many dimensions. We had help from professional volunteers: lawyers, psychologists, and doctors. When I left the movement, in the mid-80’s, about 150 people attended regularly and another 200 or so attended occasionally (Ibid.:315).

Grupo Betania, primarily made up of gay men, had an analogue in Ayuquelén, the first lesbian group in Chile. Ayuquelén, named for a Mapuche word meaning “the happiness of being,” was formed in 1984. In a 1992 interview, the group stated its objectives as “to say that we exist and to question obligatory heterosexuality, to bring to feminist discourse a reflection about sexuality and to open a debate about lesbianism within the women’s social movement (Robles 2008:23).” Much like Grupo Betania,

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7 The largest indigenous group in Chile
Ayuquelén strove mainly for visibility and acceptance, eschewing any concrete political demands or interaction with the government.

There exists only scant evidence of what seems to be the only group to make overt state-centered demands at the time. The only mention of the so-called Movimiento por la Liberación del Tercer Sexo (Movement for the Liberation of the Third Sex) appeared as a letter to the editor of the national newspaper Las Últimas Noticias in 1979 (Contardo 2011). According to Contardo, unlike Grupo Betania and Ayuquelén, this group set forth in its letter a clear, state-centered goal.

The Movement for the Liberation of the Third Sex…had a clear political objective: the repeal of Article 365 of the Penal Code [which criminalized sodomy.] That was their goal and they thought, according to the letter, that it was possible to achieve with the support of the dictatorship (Ibid:313).

Given this apparent immediate disappearance of the group after the publication of this letter, it is difficult to gauge the true character of this organization, or whether it was even an organization at all. However, this letter does represent one of only a handful of instances in which queer rights organizations made any attempt at overtly engaging with the dictatorship. Unfortunately for them, while Article 365 was eventually modified (although not overturned), it did not happen until 1999, well into the return to democracy, and was due in large part to the tireless efforts of countless activists, some of whom are still active in the movement today.

Return to democracy

Following a plebiscite in 1988, in which Pinochet was voted out of office, Chile began its transition back to democratic rule, with President Patricio Aylwin taking office in 1990. However, the plebiscite was far from an act of benevolence on the part of the
dictator. In the mid 1980’s, Pinochet’s government found it increasingly difficult to maintain the politics of repression that had characterized the early years of the regime.

Chile’s culture of street protest proved itself to be dormant, not dead, and by the date of the plebiscite, massive, illegal protests in Santiago’s city center were commonplace. According to my interviews, anti-Pinochet protests served as the training ground for many of today’s most prominent activists, both within and outside the queer social movement industry. MUMS spokesman Juan Ríos explains:

We were political leaders (dirigentes) before we started the [queer] movement. So we all knew each other, in the movements for human rights, in the Admapu movement, in all the Mapuche movements, immigrant movements, and all the social movement organizations, political parties, and universities…So, that makes the process so much easier because we have friends everywhere. I go to a Mapuche organization and I know the leaders, wherever I go I know the leaders, and that's thanks to my political experience, my political education in the dictatorship.

The combination of the political freedom to organize granted by the return to democracy and these newly formed activist networks created a climate in which a queer SMI, comparable to those already active in much of the Western world, could finally take hold in Chile. However, what began as a single movement rapidly splintered into several smaller groups.

**And then there were six…**

Although it is perhaps impossible to account for all of the queer social movement organizations in Santiago, ranging from just a few members to large, transnational actors, this thesis will focus on the six organizations that my research indicates are the largest, most organized, and of most consequence in public discourse and interaction with state

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8 One of Chile’s oldest indigenous Mapuche rights advocacy groups
actors. What follows is a brief introduction to the six SMOs in question.

**Movilh**

As mentioned above, the original Movilh was founded in June of 1991 as the *Movimiento de Liberación Homosexual* (Movement of Homosexual Liberation). The organization’s website lays out its goals as follows:

- to make the reality of lesbians, gay, bisexuals, transgender people, and transsexuals (LGBT) visible in public and private spaces, to design judicial, legislative, cultural, social, and economic actions aimed at eradicating the violation of the human rights of sexual minorities, to establish contacts with political and social leaders and academic and to participate in various fora of discussion, among other things.

According to both Robles and Contardo, as well as my interviews with MUMS and Acción Gay, the enmity between Manuel Tapia and the other members of Movilh was apparent early on in the formation of the group, and while exact timelines vary, by 1993, many members had left to form the *Centro Lambda* (Lambda Center). It was after this split that Movilh added the word *integración* (integration) to its name, signaling the politics of assimilation and government collaboration for which it has become known, and officially becoming the *Movimiento de Liberación e Integración Homosexual* (Movement of Homosexual Liberation and Integration.) As previously mentioned, Movilh generally maintains a politics of interaction with the government, regardless of party affiliation. Additionally, although membership in queer SMOs is difficult to measure precisely, there is a general perception in the larger SMI that Movilh is primarily made up of white, upper class men.

**MUMS**

MUMS is by far the most well-known group to have split directly from Movilh Histórico. It was formed in 1997 as the *Movimiento Unificado de Minorías Sexuales*
(Unified Movement of Sexual Minorities) through a reunification of former Movilh Histórico members with activists from the Centro Lambda. As stated above, MUMS views itself as more open to diversity within the queer community than Movilh, one of the reasons for the initial fissure. Rather than a group based on individual sexual identity, MUMS sees itself as an organization fighting for *diversidad sexual* (sexual diversity) a concept that will be explored in depth in Chapter 1. While MUMS has a troubled relationship with Movilh, they collaborate actively with the other groups in this study.

**Acción Gay**

Formed in 1987 as the *La Corporación Chilena de Prevención del SIDA* (The Chilean Corporation of AIDS Prevention), Acción Gay is the only organization in this study that predates Movilh. Nonetheless, Acción Gay does not consider itself to be Santiago’s first gay rights organization because for its first decade of existence, it focused mainly on HIV/AIDS outreach and left traditional (street) activism to the other organizations. Since the first cases of HIV in Chile were reported while the country was still under the dictatorship, Acción Gay was among the only resources available to HIV positive men. Nonetheless, as the HIV/AIDS situation in Chile has improved, Acción Gay has expanded its mission. Spokesman Mario Rodríguez explains:

We’ve always worked on two fronts, but until 2000 [we focused on] the holistic health of gay men, and then after 2000 we started with a discourse that was more open to *diversidad sexual*... We work a lot on health, because the epidemic continues to be a localized epidemic, and for that reason we’ve maintained that effort with the gay men that come in with HIV, in terms of prevention, promoting condom use, safe sex, and we also have a bunch of services for gay men. Nonetheless, we work with all *diversidad* when it comes to promoting rights, but there are sort of two pillars of work.

He concludes, “At the end of the day though, this organization started as a community
health incentive.”

**CUDS**

The *Coordinadora Universitaria de la Disidencia Sexual* (University Coordinator of Sexual Dissidence), hereafter CUDS, is undoubtedly the most radical group in this study. Founded in the early 2000’s, it is based at the Universidad Católica in Santiago which, despite its official affiliation with the Catholic Church, has served as the base of operations for the organization since it is inception. On its website, CUDS describes itself as follows:

> Here there are neither men nor women nor gays, we are what the feminist wave left behind in Santiago de Chile. Officially we are a post-feminist sexual dissident university collective that organizes bodies to carry out acts of sexual terrorism in spaces of sexual authoritarianism.

They continue with an unattributed quote:

> “Sexual dissidence implies a critical wager toward the politics that govern our bodies, subjectivities, and all the representations they superimpose on them. For that very reason, sexual dissidence goes beyond visibilization and the problematics that inscribe certain bodies as minorities or excluded.”

Although not overtly self-identified as a *diversidad* organization, I have chosen to include CUDS in this study for 3 reasons. First, the representative with whom I spoke made regular use of the language of *diversidad* in our interview when speaking about both CUDS and other organizations. Secondly, regardless of their more radical queer stance, CUDS does occasionally collaborate with other SMOs within the industry, and are especially linked with MUMS, from which some of its founding members came. Finally, I believe the philosophy of CUDS represents the closest approximation to a “successful” deployment of a *diversidad* frame as it was originally intended. I place “successful” in quotations marks because, while I believe they have been the most successful in
maintaining the true spirit of a *diversidad* frame, the anti-state politics of CUDS, as well as the rejection of their radical agenda by the Chilean state, have prevented them from interacting with Chilean society in the same way as more traditional groups, like Movilh. However, this should not diminish the importance or innovation of their style of activism.

**Fundación Iguales**

The newest group in this study, Fundación Iguales is nonetheless often viewed as the “heir apparent” to Movilh, despite its mere three years of existence. This is most likely due to class, ethnic and political similarities, as both SMOs are viewed as white, upper class, and moderate to conservative in political orientation. It should also be noted that, unlike the other SMOs analyzed in this paper, Fundación Iguales has had a direct link to the government since before its foundation. Current president and founding member Andrés Yáñez is the son of the current president of *Renovación Nacional*, the right-wing political party of Chile's former president, Sebastián Piñera (March 2010-March 2014). Additionally, Andrés appeared in a campaign ad for Piñera in 2009, although he has since broken ties with the party.

Like Movilh, there is a perception that Fundación Iguales is largely made up of upper class, white male activists; their affiliation with the *Renovación Nacional*, a notoriously undiverse party, has done little to help this perception. However, regardless of outside perceptions, representatives of Fundación Iguales exhibited the same skepticism about Movilh as the other organizations in this study, going so far as to hold a competing parade on the same day as Movilh’s, as I will discuss in Chapter 1. Also made evident by the competing marches is the fact that Movilh seems equally wary of Fundación Iguales. Nonetheless, Fundación Iguales’ state-centered approach to activism,
similar to that of Movilh, is undeniable; the group was founded in 2011 as a direct response to the failure of President Sebastián Piñera to make good on promises of civil unions made in his 2009 campaign.

**OTD**

The *Organización de Transexuales por la Dignidad de la Diversidad* (Organization of Transsexuals for the Dignity of Diversidad), hereafter OTD, is the only group in this study that specifically focuses on trans* activity. Founded in 2005 by Alfonso García and 4 other members, the group has rapidly become the voice of the Chilean trans* community. They are unique in that they, unlike the other groups in the study, are based in Rancagua (to the south of the capital), although they maintain an office in Santiago as well. While OTD is clearly a trans* specific organization, I have chosen to include them in the study for three reasons. First, the overt use of *diversidad* in the name of the organization is a clear indicator of *diversidad* framing. Secondly, OTD works closely with organizations such as MUMS and Fundación Iguales who are interested in increasing their capacity to attract and interact with the trans* community. Finally, the existence of a dedicated trans* organization on the margins of Santiago’s queer SMI provides a crucial counterpoint to the politics behind the *diversidad* frame, calling into question the actual effectiveness of the frame in dissolving the borders between subgroups.

**A brief outline**

Chapter 1 will explore the recent frame amplification from rights-based

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9 The addition of an asterisk (*) to the word trans, in the style of internet truncation, is an effort to acknowledge the incredible diversity of identity within the trans community. While the usage is not of my invention, I have chosen to use it throughout this thesis to speak about the community of queer people who identify as transgender, transsexual, or transvestite, as well as those who, for a variety of reasons, feel that their gender expression falls outside of the gender binary.
organizing around demands such as marriage equality and anti-discrimination legislation to a frame of ‘sexual diversity’ and finally to one of ‘diversity’ writ large. Additionally, this chapter will explore the ways in which the transition from *diversidad sexual* to *diversidad* has served to strategically desexualize Santiago’s queer social movement industry, which has in turn favored activists whose hegemonic masculine capital allows them to interact with the upper echelons of Chilean society and the state. Finally, using theories of hegemonic masculinity, this chapter will argue that *diversidad*-style frames, while originally intended to expand the appeal of the movement to a larger audience, have been coopted by some SMOs as a means of reifying and reproducing the current hegemonic masculine control over the movement under the guise of diversity.

Chapter 2 will problematize the recent passage of the *Ley Antidiscriminación* (Anti-Discrimination Law) in response to the murder of Daniel Zamudio, a young gay man. While this legislation is often hailed as a significant step forward for non-heterosexual people, as well as ethnic minorities and the disabled, I will explore the ways in which hegemonic masculinity was deployed and reproduced in both the law itself and the process leading to its passage, as the Chilean government dealt almost exclusively with Movilh, reproducing the already existent divide in Santiago’s queer SMI.

Finally, Chapter 3 will analyze the ongoing fight for same-sex partnership recognition in Chile against a backdrop of a notable decrease in the importance of marriage for the legitimacy of heterosexual couples. This chapter will argue that the fight for state recognition of same-sex couples is inherently both gendered and exclusionary and that it represents further attempts on the part of assimilationist social movement organizations to maintain hegemonic masculine control by appealing to the masculine
dominance of the Chilean state itself.

Although Santiago’s queer SMI has been fragmented virtually since its inception, its recent step into the spotlight has aggravated tensions among the city’s various SMOs. I believe that in the coming years these inter-group tensions will become increasingly salient as issues of queer rights and queer SMOs gain more traction and political capital in Chile. It is important to endeavor to understand this SMI now, while it is still in the early stages of societal legitimation. An understanding of the dynamics among queer SMOs, and in turn between these SMOs and the state is crucial to understanding both the current reality and future of queer citizenship in Chile, as well as the fight for queer citizenship in the larger Latin American context.

This thesis aims to intervene in both queer theory and social movement theory. While much has been written about gender in Latin American social movements as it pertains to subaltern women, queer issues in Latin America are only now becoming a salient topic of research in the region. My research endeavors to add to the nascent body of scholarship on queer social movements in Latin America, helping to construct a theoretical framework that might ultimately be used to understand these movements throughout Latin America. Through this project, I hope to encourage conversation between social movement theorists and queer theorists, with the idea that queer social movements must be analyzed using queer lenses as well as those provided by traditional social movement theory. Queer social movements are unique in the overt heterogeneity of their participants, encompassing a wide variety of personal identities (gay, lesbians, bisexual, trans*, queer, etc.) By bringing queer identities into conversation with social movement theory, we may better understand the heterogeneity of all identity-based social
movements, as well as the forces that work to homogenize them externally.

In turn, queer social movements represent an exciting intersection of sexual and gender identity groups, state actors, and national and transnational publics, the intersections of which are crucial to the study of queer theory. This thesis aspires to demonstrate that queer social movements, and social movements of all kinds, can provide a microcosm of interpersonal and systemic relationships that will help gender and sexuality scholars better understand these relationships, both within social movements and in general. The gendered and sexed dynamics that occur within these movements are indicative of larger societal processes dictated by the same forces at work in the larger cultural context. By studying them at the micro level, in social movements, it is my hope that we can increase our understanding of them at the macro level, allowing us to better ascertain how gender and sexuality work to shape our interactions with each other and with power.
To be able to get to know the community of la diversidad, to be able to collaborate with the trans* community, which I knew nothing about...to be able to meet young lesbians, lesbian mothers, and two fathers with kids was a super diverse universe...that’s what made me become a queer activist.

--Rodrigo Pérez, Fundación Iguales

Chapter 1: Who framed diversidad?

In her photographic retrospective *Diversidad Sexual: 10 años de marchas en Chile*, author Kena Lorenzini (2011) observed:

For the past 13 years, [Santiago] has been home to a MARCH\(^1\) for all the contemporary non-heterosexual sexualities, which has had several different names: Gay Parade, Gay Pride, and in the last few years, MARCH FOR SEXUAL DIVERSITY. This year, 2011, the organizations in charge of organizing [the march] called it simply MARCH FOR DIVERSITY, removing the word SEXUAL, which for me and others constitutes the crux of their political identity. I can only hypothesize what their reason might be: the presumption of attracting more people, hopefully from all ideological sectors and political parties (19).

Lorenzini’s observation illuminates a recent and significant change in the way Santiago’s queer social movement industry (SMI) frames its activism. The names of Santiago’s parades provide a window into the nature of the trajectory of the movement’s collective action frames, but stop far short of telling the whole story. While it may seem that a move from “gay-centric” frames such as ‘Gay Parade’ and ‘Gay Pride’, to one of sexual diversity, and finally to one of diversity writ large represents a significant frame

\(^{1}\) Capitalization in the original.
amplification in relation to both the queer community and the general public, this chapter will demonstrate through the use of interview data that this is not entirely the case.

Santiago de Chile’s queer SMI has recently undergone what I will argue constitutes a significant frame amplification, from one of specific (gay) rights-based organizing to one of more deliberate collaboration with both other movements and the general public under the umbrella term *diversidad* or ‘diversity’. This particular discursive frame represents what I believe to be an innovation in the history of Chilean social movement, although to a certain extent it may be viewed as a new articulation of such inclusive collective action frames as queer identity and rights-based claims framed as human, and not just gay, rights. While this development is noteworthy *per se*, what is equally compelling about a frame amplification, first from gay rights to *diversidad sexual* and then simply to *diversidad* is that, despite its theoretically broad scope, the *diversidad* frame has not escaped the general pattern of cooptation and normalization to which “radical” frames often fall prey. Moreover, anecdotal evidence shows that the term *diversidad* has not only been coopted by queer activists. Rather, the term *diversidad* is used in all of its forms by the general public in Chile, exclusively to refer to the queer movement and queer people. This is evident in a variety of common lexical constructions from *Movimiento Diversidad* (Diversity Movement) to *familias diversas* (used to signify families led by same-sex parents).

In this chapter, I will first argue that the transformation to a *diversidad* frame constitutes a conscious effort on the part of many social movement organizations to combat perceptions of machismo and gay exclusivity often leveled at the movement, but that its very lack of specificity may ultimately further the ethnic and gender
discrimination it hopes to combat by creating false equivalencies among oppressed groups. Secondly, I will argue that this frame, despite its efforts at unification, is complicated by the lack of pre-existing discourse around a more general ideal of diversity in Chile. Finally, I will argue that efforts to deploy this frame in a desexualized manner by traditionally assimilationist organizations constitute a move toward the reassertion and reinforcement of hegemonic masculine dominance in interactions between SMOs and the Chilean state, reproducing the already extant divide in Santiago’s queer social movement industry.

**Unmasc-ing masculinity**

While the deployment of hegemonic masculinity will be explored and problematized throughout this thesis, it is first necessary to establish what hegemonic masculinity means in the Chilean context. Although Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) warn against viewing hegemonic masculinity as solely a cultural norm, varieties of hegemonic masculinity, within a larger hegemonic master frame, are undeniably both produced by and productive of the cultures they inhabit. In the Chilean context, scholars agree virtually unanimously that not only is Chilean society dictated by rigid gendered norms, but that the very nature of the relationship between state and nation has historically been gendered (Contardo, 2011; Bengoa 1996; Devés 1996; Góngora 1981.) Although the authors point to different sources of this dynamic, (Reconquista Catholic theology, pre-Columbian family structures, the construction of Chile through military prowess, among others), the end product is the same: the domination of a masculine state over a feminine nation.
The characterization of the state as masculine has one clear repercussion; I argue that, in order to interact with a masculine state, individual and group subjectivities alike must perform hegemonic masculinity. Here I must emphasize, along with Mimi Schippers (2007), that we must make a qualitative difference between “maleness” and masculinity, as well as “femaleness” and femininity. As Schippers explains in her discussion of what she calls ‘pariah femininities,’ “Although pariah femininities are actually the quality content of hegemonic masculinity enacted by women…they are necessarily and compulsively constructed as feminine when enacted by women; they are not masculine (95).” Female bodies are never fully granted access to genuine masculine capital. Nonetheless, although hegemonic masculinity is never truly accessible to women, men are conversely punished for gender transgression by a ‘demotion’ to the feminine. The author elaborates:

Men’s homosexual desire and being weak and ineffectual are not symbolically constructed as problematic masculine characteristics; they are constructed as decidedly feminine. Because femininity is always and already inferior and undesirable when compared to masculinity, it can sustain features of stigmatization and contamination. In contrast, masculinity must always remain superior; it must never be conflated with something undesirable (96).

This tendency to equate homosexuality with femininity, and therefore inferiority, further explains the necessity for homosexual activists to assert their masculinity in other ways, thus accruing enough masculine, and thus political, capital to be granted access to the masculine state.

While the reading of homosexuality as transgressively feminine is common in many cultures, the strict gender roles and machismo that govern Chilean culture serve to further exacerbate this tension. Devés (1996) outlines 5 major components of machismo
in Chile: “courage, leadership, penetration, protection, and daunting/audacity” (Devès 1996:98). Of these five characteristics, only one is necessarily destabilized by homosexuality: penetration. Susan Kippax and Gary Smith (2001) found that the act of penetration is imbued with power even in gay male sexual relationships. They found that even those men who did not explicitly conceptualize the act of penetration as a power differential spoke about it in terms of a heteronormative dichotomy (active/passive, dominant/submissive, man/woman, etc.) Furthermore, they assert that “receptivity is automatically associated here with being gay and feminine, suggesting one is more or less gay according to whether or not one engaged in ‘feminine’ sexual practices (418).”

In general and specifically in the Chilean context, hegemonic masculinity is predicated on heterosexuality, more in deed than in desire, as well as the reinforcement of that heterosexuality through the active rejection of homosexual contact. Homosexuality threatens hegemonic Chilean masculinity, and thus the masculine Chilean state, both in the form of gay men who have forsaken “impenetrable fortified phallic masculinity” in favor of “men’s secret femininity, receptive anal eroticism” (Waldby 1996:270-272) and lesbians whose rejection of the necessity of traditional male dominance destabilizes the socially dictated role of the Chilean woman. In conversation with Bengoa’s gendered understanding of the Chilean state-nation dynamic, homosexuality presents a clear affront not only to societally acceptable gender roles, but also to the state itself.

Similarly, a study published in 1997 by the Corporación Chilena de Prevención del SIDA on homo- and bisexual male populations in Santiago echoes the idea that the act
of being penetrated is a source of shame for many Chilean MSM\(^2\) as it represents a status downgrade toward femininity. Participants continually point to verbally identifying as *activo* (penetrator) regardless of actual sexual preferences as key to the cultivation of an ‘acceptable’ male homosexuality that can be rounded up to ‘acceptable’ masculinity. As quoted in the study, men say:

“...and I told them, daddy, mommy, I’m a homosexual. And my dad asked me: ‘Are you *activo* or *pasivo* (penetrated)? And I answered him *‘activo’.* ‘Oh, ok, that’s alright.’” (1997:50)

“...it’s like, the roles are super defined and everybody always tends to say, ‘no, I’m *activo*” and then you just start realize that it’s not true. But the role were always demarcated like that.” (Ibid)

Clearly, the concept of the “impenetrable male” is crucial to the construction of both Chilean masculinity and hegemonic masculinity itself. I argue that, although a *diversidad* frame has the potential to produce many positive outcomes for the SMOs and activists who employ it, one of its potentially negative side effects is the erasure of individual and sub-group differences, as will be explored in the next section. Nonetheless, I believe that the elimination of difference serves a potentially advantageous purpose for queer activists. By eliminating sexual difference, many gay male activists are potentially able to restore their damaged hegemonic masculinity by eliminating the only part of their gender performance that separates them from those in power: their perceived sexual difference.

**Zooming out: *diversidad* as value amplification**

Benford and Snow (2000) define the role of collective action frames as follows:

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\(^2\) Men who have sex with men. This difference is crucial when speaking of queer populations, as the consequences of both policy and societal attitudes are vastly different for ‘out’ queer people and those who engage in queer behavior in secret.
Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action. Collective action frames also perform this interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects of the “world out there.” But in ways that are “intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists (614).

Additionally, they outline three basic “core framing tasks”: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing; attention to these three main tasks allows a given SMO to move from ideology to action. Briefly, diagnostic framing is often referred to as “injustice framing”, as its primary goal is to identify both the victims and perpetrators of a given injustice. Prognostic framing, in turn, focuses on finding tangible solutions to that injustice. Finally, motivational framing serves to provide a rationale for participation in an SMO.

In an earlier paper, Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, and Benford (1986) identify four distinct processes for what they term ‘frame alignment’ or “the linkage or conjunction of individual and SMO interpretive frameworks (467).” They are: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. The first part of this chapter will analyze the adoption of a diversidad frame as an example of frame amplification, through a sub-process called ‘value amplification.’ The authors explain, “[v]alue amplification refers to the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons (469).”

As discussed in the introduction, Santiago’s queer SMI has, until recently, been dominated by normative masculine framing, contributing not only to the erasure of dissenting voices but also to the gradual narrowing of such traditional queer frames as ‘pride’ and ‘dignity’ to the point that they may no longer be effective motivational frames
for anyone outside the narrow confines of “acceptable” masculine, gay identity. It is important to distinguish here between frame amplification and other forms of frame transformation. This thesis does not argue that a shift to *diversidad* framing necessitates the abandonment of previous collective action frames. As will be demonstrated in chapters 2 and 3, rights-based organization is still an integral part of the queer SMI’s tactics. Nonetheless, the *diversity* frame represents an aperture to broader forms of contention in conjunction with previous forms. The *diversidad* frame represents a clear effort to breathe new life into the movement, inviting both erased voices from within the queer community as well as the general public to participate as members of a new diverse movement, without the strictures of group identity politics. Additionally, it calls upon the public to recognize the idea of diversity as an important value for society as a whole, not just for those within the movement.

Although I believe queer organization explicitly around the idea of *diversidad* to be an innovative frame choice for the Chilean queer SMI, the diversity frame *per se* seems to signal a larger transnational trend. In her work on queer populations in Indonesia, Blackwood (2008) views the concept of queer diversity as an extension of the idea behind acronyms such as LGBTI, representative of a constantly evolving effort to build community out of disparate identities. Nonetheless, her study views diversity as a euphemistic tool used by organizations within the queer community, rather than as a collective frame intended to engage with non-queer people. Álvarez (2000) analyzes the transnational elements of diversity discourse in the Latin American feminist movement, arguing that while the discourse was initially installed by transnational NGOs working with women’s group, the women in these groups were able to effectively use it to
visibilize the voices of minority women, such as those of African descent, in way similar to that analyzed in this chapter.

While the motivations behind diversity discourses are generally viewed as noble, several scholars have taken pessimistic views of its implementation. In his discussion of transnational citizenship, Michael Chang (2004) argues that diversity has become a “catch-all word” (24) with more political capital than actual transformative power. Lentin and Titley (2008) concur, arguing:

Diversity discourses recognise an array of differences in society, but in knitting them together into a tableau of plurality and richness they rob difference of its critical and contextual significance: equalizing all differences, and concomitantly, reducing all inequality to difference (13).

The tensions highlighted by the above authors are also present within Chile’s queer SMI. On one hand, diversidad framing offers the potential to fundamentally change the ways in which minority groups organize, possibly rendering identity-based mobilization ineffective or obsolete in the long-term. However, as will be explored below, diversidad framing in the Chilean context holds the potential to erase difference to such an extent as to allow hegemonic forces to take control of the movement, negating the very real differences that exist in its membership.

**Nothing but a ‘G’ thing**

While it is impossible to pinpoint an exact moment or location in which the term diversidad became widely used in Santiago, MUMS rep Juan Rios gives 2009 as an approximation. This is specifically because while MUMS has retained its original acronym for the purposes of name recognition, they actually changed their name to Movimiento por la Diversidad Sexual or Movement for Sexual Diversity at about this time.
We made an effort to change to a more incorporative image. We kept the acronym MUMS, but the meaning was “Movement for Sexual Diversity.” [We kept the acronym] so that the same thing that happened to Movilh wouldn’t happen to us. But everybody knows now. At first, everybody always asked us. We had to explain it over and over until people stopped caring. Now people don’t care so much, and they understand that our focus isn’t gremial. It’s taken four years of effort for people to understand that we’re not a homosexual organization. We’re a movement for sexual diversity.

For both Ríos and MUMS, the difference between diversidad and gay or LGBTI rights is both significant and indicative of another divide in the movement. Later in the interview, Ríos again referred to Fundación Iguales, Movilh, and Acción Gay as gremial, while clearly demarcating MUMS as a diversidad organization.

Also salient in the interview is the notion that a frame amplification to diversidad was a deliberate choice, as least on the part of MUMS who, according to Ríos, played a significant role in the overall popularization of the concept.

It took us two years of internal discussion, in the movement, for [the frame change] to happen. Before, we pushed the topic of “sexual minorities”...before our movement, nobody was talking about sexual minorities, and then we came along and installed that concept and everybody referred to us that way—until it started to make us feel uncomfortable...We want to move beyond the limits of heterosexuality. We understand, thanks to the “Kinsey Report,” that in reality there are maybe 10% of the population who respond exclusively to homosexual stimulus, and 10% who respond exclusively to heterosexual stimulus—10% and 10%. What you have left is that 80% of people are mixed. That is where we want to work. And that is where have a majority. Where we want to work is on that 80%. And the [homosexual] 10% can stay in Movilh. And if they want to be on TV, we don’t care. What we’re doing is changing the mentality of the 80%.

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3 From gremio or ‘workers’ guild.’ While a direct translation to English is difficult, the meaning behind the word is that gremial politics serve the interests of a specific or niche population

4 While it is unclear from the translation, Juan’s use of the word movement in this case implies his specific organization, MUMS, and not the entire queer SMI
Although it is never entirely clear at exactly which moment any discursive element is truly born, what is clear is that the *diversidad* frame represents both a recent innovation and a conscious choice by leaders in the SMI. According to the posters in the MUMS archives, traditional “pride” marches began to be advertised as ‘*diversidad sexual*’ around 2009, as corroborated by Juan Ríos above. Beginning in 2011, as discussed by Lorenzini, the marches began to be advertised, at least partially, simply as *diversidad* marches (Fig. 1.1). This tactic has been incredibly effective in creating a rapid lexical shift in which *diversidad* has quickly come to mean ‘queer’ and only ‘queer.’ This is evident from activist materials such as the poster in Fig. 1.1, but also in the everyday speech of queer activists and straight Chileans alike. Where the was once an almost total lack of discourse around the Chilean queer SMI, *diversidad* has provided
a vocabulary with which Chileans can speak about the queer movement and queer people, using *diversidad* as a tool.

As stated in the introduction, representatives from several SMOs overtly stated that the decision to start using the word *diversidad* was in direct response to the perception, both within the individual SMOs and in the general culture, that the LGBTI movement had in fact become the ‘G’ movement, focusing only on the needs of gay men. Additionally, they expressed that even within the gay community, there was a clear tendency to exclude gay-identified men who were economically disadvantaged, of color, or too *amanerados*.\(^5\) As explored in the introduction, this perceived climate of compulsory masculinity and female and trans* erasure on the part of activists like Manuel Tapia was cited by older activists (such as Juan Ríos) as one of the primary motivations behind the break-up of the original Movilh, although Ríos’ explanation clearly presents only one side of the story; undoubtedly, the explanation is more complex than this and should be explored in subsequent research.

Nonetheless, the discourse around *diversidad* is significantly complicated in the Chilean context. Although evidence from interviews, organizational materials, and official documents all point to a preference for the term *diversidad sexual*, there is an increasing tendency, as pointed out by Lorenzini at the beginning of this chapter, to shorten the term simply to *diversidad*. This in turn has had the effect of creating an automatic equivalence between the idea of *diversidad* and the queer SMI, effectively erasing the possibility for discussions around other forms of diversity. While to the casual observer this may seem like nothing more than an even wider frame amplification, I argue that the use of this “shorthand” in Chile is potentially problematic for two

\(^5\) displaying typically feminine mannerisms
reasons: the continued invisibility of Chileans of color and the desexualization of the movement for political gain.

**Getting Race-y**

Unlike the United States, the concept of “diversity” does not invoke racial or ethnic identities. Chilean culture has until recently operated under the myth of a homogeneous *criollo or mestizo* \(^6\) identity for the creation of a national identity (Garabano 2009). While ethnic discrimination clearly exists in Chile, the formation of a creole Chilean identity has depended on the othering of ethnic minorities such as indigenous populations in both discourse and law (van Dijk 2005; Mora 2008; Merino et al 2009; Maldonado Ledezma 2012). This discourse of *blanqueamiento* or ‘whitening’ was made especially clear during the Pinochet dictatorship. In a 1979 speech in Villarrica, Pinochet famously proclaimed, “The Mapuche no longer exist. We are all Chileans.” This declaration was not, however, simply indicative of the regime’s brutal treatment of many indigenous people; it also gave voice to an already existent lack of discourse around ethnic and racial diversity in the country.

Of the six organizations I interviewed, only one made overt mention of race. CUDS Chile’s emphasis on class-consciousness overtly acknowledges the inextricability of class from race. Due to the process of *mestizaje* discussed above, discussions of race in Latin America are always fraught and, specifically in the case of Chile, discourse around race tends to masquerade as a discussion of social class (Mora 2008; Barandiarán 2012.) As made evident in the discussion of Movilh and Fundación Iguales in the introduction, in Chile the words ‘*clase alta*’ (upper class) are almost synonymous with

\(^6\) *Criollo* and *mestizo* are often used interchangeably in Chile to refer to the mixture of Spanish conquerors and indigenous people through both the overt and systemic sexual violence of colonization. This process of “racial mixture” is referred to as *mestizaje*.
“white.” This relationship between race and class is so ingrained in Chilean culture that a popular compliment\(^7\) for the parents of newborn babies is that the baby “tiene buenos colores,” or “has good colors.” This is, perhaps predictably, only said of light-skinned, blond babies.

Race is also addressed in the Chilean context through the discourse around indigeneity. Specifically, Chile’s largest indigenous group, the Mapuche, often fill the societal role of ethnic “other.” CUDS’s dissident politics of what they call “sexual terrorism” allow its members to engage with a race in a way that the less radical organizations in this study cannot. By maintaining an antiestablishment politics, CUDS negates the risk of alienating a state that actively oppresses the Mapuche minority and a society that largely views the Mapuche as remnants of the past. In this way, their refusal to engage with state-centered projects allows them greater freedom to mobilize in ways of which the state might not approve. CUDS member Pedro Gutiérrez described a performative intervention by CUDS in Santiago’s 2010 LGBTI pride parade.

It was in 2010, in a gay march of the Chilean bicentennial, and we showed up at the march, and what we did was several groups of activists...we bleached our hair so it would be blond, and we wore masks of the faces of blonde female politicians, because there were so many of them on the right. I mean, it was act of blond transvestitism.

While this action alone would be sufficient to subvert notions of class, race, and gender, the performance had an unplanned additional nuance.

And the wonderful thing that happened was when we bleached our hair; there were some that turned out more and less blond, like when Mapuche hair was bleached. So whenever there was somebody whose hair had turned out more orange, we would yell “Mapuche!” as a way to make that hidden identity visible, because we never see that intersection.

\(^7\) Personal communication
This lack of intersection between the queer social movement industry and that of Mapuche activists indicates that, in the eyes of the queer SMI, despite attempts at a value amplification of the concept of *diversidad*, ethnic, racial and class diversity are secondary to sexual diversity. This is exacerbated by the enthusiastic adoption of this term by the general public as a “catch-all” term exclusively for queer identities. Paradoxically, it may also be *because* of the *diversidad* frame itself. Although MUMS does have one member who identifies as Mapuche, Juan lamented the lack of ethnic diversity in the organization.

> Here in MUMS, there’s not a single Peruvian immigrant. In Chile there are 100,000 Peruvians; many of them must be gay. But they don’t come. They don’t participate in the organizations. Because they’re even more discriminated against than us. And that’s something we have to learn how to address.

His assertion that gay Peruvians may face qualitatively worse discrimination than gay Chileans lays bare the critiques of the discourse of diversity, erasing difference within groups and tacitly sending the message that all minorities are of equal status.

Additionally, by organizing not under the banner of *diversidad sexual* but instead simply *diversidad*, queer SMOs further the idea that discrimination is homogeneous across the board and that gay male voices can speak not only for the entire queer community, but for all societal ‘others.’

**“Prophylactic” Homosexuals**

Besides erasing racial and ethnic difference, the removal of sex from the *diversidad* frame, as with the mainstream LGBTQ rights movement in the United States, is indicative of a transnational queer tendency to desexualize a movement that has, from
its origin, been based on *sexual* difference. Michael Warner (1999), in his discussion of the movement in the United States, refers to this as the ‘normalization’ of the movement.

Political groups that mediate between queers and normals find that power lies almost exclusively on the normal side. The more you are willing to articulate political issues in a way that plays to a normal audience, the more success you are likely to have. The more a political or cultural group defines itself in this way, or course, the more it is likely to be staffed and supported by individuals who have resolved their personal ambivalence in the same way. (44)

Warner’s statement again echoes Lorenzini’s hypothesis about the framing of the 2011 March. Her feeling that the decision is motivated by a desire to attract outside support is hard to argue with, especially given its parallels in the US movement. MUMS spokesperson Juan Ríos affirms these sentiments, with his typical sarcasm, pointing to a larger trend of normalization à la Warner as the *diversidad* movement becomes more mainstream.

This kind of homosexual is different. These ones go to cafés; they’re “prophylactic homosexuals.” They go with their little dogs, they have a coffee, and everybody can see them. They don’t do dirty things; they don’t go around having sex. Can’t you see that they’re decent people? You see, it’s really about imposing a model.

Although this “normalization” of the movement may be viewed by some as both problematic and diametrically opposed to the stated ideal of *diversidad*, it is indisputable that the ‘normalization’ and ‘desexualization’ of the movement have allowed both Chilean activists and those in other contexts, such as the United States, to gain a foothold in public and political spheres in which their presence was previously unwelcome. By desexualizing the movement, organizations like Movilh and Fundación Iguales have been able to make great in-roads with the Chilean government, focusing on issues like marriage equality and civil unions. Mario Rodríguez, of Acción Gay explains:
Fundación Iguales is really married to the idea of marriage, in my opinion -- really primarily with the idea of marriage. Movilh is on board with the idea of the AVP\(^8\) and with the bare minimum. They have a discourse that to me seems really, really “sell-out” with this government. Movilh has a policy right now of giving up a lot of space to rightist policies in relation to diversidad.

Mario’s comments underscore his perception that the reason that Movilh has been successful in collaborating with a conservative government is a combination of “selling out” and fighting for state recognized same-sex unions above all else. His comments also make it clear that he views Fundación Iguales as on the same path.

For his part, Movilh representative Jorge González does not disagree with Mario.

We don’t believe that there’s one cause that’s more important than others. The deal is that sometimes we’re more emphatic about certain political momentums, or about giving priority to certain projects. For example, nowadays everyone is talking about the AVP, and our biggest cause right now is to get the AVP passed, but while we’re doing that, we’re also working on public policies of anti-discrimination, for the health of the transsexual population; we’re doing a lot of things, but at certain points we make one thing more visible than another, considering certain political moments in which some causes are more established than others.

Whether we view the more normalized politics of Movilh and Fundación Iguales as part of a larger plan for full equality, or more skeptically as MUMS and Acción Gay clearly do, the advantages of the desexualization and normalization of their demands are clear. However, it should not be taken for granted that organizations that attempt to “normalize” queerness do so not out of malice, but in response to a larger system that incentivizes these acts. Queer SMOs are subject to the same masculine societal pressures as the rest of the general public, and their choice to utilize the tactics that are most likely to work (in this case desexualization and normalization) is both logical and politically astute.

Nonetheless, the idea of normalization has had the consequences of reinforcing

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\(^8\) *Acuerdo de Vida en Pareja* or Agreement of Life as Couple, the proposed civil union legislation that will be analyzed in depth in Chapter 3.
difference in its quest for sameness. This is because the very concept of ‘normal’
necessitates the existence of a complementary category of ‘abnormal.’ As Warner (1999)
explains:

The problem, always, is that embracing this standard merely throws shame
on those who stand farther down the ladder of respectability. It does not
seem to be possible to think of oneself as normal without thinking that
some other kind of person is pathological. (60)

Clearly, the politics of normalization presents complications for an SMI that is
theoretically interested in the value of 
diversidad. While 
diversidad as a discursive tool
theoretically invites everyone to participate in a larger societal movement of interpersonal
acceptance, the subsequent erasure of sexual difference in exchange for societal sameness
negates the very thing that makes queer people queer: their performance of gender and
sexuality. Additionally, the lexical desexualization of the 
diversidad sexual frame in
favor of simple 
diversidad furthers the erasure of other minority voices as it creates a
direct equivalence between 
diversidad and queer identity. With their difference safely
hidden away, queer actors lose a potential opportunity to transform society for the better.
Rather, they are asked to transform themselves to fit society, or risk being ostracized both
within the larger culture and the mainstream queer movement.

A frame by any other name…

Although this chapter focuses specifically on the deployment of 
diversidad as a
discursive framing tool, it should not be taken for granted that a frame is more than just a
single lexical choice. While the rapid permeation of 
diversidad both within Chile’s queer
SMI as in the general lexicon is certainly important in and of itself, it is also part of a
larger trend within the SMI of broad, inclusive framing that, while not overtly making use
of the word *diversidad*, undoubtedly aims to produce a value amplification of the recent, larger idea that diversity is valuable.

June 2013 was an exciting time to be researching Santiago’s queer SMI. June is, in much of the world, “Pride Month,” and there are pride parades in major cities throughout the world. Santiago is no exception, but I quickly learned that the politics of pride marches are far from friendly. In keeping with the divided and divisive nature of the queer SMI in Santiago, two marches were planned for June 22\textsuperscript{nd}: Movilh’s *Marcha por el orgullo de ser quién eres* (March for pride in being who you are) and Fundación Iguales’ *Marcha por la Igualdad* (March for Equality). Although Movilh has traditionally had a monopoly on June marches (MUMS and Acción Gay generally hold their marches in September since June is winter in Chile), the birth of Fundación Iguales in 2011 has resulted in competing marches for the past 3 years. It should also be noted that both MUMS and Acción Gay co-sponsored Fundación Iguales’ 2013 march.

The inability of Movilh and Fundación Iguales to collaborate on one march is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it is clearly not in the spirit of the *diversidad* both organizations ostensibly promote. In the most idealistic reading of the frame, even two diametrically opposed SMOs should be able to collaborate under *diversidad*, all the while respecting their difference in opinion as a part of *diversidad*. Secondly, the decision to have two marches, according to my interview with Fundación Iguales, appears to have stemmed from a disagreement about who would remain in control of the march. As previously addressed, leadership is one of the principle markers of hegemonic masculinity in Chile. It appears that Fundación Iguales’ attempt to assert its leadership
capacities in the domain of June parades, traditionally dominated by Movilh, may have acted as a direct affront to Movilh’s well-established masculine capital.

Neither Movilh nor Fundación Iguales gave their march a title that specifically uses the term *diversidad*. However, I contend that the omission of any overt mention of sectarian terms like ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, or LGBTI represents a *diversidad* style frame. Moreover, Movilh has overtly put a new twist on an old concept, directly challenging the idea that *orgullo* (pride) is specifically ‘gay’ by championing the idea of pride to be “who you are” in what is traditionally a queer event. It would seem, then, that *diversidad* framing, or at least the ideas behind it, represents a significant value amplification across Santiago’s queer SMI.

Although further research is warranted, an informal study of previous organizational materials at several of the SMOs (from the return to democracy to the present) presents a clear tendency to abandon these terms in favor of more inclusive language over the past few years. Perhaps most compelling is the effect that the concept of *diversidad* has had on the Chilean lexicon. Interview data and anecdotal evidence from activists, non-activists, queer people, and straight people all present a marked prevalence of the word *diversidad* as both a catch-all term for queer identity and for the queer movement. The word is employed in a variety of forms, including the proclamation “*Soy diverso*” (I’m diverse) on a number of hand-made signs at the June 2013 marches. Additionally, the word has entered the public lexicon in an impressively rapid and specific way, coming to signify only queer issues and identities. It seems that, if this frame amplification is not representative of the entire queer community, it is certainly representative of the tactics of the large majority of major actors in the SMI, as
well as a larger societal shift in the public discourse around queerness. While this is certainly noteworthy in and of itself, the remainder of this chapter will discuss the ways in which similar and even identical frames can be deployed by different SMOs to drastically different ends.

**Two parades, one message**

Lest it be thought that the names of 2013’s marches are purely coincidental, Jorge González made it very clear that decision to play with the term ‘pride’ was both intentional and strategic.

The March of *Diversidad Sexual* is not only a march for *diversidad sexual*, but rather a march for civil rights and the defense of human rights in general. That’s why, if you watch the TV spot that we put out yesterday, there aren’t homosexuals in it. Rather there are disabled people, Mapuches, immigrants, Jews, Palestinians, because what we want to do is spread the word so that people, at the end of the day [understand] that the subtext of message is that you feel proud of whomever you are, regardless of who you are.

The spot that Jorge is referring to is approximately a minute long and was released on national television about a week before the election. His description of the spot is as interesting for what it leaves out as for what it emphasizes.

The spot, accompanied by upbeat acoustic guitar music, opens with a black man with short dreadlocks and non-Hispanic accent who says, “Yes, we’re in Chile, where people discriminate because I’m black.” Then, person after person flashes across the screen saying “I am...” and verbally filling in their respective identity labels: a Mapuche woman in traditional dress, (what we assume to be) a female same-sex couple with a

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9 Jorge’s use of the name *Marcha de la Diversidad Sexual* presents an ambiguity in Spanish, in that it is unclear if he speaking about a march for the entire *diversidad sexual* community or if this is actually the name he is using for the march. Either way, this elision of terminologies strengthens the case that *diversidad sexual* is not only used as a discursive frame but has also become synonymous with the actual members of the SMI themselves.
daughter, a man in a wheelchair, a little girl, a blonde woman, a female ‘immigrant’ of unknown provenance, a young white man, a Palestinian woman, a Jewish man, and finally Jorge González himself. Notably absent from the spot is any overt mention of non-heteronormative sexuality. Even the ostensible female same-sex couple who proclaim “They say we should hide our differences” does not actually say how they are different. The only gay male voice in the spot is that of Jorge González, himself only legible as gay due to his public notoriety as the first openly gay elected official in Chile. Movilh undoubtedly deserves some credit for explicitly addressing the lack of discourse around a more general idea of diversidad, as discussed above. The deliberate representation of underrepresented ethnic minorities such as the Mapuche, Palestinians, and Jews, is rare in general, let alone in a TV spot of this kind. However, what González failed to mention in his description of the spot is how it ends. As Figure 1.2 shows, the

![AVP AHORA! #yomarcha](image)

Figure 1.2 The last frame of Movilh's TV spot reads "AVP now!"

spot ends on a very different note than the discourse of diversidad with which it began. Additionally, a spot that by González’s own admission goes out of its way to avoid invoking non-heteronormative sexuality turns out to be a kind of “bait and switch.” For all its emphasis on diversidad writ large, the spot is actually about supporting the AVP
civil union legislation, and even the Twitter “hashtag” for the march (\#yomarcho or \#Imarch) is decked out in the rainbow colors\textsuperscript{10} of the transnational queer movement.

This is not to say that the passage of the AVP or similar legislation would or could not affect the people in this video. To imply this would be to negate any possibility of intersection with other salient identity groups. Nonetheless, the passage of the AVP will not affect any of these people because of their status as oppressed ethnic minorities or because of their physical differences. The AVP will only affect them if they wish to enter into a legally protected partnership with a member of the same sex. There is no mention of protections for ethnic minorities or the disabled on the basis of these identity markers, nor the rights of children or women. The message seems to be less about organizing for “diversity” writ large, and more about organizing for \textit{diversidad}, in the queer-specific Chilean sense of the word.

Although it is tempting to read this call for collaborative mobilization as an attempt to approximate queer rights claims to those being made by other minority groups, I am skeptical of this reading for one reason: the total lack of queerness in the commercial. By completely avoiding any performance of queer identity in the commercial itself and then suddenly, at the very end, calling on all minorities to organize around a queer-specific issue, Movilh’s commercial fails to establish any actual linkage between queer people and other minority groups, let alone the possibility that more than one minority identity might intersect in the same person. Rather, the omission of queerness from the spot seems to send the tacit message that there is something to hide,

\textsuperscript{10} It should be noted that this rainbow was also used in the campaign to overthrow the dictatorship in the 1988 plebiscite. Nonetheless, the total lack of any mention of modern ties to dictatorship-era organizational tactics, coupled with the fact that the march itself was inundated with rainbow pride flags, allow me to confidently assert that this particular rainbow represents the queer community.
or to be ashamed of, about being openly queer. More specifically, it once again serves to erase differences in the discrimination experienced by different individual and group subjectivities. This is especially important when analyzed in conversation with the larger societal shift to an understanding of *diversidad* as synonymous with queerness. Any efforts to showcase other ideas of diversity, whether discursively or visually, are necessarily hindered by the lack of a societal context for other, more inclusive definitions of *diversidad* in Chile. The commercial never overtly calls for the societal changes (or the policy) required to address discrimination systematically in Chilean society. If the problem being addressed by the march is ‘discrimination’ in general, the solution is not legislation that only addresses the needs and desires of a small fraction of oppressed minorities.

**Same-sex partnerships: for the dogs**

As explained in the introduction, Fundación Iguales was founded specifically to demand the recognition of same-sex partnerships by the Chilean government. Thus, it should come as no surprise that their spot, running in direct competition with that of Movilh’s, might have a marriage-centric focus. Nonetheless, Fundación Iguales’ TV spot is comparable to that of Movilh in other ways as well. Once again, there is a studious lack of any overt representation of non-heteronormative sexuality. Moreover, Fundación Iguales takes *diversidad* framing one step further by attempting to address literally everyone in the country.

As upbeat piano music plays, we are shown small child after small child saying things like, “They cuddle me and take care of me” and, “I love my puppy” as they chase puppies around a brightly lit room. The entire spot lasts about a minute, and can be
summed up by the words of one little boy: “Wherever there’s love, there’s a family.”

The only adult voice is that of a male announcer who ends the spot by saying “Because we’re all family, we invite you to march.” This spot, if played on the radio, could be read as progressive and even subversive as it advocates the redefinition of the family in terms of emotion and not the legal contract of marriage. Nonetheless, the television viewer is forced to reconcile this message with a completely opposite set of visual cues. In the spot, scenes of adorable children playing with cute puppies are interspersed with frames that say, “In Chile…the only way to form a family, legally, is through marriage, (Fig 1.3)” “#todosomosfamilia”.

As with Movilh’s spot, the viewer is left with two fundamentally different messages. On one hand, a bevy of precious children and animals tell us that, “whatever it may look like, we’re family, too!” However, what might have been used as a strategy to question the very necessity of marriage (explored further in Chapter 3) becomes, in the hands of Fundación Iguales, a tool to reify the idea that, while love might make a family,
that love is only truly legitimate within the bounds of state-sanctioned marriage. Again, this spot appeals to the masses under the guise of *diversidad*, and a kind of *diversidad* that theoretically includes everyone; Nonetheless, it once again appeals to the idea of *diversidad* to fight for the legal rights of the queer community and that community alone. This is communicated both overtly by the focus on legalized same-sex partnerships in the add, as well as more generally by the queer-exclusive nature of the *diversidad* frame, explored throughout this chapter. Unlike Movilh, rather than highlighting difference, they choose to highlight our “sameness” with the tagline and accompanying “hashtag” #TodosSomosFamilia (We are all family.)

Nonetheless, what is perhaps most interesting about Fundación Iguales’ TV spot is their decision to include only children and animals. Like Movilh’s spot, the lack of sexuality in the commercial, while a politically astute decision, potentially does a disservice to a community formed around sexual difference. However, Fundación Iguales goes beyond simply eschewing a discourse of sex. In choosing children and animals, they have also chosen the epitome of desexualized innocence to represent their cause. Perhaps two of the most pervasive sexual taboos in the Western world, both children and animals represent the antithesis of sex.

**I’m innocent!**

Kerry Robinson (2008) links the desexualization of children with the modernist move to clearly demarcate childhood and adulthood, arguing that “children’s sexuality within this discourse is read as nonexistent or immature at the most (116).” Eagan and Hawkes (2013) concur:

The lived experiences of children got distilled and reconfigured into a set of rigid binaries such as innocent/sexually knowing, child/adult,
pure/impure and normal/abnormal. The child’s sexuality ultimately became a symbol of purity and future prosperity if it remained dormant or a portent of life-long corruption once manifest (637.)

In the Western imaginary, young children are viewed as synonymous with purity and chastity, conferring upon them the symbolic power to convey this message in publicity like that of Fundación Iguales.

In a different but related vein, the taboo against sex with animals is deeply ingrained in Western society, and is overtly stated at least as far back as the writing of the Old Testament, where it is referenced (among places) in Leviticus 20: 15-16. Although these Judeo-Christian sexual mores are sometimes attributed to a distinction between reproductive and non-reproductive sex, Peter Singer (2001) argues that the motivation for maintaining this taboo goes beyond reproductive ability.

[The vehemence with which this prohibition continues to be held, its persistence while other non-reproductive sexual acts have become acceptable, suggests that there is another powerful force at work: our desire to differentiate ourselves, erotically and in every other way, from animals (2)

The choice to employ children and animals in the TV spot obligates the viewer to desexualize the subject matter completely. On one hand, this represents a brilliant strategy against those who might make discursive connections between homosexuality and these sexual taboos. On the other hand, it represents an overt attempt to desexualize the queer movement, tacitly demanding change from the queer community, and not from society. The name of Fundación Iguales’ march serves this purpose as well.

When asked about the decision to name their march “The March for Equality” as opposed to something more overtly linked to non-heteronormative sexuality, Fundación Iguales spokesman Rodrigo Pérez explained the motive of the march as
Not fighting for my benefits, but fighting for my benefits in a way that links with the benefits of others. That’s the most powerful thing about this march and I hope, I hope that is what it makes people really feel. That’s why we called it, strategically, “March for Equality”, and it’s not a pride march, it’s not for the LGBTI community, but rather we want to gather as many people as possible. Obviously, we want to show that we’re the gay community, and in fact we’re going to carry a 100 meter gay flag so that people will realize that it’s the LGBTI community that’s leading this process, but fighting for equality of human rights for every man and every woman who makes up Chile today.

As with Movilh, there is a clear tension between wanting to appeal to a broader public, via strategic diversidad-style framing, and a hesitance to be completely absorbed into the masses. It is not my intention to question the commitment of Pérez and his organization to genuine diversidad. In his interview, he spoke passionately (and I believe genuinely) about this ideal, as did Movilh’s González. It is important to bear in mind that both SMOs are working inside a larger, hegemonically masculine system that incentives the employment of certain frames and acts of contention over others. Additionally, it should not be taken for granted that working within the system undeniably yields results, while more “radical” activism presents a significantly longer trajectory for activists, with no guarantee of success. Movilh and Fundación Iguales are, without question, working toward social change in a politically savvy way.

Nonetheless, while the march itself may have been conceived as a moment to advocate for equality writ large, the publicity leading up to it, such as that analyzed above, sends a clear message that same-sex partnership recognition is the primary issue of contention. My analysis thus does not question intent but execution. Advertising materials that exclusively address partnership recognition allow Fundación Iguales and Movilh to organize a pro-partnership recognition march under the banner of diversidad by essentially pre-selecting their audience. This, whether intentional or incidental,
reinforces the hegemonic masculine control of the SMI through both the direct masculine
dominance of these two SMOs and the more subtle project for civil unions and marriage,
inherently patriarchal institutions.

While it is tempting to view *diversidad* framing solely as a genuine effort on the
part of Santiago’s queer SMI to diversify both participation in and the message of the
movement, evidence from both interviews and previous sociological studies demands that
we view this frame deployment more critically. As evidenced by the TV spots produced
by both Movilh and Fundación Iguales, appeals to ideas of diversity in the broader sense
(ethnic, religious, sexual, etc.) may function as both genuine calls to action and as
politically savvy attempts to rally popular support around the idea of *sexual* diversity.
Although some lip-service is paid to idea of general diversity, in Santiago I am as yet
unaware of any public action (such as a parade) that actually frames its demands in this
way. As discussed above, diversity as a value amplification is complicated in the context
of Chile, where discourse around other (non-sexual) kinds of diversity is almost totally
absent from public discourse. The cooptation, whether intentional or incidental, of the
term *diversidad* by the queer SMI paradoxically serves to the further the erasure of non-
queer minority voices, even as it discursively appeals to loftier ideals. The myth of total
*mestizaje* makes frank discussions of race, ethnicity and their intrinsic links to social class
difficult, and the direct equivalence between *diversidad* and queerness has created a
situation in which other minority groups must now seek other lexical tools with which to
give voice to their struggles, needs, and desires, furthering the sectarianism that the
*diversidad* frame claims to fight against.
Additionally, this chapter has argued that the deployment of *diversidad* framing in the hands of more self-described state-centered groups, as explored in the introduction, is key to the process of desexualizing Santiago’s queer SMI, a social movement industry originally founded upon the very idea of sexual difference. This desexualization of the SMI in turn allows groups like Movilh and Fundación Iguales to distract from the ‘femininity’ ascribed to male homosexuality in Chilean culture by erasing the only point of difference between ‘masculine’ gay men and their straight counterparts: the challenge to impenetrable hegemonic masculinity. In the case of Movilh, focusing on general ideas of diversity allows the SMO to gain support for its own cause while taking few substantive steps to advocate for those of others, all the while distracting from any perception that homosexuality and sex are related. Similarly, Fundación Iguales chose children and animals, two clearly legible markers of desexualization, to push their message of same-sex partnership recognition. The practice of desexualization, while it may present problems for other queer activists and citizens, is undeniably politically astute in the hegemonically masculine context of Chilean society.

By coopting the *diversidad sexual* frame from its more radical originators and subsequently removing from it all mentions of sex, Movilh and Fundación Iguales accomplish four main tasks: first, they continue to strengthen the direct equivalence between the word *diversidad* and queerness already present both with the SMI and in the general public. Secondly, through the desexualization of both the frame and, consequently the movement, they are theoretically able to reach out to a wider variety of potential supporters. Third, their refusal to mention sex in their organizations’ publicity serves to obscure male homosexuality’s ‘femininity’ and restore masculine capital to
activist groups, such as themselves, dominated by spokesmen who perform hegemonic masculinity in virtually every other way. Finally, this re-masculinization of both group and individual activist subjectivities permits them access to the masculine Chilean state that is not enjoyed by their more radical counterparts, as will be addressed in the next two chapters. The next chapter, on the passage of the *Ley Antidiscriminación*, will analyze the ways in which this same reclamation and reassertion of hegemonic masculine capital allowed both groups, but specifically Movilh, key access to the Chilean state and, as a consequence, a pivotal role in the formation of the law.
In Chile, the way we do politics is by making laws. When bad laws are passed, they stay bad for a long time. And Movilh has given their stamp of approval. They’ve endorsed those bad laws…and I think that’s a price they’ll have to pay sooner or later. They’ve negotiated on behalf of all of us, but they’ve never asked our opinions.

--Mario Rodríguez, Acción Gay

Chapter 2: La Ley Antidiscriminación: Anything but Arbitrario

President of Acción Gay, Mario Rodríguez, met with me in a brightly lit, sparsely furnished room in the converted colonial house that serves at the organization’s headquarters. Despite his generally chipper disposition and the sun streaming in on the unseasonably warm winter day, Mario’s mood became markedly less pleasant when asked to address the perception that Movilh has a privileged relationship with the Chilean government.

Manuel (Tapia), with Movilh, has made some moves with this government that are unacceptable. I mean, to give Piñera a hug at La Moneda, to go to Congress and give Piñera a standing ovation...Every year in Chile the President pays a visit to Congress. Last year, Movilh was invited when the Zamudio Law, the Ley Antidiscriminación (Antidiscrimination Law) was passed. Manuel went with Jorge [González] and other people from Movilh, and there’s a very powerful image where Piñera is talking about all the advances [his government has made] and Manuel is giving him a standing ovation. So, he has a certain personal\(^1\) capital.

Rodríguez’s indictment of Tapia’s standing ovation at the passage of Chile’s Ley Antidiscriminación in 2012 was a constant in virtually all of my subsequent interviews (except, for obvious reasons, the one with Movilh.) However, it became clear that the

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\(^1\) Emphasis his
consternation around Tapia’s actions went much deeper than a simple perception that he was giving his tacit approval to a right-wing government; Tapia would certainly not be the first person to applaud a President out of decorum as opposed to genuine respect. As problematized in the introduction, the uniformity with which other SMO actors mentioned Tapia’s standing ovation is important for two reasons. First, it undoubtedly signals at least some official engagement between Movilh and the Chilean state. Conversely, it also speaks volumes about the potentially politically motivated “united front” against Movilh in the rest of the SMI. Nonetheless, it also seems that Santiago’s other queer SMOs were in fact reacting to two overarching perceptions: first, that under the guise of advocating for the entire queer community, Tapia and Movilh had unjustly prioritized their own interests in advocating for the Ley Antidiscriminación and secondly, that they were thus directly responsible for a law that many viewed as not only mediocre but potentially dangerous.

This chapter will discuss and analyze the recent passage of Chile’s Ley Antidiscriminación. It first argues that the law itself, while putatively passed with good intentions, may actually be used to reify and reinscribe the hegemonic masculine control of the country’s queer SMI. Secondly, it will explore the process by which the law was passed, interrogating the almost total exclusion of all queer SMOs other than Movilh, and arguing that this process itself was both inherently gendered and ultimately reproductive of preexisting norms of hegemonic masculinity. Finally, it will argue that the law itself serves to maintain the hegemonic masculine dominance of the Chilean state over its people through the policing and punishment of non-normative masculinities and that
Movilh’s overt approval of the law and thus tacit approval of the problems with the law may contribute to the negative perceptions of the organization in the larger SMI.

**Chile’s Matthew Shepard**

There is no doubt that the rapid passage of the *Ley Antidiscriminación* in July 2012 was due in part to the decades of work of activists both within the country’s queer SMI and a variety of other social movements. Nonetheless, it is also undeniably and inextricably linked to the brutal murder of Daniel Zamudio, a 24-year-old gay man, by 4 ‘neo-nazis’ earlier that year. The night of March 2, 2012, while returning home from a gay club in Santiago, Daniel was attacked by Alejandro Áxel Angulo Tapia, Patricio Iván Ahumada Garay, Raúl Alfonso López Fuentes, and Fabián Alexis Mora Mora. His attackers beat him brutally, carving swastikas into his torso, burning him with cigarettes, and smashing his legs and skull. They then left him for dead in the San Borja Park just blocks from the *Alameda*. After weeks in a medically induced coma, Daniel died on March 27, 2012.

Far from Chile’s first case of homophobic violence, (Movilh documented 66 individual cases of physical or verbal aggression between 2002 and 2012) (*El Ciudadano*, March 6, 2012) Zamudio’s brutal murder struck a chord both within Chile and transnationally. While this is no-doubt partially due to the many similarities of the murder of Zamudio and that of Matthew Shepard in 1998, it is not entirely clear why this particular attack resonated with so many people. Whatever the reasons, the murder of Daniel Zamudio served as a catalyst for a long overdue discussion of homophobic violence in Chile. However, as was arguably also the case in the murder of Matthew Shepherd, what should have been a societal conversation about systemic violence was
rapidly overtaken by the grisly details of the crime. By focusing on individual hate crimes in this way, we often inadvertently ignore the larger, systemic causes of crimes that, while perpetrated against individuals, are targeted at entire segments of the population. In her book *In a Queer Time & Place*, Judith Halberstam (2005) reflects on similar reactions to the murder of trans* person Brandon Teena in 1993.

By reckoning only with Brandon’s story, as opposed to the stories of his girlfriends, his family, and those other two teenagers who died alongside him, we consent to a liberal narrative of individualized trauma. For Brandon’s story to be meaningful, it must be about more than Brandon. (33)

Stories like Brandon Teena’s are all too familiar, and Movilh’s reaction to Daniel’s murder bore a striking resemblance to previous coverage of similar crimes in the US. In a press conference outside the hospital, mere moments after Daniel was pronounced dead, Movilh spokesman Jorge González, fighting back tears, delivered this emotional speech:

Today, Daniel has become a martyr for us, for the community of sexual minorities, a citizen martyr who did nothing more than have a different sexual orientation, whose only sin was to be born the way he was born. We’re going to demand the justice that Daniel requires. We’re going to demand that those four people who are today in prison awaiting trial, and who we are sure are responsible for Daniel’s death, be charged with a felony, as murderers, and as such may be sentenced to the 40 year minimum sentence that the law demands. And of course, we’re going to demand the law’s reform, of course we’re going to continue fighting with even more strength so that we minorities can live free in this country like any of the other human beings who make up this society (CNN March 27, 2012.)

If Daniel Zamudio had not yet became the symbol for homophobic violence in Chile, González’s discourse of martyrdom surely helped to cement his place. His impassioned remarks did not stop there. When asked by a reporter what Movilh’s message was to the legislature, he said emphatically:
We call on the legislators to take responsibility for politics. Politics doesn’t stop with economic growth. It also has to do with values and morals. There is a group of conservatives festering in Congress who owe the country an explanation. They owe us for seven years of discrimination. That is how long this bill has languished in committees. The 33 deputies of the UDI\textsuperscript{2}, the 9 from Renovación Nacional\textsuperscript{3}, and the one from the Democracia Cristiana\textsuperscript{4} who questioned the constitutionality of the bill before the Constitutional Court are morally co-responsible for what happened to Daniel, and for what is happening to many other Daniels in different parts of Chile (Ibid.)

He concluded:

We have a message of inclusion that goes beyond sexual minorities and applies to any person who feels discriminated against. And I say to those deputies who have rejected the Ley Antidiscriminación, you are the first to discriminate (Ibid.)

In his unquestionably powerful speech, Mr. González and Movilh accomplished three things. First, they helped establish the relationship between the murder of Daniel Zamudio and hate-based crimes in the minds of the general public. Second, they successfully used Zamudio’s legacy to reignite and fast track the debate around the anti-discrimination bill that had been languishing in Congress for seven years. Finally, Movilh publicly placed the blame for the atrocity on the Chilean legislature, forcing them to take concrete and immutable action. Regardless of SMI perceptions of Movilh, it is clear that their intentions in this instance were to deal with the tragedy in the best way they knew how.

**Twos Steps Forward, One Step Back**

Chile’s Ley Antidiscriminación was first proposed in 2005 by leftist then-President Ricardo Lagos. Nonetheless, it would not be passed until 2012 by right-wing

\textsuperscript{2} Independent Democratic Union, a right-wing political party
\textsuperscript{3} National Renewal, a right-wing political party which collaborates with UDI in a coalition known as La Alianza (the Alliance)
\textsuperscript{4} Christian Democracy, a centrist (slightly left-leaning) political party
President Sebastián Piñera. Like legislation of its kind in other countries, the law faced intense scrutiny at both the legislative and judicial levels. Legislators and judges raised a number of concerns about the law. From a legal standpoint, many argued that Chile’s constitution (ratified during the Pinochet Regime) already provided the necessary legal protections for all Chilean citizens. Article 19 of the Chilean Constitution (in its second and third subsections) guarantees:

2°. Equality under the law. In Chile, there are neither privileged people nor privileged groups. In Chile there are no slaves and whoever sets foot on its territory is free. Men and women are equal under the law. Neither the law nor any other authority may establish arbitrary differences;

3°. Equal protection under the law in the exercise of one’s rights.

Additionally, those opposed to the law for constitutional reasons argued that it would necessarily create ‘privileged’ groups, an action directly prohibited in the same article of the Constitution. Others argued that, while this was true, the Constitution did not provide a specific mechanism for addressing cases of discrimination.

Nonetheless, the almost eight-year delay in the passage of the legislation was not due solely to constitutional concerns. As in the United States in the case of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the sticking point for many legislators on both sides of the aisle was the question of the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans* people. According to one analysis of the passage of the law, the question for some legislators was not how to best protect those people, but precisely the opposite. Conservative legislators openly questioned how it might be possible to avoid creating a situation in which the new law could be used to help sexual minorities demand full equality in things like marriage and/or domestic partnerships, rights claims which will be further discussed in Chapter 3. For example, in July 2005 the Human Rights
Commission of the House of Deputies (roughly analogous to the US House of Representatives) debated the language that should be used concerning sexual minority groups in the legislation.

The discussion centered on the terms “condición sexual” (sexual condition), “orientación sexual” (sexual orientation) and “género” (gender). Finally, the decision was made to use the term “condición sexual”, given that this had been used previously in Chilean jurisprudence. It was thought that the term “orientación sexual”, generates rights in groups of people, or expectations that are not recommendable; according to the majority of the deputies who participated in the discussion, among these rights it is thought that they could demand homosexual marriage. For the Government and the majority of the deputies on the Commission, generating this type of expectations should be avoided, since they are not within the plan of the Government and, according to the understanding of the deputies, neither is it within the objectives of the proposed bill (Nieto Fernández and Parada Rodríguez 2013:56-57).

The authors go on to note that “género” was not originally included in the bill because it was decided that, since the bill already included provisions against crimes on the basis of sexo (sex), additional gender-based protection was redundant. Nieto Fernández and Parada Rodríguez highlight the importance of this discussion of semantics, arguing that a preference for one term or another (i.e. condición sexual vs. orientación sexual) generally proved to be indicative of the broader political postures of many legislators, with those in favor of the latter term also generally less reticent to extend broader rights to LGBT individuals. It is worth noting that, despite the previous decision in 2005, due to the efforts of queer SMOs, the term orientación sexual was ultimately chosen.

Although this chapter neither claims nor intends to present a complete analysis of the process behind the law’s eventual passage, two procedural points seem most salient to the arguments that follow. First, the legal back-and-forth of the bill, from committees to plenaries, plenaries to courts, and back to committees, is dizzying, even in retrospect.
Nieto Fernández and Parada Rodríguez’ analysis of the history of the bill paint the picture of a bill that was nowhere near coming up for a vote in early 2012. Secondly, it is evident that the events of July 2012 forced the hand of the Chilean legislature, resulting in a law that many detractors and supporters claim was passed haphazardly and for political gain.

**Discrimination as a Hate Crime**

The *Ley Antidiscriminación* is often conflated with so-called hate crime or bias crime legislation in other countries. This is no doubt in part because of the tendency, both in Chile and abroad, to refer to the law as the *Ley Zamudio*, prompting obvious comparisons between the Chilean law and the US hate-crime legislation bearing Matthew Shepard’s name passed in 2009. However, while the *Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act* was specifically enacted as an amendment to pre-existing hate-crime legislation in the United States, the *Ley Antidiscriminación* represents the first attempt at such legislation in Chile. Secondly, the *Ley Antidiscriminación* never makes direct use of the terms hate crime or bias crime. This is because the law was specifically written (after much debate) to instead prevent so-called ‘*discriminación arbitraria*’ or arbitrary discrimination. The exact implications of this linguistic choice will be discussed in greater detail below, but it is first necessary to establish a direct correlation between the Chilean law and previous, similar laws in other contexts.

This chapter is predicated on the idea that Chile’s *Ley Antidiscriminación* can and should be analyzed in relation to body of literature problematizing hate crime legislation for two important reasons. First, although the language of the laws may vary from country to country, the underlying intent of the *Ley Antidiscriminación* is nearly identical
to that of hate crimes statutes passed in much of the Western world. According to Marlene Stanger (1995):

[A]nti-discrimination legislation makes discrimination itself a crime, if done with a bigoted motive, whereas hate crimes legislation makes the crime of hate secondary to an underlying crime which already has a punitive measure in place (426).

Chile’s law, like hate crime laws in countries like the United States, is less focused on legally establishing new types of crime and more concerned with establishing legal justification for stricter punishments when already illegal acts (e.g. murder) are perpetrated from a place of hatred for a protected group as opposed to an individual target. Although the Ley Antidiscriminación is devoid of overt mentions of hate crimes or bias crimes, it is clearly concerned with enacting stricter, motive-based punishments for acts that are already illegal under national law.

The second reason for which I have chosen hate crime legislation as a lens is less legal in nature. Simply put, the rapid passage of the Ley Antidiscriminación and its clear connection to the homophobic murder of Daniel Zamudio have created a situation in which the law is virtually interchangeable with Zamudio’s name. People who were perhaps only marginally aware of the law before it was passed now regularly hear it referred to, by the government, the media, and many queer SMOs as the Ley Zamudio. This is not surprising, considering comments like those made by Jorge González, establishing Zamudio as the face of anti-discrimination efforts. Without a doubt, what happened to Daniel Zamudio was an atrocity, and the association of the law with his name will be further problematized below. Nonetheless, the association undeniably exists in the Chilean popular imaginary, placing a specific emphasis on violent forms of discrimination that is not present in the actual language of the law. I argue that for these
reasons, although the Ley Antidiscriminación is not literally a hate crime statute, it serves the same function in both the Chilean legal system and the hearts and minds of many Chileans.

**Problematising Hate Crime Legislation**

There is a large body of literature addressing hate crime and bias crime legislation, although due the relatively recent nature of these statues in much of Latin America (especially in Chile), there is very little published scholarly research on specific pieces of legislation in Latin America. As such, this chapter walks the uneasy line of applying Western theory to a non-Western context; further research should focus specifically on case studies of Latin American statutes both in isolation and in comparison to similar legislation in other contexts. Nonetheless, many elements of North and Latin American legislation are analogous and allow for meaningful comparison.

Gary Mucciaroni (2008) echoes Stanger’s assertion that ‘hate-crimes’ legislation is different from other criminal statutes in its punishment of already criminal behavior based on hatred as a motive. “Hate-crime laws express society’s judgment that a violent act motivated by bigotry deserves greater punishment than a random crime committed under the same circumstances (92).” Stephen Tomsen (2009) concurs, citing Hall’s concept of ‘message crimes’, intended not only to generate fear in the individual victim of a given aggression, but also to broadcast a message of fear to anyone else who may be similar to the victim. While most authors recognize the noble intent of hate crime legislation, most are skeptical of the actual effectiveness of this type of legal intervention.

Many authors such as Mogul, Ritchie, and Whitlock (2011) argue that attempting to solve the problem of ‘hate-crimes’ through legislation ignores the systemic roots of
this type of violence. “The fact is many of the individuals who engage in such violence are encouraged to do so by mainstream society through promotion of laws, practices, generally accepted prejudices, and religious views (126).” This will be addressed below as one of the Ley Antidiscriminación’s major shortcomings. Furthermore, the authors assert that legislation of this type creates a false sense of equivalence among protected groups. For example, the Ley Antidiscriminación protects many groups from discrimination, including queer people, the disabled, and ethnic minorities. Douglass Janoff (2005) echoes this critique. “By clustering different varieties of hate crimes into one category, hate crime laws ensure ‘across-category sameness,’ so that ‘hate crimes against persons with disabilities are rendered equivalent to hate crimes against Muslims’ (120).” This erasure of distinction among protected groups ignores the nuances of race/ethnicity, class, and gender that grant some minority groups positions of privilege over others, as well as the potential for intersectionality of two minority identities in the same person (e.g. queer indigenous people).

The tendency to address systemic violence through atomized legislation is especially problematic as it pertains to minority groups. Hate crimes legislation places the onus for enforcement in the hands of the police. This ignores the long history of police brutality toward queer people, as discussed in the example of the locas protest in the introduction. Basia Spalek (2008) discusses a similar climate of police abuse in the United States. “A large number of surveys carried out with LGBT minority groups illustrate that hate crimes experienced by LGBT groups are significant, and that, moreover, most crimes are not reported to the authorities, distrust of the police being a significant factor here (191).” Mogul et al (2011) echo Spalek’s assertions arguing that
involving the police in a potential hate crime may not only be futile, but potentially traumatic.

Numerous factors may contribute to LGBT individuals’ reluctance to report violence they experience, including fear of retribution by their attackers, and of disclosure of sexual orientation, gender identity, or immigration status, perceptions that police will not take the report seriously, or will blame them for the violence, and participation in informal or criminalized economic activity, including sex work (121).

Finally, of great importance to this chapter is the problematization of the concept of anti-queer hate crimes itself. Tomsen (2009) argues that, although we may frame crimes like those committed against Matthew Shepard and Daniel Zamudio as homophobic, their motivation is actually rooted in the policing of acceptable hegemonic masculinity. Gay-identified men are not generally attacked because they are known to be gay, but rather because they are publicly performing a non-normative masculinity. Similarly, crimes committed against lesbians are in fact rooted in their perceived attempts to perform a masculinity to which they are, buy virtue of their womanhood, categorically denied access. Schwartz, Ulit, and Morgan (2006) echo the importance of policing masculinity in the animus behind ‘hate-crimes.’

Gender identity and sexual orientation are different, yet these characteristics are often conflated because of ignorance and stereotyping. For example, “faggot” is the most common epithet used during hate crimes against transgender victims. To many perpetrators of hate violence, there is little to differentiate a gay person and a transgender person: but are considered deviant. Transgender people are victimized because they are perceived as homosexual, and lesbians and gays are victimized because their gender presentation is perceived as discordant with social norms (175).

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the various ways in which the deployment and policing of hegemonic masculinity serve as the connective thread in fight for, passage, and enforcement of the Ley Antidiscriminación.
Crime and Punishment

I met up with Alfonso García and María Sánchez of Chile’s largest trans* organization, OTD, at a small restaurant just off of Santiago’s Plaza de Armas. What I imagined would be a fairly brief interview turned into three hours, interspersed with casual conversation and laughter. Alfonso, a trans* man, and María, the mother of a trans* man (Miguel, who joined us at the end of the interview), often amiably finished each other sentences. One instance of this in the interview, so frenzied as to be almost unintelligible, is the moment that the Ley Antidiscriminación first came up casually in conversation. Alfonso began:

We shouldn’t even have a Ley Antidiscriminación because by the simple virtue of us all being human beings, we shouldn’t be discriminated against. Nobody should be discriminated against. But we’re in a country that runs on a system of crime and punishment. Without it, we can’t function.

Alfonso is especially passionate about the Ley Antidiscriminación because his success as a trans* activist has come at a high cost. After his first public appearance on television as an openly trans* person, he was fired from his job because of his gender identity and is now a professional activist. When I asked him if, since the passage of the law, this could still happen, his response was emphatic: “Yes, of course!”

My interview with OTD was by far the most eye opening in terms of critiquing the law, which, then barely a year old, was largely being heralded as a success as a few initial cases were being tried and won. Nonetheless Alfonso explained that, just because you’ve been discriminated against, that doesn’t mean you can actually win your case.

We must be one of the only countries that has an anti-discrimination law that discriminates!...We have a law that, if you discriminate against me, I have to prove that you did it. The burden of proof is on the victim, not on the accused. And the worst part is that, if I prove that you discriminated
against me, you pay a fine to the state. There are no reparations for the victim.

The lack of reparations for victims of discrimination was repeated by several other activists as one of their main of objections to the law. Alfonso explained that, while it was possible to bring charges in civil court, this process was not outlined in the law and that the time and financial investment required made it impossible for most people.

At this time, María chimed in:

What’s worse, the worst of all, is that if you don’t demonstrate that you were discriminated against, even if it was 5 or 10 times a day, you have to pay the state for having...what do you call it?

Alfonso interjected to add:

...for having incurred those costs for the investigation. There’s a fine for the victim!

María concluded with a hearty laugh

I bet [Jorge] González told you another story!

While María’s mention of Jorge González (and by extension Movilh) may seem random, I argue that it is anything but. As the interviews I conducted show in almost every case, while much of Santiago’s queer SMI is genuinely concerned about the content of the Ley Antidiscriminación, they are equally concerned about the way in which it was passed.

“Not even the shadow…”

Echoing the sentiments of OTD, Juan Ríos of MUMS delved deeper into the process by which the law was passed. As mentioned above, the law was introduced to the Chilean legislature in 2005. What is often left out of the story however, is the
significant role of both queer and other minority SMOs in the creation of the original bill. Juan explained:

It took ten years of work to create the bill that was originally presented, ten years of discussions, of building alliances, convincing others, working with the government, with universities, to even reach a “preproject,” which then turned into the bill that President Lagos sent to Congress in 2005.

As he explained the process of drafting the bill, I couldn’t help but notice a tinge of sadness in Juan’s normally sardonic demeanor. It was clear to me that the Ley Antidiscriminación, or what it could have been, was close to his heart. He, like other activists I interviewed, again returned to the image of Manuel Tapia and other Movilh representatives giving Piñera a standing ovation at the bill’s signing.

We saw, not one year ago, Manuel Tapia giving Piñera a standing ovation for the passage of the Ley Antidiscriminación. A law that, in our opinion, is not even the shadow of what we proposed all those years ago.

It is unclear to me exactly what process led to the gradual elimination of groups like MUMS from formal discussions with the government as the bill was debated in Congress. Although further study of these processes is necessary, the available data do not permit me to speculate with any certainty in this chapter. However, what is clear is that the departure was not voluntary on the part of groups like MUMS, and that by the time the bill was being debated in Congress, Movilh was unquestionably the voice for the entire queer SMI in the eyes of the Chilean legislature, although not necessarily due to any intent on the part of Movilh. It is likely that the perception of Movilh as hegemonically masculine incentivized the state to interact with Movilh, and not vice-versa. This legislative preference for interaction with Movilh is demonstrated in the critique of the Ley Antidiscriminación written by Nieto Fernández and Parada Rodríguez.
Their work meticulously traces the trajectory of the law through a seemingly endless process of committee hearings, plenaries, and judicial rulings. Movilh, and Manuel Tapia, are mentioned as the only queer SMO to give direct input about the structure of the law until late 2011. In 2011, Fundación Iguales is mentioned in the same capacity albeit only once. What is perhaps most interesting about this is that Fundación Iguales was only founded in 2011, suggesting an almost immediate accrual of enough political capital so as to be invited to offer opinions on a bill before the legislature. I argue that, despite their differences, the salient similarity between the two SMOs is the perception of their hegemonic masculine organizational homogeneity, which in turn affords them the political capital to be able to speak to power. The next section will argue that Movilh’s seemingly exclusive relationships with the Chilean legislature in this matter serves to reinforce the division in the SMI, which as I argued in the previous chapter is produced and reproduced by the deployment and policing of hegemonic masculinity.

**Movilh-ization**

Although my interview with Movilh representative Jorge González was understandably less critical of the *Ley Antidiscriminación*, I was struck less by what González said and more by how he said it. Unlike most of the other activists I interviewed, González spoke like a politician. It should not be forgotten that he, in fact, *is* a politician, although he was not when he joined Movilh. In comparing my interview with González and his recently released memoir, two things became clear: Movilh and its representatives view their role as spokespeople for Santiago’s queer SMI as a foregone conclusion. Secondly, Jorge González’s rapid promotion (in under a year) to ‘spokesman’ may not have been an entirely random choice.
In our interview, González explained his decision to officially join Movilh, explaining that he had also explored becoming a member of Fundación Iguales.

And just when I was leaning toward Movilh, Manuel [Tapia] invited me to a meeting of a big group of organizations, including Amnesty International and other groups, where they were discussing the changes that needed to be made to the *Ley Antidiscriminación*. That it had been dormant for 7 years and that it was finally going to be debated and passed this year.

While it is impossible to know which groups were present at this meeting, I can confidently say that none of the other SMOs in this study were present, with the possible exception of Fundación Iguales. The way in which González speaks about the inevitability of the passage of the legislation implies an openness of communication with the Chilean government that most other queer SMOs are not afforded.

Along with anecdotal evidence of meetings at *La Moneda* and in Congress present in interviews both with and about Movilh, Jorge’s linguistic choices belie the nature of Movilh’s relationship with the government. The phrase “it was finally going to be debated and passed this year” is as definitive in the original Spanish as it is in translation. Jorge gives the impression of a man, and consequently an organization, who have no reason to doubt that the law will be passed, and soon. This is especially remarkable considering that the bill, as stated above, had languished so long in the legislature that the Chilean public had largely forgotten about it. Other than a very close relationship with networks of power within the government, there would have been no reason for Tapia to be so optimistic in his portrayal of the situation to Jorge, especially since the murder of Daniel Zamudio would not happen for more than another year.

Similarly, when asked about Movilh’s reaction to the murder of Daniel Zamudio, he replied:
I was supposed to be a lower-level activist and from one day to the next and without my volition, Manuel told me that I had to be a spokesman. I’m more a quiet kind of guy, without a great gift for public speaking. Nonetheless, Manuel offered me the position, I took it as a challenge and, coincidentally very soon after, the Zamudio case happened, and since Manuel was not in Chile, it fell to me (me tocó a mí) to take charge of the situation, and that was sort of my debut in the public discourse.

Whether González is in reality so soft-spoken or simply being self-effacing, what is undeniably strange is his role in the Zamudio case in the first place. To begin, it seems strange that an organization that prides itself on being the queer SMO in Santiago would choose González, at that point a member of under a year, as its main spokesperson in what is undoubtedly the single most famous case of anti-gay violence in Chilean history. Additionally, his phrasing “it fell to me to take charge of the situation” (me tocó a mí)\(^5\) carries with it the tacit assumption that someone within Movilh would have to take charge of the situation, indicating that both outside actors such as the media and the organization itself view their responsibility as spokespeople for the greater queer SMI as unspoken.

González’s description of his ascension in the ranks seems mystifying even to him. Throughout our interview he spoke about his trajectory in the organization with a certain sense of disbelief about his role as an activist. Nonetheless, a closer reading of his word choice in the phrase “Manuel told me I had to be a spokesman” points to what I believe to be at the heart of this issue: the vertical and masculine nature of the organization. This remark, perhaps inadvertently, portrays Movilh as an organization in which Manuel Tapia calls all the shots, the very critique leveled at Movilh by its detractors in organizations such as MUMS and OTD.

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\(^5\) This phrase can also be translated as, “It was my turn.” Either way, the implication of automatic organizational responsibility remains the same.
Based on my personal observations, I believe that González’s rapid ascent to a position within Movilh is at least partially due to his masculine cultural capital. Jorge, in both our interview and his memoir, went to great lengths to “humble himself,” expressing that he felt Fundación Iguales was too classist for a person of his middle-class background, while Movilh was only of a slightly higher class than his own. Although I cannot claim to know his life story, for anyone familiar with the physical markers of the upper class in Chile, it is hard to imagine a high-class situation into which he would not be welcomed, at least initially, with open arms. He has a very light complexion and reddish brown hair, markers of European descent. Given the interconnected nature of race, class, and masculinity, Jorge’s European descent and his class and educational background are instrumental to the construction of the hegemonic masculinity required for interactions with power. Additionally, despite his claims to the contrary, González is both extremely well spoken and well educated, holding a doctorate in History from the prestigious Universidad Católica in Santiago. As stated in his memoir:

I was not as hardened as my colleagues at Movilh, who had been subjected to similar things [to the violence against Zamudio.]...I came from a very socially protected environment. An upper-class impoverished maternal family, a grandmother from the Sotomayor and Pérez-Cotapos families, a private university where everything was pretty comfortable, where I worked and rapidly came to realize that I was a very good student. I became an important person for the director of the School of History, was the first student from a private university to be accepted to the History doctoral program at la Católica, and made more money than my friends (Parada 2013:26.)

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6 It should be noted that, in Spanish, González writes clase alta empobrecida, literally translated above. This is by no means a common saying in Chilean Spanish, and furthers my impression that González has cultivated a politics of straddling the line between his upper-class social capital and discursively constructing himself as a “man of the people.”

7 González’s grandmother’s last names are among those that generally indicate high social status in Chile.
Finally, and most importantly, Jorge is not a loca. By Chilean standards of masculinity, Jorge is not legible to most as a homosexual. However, by his own admission, the social capital he draws from his race and upbringing would have at least partially shielded him from homophobic violence even if this were not the case. Similar to Tapia himself, González is media-friendly gay man. Although his sexuality, a matter of public record, should serve as an automatic indictment of his masculinity, González’s ethnic and class background as well as his ability to perform a more acceptable masculinity allow him access to the hegemonic masculine capital required to speak to power. All this aside, it should not be overlooked that González does in fact have a natural talent for politics, and any critique of the processes behind his selection as spokesman should not be read as indictment of his talent or dedication to his activism.

**A Face for TV**

Although Chilean media theory tends to shy away from issues of race and ethnicity, lacking a rigidly stratified racial system like that of the United States, there is a large body of work addressing the general lack of ethnic diversity in Latin American media. Chileans scholars who have engaged with this topic have tended to do it on the basis of socioeconomic difference, speaking instead of *clases populares* (popular classes). In Chile, this economic stratification must also be read as racialized (Barandiarán 2012). Although ethnicity and class are not entirely synonymous in the Chilean context, European descent is generally read as a marker of high socioeconomic status, and the Chilean media show an undeniable preference for people of higher socioeconomic—and thus ethnic—strata, except where programming is targeted specifically at popular markets (Fuenzalida 1987; Sanhueza 1987). Additional scholarly
evidence for the whitening and socioeconomic stratification of Latin American visual
media can be found in the context of Bolivia (Soruco and Pinto 2009) and in the Hispanic
community of the United States (Rodríguez 1997) among many others.

I argue that it is likely that these factors, substantive of hegemonic masculine
capital, influenced Movilh’s choice of González as spokesman during the Zamudio crisis
and that his role as the face of the crisis in the media cemented Movilh’s role as the
organization of reference. Consequently, Movilh’s monopoly on the media coverage of
the situation served to establish masculine control of the aftermath, ultimately
culminating in the passage of the Ley Antidiscriminación. González’s promotion to
organizational spokesperson is advantageous for a group whose credibility is deeply tied
to its ability to perform hegemonic masculinity. By performing this masculinity in every
way besides his (invisible) sexuality, Jorge is able to serve as an ‘acceptable’ voice for
the gay community because his difference is subsumed by the illusion of sameness.

Nonetheless, during the Zamudio case, the greatest deployment of hegemonic masculinity
on the part of Movilh is arguably not its choice of representatives, but its discursive
choices.

Un lindo homenaje?

As explored briefly above, there is a tendency in Chile to refer to the Ley
Antidiscriminación as the Ley Zamudio. This continues the obvious parallels between the
murders of Zamudio and Matthew Shepard after whom, along with James Byrd, Jr., the
United States LGBT hate crimes act is named. Unlike the law in the United States,
however, Chilean legislators voted against officially naming their new anti-
discrimination law after Daniel Zamudio. Official or not, the fact that the name has stuck
is no accident. María Sánchez of OTD blames Movilh: “El Movilh le puso ese nombre!” she says emphatically. “Movilh gave it that name.” Movilh is directly responsible for the initiative to name the law Ley Zamudio according to an El Mercurio article from July 12, 2012, the day the law was passed. Jorge González is quoted as saying:

We want the law that was passed today to be called the Zamudio Law (Ley Zamudio). We believe it is a beautiful homage (un lindo homenaje) to Daniel and we believe it is a beautiful homage as well to the 18 victims of homophobia and transphobia who died during the time it took to debate and pass this law, and for the more than 800 cases of discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity that occurred during that same time frame (El Mercurio, July 7, 2012.)

Additionally, Movilh has been largely responsible for popularizing the name given their undeniable an undeniable monopoly over the media attention surrounding the case.

A frequency analysis of media coverage of the Ley Antidiscriminación from the year before the law’s passage show’s clear evidence of media preference for Movilh, especially in the right-wing media (Fig 2.1). El Mercurio, one of Chile’s most widely read national newspapers and traditionally associated with right-wing politics, only mentions two out of the six organizations in this study. El Ciudadano, a left-wing newspaper, presents a more heterogeneous view of the SMI, mentioning five of the six. CUDS, mentioned in neither newspaper, has thus been removed from the bar graphs.
The prevalence of Movilh in both the left- and right-wing media coverage of the year leading up to the passage of the *Ley Antidiscriminación* is evident, although the popularity of Fundación Iguales is also surprising. However, it should be noted that Fundación Iguales was founded in the same year (2011) represented in this data, and thus may have experienced a disproportionate amount of press for this reason. Also surprising is the prevalence of MUMS in *El Ciudadano*. In this case, the data are somewhat misleading, because *El Ciudadano* is both left-wing and significantly less popular than *El Mercurio*, although it is among the most popular of the left-wing newspapers available in Chile. MUMS’s official discourse of leftist politics aligns them directly with the politics of *El Ciudadano*, but given its complete absence from *El Mercurio*, it is likely that the prevalence of MUMS in these data has more to do with political solidarity than with a widespread presence of MUMS in the mainstream media. For the moment, it is more
important to focus on the points of intersection between *El Mercurio* and *El Ciudadano*, Movilh and Fundación Iguales.

It is worth noting that the two groups mentioned in both the left- and right-wing media coverage are the same two that are most closely aligned with the politics of the government in power at the time. Once again, the most obvious commonality between the two organizations is the perception of their gender, racial, and class identities or, in short, their hegemonic masculine capital. Thus, although the prevalence of Fundación Iguales in these data is surprising, it lends further evidence to the idea that hegemonic masculine capital has pushed these two groups to the forefront of the SMI, allowing them to act as spokespeople for the entire movement.

Figure 2.2 shows a similar frequency analysis of the newspaper coverage of the *Ley Antidiscriminación* since its passage. Although *El Mercurio* mentions Acción Gay in one article, its preference for Movilh and Fundación Iguales remains undeniable. Additionally, they seem to heavily favor Movilh after the passage of the law, suggesting that the initial popularity of Fundación Iguales in the discourse around this law was likely due to the newness of the organization, as posited above. By analyzing these two frequency analyses together, the preference for Movilh in the right-wing media, as well as to a lesser extent in the left-wing media, is clear and consistent for more than three years. Finally, judging by the almost 30% increase in Movilh’s popularity in *El Mercurio*, it would appear that their dominance in this area has grown and solidified. This in turn reifies and reproduces the masculine dominance of the SMI at the root of this thesis. Given the SMO’s dominance in the media frenzy surrounding the *Ley*
**Antidiscriminación**, it is unsurprising that, although the law’s name was never officially changed, Movilh has been successful an inserting *Ley Zamudio* into the public discourse.

Echoing Halberstam’s remarks about Brandon Teena at the beginning of this chapter, OTD’s Alfonso García explains his objection the trend of naming hate crimes legislation after victims of hate crimes.

It is a socio-cultural error and error of human rights to call it the *Ley Zamudio*. That invisibilizes all of the other discriminated categories [in the law]. It becomes a law for homosexuals. This is *not* a law for homosexuals. It’s a law for women, for ethnic minorities, for boys, for girls, for immigrants, for Afro-descended Chileans...

Maria adds:

*Whenever someone says Ley Zamudio, it makes all other discrimination invisible and then...we’re just back where we started! Why? Because it’s not a gay law! It’s a law for all of us who are discriminated against for one reason or another.*

On one hand, while Movilh has clearly made a conscious effort to tie Daniel Zamudio’s murder to the *Ley Antidiscriminación*, this strategy has clearly borne fruit.
The case was successful in galvanizing both national and transnational attention to their cause. Although anti-queer violence has been present in Chile since (and before) independence (Contardo 2011), the conflation of the murder of Daniel Zamudio and anti-queer hate crimes seemed to strike a chord with the international community, as evidenced by news items about the incident in North American, Latin American, and European mainstream media. This is undeniably due largely to the hard work and dedication of Movilh activists in the days and weeks surrounding Zamudio’s attack and eventual death.

Conversely, the disproportionate focus on the murder, at the expense of a larger discussion of systemic violence, is a clear indicator of the dominance of masculinity in both Santiago’s queer SMI and in the culture as a whole. As María emphatically stated, calling the law the Ley Zamudio sends the tacit message that the law is only applicable to cases like that of Daniel Zamudio. This invisibilizes all other hate crimes, based on non-gay male sexual orientation, gender identity, as well as all of the other protected categories outlined in the law. Jorge González’s remarks above about renaming the law in homage to Zamudio display the masculine dominance of the SMI by conflating the violent deaths and daily discrimination of all queer people with the horrific murder of one middle class gay man. While I in no way mean to diminish the tragedy experienced by Daniel Zamudio and his family, his experiences are not the same as those of lesbians, bisexuals, trans* people, and other members of the queer community. They are not even the same as those of other gay men. By essentializing Daniel Zamudio’s murder as the reference for all anti-queer violence, the public is asked to forget the suffering of 18
queer people as we remember the murder of one gay man. While I doubt that this was Movilh’s intention, the consequences (both positive and negative) are apparent.

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the de facto name of the law is that it atomizes anti-queer violence. Focusing on one hate crime out of many gives the impression that Daniel Zamudio’s murder was an isolated incident, stunting potentially productive conversations about the systemic factors that lead to this type of violence. This discourse in turn removes the onus from the Chilean state to prevent future hate crimes through systemic changes. Indeed, the Ley Antidiscriminación does little to prevent violence, preferring to punish the perpetrators after violence has been committed.

The remainder of this paper will analyze how the Ley Antidiscriminación itself serves to perpetuate hegemonic masculine dominance on the part of both the Chilean public and the state itself, even as it is purports to fight for, among other things, gender equality.

“Arbitrary” Discrimination

As mentioned above, one of the peculiarities about the Ley Antidiscriminación is that it never makes use of the language of hate or bias crimes that is so common in similar legislation elsewhere. Instead, it employs a unique term, ‘discriminación arbitraria’ or ‘arbitrary discrimination.’ Article 2 of the law reads:

For the purposes of this law, arbitrary discrimination is understood as any distinction, exclusion, or restriction that lacks reasonable justification, effected either by state agents or private citizens, and that causes lack, disturbance, or threat to the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Political Constitution of the Republic and the international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile that are still valid, in particular when they are grounded in motives such as race or ethnicity, nationality, socioeconomic situation, language, ideology or political opinion, religion or belief, status as a union or guild member or lack thereof, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, age, familial relationship, personal appearance and illness or disability.
While the Chilean law is hardly unusual in this respect, its establishment of protected classes of people is inherently problematic. Furthermore, by establishing a statute for “arbitrary discrimination,” the law tacitly establishes that some forms of discrimination are legitimate; by explicitly enumerating which groups qualify for protected minority status, the drafters of the legislation have also signaled which groups do not. The problems inherent in the Ley Antidiscriminación are undoubtedly exacerbated by the perception that Movilh (and to some extent Fundación Iguales) played an active part in its construction. While the whole SMI (including Movilh) was initially critical and skeptical of the edits to their original bill, after the murder of Daniel Zamudio, the domination of the legislative process by Movilh and their calls for immediate action in the media appear to have quickly silenced dissenting voices, as evidenced both by media analysis and the sheer speed with which the bill became law.

As explored above, Juan Ríos and MUMS worked for years in conjunction with other SMOs on a comprehensive anti-discrimination law that would be both punitive of individual crimes and transformative of society.

That [original] bill contained preventative measures surrounding discrimination. It contained the creation of a public institution that would be in charge of promoting a politics of anti-discrimination. It was financed. But all of those elements, the prevention of discrimination part was eliminated; a whole half of the project was eliminated. It ended up being just a project, like most things in Chile, that was punitive, that only wants to punish those who commit discriminatory acts.

OTD’S Alfonso García reiterated the same complaints.

We have an anti-discrimination law that doesn’t allow for affirmative action, an anti-discrimination law that doesn’t demand public policy, and as a consequence it doesn’t demand the real changes that are necessary.
The final part of this chapter will argue that *Ley Antidiscriminación*’s lack of “teeth” constitutes an effort on the part of the masculine Chilean state to police masculinity and that Movilh’s readiness to quickly approve faulty legislation may have unintentionally directly contributed to this consequence of the law.

**Dulce Patria**

As explored above, homophobic violence is not usually, in the strictest sense, homophobic. That is to say, most ‘gay-bashing’ is not the result of concrete knowledge on the part of the attacker of the sexual orientation of a victim or victims, although this type of violence does exist and should be no way minimized by its problematization. More often, so-called ‘homophobic violence’ is in reality gender based violence. As established in Chapter 1, heterosexuality is inextricably intertwined with hegemonic masculinity, especially in the context of Chile’s strict gender norms. Tomsen (2009) theorizes that homophobic violence serves as mechanism to reinforce the masculinity of a given attacker, especially if the attacker belongs to other societal groups to whom other forms of social capital are categorically denied.

The attraction of these assailants to anti-homosexual violence is continuously linked to a widespread social understanding of a desired ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as thoroughly heterosexual, and engagements with violence as a possible means of establishing a respected male identity. The hegemonic form remains beyond reach for those with little or no material wealth or institutional power, and violence and harassment directed against sexual minorities serve as ready means of establishing a respected male identity within the less empowered pattern of ‘protest’ masculinity. (82)

As evidenced by this reading of homophobic violence, it is an error to address hate crimes on an individual rather than systematic basis, if in fact the goal is the eradication
of this type of violence. This echoes the arguments of both theorists and activists in the previous sections about the problematic nature of the name *Ley Zamudio*.

Although the *Ley Antidiscriminación* was only ratified in 2012, the few analyses that exist have concurred in their opinion that the greatest failure of the legislation is the state’s reticence to address the systemic origins of hate crimes. 

*[The Ley Antidiscriminación]* was criticized for failing to create an independent institution that would watch over antidiscrimination, and that it did not contain a section that dealt with hate speech (Funk 2013:87.)

While this point is certainly true and worthy of substantial debate, of equal interest to this project is the fact that, as the law currently reads, the state benefits financially from each case of discrimination brought before the judicial system.

At the same time, it was also observed that new law only provided for a fine, and did not make obligatory any form of compensation for the victims of discrimination (*ibid*:88)

Although the establishment of a fine is fairly standard in hate crimes legislation, the provision of the law allowing the state to demand legal fees, mentioned by OTD representatives Alfonso García and María Sánchez from the plaintiff seems uniquely draconian. At best, this stipulation can be read as an effort on the part of the legislature to avoid frivolous lawsuits. At worst, it is an active deterrent from legal action in the first place, with the added tacit message that anti-discrimination suits are unique in their potential for frivolity. Additionally, as the law stands, there is no legal outcome in which the state does not benefit financially from the prosecution of hate crimes.

The economically punitive elements of the law represent one of the areas in which members of Movilh, generally belonging to the upper class, are potentially favored by the *Ley Antidiscriminación*. While the potential cost of a lost court case would be
catastrophic to a queer person of a lower social stratum, upper class victims of hate crimes have significantly less to lose. As the voice of the queer community in Congress, Movilh’s failure to demand the removal of this stipulation constitutes a fundamental misunderstanding of the class diversity of the queer community. More tragically, it has created a situation in which the least privileged members of the queer community are the most likely to experience violence without any legal retribution, as the financial risks are simply too great to pursue legal action. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that Movilh was only one lobby group out of many in the debate surrounding this legislation, including conservative Christian groups directly opposed to Movilh’s agenda. Movilh is clearly not all-powerful, and the blame for the negative consequences of the law surely lie as much with the queerphobic and hegemonically masculine Chilean government and other activist groups as with Movilh itself.

The placement of the burden of proof on the plaintiff is further complicated by the earlier discussion of the gender-based nature of ‘homophobic’ violence. In a system where the burden of proof is on the victim of a discriminatory act, members of non-phenotypically marked minority groups face an uphill battle. Even in the case of Daniel Zamudio, people both within and outside the queer community question whether the murder was really based on his perceived failure to perform masculinity (inscribed as homosexuality) or whether it was a random act of horrific violence. The question becomes, especially for queer people, how to prove intent. I argue that this deficiency of the law is intentional, and unfairly persecutes members of the queer community whose gender expression is not normative.
A law that both establishes a mechanism to punish minorities for reporting abuse and places the burden of proof on the victim is an outstanding tool for the policing of gender. First, it incentivizes queer people to perform their genders more normatively in the public sphere, lest they draw unwanted violent attention. Second, in the event of a discrimination lawsuit, it requires the victim to interrogate his/her own behavior as a possible motive for violence. While a person of color can do little to disguise his/her identity, under this law, the burden falls disproportionately on queer people to simply ‘stop acting in so queer’ in public.

By forcing queer people to justify how their attackers might have perceived their queerness, the Ley Antidiscriminación creates a binary in which justice and personal dignity are mutually exclusive. This is especially problematic for ‘closeted’ queer people, who may face life-and-death consequences if ‘outed.’ Specifically in the case of Chile, the risk to the masculine capital of a male victim of homophobic violence may be so great that he would prefer to stay silent than to publicly announce any involvement in an incident of homophobia, echoing Mogul et al earlier in this chapter. This is to say nothing of the risk to trans* and lesbians victims, who bear the double burden of their sexual minority status and the categorical denial of access to masculine social capital. Once again, by interrogating the applicability of the law, we see clearly how Movilh, in its advocacy for the Ley Antidiscriminación, acted almost exclusively in its own best interest. Queer people of high social status, stand to lose less if ‘outed,’ as they are more likely to have both the financial and social capital to survive the aftermath.

In this way, the Ley Antidiscriminación can be seen as a tool that allows the Chilean state to have its cake and eat it, too. On the one hand, Chile can now present
itself both internally and transnationally as a country that has taken a firm stand against
discrimination. Nonetheless, the Chilean government’s refusal to create any mechanisms
for systemic change or even to fund these efforts points to a disconnect between the letter
of the law and the spirit. Finally, as discussed above, the Ley Antidiscriminación creates
a financial conflict of interest in which the Chilean state actually stands to benefit
substantially from the denouncement, and thus by the committal, of acts of
discrimination. Scholars of both the Chilean law and similar laws abroad agree that anti-
discrimination legislation is destined to fail if it refuses to recognize and address the
systemic origins of this type of violence, and that the failure to do so may in fact make a
bad situation worse.

This chapter has shown that, while on the surface the Ley Antidiscriminación
appears to present a large step forward for queer people in Chile, both the route taken for
its passage and its implementation have ultimately served to reproduce and reinscribe
hegemonic masculine control over both the queer social movement industry and over
Chilean subjects writ large through almost exclusive state interaction with Movilh.
Additionally, the correlation of Movilh with the successful passage of the Ley
Antidiscriminación, as portrayed in the mainstream media, serves to reward the
organization with additional social and political capital as the sole voice for queer rights
in Chile. The advocacy in favor of naming the law after Daniel Zamudio, though
ultimately legally unsuccessful, served to emphasis the gay male dominance of the queer
SMI. Conversely, the actions of Movilh indisputably played a major role in injecting
conversations about queerphobic violence into mainstream discourse, as well as in
reigniting debate about the long-dormant Ley Antidiscriminación, resulting in its eventual
Finally, I have argued that the Movilh’s haste to pass the *Ley Antidiscriminación* after the murder of Daniel Zamudio, rather than providing a mechanism for the eradication of ‘hate-crimes,’ has actually served to reify the masculinized and paternalistic role of the state through the policing of the gender of its subjects, making use of unclear and prejudicial language, financial penalties, and the placement of the burden of proof on the victim of a discriminatory action. In this same vein, Chapter 3 will further analyze deployment of masculinity through the current discourse surrounding demands for same-sex partnership recognition in Chile.
In Chile it’s very probable that gay marriage, even without Stonewall, without the sexual revolution, without a revolutionary history, always under dictatorship, under discipline, will happen before abortion [is legalized.] And that’s very important because, you can see, homosexuality offers the potential for political gain.

-Pedro Gutiérrez, CUUSD Chile

Chapter 3: From Rites to Rights

When I arrived at the headquarters of Fundación Iguales in Santiago’s posh Parque Bustamante neighborhood, it was abuzz with activity, in stark contrast to the initial visit I had made the week before. While on my previous visit I had been greeted by one volunteer without an official role in the organization, all hands were now on deck, sewing rainbow flags, painting posters, and making phone calls, in preparation for the organization’s annual march (discussed in Chapter 1), only a few days away. Upon entering the office, a volunteer invited me to take a seat as I waited for Fundación Iguales representative Rodrigo Pérez, who was to arrive in a few minutes. In what was either a nod to my obvious foreignness, an indicator of the upper-class nature of the organization, or a combination of the two, I was offered instant coffee, a rarity in tea-drinking Chile.

When Rodrigo arrived, we began the interview immediately, as it was clear he was busy preparing for the march. I began by asking him about his personal history as an activist; most likely due to his age, his story is different from those of older activists like Juan or Mario. Rodrigo was only 31 at the time of the interview and thus has lived most of his life in a democratic Chile. Unlike older activists who cut their teeth in the anti-
dictatorship protests, he came to queer activism while working in the north of Chile for

*Un Techo Para Chile* (A Roof For Chile), an organization that provides homes for underprivileged families, similar to Habitat for Humanity. Having never identified with the queer movement in Santiago, Pérez changed his mind when he saw a TV interview with Fundación Iguales co-founder and author Ignacio Sanz in which he publicly declared his homosexuality. Soon after, another co-founder and son of a Pinochet-era government minister, Andrés Yáñez publicly demanded that then-President Piñera make good on his campaign promise to legally recognize same-sex civil unions. Pérez explains:

> [Andrés] publicly called upon the President of the Republic, Sebastián Piñera, to keep his word, because he had made a commitment to regulate civil unions for same-sex couples. And after a year, nothing had happened.

This public rebuking was eventually answered by the introduction of the *Acuerdo de Vida en Pareja* (AVP), or Agreement of Life as a Couple, to the Chilean Congress in 2011. The AVP is similar to proposed civil union legislation in the United States, and has yet to be voted into law. For the purposes of this chapter, the specifics of the law are not of great importance, other than that the AVP is available to both straight and same-sex couples and is framed as a way to strengthen the traditional family, without changing any existing statutes. As such, I will generally make use of the term ‘partnership recognition’ to refer to the body of proposed legislation that encompasses both civil union and marriage equality efforts around the world.

The public actions of Sanz and Yáñez impressed Pérez so much that, after receiving news of a paid opening at Fundación Iguales, he applied and relocated back to his native Santiago. Pérez also expressed the same negative feelings about Movilh as
other interviewees, citing them as one of the primary reasons he chose to join the fledgling Fundación Iguales as opposed to the well-established Movilh.

It didn’t really seem like a unified body...Movilh was Manuel Tapia, and that’s reflected a little in the history of the movement. So, I guess, I also didn’t like the tone or the language that Manuel used when defending the community’s rights. He was super machista, they didn’t have a lesbian group, it was all much too segmented.

Although only founded in 2011, Fundación Iguales has rapidly accrued political capital both within Chile’s queer SMI and in its interactions with the state, as evidenced by its role in the later steps of the passage of the *Ley Antidiscriminación* explored in Chapter 2. It is unique among queer SMOs as its members are generally perceived to be both younger and more politically conservative than those in groups such as Movilh or MUMS. However, Fundación Iguales is also unique in having been formed specifically around the idea of state recognition of same-sex partnerships. Like Movilh, although they also organize peripherally around other issues, both groups readily admit that partnership recognition (either in the form of the AVP or marriage) is their most urgent cause.

The debate around partnership recognition in Chile comes at an interesting time as, increasingly, marriage is not a significant priority for many heterosexual Chilean couples. According to Chile’s Civil Statistic Registry, marriage rates have fallen 50% since 1990. While outside the scope of this project, it is possible that the illegality of divorce (only legalized in 2004) served to deincentivize younger generations of heterosexual couples from entering into unions from which there was no legal escape. Further research on this phenomenon is warranted. Regardless of the possible reasons for this decrease, even as marriage declines in popularity among younger Chilean
heterosexual couples, it has become a rallying cry for the queer SMI. The explanation for this is far from cut-and-dried and what follows constitutes an initial effort at explaining this counterintuitive phenomenon.

This chapter will explore the meanings and consequences of the tendency of some queer SMOs to organize almost exclusively around official partnership recognition. I will argue that state recognition of partnerships, while a putatively logical choice of organizational focus, serves to desexualize the queer movement and return queer sex to the private sphere, in an attempt to re-stabilize the hegemonic roles that are destabilized by the existence of open homosexuals. Additionally, I will argue that the masculine social capital afforded to the groups most vocally demanding partnership recognition, through the desexualization and normalization of queer identities, allows them the political capital necessary for access to the state. Finally, I will posit that by privileging partnership recognition as their main organizational demand, certain SMOs reify the importance of the patriarchal institution of marriage, thus strengthening state control over the nation through the selective conferral of sexual citizenship, while simultaneously ignoring the more immediate needs and desires of large segments of the queer population through their continual privileging of a hegemonically masculine agenda.

**Theorizing Citizenship**

In his aptly named article *The Sexual Citizen*, Jeffrey Weeks (1998) offers a rich definition of sexual citizenship.

The sexual citizen…could be male or female, young or old, black or white, rich or poor, straight or gay: could be anyone, in fact, but for one key characteristic. The sexual citizen exists—or, perhaps better, wants to come into being—because of the primacy given the sexual subjectivity in the contemporary world…[T]his new personage is a harbinger of a new politics of intimacy and everyday life. (35)
Additionally, he argues that the destabilization of the divide between public and private has produced this new kind of citizen. “The sexual citizen therefore is a hybrid being, breaching the public/private divide which Western culture has long held to be essential (Ibid:36).” Weeks argues that what he calls ‘new stories of self’ (such as those of sexual minorities) ultimately provide the cultural and societal space in which the sexual citizen can emerge, as they both democratize the public sphere and interrogate the role of the state in controlling the bodies of its citizens. Although she employs different language, speaking instead about ‘cultural citizenship,’ Jan Pakulski (1997) makes similar arguments about the emergence of new ways of thinking about citizenship. She argues that claims for rights based on matters traditionally relegated to the private sphere will be met with resistance, as they ultimately chafe against the capacity of the state to legally dictate social and interpersonal relationships.

Iris Marion Young (1989) enriches this debate with her discussion and problematization of the ideal of ‘universal citizenship.’

The attempt to realize an ideal of universal citizenship that finds the public embodying generality as opposed to particularity, commonness versus difference, will tend to exclude or to put at a disadvantage some groups, even when they have formally equal citizenship status. The idea of the public as universal and the concomitant identification of particularity with privacy makes homogeneity a requirement of public participation. (256-257)

Young’s interventions on universal citizenship have special implications for sexual minorities whose ‘difference’ (their sexual practices) is located in what is traditionally considered to be the private sphere. The demand that the universal be public and that peculiarity be private reproduces the already extant privatization of sexuality and serves
to completely erase sexual difference from discourses of citizenship, at the same time effectively erasing queer bodies and voices.

Diane Richardson explains, “Lesbians and gay men are granted the right to be tolerated as long as they stay within the boundaries of that tolerance, whose borders are maintained through a heterosexist public/private divide (Richardson 1998:90).” Echoing Richardson, Bell and Binnie (2000) add, “[T]his means that lesbians and gay men can be citizens only if they can be ‘good citizens’ (26).” The hierarchy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sexual citizenship extends beyond both the Chilean context and the fight for partnership recognition, and is masterfully illustrated by Rubin’s concept of the ‘charmed circle.’

Briefly, the charmed circle illuminates a dichotomy of acceptable and unacceptable sex acts, with societally acceptable or ‘charmed’ sex acts on the inside of the circle, surrounded by their opposites, deemed “the outer limits” of societally unacceptable sexuality. ‘Charmed’ sex acts are: heterosexual, married, monogamous, procreative, non-commercial, paired, relationship-bound, intra-generational, private, pornography-free, bodies only (unaided by manufactured objects), and vanilla (‘traditional,’ non-transgressive). Conversely, all sex acts that fail to meet these criteria are defined as outside the charmed circle (Rubin 1984). The institution of marriage grants married people both access to the charmed circle and, consequently, a litany of legal rights through the institution of marriage.

While the erasure of sexual difference from the public sphere is problematic for large segments of the queer community, it is advantageous to the subset of queer people whose only legible ‘difference’ is their preference of sexual partner. This thesis has thus far argued that the deployment of hegemonic masculinity is ultimately at the root of the
divide in Chile’s queer SMI, first in the framing of the movement itself, and then in the debate and passage of anti-discrimination legislation. Accordingly, this chapter will argue that the push for partnership recognition continues this trend. For queer people who are willing and able to perform acceptable masculinities and femininities in all other aspects of their lives, such as many of the activists at Movilh and Fundación Iguales, partnership recognition provides an avenue through which they can also perform the role of ‘good’ or ‘acceptable’ queers. The next section will explore the ways in which acquiescing to demands for same-sex partnership recognition in fact allows the Chilean state to reinstate the destabilized public/private divide and re-heterosexualize the public sphere under the guise of queer-friendly politics.

Private (and Public) Parts

Santiago is peculiar among large cities, even in Latin America, for its lack of a “gay neighborhood”, such as San Francisco’s “the Castro” or Ipanema in Rio de Janeiro. Accord to MUMS representative Juan Ríos, this is not a coincidence, but rather the direct result of a state project of gay subjectivity formation.

No, there’s no “gay neighborhood.” What there is a street, José Miguel de la Barra, because the city of Santiago put a fence around Cerro Santa Lucía, where both straight and gay couples had always gone to hook up in the bushes. At the same time, they stimulated the development of a block of cafés on José Miguel de la Barra – just cafés, for homosexuals...So all the poor gays, the lesbians, the transvestites, all the rest of them are left out. In Chile we don’t have [racially segregated] ghettos. We just have economic segregation.

His a priori dismissal of Chilean racial politics aside, Juan’s larger point about public and private space remains intriguing. Capitalist domination of queer spaces, though it represents a growing global trend (Jackson 2009) has not always been the norm
in Chile. Contardo (2011) speaks of spaces for *entendidos* (literally, the understood, an antiquated term for homosexuals) in the bohemian sectors of 1950’s Santiago, as well as the beginnings of drag culture in the city’s illegal brothels. While these illicit spaces were necessarily clandestine, they were also fundamental for the creation of queer publics within the larger heterosexual hegemony of the city. Michael Warner (1999) argues that access to queer spaces is fundamental for the queer movement.

Queer politics has a profound stake in public space and the sexual cultures it enables, and that interest needs to be made clearer in the language of the gay and lesbian movement. In the culture of privatization, however, organizing a city’s users on any footing other than identitarianism can be extremely difficult (192).

Coinciding with Warner, Henning Bech (1997) argues that sexual minorities (in this case gays and lesbians) are unique in their necessity for queer spaces in which to “acquire” certain modes of being homosexual; while the origins of hetero and homosexual desire are constant fodder for theoretical intervention, many queer cultural norms are most certainly learned. Thus, without democratic access to queer spaces, dissident and alternative forms of queer sexuality are less likely develop and be acquired or learned, and state and hegemonic forces are more easily able to shape ‘acceptable’ queers in their own image, in most cases either rendering them entirely invisible as queer bodies and/or rendering them as close to the norms dictated by hegemonic masculinity as possible.

By forcing the physical displacement of gay culture from Cerro Santa Lucía, a giant park with plenty of places to hide, to a commercial street, the Chilean state has succeeded in defining acceptable gay subjects in two ways. First, they have succeeded in creating what Juan sardonically called “prophylactic homosexuals” in Chapter 1. To reiterate:
[T]his kind of homosexual is different. These ones go to cafés; they’re “prophylactic homosexuals.” They go with their little dogs, they have a coffee, and everybody can see them. They don’t do dirty things, they don’t go around having sex. Can’t you see that they’re decent people? You see, it’s really about imposing a model.

Given the taboo surrounding same-sex sexual activity in Chile, it is unlikely that a gay or lesbian couple would be openly affectionate toward each other in the public sphere, although anecdotal evidence shows that this may slowly be changing, at least in the capital. This serves to disseminate an ideal of the asexual homosexual, an idea that does not automatically destabilize hegemonic gender norms. Secondly, the commercialization of Chilean queer life reinforces the class requirements on acceptable queer identity. The block in question is in a very upscale part of Santiago, across the street from Chile’s Museum of Fine Arts. By forcing queer subjects into this *particular* public space, the state denies sexual citizenship to any queer person whose financial or cultural capital does not permit them access to this space.

While the redefinition and denial of queer physical spaces is, *per se*, problematic for the queer SMI, we must also view it as indicative of a larger project of subject formation in which marriage itself serves as a societal space for ‘normalization,’ fueled in turn by an effort to return queer sexuality exclusively to the private sphere. This process is especially interesting since the mechanism of returning queer sex to the private sphere often masquerades as increased openness to queer people. To the average Chilean, the policing of Cerro Santa Lucía and the opening of queer-friendly businesses may appear to be both a measure of public safety and a step forward in increasing the societal acceptability of queer people in public spaces. Nonetheless, by removing queer sex from the shadow between public and private afforded to it by Cerro Santo Lucía, the
government of Santiago has pulled queerness so far into the public sphere as to obliterate outward manifestations of sexual differences entirely, echoing Young’s interpretation of the conditions on universal citizenship explored above. Without sexual difference, many queer bodies are not legible as such, and through the perception of obligatory heterosexuality are more likely to be assumed to be straight.

This process of the redefinition of physical space is directly analogous to the societal space created by political initiatives for partnership recognition. As established throughout this thesis, one of the key ways in which some queer SMOs in Santiago have gained state and public support for their initiatives is by desexualizing their identities. Rather than talking about the sexual differences that separate queer and straight people, these SMOs focus on the ways in which we are ‘the same.’ While the message that we are all the same is clearly an effective tool for organizing, it obscures the very present reality that we are not, in fact, all the same. Granting partnership recognition to queer partnerships is arguably a necessary step given the current cultural atmosphere of Chile, but it does nothing to actually address the (sexual) differences that separate queer and straight people. In fact, by permitting queer people access to an institution designed for straight couples, it once again sends the tacit message that their differences must be relegated to the private sphere (in this case the marital bed) in order for them to be granted full sexual citizenship. Rather than redefining hegemonic definitions of acceptable partnerships, queer people must redefine themselves, at least publicly, to fit a heterosexual mold. Nonetheless, before we further analyze partner recognition as a tool for the normalization of queer bodies, we must first explore the mechanisms through which demands for legal partnership recognition are made.
Keeping it Class-y

As explored throughout this thesis, both Movilh and Fundación Iguales are perceived to be the whitest, most upper class, and most ultimately most hegemonically masculine of the SMOs in this study. Although I do not possess exact data on the membership of each of the six social movement organizations in question, I contend that the actual racial/ethnic, class, and gender homogeneity of each organization is not as important as the perception thereof. This is because the vast majority of Chileans (and Chilean politicians) will never bother to attend a meeting of a queer SMO; rather, their overall perception of each SMO will logically be based on the public faces they choose to put forward. In the case of Movilh and Fundación Iguales, these faces are largely white, male, and hegemonically masculine.

The perception of Movilh and Fundación Iguales as organizations primarily made up of upper class, white, masculine men was uniform across all six organizations (including Movilh and Fundación Iguales themselves), as well as countless informal conversations with other activists. Interestingly, even Movilh’s own Jorge González acknowledged the elite nature of his organization. Jorge explained that when he decided to get involved in LGBTQ activism, he felt he had a choice between Movilh and Fundación Iguales. He stated:

For reasons of social class I felt much more challenged by joining Movilh than by joining Fundación Iguales because [Movilh] is in a certain class category that’s more upper class than my own...I decided to stay where I felt less comfortable but where my personal challenge would be much greater...and [I wanted to be in] an organization that I also respected because of the amount of successes it had had, so I also had to check out a little who was who.
Although Jorge presents a dichotomy of choice between Movilh and Fundación Iguales, it is important to remember that he did in fact have more than two choices. Although not overtly stated, Jorge’s own presentation of the nature of his choice is indicative of his consciousness of the class status of both organizations. Although Jorge asserts that his choice was ultimately influenced by a survey of “who was who,” for the purposes of this thesis it may be more productive to think about who was not who. In his out-of-hand dismissal of the possibility of becoming a member of MUMS, Acción Gay, or CUDS, Jorge reifies yet another aspect of hegemonic masculinity in Chile: upper class status.

The class divide is especially marked in the preference for the partnership recognition-based activism undertaken by Movilh and Fundación Iguales. Marriage (and institutions like it) is an inherently classed institution, serving in many cases to legally cement a financial relationship. Eva Pendleton argues that “the main proponents of same-sex marriage in the USA are dual-income, middle-class white gay men” (Pendleton 1996, as cited in Bell and Binnie, 60). Victoria Brownworth (1996) continues, “for generations in the United States, the married state has been associated with class: poor white trash don’t get married; they just “shack up” together” (96). Although further research in the Chilean context is warranted, as both Acción Gay spokesman Mario Rodríguez and MUMS spokesman Juan Ríos clearly state below, marriage is far from a top priority for many Chilean same-sex couples and same-sex attracted people. By privileging it as a frame for activism, organizations like Movilh and Fundación Iguales make a tacit assumption of class homogeneity among Chile’s queer populations. As Mario Rodríguez explains

We have a lot of collective demands, but we can’t forget that we’re part of a society, that we’re part of an unjust system. Therefore, not only do we
have to make demands for the gay movement like marriage equality, but we also have to demand that Chileans have access to work, and work that’s well compensated. Because workers are homosexuals too. So if in Chile the rules of the game change for workers, the truth is that that’s going to have lasting repercussions in our community.

The classism of partnership recognition-based activism is representative of the larger masculinist divide in Santiago’s queer SMI. The deployment of hegemonic masculinity by these two groups in their gender, racial/ethnic, and class identities allows them prioritize partnership recognition as the primary goal of the queer movement because other concerns, like those of the working class mentioned by above, are most likely not salient in their lives. Their hegemonic masculine and economic capital allows them to presume homogeneity in the queer community where none exists.

There does, however, appear to be homogeneity within these groups, a characteristic that Juan Ríos claims is by design. Speaking of his time in Movilh Histórico, he explains:

[O]ne very authoritarian director that we (Movilh Histórico) had is Manuel Tapia, who thought that you couldn’t very well send a transvestite, or a very effeminate gay man, to speak with politicians. He thought we should present the image of a [male] homosexual who was masculine, serious, rational, and political. And [according to him] all those qualities are masculine qualities, so all the homosexuals that were a little effeminate were sent back to the closet. From that point on, that movement has never had a leader who is an effeminate man.

Given the Chilean definition of hegemonic masculinity and its conflation with the Chilean state outlined in detail in Chapter 1, Manuel Tapia’s insistence on masculine representation of the homosexual is far from surprising. As explored in Chapter 1, female and trans* bodies are automatically excluded from Manuel’s definition of appropriate representatives for Movilh, as they can never hope to access hegemonic masculinity. However, many gay male bodies are also excluded. I argue that this is
motivated by the same desire to obscure the reality of queer sexual difference in interactions with power through the over-performance of acceptable masculinity. Once again, it is important to remember that Juan Ríos’ representation of the events leading to the breakup of Movilh do not represent absolute truth, and that the interests of MUMS are possibly served by portraying the fissure in this one-sided manner. Further interviews with other key activists at the time, including Tapia himself, would help to provide a more complex understanding of the events.

This in turn is motivated by a desire to restore masculine capital through a distancing of the ‘feminine,’ more specifically the penetration of the male body. Hegemonic masculinity is threatened by the idea of the penetrable male. Judith Butler (1993) explains:

One might read [the] prohibition that secures the impenetrability of the masculine as a kind of panic, a panic over becoming “like” her, effeminized, or a panic over what might happen if a masculine penetration of the masculine were authorized...Would the terms “masculine” and “feminine” still signify in stable ways? (51)

This means that if gay men hope to access hegemonic masculinity, and thus access to power, they must compensate for their compromised masculinity. While many scholars of Latin American masculinities have emphasized the especially compromised masculinity of the ‘penetrated’ or pasivo man in an act of queer sex (Murray 1995; Carrier 1995), I coincide with Lancaster (1997) is his assertion that too much has been made of this dichotomy. While it is true that in much of Latin American (as well in the United States) the penetrated role is more stigmatized, this should not be extrapolated to mean that men who penetrate other men pose no risk to their masculinity. This is especially salient when speaking of openly gay men in public relationships with other gay
men, rather than of MSM. Admitted homosexuality is enough to imply participation in trangressive penetrative acts until proven otherwise. Butler elaborates, “If a man refuses too radically the “having of the phallus,” he will be punished with homosexuality, and if a woman refuses too radically her position as castration, she will be punished with homosexuality (Ibid:103).” This inscription of de facto homosexuality on unidentified male bodies produces embattled masculinities that must be contested through the performance of other facets of hegemonic masculinity, such as hegemonic racial/ethnic, class, and gender norms. In Gender Trouble, Butler (1990) explains gender as performance as follows:

“[G]ender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating attributes, for we have seen that the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced…There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results (24-25.)”

This constant performative nature of masculinity, coupled with its intrinsic link with heterosexuality in the Chilean context, thus incentivizes some queer activists to overperform of all other facets of hegemonic masculinity in order to compensate for a lack of heterosexual capital, among them acceptable race/ethnicity and class identities and machismo. Connell deems this performance of hegemonic masculine norms by gay men as being “a very straight gay. (Connell 1992:746)”

This in turn allows gay men access to the masculine capital denied to them by their presumed sexual practices and, consequently, the political capital necessary to access the state. Conversely, it disenfranchises everyone who is either unwilling or unable to perform an acceptable version of hegemonic masculinity, accounting for the general lack of lesbian and trans* voices in the SMI, except where they have created their
own organizations, as in the case of OTD. As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, in the context of the masculine Chilean state, political capital and masculine capital are historically linked, each productive and reproductive of the other. It is logical that organizations interested in engaging with state-centered projects like partnership recognition would prefer representatives possessing the necessary masculine capital to access political capital. Organizations that prefer more hegemonically masculine representatives are simply responding to larger societal pressures that incentivize hegemonic masculine dominance in all spheres of life. While the consequences of these actions must be problematized, individual activists and SMOs should not be faulted for taking a politically pragmatic approach. Clearly, the masculine capital required is about more than just acting macho; it is a complex interplay of phenotype, social status, and gender expression. Whether because of their refusal to send “very straight gays” as representatives, their broader representation of diverse social strata, or the perceived more ethnically diverse nature of their organization, according to MUMS’ Juan, the proof is in the pudding: “We’ve never been invited to the Presidential Palace.”

(They) walk the line

Unlike Movilh and Fundación Iguales, the other social movement organizations in this study have decidedly more critical and complex relationships with the idea of state recognized relationships. As already established, MUMS has maintained, at least discursively, the leftist dissident identity rejected by Movilh. Nonetheless, MUMS seems to walk the line between dissidence and skeptical participation. While not outright rejecting the idea of marriage equality and civil unions as a frame for activism, Juan Rios
takes a decidedly more critical view of the current possibilities for both engagement with
the Chilean state and the efficacy thereof.

These days, Congress is all conservatives. Almost all of them are right-wing. There’s nothing to gain from speaking with them. All you get is a bad law. It’s the same with the AVP. We (MUMS) don’t want the AVP. We want the same rights for everyone...but you can’t advance against the will of the populace. We have to convince them. We have to generate cultural change first. We have to convince them of its legitimacy. Otherwise, all it does is strengthen the Right.

MUMS’s position on civil unions represents a middle ground between the overt advocacy of Movilh and Fundación Iguales and the ‘radical sexual dissidence’ of groups like CUDS. Perhaps because many of MUMS’ members, like Juan, entered the world of activism through the anti-dictatorship protests of the late 1980’s, the organization seems to have a more tempered view of both activism and itself, advocating for deep societal changes from a leftist perspective while bearing in mind that these changes take time. Nonetheless, it has become clear to me since my initial field work that MUMS is far more involved in advocating for state-centered goals than Juan was willing to admit in our interview.

MUMS has not remained silent in the AVP vs. marriage equality debate. Although it was never mentioned in my interview with Juan, MUMS had already begun a video campaign with the tagline “Matrimonio Igualitario Ahora!” (Marriage Equality Now) several months before my arrival. Although my interview questions did not focus directly on the AVP or marriage equality, these topics were repeatedly broached and there were multiple occasions in which this information could have been volunteered. Its absence from the interview data is puzzling, and might be interpreted as an attempt to present a “radical” appearance to a foreign researcher; MUMS’ more radical identity is a
clear demarcating characteristic between itself and Movilh. Further research into the role of enmity, such as that between Movilh and MUMS, in the formation of SMO identities is required, as well as on the day-to-day activism of the SMOs in this study in comparison with their official party lines. However, it is also possible that MUMS, as many queer people do, views marriage equality in the same way as Acción Gay: as a first step in a larger process of societal change.

“Just watching TV -- like old people.”

Of the six organizations featured in this study Acción Gay is most reticent to overtly identify itself as an activist group. As such, it is difficult to place this activism on the political spectrum, especially as it relates to the Chilean state. Acción Gay exhibits what I would describe as the most ambivalent stance toward state-centered activism of the SMOs represented. For Mario, the societal essentialization of his sexual identity as his entire identity clearly presents an ideological hurdle for his own activism. While Mario is clearly a proud openly gay man, he makes it clear that he is also more than that. In my interview with him, this issue became most salient in his opinions about marriage equality.

This idea of essentializing homosexuality: there are people who think that I walk around all day worrying about getting married. I understand that marriage has consequences from a legislative point of view and for familial relationships. It’s obvious that it’s important. But come on, let’s talks about this. There are grievances that should probably take priority over that one.

In this vein, his opinions echo the party lines of Movilh and Fundación Iguales, if not their actions, as presented in Chapter 1 and in the next section. Nonetheless, there is something less politically shrewd in the way that Mario speaks about legalized marriage equality.
It is clear in all my interviews that Chile’s queer movement looks to North America as a reference. But Mario doesn’t only look to North America as a reference for queer activism. On the contrary, he looks to the North American movement as a source of inspiration, as a sign of what the Chilean queer SMI might someday achieve.

Gay and lesbian organizations in Canada get together to play sports and hike. They take cruises together and I say, “That’s great!” Because they have marriage equality, adoption rights, the state gives them pensions, they don’t have high rates of homophobia or hate crimes…I would love to wake up tomorrow and be in a resort full of old gays and just watch TV -- like old people.

Mario’s dream of a resort full of “old gays,” while obviously indicative of his jovial and slightly sarcastic personality, also serves to neatly encapsulate much of the debate around marriage equality. While in his previous comments, Mario made it clear that from a purely ideological standpoint, he recognizes that marriage equality is probably not the most urgent need in Chile’s queer SMI, his comments about Canada demonstrate that he draws a direct correlation between a state-sanctioned relationship and citizenship. This dream is also markedly apolitical. While Mario readily stated that he had read the same Queer theory as his activist counterparts, he was emphatic that, while he understood it, he was no radical.

A lot of people talk about how “we don’t want to normalize homosexuals”, but I don’t like that counterculture discourse at all. I think everybody, gay or straight, just wants to be able to lead a dignified life where they can grow in the way that they see fit, with support from the State...and if people want to get married, more power to them.

Mario’s opinions overtly acknowledge the importance of the role of the state in normalizing homosexuality, specifically through marriage, adoption rights, and retirement benefits. Moreover, it marks a clear equivalence between the normalization of homosexuality and the granting of sexual citizenship, implying that state recognition of
same-sex relationships is the missing piece for same-sex attracted people to achieve full citizenship. Mario’s gay resort paints an undeniably rosy and attractive picture.

It should not be taken for granted that Mario, as a gay man, demonstrates a certain masculine privilege in his dismissal of the ‘counterculture discourse.’ As someone who dreams of retiring to a Canadian-style gay resort, the normalization of queerness may be exactly what he is looking for personally. As a middle-class gay man, his sexual ‘difference’ is the largest obstacle between him and hegemonic masculinity. However, this masculine privilege erases the realities of all the queer people for whom partnership recognition and subsequent normalization is not a panacea. In his fatigue with counterculture queerness, Mario deploys a type of masculine privilege that allows him to forget the heterogeneity of identities, needs, and desires in the queer community. Nonetheless, his remarks also highlight one of the most important critiques of activist demands for partnership recognition. The remainder of this chapter will explore the use of partnership recognition as tool for queer assimilation, normalization, and the maintenance of the hegemony of the masculine state.

**Methinks thou dost protest too much!**

The prioritization of partnership recognition is not a peculiarity of the Chilean queer SMI. Much of the Western world is currently embroiled in debates over questions of civil unions and marriage equality. Not surprisingly, there has been backlash from within the queer community about the primacy of this type of demand. As cited in Chapter 1, Movilh’s Jorge González justified the choice as follows:

> We don’t believe that there’s one cause that’s more important than others. The deal is that sometimes we’re more emphatic about certain political momentum, or about giving priority to certain projects. For example, nowadays everyone is talking about the AVP, and our biggest cause right
now is to get the AVP passed, but while we’re doing that, we’re also working on public policies of anti-discrimination, for the health of the transsexual population; we’re doing a lot of things, but at certain points we make one thing more visible than another, considering certain political moments in which some causes are more established than others.

Given what we saw of Movilh’s relationship with OTD and the trans* community in Chapter 2, it is not entirely clear what form the organization’s work on trans*-specific issues takes. According to their website, they do have a trans* contingent, but OTD, by far the loudest voice for trans* rights in Chile, has clearly categorically dismissed any idea of collaborating with Movilh. Nonetheless, the central point remains unchanged; even if they are quietly working for trans*-specific rights, for Movilh, partnership recognition currently matters above all else.

Fundación Iguales, regardless of its overt focus on partnership recognition, similarly mentioned their work on trans*-specific issues. Rodrigo Pérez explained:

With OTD, we have an alliance of collaboration; we put forth a gender identity bill together, and in Rancangua (OTD’s base of operations) we don’t have anything. It’s all them.

Nonetheless, in the next breath he made it clear that Fundación Iguales is still working more actively on partnership recognition than any other issue.

Nowadays, fortunately we’re starting to recognize certain priorities, like being able to better defend gender identity and then get into debates about marriage equality, with the understanding that the idea of marriage equality is strategically the rights claim that is driving all the others.

Although Fundación Iguales clearly has a more established relationship with the trans* community (corroborated by OTD representatives), it seems clear where their priorities lie. The double-speak displayed by recognizing that trans* rights are of a higher priority but that marriage equality is actually the movement’s most salient claim makes it clear that both Movilh and Fundación Iguales in fact occupy a precarious position within the
SMI, despite their masculine dominance. On one hand, in order to maintain a rapport with the state, they must advocate for certain state-centered projects above all else. On the other hand, in order for them to maintain their roles as the mouthpieces of the movement, and thus maintain hegemonic masculine control, they must also at least discursively advocate for entire queer community. Nonetheless, they are clearly ultimately interested in pushing a much narrower agenda as a first priority, the agenda that presents the greatest possibility for the maintenance of their masculine political capital: partnership recognition.

I now pronounce you citizens

This chapter is not meant as an indictment of marriage-based organizing, nor is this thesis meant as a value judgment on the tactics used by one SMO or another. As we have seen in the past decade, demands for partner recognition have been undeniably effective on the global stage, and activists should not be faulted for doing what works; the political momentum behind marriage equality is a reality that must be confronted and used in the most advantageous way possible. While partnership recognition is not the most salient need of every queer person in Chile, it is important to many of them, and even as SMO tactics are problematized, it is crucial to remember that the battle they are fighting is supported by, and important to, many queer people. Nonetheless, state recognition of partnerships is only the most important issue for queer people of certain political inclinations and social strata, and should not be misinterpreted, or misrepresented, as the sole desire of the queer community at large.

The immediate legal benefits aside, marriage as a path to sexual citizenship presents as many problems as it solves. Many queer activists see marriage as
“assimilationist”, as it demands the normalization of queerness not through the acceptance of difference but through the obligation of homogeneity. Bell and Binnie (2000) argue:

[Legalizing same-sex marriage] could have the function of reaffirming marriage as an institution...It ‘liberalizes’ the institution of marriage...reinforcing marriage over and above non-married relationships. It puts people currently ineligible to marry under increased moral and legal pressure to wed...Perhaps most significantly, it upholds the notions of a particular model of romantic love and commitment (58-59).

The institution of marriage in the West is inherently both hetero- and mononormative¹, serving to widen (ever so slightly) the charmed circle instead of shattering it, incorporating only same-sex attracted people who desire marriage. Given the connection between marriage and ‘legitimate’ sex, extending marriage to same-sex couples would legitimate sex between same-sex partners, but only within the confines of a state-sanctioned, monogamous union; that is, the kind of sex people have in private. Moreover, it allows the state to fold queer sexuality into the preexisting institution of the family, at the root of traditional ideas of Chilean citizenship.

In the proposed AVP bill, the state’s interest in preserving traditional family structures through legal means is made abundantly clear. The accompanying message to the President of the Senate (Piñera et al 2011) is explicit not only in its valorization of the traditional family (referring to it as the “fundamental pillar of society”) but also in the importance of the legitimation of certain kinds of families by the state.

Since time immemorial, the family has been the place where intergenerational relationships are first structured, where fundamental values for personal development and growth are taught, such as love, loyalty, gratitude, solidarity, industriousness and cooperation; and where

¹ ‘Mononormative’ refers to the idea that sexual and sentimental relationships should be limited to two people, a mandate that is institutionalized through the institution of marriage and the illegality of marriages among more than two people in the Western world.
social and moral codes of behavior are developed. All of this makes the family a decisive actor in the formation of these habits and in the democratic coexistence and social cohesion that permit the development of good people and better citizens (Piñera et al 2011).

Although this ode to the family is not linked to partnership recognition per se, the rest of the bill goes on to reinforce, on multiple occasions, the importance of state recognition and traditional partnership paradigms for the formation of acceptable families and, consequently, acceptable citizens. The fact that the AVP is discursively framed as a tool to legalize the situation of the 2 million Chilean couples living together outside of wedlock points to the fact that the bill is in fact part of a larger state project of partnership legitimation for the good of the state, implying that only then will these familial situations become ‘legitimate’.

In effect, there are many specialized studies that confirm that the institution of the family is the principal source of happiness for Chileans, very far above other considerations, including friendship, and that [family] corresponds to an extraordinarily valued institution that deserves to be protected and promoted (Ibid.)

The implication in these pro-family statements, besides outlining the importance of the institution of the family itself, is that the non-traditional family structures in which millions of Chileans already live are not truly valid until the state grants them legitimacy. The institution of marriage, even in countries where marriage rights are extended to same-sex couples, is inherently exclusionary. Marriage serves as a tool for othering anyone who is unable to enter into a marriage, as well as anyone who simply wishes not to. In Chile as in other countries, legal marriage comes with a plethora of legal rights denied to the unmarried, including access to social programs, tax incentives, and immigration rights. In a Western model of citizenship, largely predicated on legal rights, the denial of certain rights based on marital status is a clear denial of full citizenship; to
do so on the basis of sexual orientation is a denial of sexual citizenship. Thus, the issue becomes less about who can get married, but rather the institution of marriage itself. Unmarried people of all sexual orientations and gender identities are excluded from all the rights marriage provides because the state privileges marriage as the nexus of the family above all other relational forms.

**Family Matters**

Scholars of both the Chilean case and marriage policy in general continually point to its importance to the state for the preservation of the traditional family. Judith Stacey (1996) and Melanie Heath (2012) point to the alarmist outcry about the death of the family as divorce becomes more common and non-traditional family structures become increasingly main-stream. Sarah Carter (2008) explores the way in which marriage served to stabilize the traditional family and incentivize reproduction as a tool for nation-building in 20th century Canada. Specifically in Chile, Liesl Haas (2010) examines the almost universal usage of pro-family language in the debates surrounding the 2004 legalization of divorce, signaling a clear connection between marriage and ideal family paradigms. Mala Htun (2003) elaborates, illuminating the familiar “death of the family” rhetoric employed by anti-divorce voices. Finally, Gwynn Thomas (2011) explores the role of the traditional family as the target for Chilean social programs. Throughout its history, the Chilean government has shaped acceptable citizenship through its incentivization of traditional family values (through marriage) in the social welfare programs it has created. It is thus in the best interest of the state to bring as many families as possible under the purview of the state. If this cannot be done through marriage (either because these couples are unwilling or unable to get married), the state
must create an alternate institution so as to not lose total control over these non-traditional Chilean families.

It is clear that the patriarchal state has an interest in preserving the traditional family as a site of the production of acceptable citizens, and that partnership recognition is the easiest mechanism for the maintenance of control. Consequently, queer advocacy around these issues make these SMOs complicit in the on-going processes of queer normalization and state control of queer subjects. Families that fall outside of the traditional bounds of Chilean families consequently also fall outside the sphere of control of the Chilean state. This is because the exclusive nature of marriage means that even straight couples who choose to remain unmarried are denied full citizenship. Warner (1999) argues:

Marriage sanctifies some couples at the expense of others. It is selective legitimacy. This is a necessary implication of the institution, and not just the result of bad motives...The ennobling and the demeaning go together. Marriage does one only by virtue of the other. Marriage, in short, discriminates (82).

It should be noted that radical organizations, like CUDS, regularly problematize the institution of marriage in their organizational discourse. In fact, CUDS member Pedro Gutiérrez pointed to this questioning of larger state institutions as one of his primary reasons for participating in queer activism.

One of the things that I really like about doing activism [in CUDS] is the opportunity to criticize heterosexuality, for example, to be able to begin to question normality, the family, all of those institutions...the couple, monogamy, the body, beauty, all of those things that feminism does...I haven’t really been that involved with other feminist or diversidad sexual groups exactly because they’re already institutionalized. They already have their demands and they impose them on you. They say, ‘OK, let’s go

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2 The original Spanish uses the verb criticar which can also be translated as “to critique.” Nonetheless, it is more common to translate “to critique” as hacer una crítica, which is why I have chosen the above translation. Regardless, the potential difference is one of degree, and not one of meaning.
after abortion’ or ‘Let’s go after marriage,’ and they don’t discuss or think about anything. And that really overwhelms me, because maybe they’ve been working on the same demand for 20 years, and there’s no possibility to transform anything, or suggest something else.

Pedro’s comments belie the most systemic consequences of placing primacy on demands for partnership recognition. The very act of demanding partnership recognition in the form of marriage (or something like it) reaffirms the validity and value of that institution, as explained by Bell and Binnie above. Beyond that, it reifies the patriarchal nature of the institution, as well as its importance to the larger state project of patriarchal control over the creation of acceptable citizenship through the institution of the family.

Ultimately, the portrayal of partnership recognition as the primary demand leaves little room for critique or for addressing other concerns, a frustration evident in Pedro’s comments above.

The insistence on advocating for partnership recognition on the part of Movilh and Fundación (as well as, it would seem, MUMS) obscures the lived realities of both queer people and straight people. In the queer SMI, it erases differences of gender, class, and race/ethnicity that this thesis has argued are at the root the hegemonic masculinity that divides the SMI. It gives primacy to a cause that, while politically advantageous, does not necessarily reflect the needs or desires of the larger queer community for which these SMOs claim to speak. At the same time, it also does a disservice to straight people by lending legitimacy to the institution of marriage, which in Chile is marked by and reproductive of strict gender roles, although this may slowly be changing (Olivarría 2003). Nonetheless, it is once again important to remember that marriage is important not only to the state, but also to many Chileans, queer and straight alike. Although the primacy of advocacy for same-sex partnership recognition is problematic for the reasons
outlined throughout this chapter, Movilh and Fundación Iguales are nonetheless fighting for a right about which many queer Chileans care deeply. The problematization of this strategy should not take for granted the very real and important work being done by these and other SMOs.

This chapter has argued that the primacy of partnership recognition as a demand within the Santiago’s queer SMI, although a politically astute choice, represents part of a larger process to relegate queer sexual difference to the private sphere in attempt to preserve the embattled masculinities of some gay men. Additionally, I have argued that this same ideology is at play in determining which social movement actors are permitted to make demands on behalf of the queer community to the Chilean state. Finally, I have argued that the act of demanding marriage-like partnership recognition serves not to destabilize the institution of marriage through the introduction of new actors, but rather to reinforce its societal importance and further the state’s agenda of shaping acceptable citizens through the institution of the family, as well as the patriarchal gender roles inscribed in the institution of marriage, and that SMOs like Movilh and Fundación Iguales are complicit in this process of queer normalization and reaffirmation of the patriarchal institution of marriage.

As in the case of queer physical spaces like Cerro Santa Lucía, the societal space of marriage presents the same opportunity for the privatization of queer sex through the illusion of public acceptance of queer people. By affording queer partners the opportunity to enter into societally legitimated partnerships, thus relegating the sexual nature of that partnership to the paradigm of the family home and the marital bed, the state in turn vilifies anyone who is unwilling or unable to enter into this agreement.
Clearly the extension of partnership recognition affords a much higher degree of sexual citizenship to many people who were previously almost completely disenfranchised. Nonetheless, by shaping queer people to fit acceptable partnerships, and not reshaping sexual partnerships to fit queer people, any such legislation has the adverse of reifying current exclusionary paradigms of sexual citizenship.
Conclusion

This thesis has offered a preliminary explanation for the salient divide among six major queer SMOs in Santiago de Chile. Through the analysis of data from semi-structured interviews, government documents, and mass media sources, I have argued that this divide is ultimately predicated on the deployment of hegemonic masculinity. In short, SMOs like Movilh and Fundación Iguales, due to the perception that their organizations are homogeneously white, upper class, and hegemonically masculine are afforded political capital on the basis of their masculine capital. In turn, their deployment of this masculine political capital in social movement framing processes, media coverage, and the legislative process serves to reproduce and increase this capital, exacerbating the already extant divide.

Preliminary Conclusions

Chapter 1

Chapter 1 analyzed a recent frame amplification, through value amplification, (Snow et al 1986) from specific rights-based organization to a more inclusive diversidad sexual frame, and subsequently to one of diversidad in general. I have argued that this frame, when reduced simply to diversidad, may have a number of deleterious effects. First, any discussion of ‘diversity’ writ large is difficult in Chile, owing to a historical lack of discourse around ideas of race and ethnicity. It is crucial that attempts to appeal to these ideals not take for granted the initial cultural work required to establish this
discourse in a more general sense. It is imperative that discussions of racial and ethnic difference go beyond a simple declaration of “I’m Mapuche” or “I’m Black,” leading instead to larger conversations about what racial and ethnic difference mean (and have meant) in Chile. To proceed otherwise is to establish a false equivalency between minority groups occupying different social strata.

Secondly, by quite literally desexualizing the frame by removing the word *sexual*, activists (knowingly or not) contribute to a process of desexualizing queer difference that has precedents in the US and Western European movements (Warner 1999; Hekma and Duyvendak 2011). When sexual diversity is removed from discourse, queer bodies and experienced are consequently normalized and erased. On one hand, this is strategically advantageous for certain social movement actors. On the other, it goes against the very ideal of *diversidad*. In a truly successful deployment of this frame, no one should have to hide his/her difference in the name of acceptance. To ask this, tacitly or overtly, is to contribute to the continued hegemonic masculine control over queer bodies.

Given the brief nature of my field work, I was present only for the two parades analyzed in Chapter 1, those of Movilh and Fundación Iguales. Nonetheless, further research should attempt to compare these parades, and specifically their use of *diversidad* framing, with parades throughout the year, especially the September parade held by MUMS and Acción Gay. Although representatives from these organizations expressed their opinion that this parade was markedly different from the June parades, it has become clear since my initial field work that these organizations may portray themselves as more radically different from Movilh than their daily actions may express. This speaks to a larger point, which is the reliability of interview data in general, especially as
it pertains to representatives of social movement organizations. Further research should attempt to compare, contrast, and problematize documented SMO actions with the portrayal of these actions by SMO representatives, in an attempt to understand the societal and organizational pressures that may incentive a given activist to represent an event in a certain light.

Chapter 2

This point is especially important in relation to the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2, about the *Ley Antidiscriminación*. In this chapter, I argued that both the law itself and the process by which it was passed reproduce and reinscribe the hegemonic masculine control of the SMI at the heart of this analysis. Both media and government preference for interactions with Movilh as the SMO of reference based, as I argue, on their ability to perform hegemonic masculinity, as well as Movilh’s campaign to name the law after Daniel Zamudio, have ultimately rewarded the SMO even more masculine political capital. Unfortunately, it appears that these same societal mechanisms contributed to the hasty passage of a bill that may actually do more harm than good as it reifies masculinist divides on the basis race/ethnicity, gender, an class.

Nonetheless, while the ultimate exclusion of most SMOs besides Movilh in the process of passing this law seems to be an almost universally accepted fact across the SMI, the mechanisms of this exclusion remain difficult to ascertain. At this time, it is unclear from my data whether these groups were forced out, voluntarily bowed out, or some combination of the two. I was unable to answer this question satisfactorily due to a lack of specific interview data on this subject from these groups (such as MUMS and Acción Gay), as well as data from groups not included in this study. Further research
should combine additional interview data with a critical analysis of the public record in order to understand exactly how hegemonic masculinity worked to exclude some groups and not others, as well as whether there are additional factors involved. Additionally, it will be important to analyze the potential political gain for excluded SMOs as they embrace this ‘pariah’ identity.

Chapter 3

The problematization of advocacy for same-sex partnership recognition in Chapter 3 presents exciting opportunities for future inter-organizational and transnational studies of queer organizing. Given the ubiquity of this debate in most of the Western world (Mucciaroni 2008), the conclusions drawn in this study add to the growing body of literature on the politics of same-sex partnership recognition. Advocacy for partnership recognition on the part of queer SMOs obscures the lived realities of both queer people and straight people by erasing differences of gender, class, and race/ethnicity that are at the root the hegemonic masculinity that divides the SMI. Furthermore, it obscures the needs and desires of the queer community for which these SMOs claim to speak.

Although a politically logical choice, the primacy of same-sex partnership advocacy continues the process of desexualization of the movement explored throughout the thesis, the ultimate goal of which is to restore the embattled masculinity of certain gay male actors, allowing them access to political capital at the expense of other activists. This chapter also analyzed the project of partnership recognition writ large as a process of state control over bodies, and especially over queer bodies. By advocating for extension of this institution, rather than questioning the institution itself, queer SMOs reify not only their hegemonic masculine control over the SMI, but are ultimately complicit in the
hegemonic masculine control of the state over lives, through the institutions of marriage and the ‘traditional family.’ Further research, in the Chilean context as well as more generally should question why, given a general downward turn in the popularity of heterosexual marriage, partnership recognition remains undoubtedly the most salient collective demand of the transnational queer movement.

**Directions for Future Research**

*“Everybody hates Manuel Tapia?”*

In the process of researching and writing this thesis, I often joked that I should name it “Everybody hates Manuel Tapia.” Throughout my field work, I was surprised at how readily other SMO representatives were to express their negative personal feelings about Tapia to an interviewer they had just met. It should be made clear that I have never met Mr. Tapia, and that while I may not agree politically with all of the actions taken by Movilh, it cannot be denied that their brand of activism yields results. Although I sincerely believe hegemonic masculinity to be at the heart of the divide in Santiago’s queer SMI, the role of interpersonal enmity should not be ignored. While the role of emotions on social movement theory is a controversial area of study in the field of social movements, emotions are often studied as tools for SMO intersection (Gould 2004; Doetsch-Kidder 2012) and in the creation of collective identity (Sparks 1997; Opp 2009; Tarrow 2011). Although these perspectives are surely valuable, I believe it is equally important to understand the role that negative emotions, such as enmity, may play both in dividing SMIs and strengthening individual SMO cohesion, as seems to be at least partially the case in Chile. I suspect that, while most likely motivated by hegemonic
masculine dominance, feelings of enmity toward Tapia and Movilh, may be crucial to the
group identities of the other SMOs in this study.

“In Chile, there is no lesbian movement”

Perhaps the issue with which I have grappled the most in completing this thesis is
the lack of lesbian and other queer female perspectives in my interview data. With the
exception of OTD’s María Sánchez, all of the activists interviewed were men.
Furthermore, they almost universally disavowed any knowledge of organized lesbian and
feminist SMOs in Santiago, an assertion that upon further research is patently false.
Although this presents problems for a complete analysis of the Santiago’s queer SMI, the
very absence of lesbian and feminist organizations from the study, and the refusal of male
activists to acknowledge their existence, provides evidence of the hegemonic masculine
dominance this thesis has explored. In general, although there is a significant body of
literature on feminist organization in Chile (Araujo 2002; Haas 2012), lesbian activists
are mentioned as a sticking point for solidarity in these SMOs, if they are mentioned at
all. Nonetheless, further research must endeavor to seek out these queer voices, both to
understand their roles in the overall SMI, and to better understand the mechanisms of
their exclusion.

More generally, this study might have benefitted from a larger sample size.
Given the constraints on my time in the field, I made the conscious decision to focus on
queer SMOs with a clear impact on the public sphere. Nonetheless, the preliminary
conclusions reached in this thesis may be tempered by research into the perspectives of
smaller or nascent queer SMOs, especially in relation to their interactions with the larger
SMOs in this study. While anecdotal evidence gathered in the field clearly points to
some level collaboration between larger and smaller SMOs, further research should focus on exactly what processes are at work in these interactions, as well as the possible role played by positive and negative emotions.

**A final note**

When I first set out to do field work in Chile during the summer of 2013, it was with a different, broader project in mind. Nonetheless, the division in Santiago’s queer SMI soon captured my curiosity, and I made the difficult decision to abandon a portion of my original project to focus my research on what was, at the time, a new field of interest for me. Since returning from the field, my interest in the study of queer Latin American social movements has only grown, as I have discovered new bodies of literature and new ways of thinking. It is my hope that this thesis can add to the small but growing body of research on this topic, and that the preliminary conclusions I have reached will be expanded on, and may be useful for scholars of Latin America, social movements, and Queer theory.

This thesis has effectively demonstrated the potential for enriched scholarship when Queer theory and social movement theory are brought into conversation. The additional Latin American context has further enriched this study, by demonstrating the ways in which distinct gender norms across cultures can temper processes like the deployment of hegemonic masculinity. It is my belief that Queer theorists should further explore the dynamics of gender and sexuality at work in social movement organizations and their interactions with the state. These interactions represent unique microcosms of gendered and sexed dynamics that are often difficult to assess on the macro level. By
examining them first on a case-by-case basis, we can then draw more nuanced and rich conclusions about how gender and sexuality shape our lives in more macro contexts.

In turn, social movement theorists stand to gain valuable insight from the study of queer SMOs. Given the renewed popularity of the study of the role of emotions in social movement processes, it is crucial to understand the personal and sentimental processes that allow a community to form not out of sameness, but out of difference. Although, as this thesis has demonstrated, this process is often complicated by other factors, an understanding of these dynamics is nonetheless crucial. Uncovering these processes, consequently, offers potentially valuable insight into the heterogeneous nature of all identity-based social movements, often erroneously portrayed as monoliths of opinion and collective action.

This thesis is not a value judgment of any of the activists or SMOs portrayed herein. Across the board, interview participants demonstrated passion and courage in their willingness to fight for queer citizenship in what can often be a hostile environment to queer activism (Encarnación 2011). Nonetheless, it is incumbent on us, as academics and as citizens, to examine and problematize new forms of collective action. Social movements, and especially queer social movements, are increasingly transnational (Altman 1996; Jackson 2009.) This means that what happens in the US queer movement is important to the Chilean queer movement, but it also means the inverse. By endeavoring to understand the processes of gender deployment in Santiago’s queer SMI, we can also hope to better understand these processes in other contexts, including our own.
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Biography

Baird Campbell is originally from Hancock, in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. After a year as a Rotary exchange student in La Serena, Chile, he received his Bachelor’s of Arts in Latin American Studies, French and Francophone Studies, and Applied Linguistics from the University of Michigan – Ann Arbor. He has studied in Italy, Chile, Brazil, and Senegal and was the 2009 recipient of the Chiara Maria Levin Award for Breadth and Excellence in the Romance Languages. His honors thesis was entitled Más Chileno que los Porotos and was a study of the contributions of Mapudungún and Quechua to the modern Chilean dialect of Spanish. Upon graduation he was awarded a Department of State Fulbright English Teaching Assistantship in Madrid, Spain, where he resided for the next two and half years. Upon returning to the USA, he took a position as Adjunct Spanish Faculty at Finlandia University in Hancock, Michigan. Baird is also a freelance translator, most recently having worked for the George Wright Society. Upon completion of his coursework at Tulane, Baird will pursue a Ph.D. in Anthropology at Rice University, beginning in Fall 2014, where he will build on his thesis research for his eventual dissertation.