**CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH DEFECTION PROGRAMMING:**
THE CASE OF RWANDA AND THE *FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES POUR LA LIBÉRATION DU*
***RWANDA* / DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA IN EASTERN**
**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**

AN ABSTRACT
SUBMITTED ON THE TWENTY-SIXTH DAY OF JUNE 2017
TO THE PAYSON GRADUATE PROGRAM IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW
OF TULANE UNIVERSITY
FOR THE DEGREE
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY:

_____
Molly Katha Lynderup Cohen

APPROVED: _____
Eamon Kelly, Ph.D.
Co-Chair

_____
Dauphine Sloan, Ph.D.
Co-Chair

_____
Elke DeBuhr, Ph.D.

_____
Phuong Pham, Ph.D.

_____
Stanley Samarasinghe, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Rwanda's combatting of the *Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda* or Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the ideological, and one-time terrorist group designee, non-state, armed group on its eastern border, through defection programming, has proven to be an effective strategy for weakening the armed group. This is consistent with research that has found that the strength of the rebel personnel, or the human-feasibility factor of conflict, is a critical determinant of non-state, armed-group success (Aronson et al. 2015; Collier 2000a; Gates 2002). However, little research exists on addressing non-state armed-group personnel as a means of resolving conflict. Although the approach of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) to encourage the defection of combatants has been successful, discussion with those who defected suggests that more needs to be done to encourage both more defections and prevent new recruitment to further weaken non-state, armed groups—thus addressing the supply and the demand aspects of a group's personnel. Moreover, whereas Rwanda is a unique country – suffering a massive genocide in which almost one tenth of its population was killed in 1994 to achieving significant levels of peace and development, today – lessons from this case indeed may be valuable for other countries confronting various non-state insurgencies. At a minimum, this case proves that additional research on large-scale defection programming and prevention of recruitment into non-state armed groups – as a strategy to weaken them and force their leaders to the negotiating table – has merit. If personnel can be encouraged to defect and prevented from recruitment, the rebel-group feasibility becomes significantly diminished and the likelihood of its leaders to be encouraged to negotiate increases. Furthermore, enhanced defection and recruitment prevention programming would be a valuable contribution to the current toolbox that conflict-resolution practitioners and policy makers utilize to seek an end to conflict.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH DEFECTION PROGRAMMING:
THE CASE OF RWANDA AND THE *FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES POUR LA LIBÉRATION DU*
***RWANDA* / DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA IN EASTERN**
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED ON THE TWENTY-SIXTH DAY OF JUNE 2017
TO THE PAYSON GRADUATE PROGRAM IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW
OF TULANE UNIVERSITY
FOR THE DEGREE
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY: _____
Molly Karna Lynderup Cohen

APPROVED: _____
Eamon Kelly, Ph.D.
Co-Chair

_____
Dauphine Sloan, Ph.D.
Co-Chair

_____
Elke DeBuhr, Ph.D.

_____
Phuong Pham, Ph.D.

_____
Stanley Samarasinghe, Ph.D.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my family and friends who provided endless support and encouragement throughout this process. My extremely patient parents saw me through four other degrees, and yet never stopped encouraging the completion of this doctorate—and I am so grateful for their constant motivation. My amazing boyfriend, and biggest champion throughout, encouraged me to quit my job to complete my degree, and even good-naturedly accepted the challenge of dog-sitting our little pup for nearly a year while I was overseas completing my fieldwork. His everlasting support, confidence in me, and gracious acceptance of my passion for international research, and all the challenges that brings to our relationship, allowed me to finally complete this work.

I hold a deep gratitude to those in the field, too, including local officials and supervisors who greatly facilitated my work, experts who generously gave of their time, and especially, the key informants who patiently recounted decades of personal, at times, difficult, history time and again. Their support and goodwill allowed me to complete this undertaking, and I am grateful for their time and assistance.

Finally, I would like to thank my committee members, who each played key roles in helping me to achieve my degree. They inspired in me a passion and appreciation for international development and conflict resolution; they taught the importance of rigor in research and understanding; they encouraged my many ideas over the years; and, they each committed the support to help me finish this manuscript. Dr. Dauphine Sloan, my committee co-chair, held a light for me at the end of the tunnel that never waned, and without whom, I could not have completed this work. Dr. Eamon Kelly, my other committee co-chair, sadly passed away just as I completed my degree. His careful reading of my final work, and unending patience, reassurance, advice, and guidance, were always deeply appreciated—and will be sincerely missed. Dr. Stanley Samarasinghe, or "Dr. Sam," was a wonderful resource, challenging assumptions and providing unparalleled insight on areas of conflict resolution and post-conflict development. Dr. Phuong Pham truly helped me find my path in the development and conflict resolution field, and always encouraged me to take on greater challenge in my research. Finally, Dr. Elke de Buhr, possessed a patience and quiet confidence in me that I leaned on regularly. Knowing that I could reach out for a conversation, wherever in the world any of my members were, was immensely helpful and truly gave me the confidence I needed to complete this undertaking.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AFDL	*L'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire*/Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
ALiR	*Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda*/Army for the Liberation of Rwanda
AN–Imboneza	*Armée Nationale-Imboneza*/National Army–Imboneza
APCLS	*Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain*/Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo
AU	African Union
BNK	Basic Needs Kit
CAR	Central African Republic
CDR	*Coalition pour la Défense de la République*/Coalition for the Defense of the Republic
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CNDP	*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple*/National Congress for the Defense of the People
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CRAP	*Commandos de Recherche et d'Action en Profondeur*/Research and Action Reconnaissance Commandos
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Center for Systemic Peace
CSRC	Crisis States Research Center
CSRS	Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDRR	Demobilization, Disarmament, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
Ex-FAR	*Former Forces Armées Rwandaises*/Former Armed Forces of Rwanda
FAR	*Forces Armées Rwandaises*/Armed Forces of Rwanda (Habyarimana Regime)

FARDC	*Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*/Armed Forces of Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAZ	*Forces Armées Zaïroises/*Zairian Armed Forces
FCS	Fragile and Conflict Situations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDLR	*Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda*/Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FMI	Foreign Military Intervention
FNL	*Forces Nationales de Libération*/National Liberation Front
FOCA	*Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi*/Fighting Forces Abacunguzi
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH/*German Organization for Technical Cooperation
GNI	Gross National Income
GPI	Global Peace Index
GWP	Gross World Product
HDI/R	Human Development Index/Human Development Report
IBL	Institutionalization Before Liberalization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IGA	Individual Economic Reintegration Grants
IHDI	Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index
IO	International Organization

IRB	Institutional Review Board
IRC	Information-Related Capabilities
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (also known as ISIL or IS)
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
M23	*Mouvement du 23-Mars*/March 23 Movement
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDR–Power	*Mouvement Democratique Republicain–Pawa*/Republican Democratic Movement
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIDIMAR	Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs
MILDEC	Military Deception
MINADEF	Ministry of Defense (Rwanda)
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of Congo
MOD	Minister of Defense (Rwanda)
MONUC	*Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo*/United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies de Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo*/United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo
MRND	*Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*/National Revolutionary Movement for Development and Democracy
MRU	Medical Rehabilitation Unit
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIDA	National Identification Agency (Rwanda)
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Rwanda)
OAU	Organization of African Unity

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OECD–DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee
PALiR	*Peuple en Armes pour la Libération du Rwanda*/Party for the Liberation of Rwanda
PARMEHUTU	*Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu*/ Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PDOP	Pre-Discharge Orientation Program
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
POP	Pillars of Peace
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRO	Provincial Reintegration Officer
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PS–Imberakuri	*Parti Social-Imberakuri*/Social Party–Imberakuri
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RCD–Goma	*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie*/Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma
RDF	Rwandan Defense Forces
RDR	*Rassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et de la Démocratie au Rwanda*/Republican Rally for Democracy
RDRC	Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
RDRP	Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program
RDS	Respondent-Driven Sampling
RG	Reintegration Grant
ROC	Republic of Congo–Brazzaville
ROR	Republic of Rwanda
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army

RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RUD	*Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie*/Rally for Unity and Democracy
RUD–Urunana	*Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie*–Urunana/Rally for Unity and Democracy–Urunana
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
RWF	Rwandan franc
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative Organization
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SHD	Sustainable Human Development
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSR	Security-Sector Reform
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UCDP–PRIO	Uppsala Conflict Data Program–Peace Research Institute Oslo
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNGASC	United Nations General Assembly Security Council
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSDG	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VSW	Vulnerable Support Window
WDR	World Development Report

WHO   World Health Organization

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In Rwanda, since the formation of the Hutu ultra-nationalist party – the *Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu*, or Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) – in 1959, the elimination of the Tutsi monarchy in 1961, and the achievement of independence from Belgium in 1962, the country has experienced routine spates of ethnic-motivated killings between Hutus and Tutsis (representing 85% and 14% of the population, respectively[1]).[2] The decades of fighting in Rwanda escalated, ultimately culminating in an ethnic civil war and genocide[3] by Hutu extremists against Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 1994. The perpetrators of the genocide – led by the inner circle of then President Juvénal Habyarimana's ruling party (i.e., *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*, or National Revolutionary Movement for Development and Democracy [MRND]), the Presidential Guard, the military (*Forces Armées Rwandaises*, or the Armed Forces of Rwanda [FAR]), various militia, and even common civilians – were considered to be some of the

---

[1]The remaining 1% are Twa, formerly a semi-nomadic group with Pygmy ancestry who inhabit areas of Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda.

[2]The following events, drawn from Minorities At-Risk Project (2004a, 2004b), Uvin (1999), and Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1996), are examples of large-scale violence that occurred between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda in the lead-up to the genocide in 1994:

- 1959: 10,000 Tutsis killed and 200,000 more fled after clashes with Hutu nationalists.
- 1961–1970: Tutsis in exile in Burundi and Uganda form guerilla groups and routinely invade Rwanda to target Hutu leadership. The Hutu government responds with violent massacres against Tutsi civilians still living in Rwanda. During the decade, 5,000 to 14,000 Tutsi civilians are killed and another 200,000 flee the country, primarily to Uganda and some to Burundi, for safety.
- 1962: 2,000 Tutsi civilians killed in retribution for the Tutsis in exile attempting incursions.
- 1963: 10,000 Tutsi civilians killed in retribution killings for those Tutsi guerilla groups attempting to invade.
- 1966: Clashes between Tutsis and Hutus in 1966 leave approximately 200 dead.
- 1972: 500 Tutsis are killed, and the Hutu government begins expelling any Tutsis from positions in the government.
- 1973: Following a bloodless coup, a second and more comprehensive program to oust Tutsis from government, as well as businesses and schools, is launched. Crowds of Hutus allegedly attack Tutsis.
- 1979: The Rwandan Patriotic Army/Front (RPA/RPF) was founded in Uganda in 1979 by Rwandan Tutsis who had fled Rwanda during the numerous uprisings against the Tutsi population.
- 1990: 7,000 RPA troops invade Rwanda but are pushed back within a month.
- 1990–1993: "…thousands of Tutsis were killed in frequent massacres by mobs directed by local authorities, national politicians, and police" (Uvin 1999, 260).
- 1993: The Arusha Peace Agreement is signed between Rwanda and the RPF. Approximately 600 RPA rebels enter Rwanda, breaking the terms of a ceasefire in response to information that the regime has been killing Tutsis.
- 1991: As many as 200 Tutsi civilians are killed in Rwanda (likely in response to the 1990 RPA attempted invasion into Rwanda).

[3]See Glossary: "Genocide."

most violent and efficient killing squads in history, with approximately 800,000 people killed in just three months (Gourevitch 1995; Lemarchand 1998; McNulty 2000; Corey and Joireman 2004; Lopez, Wodon, and Bannon 2004; United Nations 2014a).[4]

Ultimately, the genocide ended in a swift military victory by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), a rebel group based out of Uganda, composed of predominantly Rwandan Tutsis who had fled Rwanda over the previous two decades during periods of targeted violence against them by ruling Hutu extremists. The RPA successfully forced its way into Rwanda, halting 100 days of genocide, when the international community failed to effectively intervene.[5]

Upon victory, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (i.e., the political wing of the RPA) instituted a new government and went about establishing peace and developing the country, imperfectly though it may have been managed.[6] The conflict[7] losers – those who had perpetrated the genocide – along with more than one million Rwandan Hutu civilians, fled to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Human Rights Watch 1997). In the DRC, the perpetrators and some of the other fleeing civilians reorganized as the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda*, or the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).[8] Their objective, to reclaim Rwanda for the Hutus in a military victory, was solidified after Rwandan, Ugandan, and *L'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre*, or Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) troops (including Congolese,[9] Rwandan, Ugandan, Angolan, and Burundian fighters under President Laurent Désiré Kabila) attacked their refugee camps in 1996 and 1997 (Human Rights Watch 1997).

Initially, the FDLR was able to show some success, launching a handful of incursions into Rwanda in the early years following their arrival in the DRC. After many years of ongoing fighting on both

[4]There is some discord among scholars and organizations in their belief of numbers killed. Figures vary broadly between 500,000 (Daly 2002; Human Rights Watch 1997; Meijer and Verwimp 2005; Verwimp 2003 to one million (Brehm et al. 2014; Dagne 2011; Kang et al. 2016). The number 800,000 appears most frequently and is the figure most consistently cited by the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and other multilateral organizations and scholars on Rwanda.
[5]Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1996, 53) noted that "most foreign observers did not want to accept the killings for what they were" —namely, genocide. Those few remaining UN soldiers in Rwanda, along with a handful of African Union soldiers, lacked the resources and mandate to forcibly intervene. For more on this, see Adelman and Suhrke (1996), des Forges (1999), Ferroggiaro (2001), Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1996), Chapter 5.
[6]Chapter 5 discusses in greater detail the successes and challenges facing Rwanda since the 1994 genocide.
[7]See Glossary: "Conflict."
[8]FDLR emerged in 1999, following two preceding iterations of the group first formed in 1994. For more on this, see Chapter 6.
[9]Henceforth, "Congolese" will refer to those citizens of the DRC.

Congolese and Rwandan soils between the FDLR rebels[10] and the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries, the rebel group began to falter due to internal dynamics among leaders.[11] When the FDLR realized it was failing at retaking the state, struggling to gain a military foothold, and losing political and international support, it began attacking opportunistically for rebel and personal gain: stealing weapons, resources, and food through violent means. Their victims included Congolese civilians, military officers, miners, and other rebel groups in the region.[12] The fighting in the eastern DRC became so extensive and entrenched that it has been referred to as "Africa's World War." The fleeing genocide perpetrators from Rwanda (followed by Rwandan and Ugandan military incursions to attack and capture those perpetrators) are credited with instigating its onset, where nine regional countries and numerous non-state, armed rebel groups have routinely engaged in a massive and enduring conflict over abundant natural resources, power, and a wide variety of grievances.[13]

The onset of a multivariate, African World War in the eastern DRC in 1996, composed of numerous subconflicts of all varietals (i.e., intrastate, interstate, extremist, and genocidal conflicts motivated by grievances and greed), led to the deaths of millions of people[14] (Coghlan et al. 2006). The extreme violence and devastation caused by the fighting in the eastern DRC requires a lasting solution. Many conflict resolution-practitioners, scholars, and policy-makers, alike, often think that a kinetic or lethal military solution is the most effective approach to ending and eliminating the various non-state, armed groups once and for all—especially if it targeted the instigating group, the FDLR. However, military solutions in the eastern DRC have failed to end the fighting, time and again. Whether composed of Congolese, Rwandan, United Nations (UN), or a combination of the previously mentioned forces (and others), all military undertakings have failed to end the ongoing wars among the groups.

---

[10]See Glossary: "Rebel."

[11]Principal investigator interviews conducted in Rwanda in 2016.

[12]Numerous rebel groups operate in the eastern DRC. They emerged in the years following the Rwandan refugees' and genocide perpetrators' arrival and the back–and-forth fighting with Rwanda and other countries. Some groups emerged as protectors for the local civilians; some were funded by outside actors, such as the Rwandans, the Ugandans, and other regional countries that had an interest in destabilizing the area; and yet others emerged out of greed, to capture access and control the rich mineral resources in the eastern region.

[13]For a good review of the wars and history in the DRC, see Hochschild (1999), Prunier (2008), Stearns (2012), and Wrong (2002).

[14]From 1998 to 2004 alone, Coghlan et al. (2006) estimated a total death toll of 3.9 million in the eastern DRC. However, and notably, accounting for death totals in the eastern DRC is particularly challenging. Drawing a link between deaths due to direct violent activity is much easier than those due to the structural or second-, third-, and fourth-order effects of conflict on a region, such as deaths due to malnutrition, disease, and absence of access to healthcare.

Other tactics also have been applied to try to end the violence in the region. Sanctions imposed by the UN on the rebel leadership, arms embargoes, policies to monitor minerals (i.e., a key source of rebel funding in the area), threats and applications of international justice under the International Criminal Court (ICC), Special Envoys to encourage diplomacy and negotiations, financial settlements and pay-outs to rebel groups, and more have all been tried. Yet none of these efforts has led to a conclusive success—at least not regarding the FDLR; in fact, some approaches have caused more problems than solutions.

Military interventions by third parties and the Congolese military (*Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* or Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo [FARDC]) have been especially problematic, with countless accusations of human-rights abuses and significant civilian casualties. These kinetic interventions often have had the opposite effect intended on the rebel groups. Instead of weakening them, the military interventions drive up recruitment[15] (Olson Lounsbery 2016), thereby strengthening them. When civilians die, even inadvertently, and abuses are inflicted on them, they see the rebels as their protectors. Moreover, when the rebels are targeted, their propaganda and causes are validated.

Financial settlements are another approach to end the fighting—one that the Congolese government has frequently used. Under this conflict-resolution effort, rebel groups that have become sufficiently capable are paid a financial settlement and integrated into the Congolese military, en masse, as complete units. This effort, although adept at eliminating a rebel group in the moment, ultimately further destabilizes the region long term by incentivizing the formation of violent, non-state rebel groups that hope to gain a sizeable government settlement.

The most successful approach to weakening a rebel group has come from Rwanda—not in its military incursions or its funding of various rebel groups to engage in combat to defeat the FDLR (which it has done numerous times),[16] but rather in the form of its Combatant Defection Program. Defection in this context may be understood as "The action or fact of voluntarily, and without coercion, deserting a non-state armed group (be it ideological, extremist, genocidal, or rebel) in favor of putting down arms for the

---

[15] See Glossary: "Recruitment."
[16]See Chapter 5.

purposes of ending one's personal fight with the opposing party(s) and pursuing peaceful coexistence"[17]

(Author, derived from *Oxford English Dictionary* 2017, Collin and Black 2004, and Nolan 2002).[18]

The Rwandan defection program was established through happenstance by the current Minister of

Defense of Rwanda, James Kabarebe, when he was the Chief of Defense Staff in 2002–2003.[19] Kabarebe

identified a long-shot opportunity to target a high-level operative within the FDLR for defection. The

operative was General Jerome Ngendahimana, the Chief of Intelligence for the FDLR, and the long-shot

opportunity was the Chief's wife, Anne-Marie, who was living in Rwanda (having never fled the country).

Anne-Marie and the General, had not seen each other in nearly eight years since he fled to DRC with other

members of the FAR. Following the end of the genocide, many citizens took up the calls of the new

government administration to contribute to the rebuilding and reconciliation of the country. Anne-Marie

was particularly moved by these calls to peace and was actively participating in efforts to educate

Rwandans on the new national reconciliation plan—even volunteering with former FDLR soldiers who had

been captured and were undergoing the national Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)[20]

program. Her work ethic, energy, and competence (in particular, as a female Hutu civilian contributing to

rebuilding the nation under the primarily Tutsi-led RPF) earned her praise, and her efforts rose to the

attention of Kabarebe. He recognized her name as the wife of the Chief of Intelligence in the FDLR.

---

[17]The concept of defection in this report should not be confused with military or intelligence operations where enemy combatants are recruited and flipped to operate as spies within the enemy's group on behalf of the recruiting country or organization. This research solely explores the notion of encouraging defection for the purposes of laying down arms from an active, non-state armed group and peacefully reintegrating into civilian life.

[18]The *Oxford English Dictionary* (2017) defines "defection" as "The action or fact of deserting a person, party, organization, cause, or country, esp. in favour of an opposing one; the action or fact of defecting; an instance of this," and a "defector" as "A person who defects from a person, party, organization, or cause." The *Dictionary of Politics and Government* (Collin and Black 2004) goes a step further and defines "defection" as "the act of leaving one country or group to work for another country or group." Finally, the *Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations* (Nolan 2002) takes it the furthest and explains that in the intelligence arena, "defection" means "Asking for asylum in exchange for being debriefed on all one knows about an adversary's operations." None of these definitions adequately captures the political definition of "defection" sought for this study in that none mentions defection from a non-state armed group; each suggests some type of quid pro quo in return for defection (e.g., working for the opposition or debriefing on adversary's operations); and none suggests the relevant reason for defection from armed conflict sought in conflict resolution: putting down arms in favor of peaceful coexistence. Therefore, the author developed a modified definition of "defection," as detailed herein. Also see Glossary: "Defection."

[19]Minister Kabarebe has a long and storied past in Rwanda. He served as the former Aide de Camp to Major General Paul Kagame of the RPA (the now-President of Rwanda). He continued his military career in Rwanda after the RPF's successful capture of Kigali under the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF). He was appointed the commanding officer for the RDF's efforts to defeat the FDLR in the eastern DRC and subsequently served as the Chief Military Strategist for Laurent Desire Kabila and his efforts to capture Kinshasa from Mobutu Sese Seko. Throughout his time supporting Kabila, Kabarebe hid his Rwandan heritage. When he was found out, he was demoted and eventually returned to Rwanda. In 2002, he was promoted to Chief of Defense Staff for the RDF and, in 2010, he was promoted to Minister of Defense.

[20]See Glossary: "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)."

Curious, he reached out, explaining that he had information on the whereabouts and activities of her husband with the FDLR in the DRC. After several meetings, the two eventually concocted a plan for retrieving her husband from the eastern DRC to both help reunite their family, but more importantly, to deliver a blow to the morale of the FDLR by encouraging the voluntary defection of it Chief of Intelligence. Anne-Marie thus left her children behind in Rwanda and undertook a solo journey into the eastern DRC's most dangerous forests to find her husband and convince him to return home.

Courageously and deftly, Anne-Marie survived a week-long journey by car, boat, and mostly foot through the dangerous forests and rebel-held territories in the DRC until she reached the FDLR headquarters. Upon arrival, she learned that her husband was on a reconnaissance mission and would not return for another two weeks. Brazenly, she then spent the entire next week in the forest with the FDLR leadership, attempting to convince as many rebels as she could to return home to Rwanda—a country, she argued, that had changed for the better, viewed everyone as equal, and no longer identified or ranked people by ethnicity.

Unsurprisingly, the senior leaders of the FDLR were none too pleased with Anne-Marie's eagerness to reassure rebels of the new government's achievements in Rwanda. They radioed her husband, instructing him to hurry back or else she would be killed for treason. After days of proselytizing on Rwanda, Anne-Marie was isolated from the rest of the group so as not to influence or further undermine the FDLR-held beliefs and propaganda. Interestingly, during her time in isolation, then Commander of the FDLR, General Paul Rwarakabije, took it upon himself to engage Anne-Marie further. Under the auspices of intelligence collection, he spent hours in conversation with her—inquiring about the policies in Rwanda, its reconciliation and unity programs, and the changes that had taken place since the RPF took over. Little did Anne-Marie realize then that she would later be called back to the FDLR to help the Commander when he, too, was ready to defect.

By the time General Ngendahimana returned to FDLR headquarters, Anne-Marie had had a significant impact. Quietly, she and her husband discussed the information she brought—and the discussion quickly turned from opportunity to strategy. They discussed their plan to escape; only a few days later, they

were already on the lam. With the help of Kabarebe and his team in reaching the border, they were able to make it back safely to Rwanda.[21]

The encounter between Anne-Marie and General Kabarebe and the success demonstrated in encouraging General Ngendahimana to defect ultimately led to the development of the Rwandan defection program: an effective tool for weakening the FDLR rebel group that encouraged rebels to voluntarily defect and return home.[22]

From the FDLR's inception in 1999 to today, the group has diminished by nearly 90%, shrinking from an estimate of 20,000-50,000 or more to 2,000 (Debelle 2014)—much of it a result of the defection programming carried out by the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). Amazingly, the RDRC's DDR and defection program was led for many of its early years by another key defector, General Rwarakabije, the earlier-mentioned former Commander of the FDLR. General Rwarakabije defected shortly after Ngendahimana, his own former FDLR Chief of Intelligence. After final discussions with General Kabarebe and his old colleague, Ngendahimana, about how he would defect, General Rwarakabije insisted that he also be escorted out of the FDLR in the DRC by Anne-Marie. Again, she dangerously but patriotically responded to the calling of her country, traveling back to the DRC a second time to collect Rwarakabije along with a cadre of additional defectors who accompanied him— putting herself at grave risk, once more, to help him escape. Notably, defecting can be extremely difficult – filled with harrowing stories of beatings, decade-long planning for opportunities to slip away, years of agonizing, and fears of being caught and killed – but programming to encourage and assist voluntary defectors to put down arms and return home, at least for Rwanda with the FDLR in the eastern DRC, can have an impact on diminishing rebel-group success.

The application of large-scale, defection programming for conflict resolution is not explored in any peer-reviewed academic work—and the gap is glaring. Defection programming provides a low-cost, low-risk, high-reward approach to conflict resolution that at least should be explored for viability, replicability, and potential implementation elsewhere. Rwanda is unique in countless ways, especially in hosting the largest community of voluntary returning defectors from an armed group, peaceably

---

[21]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[22]For more on the defection programming in Rwanda, see Chapter 5.

reintegrating them (mostly without persecution) into a largely stable country, possessing an extremely

effective DDR program, and lasting government-funded social support. The FDLR is certainly not the only

rebel group to experience defections; however, it is the only one this principal investigator was able to

identify that has been targeted for large numbers of voluntary defectors (with the objective of peaceful

reintegration among the civilian population, and not as assets for intelligence-collecting activities),

specifically, as part of a government program to weaken a rebel group until it no longer poses a strategic

threat.

The potential lessons from this case could offer conflict-resolution practitioners, policy makers,

and those who have an interest in seeing conflict resolved and lasting peace achieved, an important new

tool to apply to conflict resolution.

1.1 CURRENT CHALLENGES: CONFLICT EMERGENCE AND LASTING RESOLUTION

More than two billion people in the world are affected by conflict, fragility, or large-scale

organized armed violence (World Bank 2016a). In 2014, the global economic impact of armed violence

was $14.3 trillion, or 13.4% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) (Institute for Economics and Peace

2015).[23] In addition, due to the costs of war, fragile and conflict states have the highest global poverty rates,

which is the main reason that conflict emerges according to Collier et al. (2003, 53). In fact, the world has

become less peaceful due to increases in terrorism,[24] rising deaths from internal conflicts, and population

displacements (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). Although there were fewer conflicts in 2014 (42

active conflicts) than in 2012 (51 active conflicts), they were deadlier, with 180,000 killed in armed

violence in 2014 versus 110,000 killed in 2012[25] (Institute for International Security Studies 2015). Of

those who die due to armed conflict, almost 90% are civilians and children (United Nations Women 2000;

World Bank 2007). It is troubling that in 2014, conflict accounted for the forcible displacement of 60

million people (United Nations 2015b).

---

[23]The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) Global Peace Index (GPI) Report of 2015 noted: "Large increases in costs are due to the increases in deaths from internal conflict, increases for IDP [Internally Displaced Person] and refugee support, and GDP losses from conflict, with the latter accounting for 38 per cent of the increase since 2008. The major expenditure categories are military spending at 43 per cent, homicide and violent crime at 27 per cent and internal security officers, including police, at 18 per cent. While the cost of UN peacekeeping has more than doubled since 2008…" (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015, 3) More specifically, IEP (2015, 65) noted that costs are attributed to "deaths from internal conflict, IDPs and refugee support, UN peacekeeping and GDP losses from conflict." A detailed accounting of the $14.3 trillion is included in the IEP report.
[24]See Glossary: "Terrorism."
[25]The IEP (2015) ranks the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region as the most violent.

It is well known that the challenges of resolving conflicts are many: conflicts rarely resolve quickly, they become protracted and increasingly complex, fighters become entrenched, costs of conflict as well as intervention increase, and new recruitment tools are constantly being deployed by various groups to globally increase the size of the force; this is especially true among those attempting to launch ideological or violent extremist conflicts[26] (Briggs and Feve 2014; Weimann 2014).

Not only is it difficult to resolve conflict in the first instance, it also is difficult to ensure a lasting peace. Data analysis of conflict recurrence shows that conflict-resolution efforts to bring lasting peace have had only limited success. The "conflict trap,"[27] or the threat of conflict reemergence, has a high likelihood (Collier 2004); 57% of conflicts experience the conflict trap and experience renewed fighting (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 2003; Walter 2010). Walter (2011, 1) noted that in the past 15 years, "since 2003 *every* civil war that has started has been a continuation of a previous civil war" and, even more significantly, "90 percent of conflicts initiated in the 21st century were in countries that had already experienced a civil war." This means that rates of recurring conflict are even higher than rates of new conflict.

Most frequently, conflict-resolution efforts by outside parties seeking to bring peace are tied to two key factors: economic interests and national-security interests (Aydin 2012). Typical attempts to resolve conflict fall along three general lines of effort: military, economic (in the form of sanctions), and diplomatic. These efforts address the aspects that make conflict feasible (e.g., personnel, arms, and funding) and desirable (i.e., grievances and greed) (Collier and Hoeffler 2004a; Fearon and Laitin 2003). These two sets of criteria – the factors of feasibility and the motivational factors – must come together for conflict to emerge.[28] Conventional efforts at conflict resolution, on the one hand, apply kinetic tactics or military force to limit opposition strength by eliminating forces and economic sanctions to track and reduce access to arms and finances. On the other hand, diplomats intervene to encourage opposition parties to negotiate a settlement to put down arms and address the motivational factors behind the conflict.

---

[26]See Glossary: "Violent Extremist or Ideological Conflict."
[27]Collier (2004, 2) explained the "conflict trap" as follows: "The relationship between civil war and failures in development is strong and goes in both directions: civil war powerfully retards development; and equally, failures in development substantially increase proneness to civil war. … [and] unless the incidence of civil war is sharply reduced by international efforts a substantial group of the poorest countries are likely to be stuck in a 'conflict trap'—a cycle of war and economic decline."
[28]For more on conflict emergence theories, see Chapter 3.

However, although significant efforts are applied, in whatever way conflict is finally ended, it may not be sufficient to ensure lasting peace. There are an increasing number of active, violent conflicts that have emerged since 2010 in different parts of the world (World Bank 2016b) and conflict-cessation efforts often do not lead to lasting peace (Walter 2010). These data highlight a problem in both effective conflict resolution and approaches to lasting peace.

1.2 RESEARCH OPPORTUNITY: HUMAN FEASIBILITY AMONG NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

Kreutz (2010) observed that unless armed conflicts are solved with swift military victories, they will likely continue until parties are pushed to the negotiating table. Whereas ending conflicts militarily may provide a swift end, it rarely provides a forum for addressing the real or perceived issues that motivated conflict in the first instance. As such, this means that the perceived or real threats that drove conflict are not resolved. Numerous scholars agree that encouraging groups to come to the negotiating table to ensure that none are politically excluded (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013) and that motivational issues are addressed are the most viable conflict-resolution approaches for achieving long-term peace (Gurses, Rost, and McLeod 2008; Wilkenfeld et al. 2005).

Convincing rebel groups to come to the negotiating table takes some effort and usually means weakening the rebel-group's relative advantage—most effectively through force size and access to shelter[29] (Aronson et al. 2015; Gates 2002).[30] When seeking to weaken a rebel force, the most conventionally applied mechanism is the diminishment of troop size through targeted efforts to eliminate fighters (i.e., the "military" or kinetic approach) or at least to eliminate so many that others – because of the successfully targeted deaths of colleagues – put down arms in fear of being killed themselves. Typically, this approach is expensive – both financially and in lives lost. Kinetic engagements involve significant risk and rely on nearly 100% success in eliminating only active fighters – and not accidentally targeting civilians, which often backfires and drives up recruitment numbers for armed groups (Olson Lounsbery 2016). Moreover, recent practical experience, where extensive military engagement from Western countries in Iraq and

---

[29]See Glossary: "Shelter."
[30]Aronson et al. (2015, 3) explained, "Discussion of rebel force size is almost entirely absent in existing empirical work." Gates (2002, 112) further noted: "Military success serves as the fundamental objective of a rebel group, requiring a large labor force (ranging from 500 to 5,000 troops)."

Afghanistan occurred, have proven to be costly, unpopular, and not wholly successful: "The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have exposed the limitations of hard military power and have given rise to a growing aversion to intervention among Washington and its allies." Moreover, it has the effect of making many in those conflict-affected states "inherently distrustful of what they perceive as U.S. hegemony" (Inkster, quoted in International Institute for Strategic Studies 2015).[31]

Considering the rapid emergence of new and recurring conflicts, as well as the subsequent challenges and costs of resolving them, a concerted focus for conflict-resolution practitioners should be the discovery of alternate methods of addressing those issues that most effectively limit rebel-groups' chances of success. Specifically, this is the personnel aspect of conflict feasibility—or the reduction of force strength alongside efforts to limit safe haven for troops' shelter, organization, and recuperation.[32] Aronson et al. (2015), Gates (2002), and Collier (2000a) have addressed the importance of personnel for rebel-group success, and further research should explore alternate options to reduce rebel-troop size through non-kinetic means. Identifying more nonlethal and less-expensive approaches to nudge rebel leaders to the negotiating table could address the many challenges that conflict practitioners and policy makers face today. In fact, it is precisely this aspect of conflict – human feasibility or force size, in both recruitment and retention – in which research and, by extension, practical programmatic efforts lag the most.

Another recent finding for reducing rebel-groups' success in research across large numbers of historical cases is the need to address safe havens and shelters for rebel groups (Aronson et al. 2015; Gates 2002). This may be a more challenging problem. Many conflicts take place in areas with porous borders, rebels may have access to numerous locales for safe haven, and limiting physical space or access for non-state, armed groups is militarily expensive and may carry civilian risk. This is a particularly acute challenge for targeting would-be terrorists, who intentionally hide among and identify their battlefields as among civilian populations. Therefore, it appears that focusing on efforts to limit physical space may not be an undertaking that can be addressed in a low-cost, low-risk way; neither does it guarantee that rebel leaders will opt to turn to negotiations. Moreover, considering that many conflicts today occur cross-border and

---

[31]This quotation is attributed to Nigel Inkster, former MI6 Chief of Operations and current Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk at the Institute for International Institute for Strategic Studies, in the "Introduction" of the annual *Armed Conflict Survey Report (ACS)*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015).
[32]See Glossary: "Feasibility Theory."

cross-continents,[33] limiting physical space used by rebel groups may not continue to hold resonance in future conflicts; much of the rebel recuperation may be taking place off the battlefield—for example, in communities sheltering rebels or in other difficult-to-limit spaces.

It is understood that conflict-resolution efforts are difficult, costly, and often unsuccessful, and that more violent conflicts are emerging, causing more deaths, destruction, and long-term development damages. It is also understood that focusing on rebel personnel for conflict feasibility is a critical factor in rebel-group success. However, this begs the question, then: What else can be done to resolve conflicts more effectively, with fewer costs and lives lost, and in a more lasting manner?

This study proposes a possible contribution to the area of conflict resolution by evaluating the case of Rwanda. Active conflict with the FDLR has been significantly reduced in Rwanda as a result of efforts focused on reducing rebel-group personnel through targeted and enhanced defection programming to encourage warring combatants[34] to voluntarily defect, return home, and reintegrate. These efforts have had a significant impact on the trajectory of the conflict and have been cost effective, as well. This research explores this unique and positive Rwanda case and its potential broader programmatic applications for conflict resolution in other scenarios.

1.3 RESEARCH CASE: RWANDA AND THE FDLR IN THE EASTERN DRC

Since about 2003, Rwanda has engaged combatants in the FDLR, who are actively fighting in the eastern DRC, to put down arms and return home. The FDLR continues to operate as an active, non-state, armed rebel group whose objective is to take back Rwanda from the current ruling party, the RPF, which it considers to be outsiders dominated by ethnic Tutsis. The FDLR believes that Rwanda belongs only to ethnic Hutus. Consisting predominantly of native Rwandans – including former military members of the previous regime (ex-FAR), members of the militias and government groups that perpetrated the 1994 genocide, and refugees from Rwanda who have joined the rebels – the FDLR has managed to sustain living in the forests of the eastern DRC for more than 20 years. The Government of Rwanda's non-kinetic program to encourage voluntary defections of combatants has not only been successful in its efforts to

---

[33]This includes interstate conflicts that, at times, can cross borders due to rebel movement and the need for safe havens; violent extremist conflicts and genocidal conflicts that often emerge from traditional interstate conflicts; and traditional intrastate conflicts, or state-state conflicts, that normally take place across borders but are not the most likely conflict type to emerge.
[34]See Glossary: "Combatant."

diminish the capacity of the FDLR but also has been cost effective, contributed to broader reunification

goals in the country, and ushered in a period of lasting peace.

As part of a dedicated conflict-resolution effort, as adopted by Rwanda, encouraging the voluntary

defection, repatriation, and reintegration of armed combatants who acted against the state is unique. No

other government or organization appears to have developed as comprehensive a program to encourage,

accept, and assist returning combatants to reintegrate into civilian life with the level of success seen in

Rwanda as measured by the thousands who have returned and peaceably reintegrated over the past 15

years. Neither has any other organization or government proposed a strategy for confronting a rebel group

with programming of this nature: free of prosecution, torture, or forced active military conscription against

the opposition.

The Rwandan program of defection, led by the RDRC, recognized that once rebel groups are

weakened in some way – whether by fewer arms, reduced resources, less secure shelter, or fewer personnel

– they are more likely to come to the negotiating table to develop a solution for a lasting peace.[35] More

specifically, they found that when the rebel-groups' size and access to shelter are diminished, their chances

of victory are greatly lessened (Aronson et al. 2015; Gates 2002).

1.4 RESEARCH GAP: NONLETHAL REDUCTIONS OF HUMAN FEASIBILITY FACTORS IN REBEL GROUPS

Despite the understanding that reducing rebel-force strength may be crucial to resolving conflicts,

the approach of most state actors seeking to bring an end to conflict in targeting rebel-group personnel

strength (i.e., to weaken the group and push leaders to negotiations) appears to be limited to military kinetic

activity (other than the case example of Rwanda); this is the case in both practice and policy (Peacekeeping

and Stability Operations Institute 2013).[36] In addition to an absence of defection programming in practice

---

[35]Although, as explained in Chapter 5, Rwanda's efforts in this situation are aimed at reducing the FDLR's capacity such that it no longer poses a strategic threat and not negotiation. The current administration in Rwanda has made it clear that it will not negotiate with those who are considered guilty of committing genocide in 1994, as most understand the current FDLR leaders to be.

[36]Only one relevant example is noted in Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (2013, 3) "Lessons Learned" assessment of the UN Force Intervention Brigade in the eastern DRC. It makes the following recommendations, none of which recommends defection as an objective to weaken the rebel group: "1. The UN should continue the practice of deploying a Force Intervention Brigade on missions where sizable rebel groups/irregular militaries pose a major threat to the civilian population and to UN peacekeeping contingents. 2. To the greatest extent possible, host-nation security forces should be in the lead with regard to offensive/combat actions against rebel groups/irregular militaries—with the Force Intervention Brigade in a supporting role when needed, pending approval by the UN Force Commander. This is not to say that the Force Intervention Brigade should not be able to take independent action, as necessary, to protect UN elements and/or civilians when necessary. 3. The UN should adequately equip future peacekeeping forces, to include

and in policy directives, there is a gap in the research to address the personnel in rebel groups for conflict resolution. This gap is clear in both research on recruitment prevention into armed groups (although the concepts of non-state rebel or terrorist recruitment certainly has been explored in the literature, if not that of large-scale efforts at recruitment prevention among highly at-risk groups) and in encouraging defection from armed groups—in other words, on both the demand and supply sides of rebel personnel. In fact, to date, the Author cannot identify any peer-reviewed academic, multi-case studies of what works best for defection programming and limited findings on successful cases of preventing broad recruitment into non-state armed groups.[37]

There are some well-documented accounts of individual experiences both joining and leaving various non-state armed groups, but the Author has not been able to identify any comprehensive baseline for large-scale recruitment prevention or defection programming that uses large-N sets, is externally valid, and has proven success of intervention. Horgan (2008, 17), on the subject of encouraging defection, noted (specifically regarding terrorist or extremist groups): "[t]he subject of disengagement from terrorism has escaped systematic analysis. Consequently, there is virtually no conceptual development in the area, and unsurprisingly little by way of data-driven analysis to inform the development of practical interventions, whether aimed at facilitating disengagement *or* controlling initial involvement in the first place." The problem seems to be consistent across conflict types. A number of reasons may account for the problems of defection and recruitment prevention into non-state armed groups. On the matter of recruitment prevention, several challenges emerge in the research and practice: different conflict types appeal to different recruit-types, identifying concrete characteristics which can then be lawfully used to predict who may or may not become members of non-state groups is difficult (see Monahan 2015 for a discussion on the challenges identifying hard characteristics of future terrorists, for example), and even when predictive analysis of potential recruits is possible, measuring success of prevention interventions is notoriously difficult, lacking a clear means of definitively connecting intervention activities to outcome. Due to these challenges, while the prevention field is rich in programming, most researchers come to similar, if not broad, conclusions;

---

provision/allocation of sufficient communication, aerial surveillance, and aviation assets, as determined by mission analysis."

[37]In addition, both Fearon (2007) and Aronson et al. (2015) noted the absence of empirical work on rebel military capabilities, force size, and aspects of diminishing or increasing returns of rebel size.

namely, that drawing hard and clear connections between interventions and recruitment prevention success is difficult, and that the most successful prevention of recruitment activities are those that strengthen the resilience of social networks, and increase coordination among communities and government agencies (Ellis and Abdi 2017). On the subject of encouraging defection, problems relate again to issues of external validity, notably that there are few cases of large-scale defections from an active non-state armed group (with the exception of the case of Rwanda pursued in this research), that conclusions among existing research show factors can be highly individualized and complex (Horgan 2008, 28), and that accessing former terrorists may be difficult and dangerous, as they are considered both hidden and populations at-risk from retributive actions for leaving from former non-state armed cohorts, among other possible reasons. Those challenges notwithstanding, "…comparative analyses will likely reveal valuable similarities in pattern and process. If fully investigated, these are likely to be of significant value in the development of fresher, more productive initiatives aimed both at facilitating and promoting disengagement from terrorism, as well as having critical implications for controlling the extent of initial involvement in the first place." This research seeks to help close this gap by utilizing a large set of active, armed, non-state actors for use in developing a baseline theory of reasoning on defection, as well as taking advantage of their first-hand perspective to inform better recruitment prevention activities.

The focus on feasibility of personnel is critical, as Aronson et al. (2015), Gates (2002), and Collier (2000a) indicated. Aronson et al. (2015, 3) found before their study that "no empirical work has directly explored how or if rebel military capability matters to the dynamics and outcome of intrastate conflict,"[38] despite finding that rebel military capability is a strong predictor of rebel success or failure; decreased numbers of fighters directly reduces rebel prospects whereas larger forces with access to shelter increases

---

[38]Analysis of former research from Aronson et al. (2015) reveals what the authors term the "information-centric model." The argument that emerges from the lack of empirical research in the literature is that rebels survive based on civilian support (i.e., providing shelter and keeping their identity and locations secret from the government). The longer the rebels are able to engender support, the longer the conflict continues, and the more costs are incurred by the government. The high costs of fighting for the government enable the rebel groups to press for additional concessions. Moreover, a small group of rebels – with low risk to themselves – allegedly can hold out long enough to force concessions from the government.

rebel prospects;[39] and, finally, that "conflict outcomes are a function of the size and capability of combatant forces, and the ability of an actor to shelter those forces from the opponent's military activity over time."[40]

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONTRIBUTION

Decreasing the feasibility of armed groups – in particular, their human feasibility or personnel – reduces their chances for success and may hasten conflict resolution. However, there is an absence of academic analysis on this issue, and that disparity is significant for the field of conflict resolution: comparative studies of programs used to encourage defection, large-scale surveys of defectors on reasons for defection, and recommendations for encouraging more defections and preventing recruitment into armed groups would advance the field considerably. Given the limitations of this dissertation study, this research focuses only on ex-combatants'[41] (or "beneficiaries") and key experts' input on reasons for defection, their recommendations for enhanced defection programming and recruitment prevention, the connectedness of their responses to conflict stabilization and development theories – specifically, sustainable human development (SHD) theory and the theory of positive and negative peace[42] (Galtung 1969, 168) – and assessing lessons from the case country (i.e., Rwanda) for application elsewhere. The key questions addressed in this study are as follows:

1. *How and why did the ex-combatants become members of the rebel group (i.e., the FDLR)?*

2. *Why did ex-combatants choose to defect from the rebel group?*

3. *Are the reasons for defection cited by ex-combatants:*

    a. *In line with SHD theory?*

    b. *In line with positive and negative peace theory?*

4. *What is recommended to prevent future recruitment by rebel groups?*

---

[39]Aronson et al. (2015, 4) noted that "access to more secure internal shelter strongly reduces the probability that a rebel will experience an unfavorable outcome, while rebel achievement of favorable outcomes is critically dependent on rebels having both secure internal shelter and larger armed forces."

[40]In contrast to Aronson et al. (2015), Fearon (2007) postulated that smaller armed rebel groups may be more agile in rough terrain because adding more fighters may increase risk of detection and capture. However, the extent to which a small group may be able to successfully engage in armed combat operations, particularly against a state military, may be quite limited. Numerous interviewees for this study cited as one of their reasons for defection that the rebel group was, in fact, too small and not able to counter the state military. Alternatively, the relatively small size of other rebel groups (e.g., the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda) may allow them to easily move and hide although barely to reach success.

[41]See Glossary: "Ex-Combatant."

[42] See Glossary: "Positive and Negative Peace."

5. *What is recommended to promote increased defections from rebel groups?*

6. *Are there lessons learned from the Rwanda case that could be applied elsewhere?*

The findings, collected from interviews with both defected ex-combatants and key experts, will contribute to a greater understanding of how defection programming can be a tool to weaken rebel groups for conflict resolution. This study, in its limited scope, intends to establish a baseline of understanding on which future research can build in support of an empirical, externally valid, theoretical, and programmatic framework on defection and recruitment prevention among non-state armed groups for conflict resolution.

In addition to contributing to the field of research on conflict resolution at the front end of the conflict (i.e., while active armed conflict is still underway) by pursuing defection programming, this research also may contribute to efforts addressing lasting peace programming on the back end of conflict resolution efforts. This is because the life cycle of a combatant includes not only recruitment and defection but also post-defection reintegration for lasting peace and to prevent recidivism. Moreover, compared to combatants who are defeated or captured and may harbor ill will and engage the next generation of fighters as spoilers[43] to the peace, voluntary defectors may contribute more positively to peace. Those rebels who defect and are reintegrated in the proper manner, into a state well primed to accept and assist them, may be more willing and able to contribute to stability, development, and lasting peace (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996; International Labour Organization 2010; United Nations 2000a, 2000b).

Finally, the findings of this research show that increasing efforts for defection programming could be much less expensive than some of the more traditional conflict-cessation techniques because many – although not all – of the recommendations in this report do not require significant resources.

1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This study identified a selection of research methods and techniques determined to be appropriate to the objective at hand.

---

[43]See Glossary: "Spoiler."

1.6.1 Methodology and Approach

This study used the case-study methodology as the main research approach because of the positive case of defection programming unique to Rwanda. The Author applied grounded theory[44] to gather and assess beneficiary input on what would be most effective for increasing defection and deterring recruitment among armed groups. This allowed the Author to develop a preliminary baseline of what guides defection (i.e., reasoning of defectors); what programming defectors cite as most persuasive for defection; what programming is cited as most effective for preventing recruitment; whether the reasoning for defection aligns with SHD and positive and negative peace theories[45] (i.e., the predominant findings of macro analysis of sustainable development and post-conflict stabilization); and, finally, whether any of the lessons learned from the Rwanda case are potentially viable for other cases.

Interviewees were identified using the respondent-driven sampling (RDS) technique, a variation of the snowball sampling technique (Johnston and Sabin 2010). Informants for the research were selected using the key-expert informant-selection processes driving the RDS technique within the community of ex-combatants. Interviews were semi-structured to best probe what may increase defection from ongoing rebel activity and to better understand beneficiary input on what might work to deter future recruitment.

In suggesting that to ensure lasting peace ex-combatants must be targeted for support as an especially important group in no way should deter efforts in other communities that also may pose threats for recruitment (e.g., youth); or whose contributions in post-conflict environments toward peace are unique and unparalleled (e.g., women); or any other vulnerable parties. By suggesting targeted support for ex-combatants as an important group in post-conflict states also does not suggest that humanitarian and emergency assistance stemming from international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and official development assistance (ODA)[46] in post-conflict environments is missing its target or that it should be less important than those interventions that focus on ensuring stability. This research also importantly credits the role that foreign direct investment (FDI), domestic private-sector development, trade, and regulatory reform can play in driving both immediate and long-term stability. Additionally, this research acknowledges the crucial efforts of leadership and the role of the state in development and

---

[44]See Glossary: "Grounded Theory."
[45]See Chapter 3 for an in-depth discussion of the SHD and positive and negative peace theories.
[46]See Glossary: "Official Development Assistance."

stability. Finally, to target combatants with a single intervention addresses only one key aspect of ending conflict: the human dimension of feasibility among combatants. It does little to ensure that spoilers have no grievances to address in the returned state or that any side is necessarily on the "right" side. Subsequently, this study narrowly evaluates one key group to assess what it recommends to encourage greater defection and recruitment prevention, from the targeted community's unique perspective—while also acknowledging the important contributions of other critical long-term conflict-resolution undertakings from the private, public, and non-governmental sectors in the return state to which they would defect.

1.6.2 Units of Analysis

The main units of analysis were ex-combatants (originating from and) residing in Rwanda following years of active armed activity in the eastern DRC. These are ex-combatants who voluntarily defected from ongoing rebel-group activity with the FDLR (among other armed groups) in the DRC. The Author chose to focus only on adult ex-combatants (i.e., 18 years and older) (United Nations 1989; World Health Organization 2012). All ex-combatants were formally demobilized and have either completed or are in the process of completing the national DDR program at the RDRC.[47] Sub-units of analysis included experts in the fields of security, conflict, peace, and development, as well as key actors in the Rwandan government.

The incorporation of the beneficiary (i.e., voluntary defected ex-combatant) input addressed notable gaps in working with ex-combatants (Hill, Taylor, and Temin 2008)[48] and was a strategic starting point for developing a possible baseline theory for greater analysis of reasons for defection, defection programming, and recruitment prevention into armed ideological conflicts.

1.6.3 Qualitative Interview Content and Input

The research questions were open ended to allow for novel input but drew on concepts of positive and negative peace (Galtung 1964, 1969)[49] as the driving theory in post-conflict programming and SHD[50]

---

[47]The Monitoring and Evaluation Division of the RDRC holds that there is a 0% rate of returning ex-combatants who participate in the government DDR program. However, in pursuing potential interviewees, this author encountered more than one case where possible ex-combatant interviewees were presumed to have returned to the DRC to rejoin the FDLR.

[48]In addition to the importance of ex-combatants' perspective on the topic of defection (an experience unique to them), few studies appear to even explore the perspective of the beneficiary (i.e., ex-combatant) in the conflict-resolution process. See Bandeira (2008); Gilligan, Mvukiyehe, and Samii (2012); Hill et al. (2008); Leff (2008); Samii (2009, 2010, 2012); Uvin (2007); Veal (2008); and Weinstein and Humphreys (2005).

[49]For more information on positive and negative peace, see Chapter 3.

[50]For more information on SHD theory, see Chapter 3.

as the driving theory of lasting positive development.[51] Quantitative analysis highlighted that both structural factors (i.e., those that address grievance motivators and contribute to positive peace) and direct factors (i.e., those that address feasibility and greed issues and contribute to negative peace) are the most common success factors found among large-N sets of analysis.[52] However, this information has not been measured against qualitative input by beneficiaries in the field. Engaging with ex-combatants who found the resolve to defect from rebel organizations allowed the Author to check defection findings against current theory, using the connected strategy of evaluation and analysis.

This research provided ex-combatants, as the main community defecting, with the opportunity to offer input to guide the understanding of what works, what does not work, and what is needed to encourage greater defection (and deter future recruitment) in highly at-risk environments. By evaluating this unique group of former rebel fighters about their reasons for defection from rebel activity and their recommendations for encouraging greater defection and deterring recruitment, this research identified those factors that are most important for defection to the broader community of rebel combatants (in the case of Rwanda) and establishes an important baseline for research on future cases.

1.7 RESEARCH IMPORTANCE

The absence of analytical and comparative analysis on what works best for defection programming (and recruitment prevention) represents a clear gap in conflict-resolution policy and programming. If defection programming can contribute to weakening armed groups, then conflict has a greater chance of being resolved—possibly earlier, with fewer impacts, and perhaps in less costly ways. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, if combatants can be properly engaged to defect and peaceably reintegrate, the chances of conflict resurgence also can be reduced (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), possibly increasing lasting peace.

The policy and programmatic recommendations may contribute to the toolbox that diplomats and development and conflict-resolution experts can utilize to resolve conflict. Moreover, this study is justified by the acknowledged absence of the human-dimension or human-voice input in post-conflict programming, and the voice of the beneficiaries—in this case, the ex-combatants.

---

[51]See Annex I for guiding list of interview topics.
[52]See Chapters 3 and 4 for more information on the research design and background analysis supporting the report.

> Most studies of DDRR[53] programs focus on tallying participants and gauging the effectiveness of vocational training, few have focused on how the ex-combatants themselves see their own reintegration, their future, and the issues that could compel them to rejoin a fighting faction. Thus, there has been minimal understanding of how ex-combatants' personal characteristics and experiences during and after conflict affect their choices and attitudes toward reintegrating into society or resuming violent activities. (Hill, Taylor, and Temin 2008)

These ex-combatant beneficiaries serve as partners for interventions—and their input is often absent.[54]

This research intends to close the gap on understanding what needs are identified from the ground up and whether they are matched against the findings of the more quantitatively derived analytical macro-level research. Key constituents for research included international and multinational organizations, agencies and departments within those organizations, policy makers, program developers, and researchers with an interest in conflict resolution.

1.8   CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This report describes the potential role that defection may play in hastening an end to armed conflict, at perhaps a lower cost and with fewer lives lost than traditional conflict-resolution approaches. This Chapter 1 is a high-level overview of the study, explaining the current challenges in the field of conflict resolution, the opportunity provided by the selected case, where gaps in the research appear relative to the study, the research questions articulated by the Author, the methodology pursued for this work, and the potential research contributions this study endeavors to achieve.

Chapter 2 describes in more depth the research framework, situating the study within other research in the field. It explores the basics of conflict emergence and cessation currently undertaken and identifies, in more depth, where this study fits within the broader research and policy on conflict resolution.

---

[53]"DDRR" is a slightly revised approach for DDR, with the distinction as follows: Demobilization, Disarmament, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration. Those who use DDR do not intend to eliminate the "Rehabilitation" aspect from programming but rather see it as an integral facet of "Reintegration," whereas those who use "DDRR" intend to reinforce the "Rehabilitation" facet as important and therefore include the additional "R" in the acronym. For this report, "DDR" is the selected acronym but with the intent of inclusion of the "Rehabilitation" facet of DDR as part and parcel of basic programming.

[54]Many multicase studies on the causes of internal conflict are quantitative in nature (e.g., Cevik and Rahmati 2013; Collier 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004a; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006, 2008; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). This is because the quantitative application allows for the examination of multiple cases (or a large-N sample) to draw out the most common denominator to drive theory and, subsequently, programming. Moreover, as Kumar (1989) pointed out, the case-study approach often is not conducive to decision makers' and policy makers' expectations and decision-making processes.

The literature review in Chapter 3 addresses three core issues relating to the objectives of the study: (1) how conflict emerges and ends, including details regarding the conditions for conflict to arise, the stages of conflict, the participants, its impact, and the various conflict cessation approaches undertaken by conflict-resolution practitioners today; (2) because this study argues that the defection approach may better contribute to lasting peace, the chapter discusses the challenges and interventions that may best bring about peace following conflict cessation and how defection programming may be situated within the current array of efforts; and (3) the gap in research based on research findings of what is known regarding defection; where current efforts in other sectors may align with programming recommended here is explored.

Chapter 4 describes the methodology chosen for this study and provides an in-depth discussion of the design, questions, methods, sampling technique, participant selection, data collection, data analysis, consent, and limitations both inherent to the research methods selected and specific to the research being conducted.

The two focal points for this study, Rwanda and the FDLR, are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. The history, challenges, successes, and failures of the country and rebel group are addressed. In the country discussion in Chapter 5, a critical view is taken of Rwanda's path to stability following the end of the 1994 genocide and also explores its successes in coping with former fighters and *génocidaires*.[55] Chapter 6 explores the emergence, structure, leadership, capabilities, and threats to the FDLR today.

Chapter 7 discusses research findings from the fieldwork and analysis. It addresses the core research questions and explores other relevant issues that emerged in the field discussions. This includes an exploration of reasons cited by ex-combatants about why and how they joined the FDLR, why and how they left, and what they recommend to encourage more defections and prevent future recruitment into the group. The chapter also presents input of key experts who share ideas about why combatants defect from armed conflict and how more might be encouraged to defect in the future. In addition, the key experts provide insight, guidance, and recommendations on how to manage defecting combatants in other cases, what lessons have been learned in countering radicalization, and thoughts (also shared by ex-combatants)

---

[55] See Glossary: "Génocidaires."

about why some combatants continue to fight—even when faced with mission failure, large group defections, and support to pursue a livelihood free of conflict and persecution.

Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and provides suggested guidance for their applicability for research, policy, and programming, moving forward.

2.0 THEORETICAL RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

This chapter briefly describes the theoretical research framework and provides a conceptual diagram that situates the study objectives in the larger body of conflict-resolution activities. Chapter 3 discusses the areas of conflict emergence, reemergence, cessation, and resolution in more depth.

2.1 CONFLICT-EMERGENCE OVERVIEW

The knowledge of how and why conflict emerges is widely known. In the most basic equation, motivational factors of greed or grievance drive actors with access to elements of conflict feasibility (i.e., personnel, resources, weapons, and safe haven) to undertake armed struggle to address the goals they seek (Figure 1).[1]

Figure 1 **Conflict Equation**

This is true for all conflict varietals: (1) internal, intrastate, and civil conflicts (sometimes called rebellions or rebel conflicts) (Collier 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 1999a, 2004a; Collier et al. 2003; Duffy Toft 2014; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1970; Hegre 2014); (2) cross-border and interstate conflicts[2] (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre 2014[3]); (3) violent extremist, terrorist, and ideological conflicts (Bartoli

---

[1]The main risks for instability include issues of grievance, greed, and feasibility. Grievance is the notion that "objective social exclusion" is a motivation for rebellion (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006, 6); greed explains that "predation and sadism" drive armed internal conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006, 6); and feasibility is the argument that where armed conflict is materially feasible, it will occur (Collier 2006; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Feasibility factors, also called third-party enablers, are the resources needed to wage armed conflict. In addition to impediments of war, it includes the personnel willing to undertake armed conflict. Chapter 3 revisits and explores this equation in more depth.

[2] See Glossary: "Interstate Conflict."

[3]Hegre (2014, 165) noted, "When land-based assets such as most primary commodities are economically dominant, states have strong incentives to use physical force to retain control, and potential insurgents have similar incentives to try to seize control over the central power or to obtain larger autonomy for a region."

and Coleman 2003; Briggs and Feve 2014; Stern 2003; US Agency for International Development 2009a); and (4) genocidal and mass-atrocity conflicts[4] (Fein 2007; Harff 2003; Smith 2011). Although each conflict type has various specific characteristics that distinguish them from one another, they often overlap and still fundamentally emerge from the same calculus. Herein, the category of all conflict types is referred to as "armed-conflict activity" or simply "conflict."

When new conflicts emerge, they tend to be intrastate or to occur primarily within states. Unless ended quickly, conflicts tend to drag on to protracted states. When conflicts become protracted, they also become much more difficult to resolve[5]; the longer a conflict lasts, the more complex and intractable it becomes (Ramsbotham et al. 2016). Moreover, when conflict drags on, the negative effects are extended and deepened. The negative impacts of conflict can be direct and indirect and also can impact the state, its population, and even regional neighboring states. Negative impacts that a state may experience can include but are not limited to massive debt due to excessive military spending (Muhanji and Ojah 2014); low growth; dependency on commodities; and difficulties ensuring the provision of basic services, often damaged during conflict (International Development Association 2015). Impacts also are felt by the population, including loss of employment, depreciation of savings, loss of professional opportunity due to decreased foreign transactions, and possibly even losses to the family as a direct result of the conflict— which often exacerbates household income losses and increasing overall poverty (Brück et al. 2010). Even neighboring states suffer direct and structural consequences (Internal Development Association 2015). At times, the capital flight of conflict has a reverberation effect outward to neighboring states, and the unpredictability of conflict actors during conflict could pose border risks to which neighbors must account, particularly in Africa where the borders are porous (Gurr 2010).[6] These long-term economic, societal, psychosocial, and developmental costs will challenge the post-conflict state and region for years to come. The accumulated impact can seem (or even be) nearly impossible for states to manage without extensive,

---

[4]Smith (2011) noted that ethnic conflicts are in fact conflicts over access to power or economic resources. As such, even genocidal conflicts ultimately emerge from the same calculus noted previously.

[5]Burgess and Burgess (2003) explained that intractable conflicts, in essence, "cause disputants to destroy themselves and the things they value in an effort to destroy the other. They may even realize that this is happening, but they will continue, because the goal of destroying the other is seen as supreme (even though the reason to destroy the other is because you think they are out to destroy you)."

[6]For a more in-depth review of the impact of conflict, see Chapter 3.

long-term international support; and it will bear on the state's prospects for future long-term peace and stability.

2.2. CONFLICT-CESSATION OVERVIEW

Attempts to resolve conflict, in the most basic sense, seek to dismantle the previous equation (Stern and Druckman 2000) (Figure 2). Feasibility factors are pursued most often to stem that which makes the conflict feasible—that is, cutting off access to financial resources, limiting access to training grounds, preventing the flow of arms, pursuing targeted killings of group leadership, and other efforts to limit the materiel required for war.

Solutions to the motivational factors of greed and grievance are pursued diplomatically to undermine the justification for conflict. Targeting grievance-based challenges during conflict-resolution efforts primarily takes place at the negotiating table and can require significant structural and policy reforms that may take extensive time to evidence, allowing grievance to rebuild. Greed may emerge retributively or in the form of a grievance, particularly in countries with easily extracted natural resources. Preventing greed well may be impossible. Moreover, countering the motivation toward greed, like countering grievance, can take significant resource investments, time, powerful leadership at the negotiating table, and commitments by all partners after negotiations.

Figure 2 **Typical Conflict-Resolution Equation**

Factors of feasibility are important to the successful launch, escalation, and – ultimately – success of war. In one of the few recent studies on a key aspect of feasibility, Aronson et al. (2015, 14) noted the following:

> [t]he availability of capacity mobilization solutions to nascent rebels – aggrieved co-ethnic groups, loot-able resources (e.g. diamonds, drugs), use of civilian targeting by the state, and external support (e.g. weapons, money, logistics, training) – help the rebels produce larger forces and maintain access to more secure shelter.

In fact, they found that the *size* of a rebel force "is a critical factor in determining how threatening a rebel force is" and "may dictate the number of attacks that a rebel is able to engage in" (Aronson et al. 2015, 12-13). Collier (2000a, 850) also concluded that the size of a rebel group is critical to its existence: "The rebel organization must be larger than a certain size to function. Even in conditions under which a large rebel group is profitable, a small rebel group risks getting eliminated. Hence, rebellion faces the organizational problem of surmounting an entry threshold." This entry threshold, according to Collier (2000a), includes natural resources, the opposition force size, and the ability to recruit quickly. Quick recruitment, Collier (2000a, 844) stated, is dependent on both "ethnic selectivity" in order to be a cohesive force and the availability of start-up and operations financing—usually evolving from criminal activities, foreign partners, and charitable donations from sympathetic supporters.

In another peer-reviewed study that assessed feasibility factors in rebel groups, Gates (2002, 112) also noted that military success requires "a large labor force." However, that is not all that is encompassed in crucial feasibility factors that determine the success of rebel forces: "[a] rebel also requires a base of operations to plan attacks, allow soldiers to rest and recuperate, and rebuild damaged forces following offensives" (Aronson et al. 2015, 12). Gates (2002) found that successful tactics consider terrain, resupply, and geography; deterring defection and encouraging ongoing recruitment also are crucial considerations for a rebel-group's success. In fact, Gates (2002, 112) stated that, "A rebel army's ability to succeed depends on its ability to recruit and to motivate its soldiers to fight and kill."

Finally, in discussing rebel-force size, Collier (2000a) argued that both grievance and greed are crucial for a successful rebellion: the former to drive interest and recruitment and the latter to ensure retention and operational viability. "This suggests that grievance and greed may have a symbiotic relationship in rebellion: to get started, rebellion needs grievance, whereas to be sustained, it needs greed" (Collier 2000a, 852). These various factors of feasibility matter greatly to the success or failure of all parties to a conflict; therefore, seeking to address and limit them often are key focus areas for those wanting to stem a conflict.

Addressing feasibility, then—or those areas that can reduce a rebel group's chances of winning (e.g., reduction of troop size, increased cost of fighting, and reduced access to shelter)—changes the calculus of fighting and may enhance the likelihood of political settlements. Not surprisingly, one of the

most prominent approaches to intervening to resolve conflict addresses feasibility. Within this approach is the application of external or foreign military action on behalf of one or more parties to a conflict. This may include direct military "boots-on-the-ground" support, financing, and training to fighting factions, among other possible scenarios.

Some authors have cautioned that foreign military intervention (FMI) on either side of a party to conflict tends to protract the conflict (Regan 2002)—or, in more specific instances (e.g., US military interventions in the Middle East), can actually increase the likelihood of terrorist activities against Western interests (Pape 2006).[7] This is a decidedly negative outcome for conflict-resolution seekers. The protraction worsens post-conflict conditions, increases the complexity of resolution, and increases the costs of conflict to those impacted. However, the FMI issue may be debatable. Other studies, such as David, Weingarten, and Fett (1999) and Olson Lounsbery (2016)[8], have found that military intervention on one side can drastically increase the likelihood of conflict cessation. Regardless of whether military intervention shortens or lengthens conflict, it certainly bears heavy risk in increasing fatalities (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015, 537), causing physical destruction, increasing costs, and undermining efforts that more directly may address the motivational problems driving the emergence of the conflict.

Addressing only the feasibility factors to stem conflict, however, may not be sufficient or successful in resolving conflict. In these cases, diplomats may be called on to mediate and develop negotiated peace agreements[9] or settlements to address the greed or grievance expressed by those engaged in conflict (Crocker 1995). Whereas most rebel groups view compromise as unappealing (Olson Lounsbery and Cook 2011), when armed groups are weakened predominantly along their lines of feasibility, a negotiated settlement or peace deal may be more likely to occur thereby ending the conflict (Olson Lounsbery 2016).[10,11]

---

[7]Regan (2002) explains that FMI on the side of either party (i.e., rebel or target government) tends to protract the conflict.

[8]See Olson Lounsbery (2016) for a sample framework that identifies a mechanism for weakening rebel groups where FMI on behalf of a government against rebel groups lends the balance of power to the government, weakens the rebel group, and decreases their chances of success.

[9]See Glossary: "Peace Agreement."

[10]Olson Lounsbery (2016) noted that if a target government is strengthened by the intervention of a third-party military force, it also may decrease the rebel group's chances of success and enhance chances for either a negotiated settlement or a division within the rebel group concerning the potential next steps.

[11]Wallensteen and Svensson (2014, 316) noted: "There is, as a matter of fact, a clear gap in research into such a specific question (whether muscle mediation, mediation with threat of source), although it should be possible to study the

Greed and grievance aspects can be complex to address, and the timing of diplomatic intervention may be important for their success. Some scholars note that diplomatic teams' most successful interventions occur when efforts targeting feasibility have had a significant impact on both sides of the conflict. This position is supported by extensive research that Zartman (2001, 8) undertook, in which he found that "mutually hurting stalemates" often are prime territory for engaging in third-party–assisted negotiations: when parties "find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and (find) this deadlock is painful to both of them…they seek an alternative policy or Way Out (sic)." Kreutz (2010) additionally found that conflicts that are not quickly won in outright military victory tend to be resolved via negotiation. Gurses, Rost, and McLeod (2008) suggested that mediation[12] has a stronger impact on achieving long-term peace and, relatedly, Wilkenfeld et al. (2005) noted that the "facilitative" mediation style is the most conducive to resolving problems in the long term, allowing actors to see peace as preferable to conflict.

Despite the advanced tools and studied expertise of many third-party conflict negotiators, the ability of these actors to bring a lasting resolution to a complex and protracted conflict is still limited (Human Security Centre 2006, 18).[13] The leadership of armed groups often is unwilling to engage in negotiation for many reasons. Brahm (2004) distilled the following three key reasons for their unwillingness:

1. People underestimate the costs of continuing the conflict and overestimate their chances of winning.
2. People know that the conflict is doing great harm, but they see no way out.
3. People know that the conflict is doing great harm, but they fear that the costs of resolving the conflict will be even higher.

In most instances, if sufficient resources (i.e., financial, military, and diplomatic) are leveraged against a conflict in its earliest stages, the costs are lowest (Mueller 2014) and the chances of successful

---

effects of mediation in combination with, for instance, the use of sanctions, threats of war crime prosecution or military force."

[12]See Glossary: "Mediation."

[13]Since the end of the Cold War, approximately 50% of intrastate conflicts have ended via negotiated settlement. However, the failure rate is very high—notably, the negotiations are three times more likely to fail. However, more broadly, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme dataset, of the 372 conflict terminations from 1946 to 2005, 30% ended in military victory, 25% ended in negotiated settlement or ceasefire, and the remaining simmered below the 25 battle-related deaths per year conflict-onset measurement (Human Security Centre 2006, 18–21).

resolution are highest (Ramsbotham et al. 2016)[14]; whereas the longer a conflict plays out, the more

complex it becomes, and the more resources are required (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002; van

Walraven and van der Vlugt 1996). Moreover, if a conflict ends with a military victory[15] by one side, it

tends to be a shorter conflict; longer conflicts tend to require negotiated settlements (Kreutz 2010). In

practice, however, it often is difficult to marshal resources in the early stages of conflict onset when fewer

actors have been induced to participate, fewer deaths have occurred, and fewer resources have been

sourced. Subsequently, by the time international third-party actors (i.e., those with the means to contribute

resources to resolve conflict) engage, the conflict often has progressed to a level that is considered more

complex and thus more difficult to resolve (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002).[16]

Moreover, more complex, expensive, and challenging conflicts tend to have more selective (and

thus fewer) third-party actors to help resolve the conflict because of self-interest concerns and costs

involved (Aydin 2012; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). Worse, if the conflict increases in

complexity throughout engagement, they may withdraw, causing further harm (Stedman, Rothchild, and

Cousens 2002). For example, if there is no economic or strategic security importance of a country to

international or regional powers, they will not commit resources or leverage political will to help cease a

conflict. Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002) cited Rwanda as the quintessential case for this problem.

Alternatively, where there is a significant geostrategic interest, engagement and political will to engage is

much more likely (e.g., in oil-rich nations in the Middle East).

Current efforts at lasting conflict resolution routinely suffer with conflict often recurring (Collier

2009; Collier and Hoeffler 2004c; United Nations 2012b; Walter 2011). Whereas it may be impossible to

assess the full scope of conflict-resolution successes, successful conflict resolution and lasting peace

remain core tenets of practitioners. Notably, bringing a successful resolution to a conflict requires more

than an end to active fighting or ceasefire, a peace agreement, or even a declared victor. It requires long-

---

[14]It is this notion that has driven the emergence and popularity of the field-of-conflict early warning in the past 25 years.
[15]See Glossary: "Victory."
[16]Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002) listed three criteria that determine the complexity or difficulty of a conflict environment: (1) the presence of spoilers (i.e., rebel leaders or hostile groups) who want to undermine a peace agreement particularly in violent ways; (2) neighboring states that oppose peace and offer safe haven or other resources to extend active conflict; and (3) the presence of valuable gains or spoils to which the victor will earn control—this often refers to natural resources in a stated territory over which conflict may be fought.

term investments in the post-conflict state(s) to ensure that conflict does not reemerge and peace is lasting (Independent Evaluation Group 2014; International Development Association 2015; The New Deal 2011; United Nations Development Program 2005; United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2005; World Bank 2011b). Yet, those investments are costly and difficult to achieve, often leading to a failure of lasting peace.

The propensity for conflict reemerging in post-conflict states is even higher than conflict emerging in non-post-conflict states (Cevik and Rahmati 2013; Collier 2009; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2006; United Nations 2012b). In Africa, this is particularly problematic, where more than half of the countries are considered "post-conflict" (Games 2011). The problem is that the impacts of conflict[17] often are the leading indicators of potential conflict emergence. In these situations, the potential for "spoilers of the peace" to emerge and pursue active conflict anew is a significant risk (Addison 2003).

Many renewed conflicts are led by actors who were not fully reintegrated or whose concerns were not fully addressed in the resolution process (Hill, Taylor, and Temin 2008), whether a military victory or a negotiated settlement. The absence of sufficient, comprehensive plans for former fighters to reengage in post-conflict peacebuilding[18] is a notable gap in many peace programs—limiting the attention to often poorly constructed DDR programs (United Nations 2010). When the fighters are not reintegrated, the chances of lasting peace are diminished even further (Collier 1994; Mueller 2003; Nilsson 2005).[19] The high recidivism rate of conflict underscores the challenges inherent in finding solutions to the complex problems of conflict resolution.[20]

In response to the troubling findings described previously, and following the conclusion of the *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs)[21] in 2015, the UN launched a new iteration of global-development objectives, formally beginning in 2016, entitled the *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs).[22] Importantly,

---

[17]For example, these impacts include lowered GDP and higher poverty rates, high unemployment, highly militarized society, and extensive erosions of human and social capital, among others described in Chapter 3.
[18]See Glossary: "Peacebuilding."
[19]See Chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion on the challenges facing ex-combatants.
[20]The lasting success of the conflict resolution, if achieved, can be complicated by the type, duration, and other factors of conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Programme-Peace Research Institute Oslo). For example, ethnic, ideological conflicts are more likely to repeat. For additional information on conflict recurrence, see Chapter 3.
[21]See Glossary: "Millennium Development Goals."
[22]See Glossary: "Sustainable Development Goals."

the SDGs included discussion of violence and peacebuilding relative to poverty, which the MDGs did not.[23]

Whereas the suite of SDGs, 17 in all, relate to global conflict and peace in various ways, the particular goal pertaining to conflict and peace is "Goal 16": "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels" (United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2015, 14) (Table 1). Acknowledging the worsening levels of armed conflict and violence – and the subsequent global implications – the UN SDGs tie "weak institutions and the lack of access to justice, information and other fundamental freedoms" to increasing conflict and struggle. In addition to broad SDGs, the subsequent targets for countries to meet Goal 16 are tied closely to those concepts of both negative and positive peace that Galtung (1964, 1969) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) Global Peace Index (GPI) measure. Namely, these are the absence of violence and the provision of institutions and structural reforms in society that allow for peace to emerge—and those concepts of SHD theory that the UN Development Programme adopted as the basis for its human-development programming. This study closely refers to these quantitatively derived factors for comparison to respondents' inputs.

Table 1 **UN Sustainable Development Goal 16**

Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
16.1   Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere   16.2   End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children   16.3   Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all   16.4   By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime   16.5   Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms   16.6   Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels   16.7   Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision making at all levels

---

[23]In a comprehensive analysis by Norris, Dunning, and Malknecht (2015, 27), of the 55 states found to be "fragile and conflict-affected," only two states met more than half of the 15 MDG targets for low-income developing countries (meeting eight and nine of the 15 targets); 16 met none of the targets; seven met only one target; and 14 met only two targets (ibid., 31-2). The remaining 16 fragile and conflict-affected states met between three and five targets (ibid., 31-2).

16.8
Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance
16.9
By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration
16.10
Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements
16.a
Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime
16.b
Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development.

Source: United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (2015, 25-26).

2.3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK DIAGRAM

The research framework (Figure 3) graphically:

- Defines the typical conflict-resolution approach of addressing motivational and feasibility factors (through diplomatic, economic-sanction, and military means).

- Highlights the study gap (targeting human feasibility of non-state armed groups for conflict resolution).

- Identifies the approach of this study to develop a beneficiary-driven baseline on why combatants defect, what can be done to encourage more defection and recruitment prevention to address the supply and demand sides of human feasibility of armed conflict so that rebel groups can be pushed to negotiation tables to find lasting solutions to conflicts.

- Lists the contributions that the study hopes to make to the broader field of development and conflict-resolution research.

It is intended that the outcomes of future, broader, and comparative studies ultimately can lead to modified or expanded tools on defection and recruitment prevention programming for conflict-resolution practitioners.

TRADITIONAL CONFLICT-INTERVENTION APPROACH

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS   ➕   **FEASIBILITY FACTORS**

Diplomatic	Economic & Sanctions	Military
Address Grievance	Limit Financial Resources	Provide Intelligence and Lethal Warfare
Address Greed	Limit Armament Resources	Cut Off Physical Access to Resources

=   **POSSIBLE PROGRAMMATIC GAP**   ➡   **Target Nonlethal Human Feasibility Factors**
Combatant Defection & Recruitment

Questions to Ex-Combatants and Experts about Defection Reasoning and Recommendations for Enhanced Defection and Recruitment Prevention → **Grounded Theory to Encourage Defection and Prevent Recruitment for Non-State Armed Rebels to Promote Conflict Resolution**

Baseline of Analysis for Potential Future Comparative Analysis, Programming and Policy Initiatives Targeting Human Feasibility Factors of Armed Groups through Defection Programs

MODIFIED CONFLICT INTERVENTION APPROACH

Figure 3 **Research and Process Framework**

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

There is an extensive body of literature covering conflict emergence and cessation, the impact of

conflict, the likelihood of its recurrence, and how best to address conditions once conflict ends. This work

is further refined by conflict type, region, and objective. Below is a review of the overarching theories and

data as relevant to this study's exploration of conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization, followed by

a review of what limited, peer-reviewed information is available on defection, who may already be primed

to undertake this work, and how it may be beneficial to lasting peace.

3.1 CONFLICT EMERGENCE, IMPACTS, AND CESSATION APPROACHES

A number of trends have been identified across the areas of conflict emergence, impact, and

cessation approaches. Findings show that conflict, on average, has been increasing, impacts are worsening,

and cessation approaches are failing. This troubling context further opens the door for considering new

approaches for conflict resolution and stabilization as explored in this study.

3.1.1 The Context: Rising Intensity of Armed Conflict

The intensity of violent armed conflicts has increased in the past 10 years reaching levels not seen

since the end of the Cold War. Since 2010, the IEP GPI observed that there has been a decline in "overall

peacefulness"[1] in the world (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016, 2). Other scholars have agreed, noting

increases in global and internationalized armed conflicts in the past decade[2] (Pettersson and Wallensteen

2015), terrorism, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, internal and external conflicts, and

"battle-related deaths" (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016, 8). An uptick was

evidenced even in only five years: from 41 conflicts in 2011 to 50 conflicts in 2015, 49 of which were

intrastate conflicts (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016). Pettersson and Wallensteen

(2015, 536) at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the IEP's GPI (2016) noted that this is the

---

[1]The GPI measures peacefulness according to 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators, ranking 163 states and
territories. For a more in-depth review of the data sources and methodologies, see Institute for Economics and Peace,
Measuring Peace, at http://economicsandpeace.org/research.
[2]According to Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015, 535), "internationalized armed conflicts" are "conflicts in which one
or more states contributed troops to one or both warring sides."

largest number of global conflicts since 1999—in which 11 of the conflicts had 1,000 or more "battle-related deaths" each year, thereby classifying them as "wars."

Deaths from global terrorism and armed conflict also are on the rise. According to the IEP (2016) report, there was an 80% increase in the number of deaths cited from terrorism from 2014 to 2015, and an astronomical 286% increase from 2008 to 2014, noting almost 35,000 deaths from terrorism alone (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016). The increase in deaths due to terrorism runs parallel to the increase in terrorist incidents. According to analysis from the World Bank (2016a), there was a 120% increase in the number of incidents since just 2012. Deaths from internal conflict increased even more dramatically, showing a 747% increase from 2005/2006 to 2014/2015 reaching more than 305,000 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016).[3]

The financial costs of the increasing conflicts are dire. The IEP (2016) calculated that the economic losses[4] from 2015 alone are equal to $742 billion. This includes humanitarian costs for those who were forced to become refugees and displaced persons due to conflict, some 60 million in 2015 (more than twice the number in 2007); direct costs[5] such as rebuilding following conflict damages and security provisions; and indirect costs[6] such as lost productivity, unemployment, and trauma (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016). Even more troubling, the World Bank (2016a) found that 95% of those who were displaced or became refugees now live in developing countries, potentially increasing the long-term costs of development following conflict cessation. The World Bank (2016a) further projected that by 2030, 50% of the global poor will be living in conflict situations, exacerbating the challenges faced by fragile[7] and post-conflict states.

Additionally, certain regions may exhibit more conflict than others. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) regions both face extensive challenges regarding new and reemerging conflicts (Rother et al. 2016).[8] In the Middle East, the increase in violence and

---

[3]The IEP report (2016, 30) qualified that many of those deaths are attributed to the Syrian conflict.
[4]The IEP report (2016, 44) measured economic losses using 16 variables that represent a "comprehensive aggregation of costs related to violence, armed conflict and spending on military and internal security services."
[5]The IEP report (2016, 45) defined direct costs as "the cost of violence to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government. These include direct expenditures, such as the cost of policing."
[6]The IEP report (2016, 45) explained that indirect costs are those that "accrue after the violent event and include indirect economic losses, physical and psychological trauma to the victim and lost productivity."
[7]See Glossary: "Fragile States."
[8]The Middle East and Africa tend to evidence more conflicts than other global regions due to the high presence of factors that drive conflict, including high levels of natural resources, poor governance and high poverty, policies of

internationalization of conflict have swayed global-conflict statistics negatively (Institute for Economics

and Peace 2016).[9] The World Bank's Conflict and Fragility List (FY13) posted that more than half of the

countries listed are in SSA (World Bank 2013c). Furthermore, Games (2011, 15) noted that more than half

of the countries in Africa have "been involved in some kind of war since 1980."

Post-conflict states are uniquely challenged with institutional and developmental issues

(Symansky 2010)[10] and are more at risk of conflict than most other states (Collier and Hoeffler 2002;

Collier et al. 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2006). This means that regions afflicted with conflict

are not apt to find peace easily. The challenges faced by fragile states meeting economic and social-

development targets subject them to the increased potential of conflict and armed violence (Collier et al.

2003; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2006; Walter 2011). Moreover, as Walter (2011, 3) explained:

> Governments that are beholden to a formal constitution, that follow the rule of law, and
> that do not torture and repress their citizens are much less likely to face renewed violence
> in any form. This suggests that the current heavy focus by policymakers on economic
> development as the best way to prevent recurring civil war may be wrong.

The statistics for the past decade are troubling. However, there were notable positive

developments in the field of conflict resolution and peace keeping[11] as well. Pettersson and Wallensteen

(2015) found that in 2014, 10 peace agreements were signed versus only six in 2013. In addition, IEP

(2016) noted that there was an increase in paid peace-keeping dues. The Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (2016) identified 61 active peace operations in 2015, with 162,703 field personnel –

3,336 more than in 2014 – to contribute to actively keeping the peace in at-risk situations. Spending in

2013 on peace-keeping expenditures totaled $8.27 billion and peace building by governments in 31

---

exclusion, and highly militarized societies (with a high presence of arms), among other conflict indicators, as compared
to other regions. Furthermore, structural impacts by the conflicts are now factors driving conflict: "Given the
significant political polarization, economic inequality, and rapid population growth in the region, these conflicts are
unlikely to dissipate anytime soon." (Rother et al. 2016, 5)

[9]The IEP (2016, 2) noted in the annual GPI that "The historic ten-year deterioration in peace has largely been driven by
the intensifying conflicts in the MENA region. Terrorism is also at an all-time high, battle deaths from conflict are at a
25-year high, and the numbers of refugees and displaced people are at a level not seen in 60 years."

[10]Symansky (2010, 1–2) explained that post-conflict states are unique for four key reasons: (1) "Human capacity will
either be non-existent or much lower than in other countries"; (2) "Physical capital and operating systems are either
non-existent or have not operated for a relatively long period"; (3) "Domestic revenue is minimal compared to even
recurrent expenditures"; and (4) "Initially, most emphasis is placed on establishing security and stability rather than
promoting development."

[11]The IEP (2016, 50) explained that *peace-keeping* operations are those "measures aimed at responding to a conflict,
whereas *peace-building* expenditures are aimed at developing and maintaining the capacities for resilience to conflict."
Resiliencies to conflict include democratic institutions, inclusive political processes, and sustainable development.

countries totaled $6.8 billion (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016).[12] Yet, although these statistics sound impressive, when measured against the cost of armed conflict reaching $700 billion or more annually, these figures are only a small fraction of the total economic cost of armed conflict (1.1% and 0.9%, respectively)—perhaps explaining some of the reasons behind conflict reemergence.

3.1.1.1 Definition of Armed Conflict

Scholars, policy makers, and legal bodies have yet to come to a universally agreed-on definition of armed conflict; the distinctions between the various definitions often are complicated and "intensively debated by experts in international law" (Melander 2016, 2). However, most definitions discern between conflicts that take place within a state (i.e., intrastate, between a state and a non-state armed group) and those that take place between two states (i.e., interstate, between two states against one another). This approach allows for coherent accounting mechanisms that enable global tracking of the emergence, duration, and cessation of conflicts.

However, this differentiation does not account for distinctions in the types of conflict, such as whether the internal conflict is a civil war or genocide or whether conflicts that have emerged among numerous states constitute terrorism or more traditional forms of international conflict.[13] These more discrete distinctions also are somewhat complicated to pin down—in fact, a single iteration of a conflict often may go through various stages, exhibiting multiple types of conflict. It is not uncommon for genocide to emerge from civil war (as in the Rwanda case); neither would it be unexpected if an internal conflict between a non-state actor and a state transformed from a civil rebellion to a violent extremist-type of conflict. Even within conflict types there are varieties about which scholars often debate—for example, does politicide constitute genocide? Or is there a distinction between a conflict that aims to take over the government (e.g., to introduce new leadership) versus one that seeks to implement a new government type (e.g., to replace a capitalist system with a theorcratic system)? Given these challenges, then, it is difficult to find a definition that accounts for all varieties of armed conflict without becoming so broad as to not be relevant to the types of armed conflicts that scholars seek to research.

---

[12]The IEP report (2016) used donor expenditures from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to compile these numbers.
[13]See Glossary for definitions of the key conflict types discussed.

The conflict definition that is commonly used among social scientists comes from the UCDP: "[a]n armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state. For intrastate conflicts, the location is a country. For an interstate conflict, it is two or more countries" (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015, 536). This definition is closest to aligning with the needs of this study but requires a minor modification. This research acknowledges that even for intrastate conflicts,[14] because of the nature of porous borders in many of the regions where intrastate conflicts emerge (i.e., generally poorer, developing regions) and the fact that neighbors often are complicit spoilers offering safe haven to opposition groups, it is necessary to mention that even intrastate conflicts may take place across borders in more than one country.

> An armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state. For intrastate conflicts, the location over which conflict emerges is a country, *but due to the nature of porous borders in many regions which witness conflict, the rebel group may operate either within or without the country of conflict*. (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2010, modified by the Author)

3.1.2 Conflict Emergence

All conflicts emerge along consistent lines, whether they are internal or civil conflict, intrastate, mass atrocity or even violent extremist conflict. Agreed-upon theories on the drivers of conflict and how they combine to contribute to conflict are discussed below.

3.1.2.1 Conflict Drivers

Conflict theory broadly agrees on the general drivers of conflict as emanating from challenges within the economic, political, social, and security arenas. However, theoreticians continue to debate the merits of various conflict theories.

Findings among these predominant schools of thought generally agree on several key points. The evidence is that horizontal inequality, high levels of poverty, slow economic growth, and over-reliance on

---

[14]See Glossary: "Intrastate Conflict."

natural resources are instrumental in accounting for conflict (and post-conflict violence resurgence) as long as third-party enablers[15] are available to translate these injustices into armed conflict (Cevik and Rahmati 2013; Collier 2006; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006, 2008; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). Unfortunately, the conditions found to be conducive to conflict resurgence often are those highly associated with post-conflict states (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2006).

Following is an overview of three dominant risk theories for conflict. The first two, grievance and greed, can be thought of as motivational factors of conflict. The third theory, feasibility, can be thought of as an opportunity-focused theory of conflict. Notably, in practical application of conflict risk analysis, these theories are relevant only when contextualized, balanced against resiliencies,[16] in acknowledgment of the role of triggers or accelerators, and when understood from both the quantitative and qualitative perspectives. In practice, grievance and/or greed plus feasibility are closely linked and even reliant on the other's presence in the environment for armed violence to emerge.

3.1.2.1.1 Grievance Theory[17]

Grievance theorists explain that conflict emerges when it is motivated by perceived or real injustice, such as horizontal economic inequality, lack of democratic participation among all groups, inability to access equitable social or criminal justice, and "objective social exclusion" (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006). These theorists include Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013), Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann (2015), Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011), Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010), Cevik and Rahmati (2013), Gurr (1970), Gurr and Moore (1997), and Stewart (2008). Populations that experience either social or resource-dividend exclusion have significant challenges and often are frustrated by the absence of an equal dividend and therefore suffer grievances. This is particularly problematic when dividends are being captured disproportionately by particular groups in the population to further reinforce inequalities (Stewart 2008). These populations that are not a party to gains proportionate to their cohorts, then, become highly aggrieved and susceptible to recruitment by spoilers.

---

[15]See Glossary: "Third-Party Enabler."
[16]See Glossary: "Resilience."
[17]See Glossary: "Grievance Theory."

Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2006) explained grievance theory relative to rebellions. Grievance, they acknowledged, is required for a rebellion—but not only for its motivational aspects. Indeed, grievance also is a lobbying or recruitment technique that the leadership of would-be rebellions utilizes to motivate and inspire recruitment.

> The Leninist theory of rebel organization, which many rebel groups follow even if they are not Marxist, is that initially the population from which forces are recruited does not realize that it is oppressed, so that an awareness of grievance has to be built by the rebellion. (Collier and Hoeffler 1999a, 8)

Although this description may undermine individual determinants of decision making to participate and does not consider that different recruits may have different reasons and goals, it does point to the role of mobilization among rebel leadership. Rebel leaders need to be successful communicators and effective mobilizers; this is accomplished most often by isolating and highlighting grievances among potential recruits. The grievances they isolate may or may not be real but should be sufficiently significant to motivate membership among the rebel group:

> [r]ebel movements need good international public relations and they need to motivate their recruits to kill.... They need to motivate their recruits to kill, because, unlike a mafia, a predatory rebel organization is periodically going to have to fight for its survival against government forces.... Rebel organizations have to develop a discourse of grievance in order to function. Grievance is to a rebel organization what image is to a business.... Rather, a sense of grievance is deliberately generated by rebel organizations. The sense of grievance may be based upon some objective grounds for complaint, or it may be conjured up by massaging prejudices. However, while this distinction is morally interesting to observers – is the cause just? – it is of no practical importance. The organization simply needs to generate a sense of grievance; otherwise, it will fail as an organization and so tend to fade away. (Collier 2006, 2-3)

Findings by Humphreys and Weinstein (2008, 436) supported Collier (2006):

> We find some support for all of the competing theories,[18] suggesting that the rivalry between them is artificial and that theoretical work has insufficiently explored the interaction of various recruitment strategies. At the same time, the empirical results challenge standard interpretations of grievance-based accounts of participation, as poverty, a lack of access to education, and political alienation predict participation in both rebellion and counter rebellion. Factors that are traditionally seen as indicators of grievance or frustration may instead proxy for a more general susceptibility to engage in violent action or a greater vulnerability to political manipulation by elites.

---

[18]These include, for example, greed, grievance, and feasibility theories.

3.1.2.1.2 Greed Theory[19]

The greed theory of rebellion proposes that the capture of economic gain is the motivation of rebellion: "Members of the population who identify opportunities for predation (controlling primary commodity exports) cause conflict" (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 1). In contrast to grievance theory, this is the motivation of actors to economic gain that drives the development of a rebel agenda. Collier (2006, 2) explained: "Rebellion is large-scale predation of productive economic activities." Thus, greed among population members also drives significant motivation for conflict reemergence. Greed by spoilers is often used as a tool for recruitment, particularly when spoils are promised to those who have few opportunities. Subsequently, for these populations, participation in rebellion may be desirable.

The greed theory of conflict often is linked to the natural-resources theory of conflict because motivations of greed often are linked to environments where significant natural resources exist but where dividends are not equitably distributed. In this theory, those countries that have a higher degree of their income sourced from natural resources that can be extracted without the use of heavy machinery or equipment are more likely to experience conflict over those resources. Collier (2006, 5) explained:

> One important risk factor is that countries which have a substantial share of their income (GDP) coming from the export of primary commodities are radically more at risk of conflict. The most dangerous level of primary commodity dependence is 26% of GDP. At this level, the otherwise ordinary country has a risk of conflict of 23%. By contrast, if it had no primary commodity exports (but was otherwise the same), its risk would fall to only one half of one percent. Thus, without primary commodity exports, ordinary countries are pretty safe from internal conflict, while when such exports are substantial, the society is highly dangerous.

The potential to control resources and their revenue, according to Collier (2000), means that some prosper during conflict and not all face losses.

Although greed and grievance constitute two distinct conflict-motivation theories, they frequently are closely linked. For example, greed-based rebellions may emerge from grievance-based rebellions, in which an evolution from grievance to greed may arise from a need to fund a protracted conflict and transition into a greed-based motivation for conflict. Weinstein (2005) explained that the potential for controlling resources and the associated spoils could change not only the motivation of the rebellion from

---

[19]See Glossary: "Greed Theory."

grievance to greed but also the composition of the rebel movement—from an ideological to a criminal intent. Quantitative analysis by Collier and Hoeffler (1999a, 26) found that greed, in the form of opportunities to capture natural resources, drives rebellion. However, the rebellion or conflict then drives grievances, which become contributors to the protraction of conflict and its reemergence over time. Notably, "it may not be necessary to choose between greed and grievance as explanatory variables. These may rather be complementary and mutually reinforcing elements of political mobilization" (Smith 2011, 9). Nonetheless, whereas grievance and greed may abound in many fragile and developing economies, translating those grievances into armed conflict requires feasibility and access to third-party enablers.

3.1.2.1.3 Feasibility Theory

Feasibility theorists, including Collier (2006), Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2006), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), found that grievance and perceived injustices emerge as armed conflict only when the means to finance, organize, and develop violent rebellions are present (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006). Collier (2006) called this the "economic theory of conflict." Here, motivation of grievance or greed or any other factor remains irrelevant; rather, "what matters is whether the organization can sustain itself financially" and thus operate successfully as a rebel group (Collier 2006, 3). These theorists argue that regardless of civil conflict type – whether motivated by a failed social contract or perceived injustice (i.e., grievance) or the opportunity to capture resources for personal gain (i.e., greed) – armed rebellion, war, and intrastate conflict require the feasibility of violence. This may constitute more important causes of armed-conflict reemergence than grievance or motivation: "[t]he feasibility thesis suggests that where insurrection is feasible it will occur, with the actual agenda of the rebel movement being indeterminate," although important, not least of which for recruitment (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2006, 5).

3.1.2.2 Conflict Equation

From the data and the theory, we can visualize the outbreak of conflict as the culmination of motivational theory (greed or grievance) plus feasibility theory (Figure 4), as follows:

Figure 4 **Conflict-Emergence Equation**

Principally, feasibility constitutes access to resources and tools of war—also called third-party enablers. Most commonly, these enablers are the tools and implementing networks for conflict, including weapons and armaments, financial networks, peripheral or unguarded terrain for training, and access to resources to fund and wage conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lopez 2012). Yet, feasibility also requires able implementers who can execute armed conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006). In interstate conflict, this is the national military; however, in intrastate and ideological conflicts, these are the groups that are the most co-optable by spoilers and most capable of armed conflict.

Access to these implementing tools alone does not drive war, as noted by conflict theorists. However, the factors of feasibility, defined previously, do indeed make possible the transition from motivations of greed or grievance, or planning of rebellion, to conflict. Understanding the reasoning behind defection (and whether those reasons align with theories of post-conflict stabilization and development) and how to better prevent recruitment in at-risk areas, therefore, is critical.

3.1.3 Conflict Protraction

When a conflict is not addressed early, there is a chance for it to drag on—or become protracted. There are numerous reasons for this. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004, 268) stated that "the key structural characteristics that lengthen conflict are low per capita income, high inequality, and a moderate degree of ethnic division." These factors, they argued, are significant drivers that press conflict actors to fight for better ends. Burgess and Burgess (2003) suggested three causes that may contribute to protraction.

These are not requisite to a protracted conflict, although the authors noted that the presence of one or more of these characteristics increases the likelihood. The three characteristics are (1) irreconcilable moral differences, (2) high-stakes distributional issues, and (3) domination of pecking-order conflicts. Irreconcilable moral differences are those that represent a significant schism between the two parties' worldviews. Examples of areas of division include religion and ethnicity. Engaging in a "noble crusade" may be more important to the parties involved than any short-term win or negotiated gain. In these circumstances, negotiation may be difficult. High-stakes distributional issues, according to the authors, relate to resource-driven or -related conflicts. Land, wealth, and the distribution of resources that are usually scarce and valuable lead to conflicts that Burgess and Burgess (2003) called "especially bitter and contentious." In describing "pecking-order" conflicts, they ascribed those conflicts that concern hierarchy of political and social status—and are related to perceptions of group "value" or "worth" (Burgess and Burgess 2003).

Other scholars attribute environmental conditions to the likelihood of conflict being extended and protracted. According to Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002), unfriendly conditions that can impact conflict protraction often include the following factors: (1) abundant spoils or natural resources; (2) unfriendly neighbors who are willing to engage against peace by harboring fighters or providing resources; and (3) spoilers of the potential for peace—that is, those who are unwilling to participate in a peace agreement and want to undermine the potential for peace using violence to obtain greater spoils through conflict.

Galtung (1969) highlighted long-standing structural inequality as contributing to protracted conflict, focusing on institutional or societal problems. Finally, Heiberg, O'Leary, and Tirman (2009, 10) stated that the conflict itself may bring value to the participants and they may find themselves unwilling to let go of their active conflict gains: "Many insurgent activities, including looting, but also including rapid attainment of social status, may be possible only during conflicts, and may have few ready substitutes in peacetime. There may be material incentives, in short, which work against conflict reduction."

Negotiation processes also can unwittingly and unintentionally contribute to the extension of conflict duration. Trusting an opponent in a peace negotiation may be challenging for opposition parties: "…peace processes are fraught with uncertainties and the possibilities of strategic deception by either the

government or the insurgents" (Heiberg, O'Leary, and Tirman 2009, 12). These challenges, both the viability and reliability of negotiation terms in the immediate and the long terms, may protract conflict and prevent resolution. Finally, group pressure of a variety – either coming from within the bounds of the rebel group or from its social base – may prevent negotiations or resolutions from taking place (Heiberg, O'Leary, and Tirman 2009).

Regardless of the specific reason behind conflict protraction, experts agree that when conflict drags on, it tends to increase in complexity. With the addition of actors, resources, issues, and parties to conflict, complexity increases, and resolution thus becomes more difficult (Ramsbotham et al. 2016).

3.1.4 Stages of Conflict

Conflict often is described as processional. Most theoreticians agree that there are underlying conditions that set the stage for conflict, the emergence of active conflict, and the ultimate resolution of conflict (however uneasy, lengthy, complex, and protracted the conflict process may be). Notwithstanding that many conflicts may not fully resolve, various phases may last an unusually long time, or that the process may move in fits and starts, there is a generally recognized process of emergence that emerges when historically analyzing the evidence of conflict stages, empirically. Brahm (2003) defined a comprehensive series of phases that accounts for the various phases of conflict and incorporates the literature of other theoreticians—with one modification from this Author: the text box that states "(or) One-sided victory" to account for all possible outcomes more clearly articulated (Figure 5).

Latent conflict is the initial or preliminary phase of the conflict process. In this stage, relative to the conflict equation described previously, the foundations of greed or grievance among actors in the population are established. In most but not all circumstances, structural or historical issues have not been fully resolved and addressed to the satisfaction of parties involved, thereby causing frustration and grievance or greed. In addition, this stage is when the indicators for conflict emergence would be evidenced, as identified by theoreticians such as Fearon and Latin (2003), World Bank (2005), Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2006), and Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2008), which includes high dependence on oil, mountainous terrain, large economic-inequality gaps, a highly militarized society, and so forth.

Figure 5 **Stages of Conflict**
Source: Brahm (2003), amended by the Author.

The subsequent phases of *conflict emergence* and *conflict escalation* are identified by the availability and application of feasibility factors, discussed in the previous conflict equation. These feasibility factors include the materiel components of conflict (e.g., personnel, financial resources, arms, and other requisite resources). In these phases, active conflict – whether traditionally launched between two parties or less traditionally in cyberspace and terrorist activities – is in full effect.

If resources are not actively applied in these phases from third parties with the intention of resolving the conflict early to avoid protraction and increased complexity, the chances of more efficiently resolving conflict decrease significantly. Often, the conflict reaches a *stalemate* phase, with neither side evidencing a decisive victory. If the stalemate leads to mutual group challenges in retaining troop strength, force cohesion, conflict materiel, and so forth such that losses to each side are equally limiting, the situation may be called a "hurting stalemate" (Zartman 2001). In this situation, the potential for engaging parties to reach a resolution at the negotiating table may well be higher than at other phases (Zartman 1989).

Mutual damages may present an opportunity for both sides to cut losses and come to a resolution. In this case, the phase of active *conflict de-escalation and negotiation* emerges. After facing losses so significant that conflict can no longer effectively continue, the parties come to a negotiation and eventually some type of *dispute settlement*.

In some cases, any one of these phases may be replaced by a military victory. The remaining phases would be replaced by an outright *one-sided victory*, and that winning party would then bear the privilege of determining the next steps toward stabilization.

Regardless of whether the conflict is resolved militarily or diplomatically, a phase of stabilization and consolidation of peace occurs; this is the *post-conflict peace-building* phase. This phase, explained in more detail in Section 3.2, is a particularly tenuous and difficult phase. If not handled correctly, the likelihood of relapsing into renewed conflict is quite high (Collier 2009; Collier and Hoeffler 2004c; United Nations 2012b; Walter 2011). Alternatively, if managed well, peace may take hold and conflict resurgence can be prevented.

3.1.5 Conflict Participants: Combatants and Their Motivations

Whereas it is important to understand why conflict takes place, it is equally important to understand who is involved in perpetrating conflict and why.

3.1.5.1 Combatants

Combatants and the opposition are the main actors taking part in conflict. According to customary international humanitarian law: "[a]ll members of the armed forces or a party to the conflict are combatants, except medical and religious personnel" (International Committee of the Red Cross n.d.). This pertains to both uniformed and non-uniformed forces and is consistent with the earliest distinction regarding war, agreed on even in advance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, at the 1899 Hague Convention concerning the *Laws and Customs of War on Land*. Article 3 notes that "the armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants." Although more than 100 years have passed since the codification of the law, it also is consistent with the US Naval Handbook (Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Department of Homeland Security, and US Coast Guard 2007)[20] and Rwanda's national approach. According to the 1997 *Report on the Practice of Rwanda*, the Minister of Defense noted that it is lawful for the state military to target only armed combatants, meaning those who carry weapons and who kill others, uniformed or not (Republic of Rwanda 1997). For this study, the term "combatant" refers exclusively to non-state armed combatants.

3.1.5.2 Rebel Groups

---

[20]The *Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations* (Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Department of Homeland Security, and US Coast Guard 2007, 5-4) states: "*5.4.1 Combatant:* Combatants are persons engaged in hostilities during an armed conflict. *5.4.2 Noncombatants:* Noncombatants are those members of the armed forces who do not take direct part in hostilities because of their status as medical personnel and chaplains."

When combatants – those not in uniform and not associated with the state – unite to undertake an armed struggle, they form rebel groups.[21] The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (2015, 3) defined rebel groups as:

> …political organizations whose goal is to counter, replace, or separate from an established national governing regime through violent acts. Rebel groups have a stated political agenda for national power (either through regime replacement or separatism), are acknowledged beyond the ranks of immediate members, and use violence as their primary means to pursue political goals. Rebel groups often have predecessors and successors due to diverging goals within their membership.

Collier et al. (2003, 56) stated that in addition to being a political organization, a rebel group is "a private military organization, an army and a business. Those analyzing rebel groups must always keep this triple feature—political organization, military organization, and business organization—in mind. Rebellions occur predominantly in countries where circumstances are conducive to all three features." The authors further explained that "as such, it faces problems of recruitment, cohesion, equipment, and survival" (Collier et al. 2003, 67). These points are particularly relevant for this study. Indeed, it is incumbent on the group to ensure its own survival, key of which is its personnel, unity, command and control, arms, finances, and so forth. It is particularly this point – that of feasibility – to which this study argues greater programming attention should be given.

3.1.5.3 Rebel Combatants

The reasons for conflict emergence are consistently found to be related to grievance, greed, and feasibility. What specifically, however, drives individuals to react against the grievance, to further the greed, and to capitalize on the feasibility? Why do people decide to use violence to further their aims? Understanding why men rebel is as key to developing programming to encourage combatants to put down arms as is the understanding of which conditions drive conflict when addressing post-conflict reforms.

Numerous scholars have addressed the question of why men rebel. Gurr (1970, 24), noting in his book, *Why Men Rebel*, stated: "Men rebel because they become so frustrated they resort to aggression. This is because of 'relative deprivation'—people getting less than they think they deserve. The greater the

---

[21]For this study, "rebels" refer to the broad variety of non-state actors who undertake various forms of conflict as non-state, armed groups, including violent extremist, ideological, or terrorist; genocidal; or internal civil conflict. Notably, a combatant, then, is a member of any of the afore-mentioned conflict-group types.

'intensity and scope of relative deprivation,' the more chance for violence." Gurr (2011, 2), in revisiting his earlier theorem, further clarified: "The politics of identity are central to understanding people's reference group, their sense of collective injustice, and their susceptibility to appeals for political action." Groups with whom people "feel kindred" or identify, and how this impacts their behaviors, are crucial to understanding why men participate in rebellions (Gurr 2011, 2).

Numerous scholars have taken a closer look at identity vis-à-vis conflict emergence. Gates (2002) and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) provided perspective on how identity plays into group behavior and how those groups view themselves relative to the political center (i.e., those with power). Ethnic distance, Gates (2002, 113) explained, concerns "the sense of group identity that an ethnic or national group feels…. An ethnically homogenous rebel group with a clear sense of group identity, therefore, exhibits narrow ethnic distances, whereas an ethnically diverse group possesses great ethnic distance." This "ethnic distance" relates specifically to conflict emergence. When ethnic groups perceive themselves as having a narrow distance and strong identity, their group perception vis-à-vis other groups, specifically those in power, matters greatly—particularly when one group is experiencing inequity at the hands of another. This drives up the likelihood of "competing ethnonationalist claims on the state" (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 88). The more members of an ethnic group shut out of central power, the better their ability to mobilize; the more past conflict experience they possess, the more likely for conflict to erupt over ethnic division (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Where "people stand in society and what goods and bads they experience" must be understood and interpreted if we are to understand participation in armed conflict (Gurr 2011, 2).

What a group member perceives to be his return or payout for group participation also impacts why individuals may choose to join. Weinstein (2003) explained that individuals opt to join rebel groups in the interest of what the final payout will be. Often, rebel participants willingly cede immediate payout in exchange for their investment in the group and the promise of a more significant return. Concessions that come with rebel-group participation may be severe; they can include foregoing salary, safety, family, status, and more.

The type of rebellion undertaken also can impact the type of reward anticipated—and the type of combatant recruited. Rebel groups that undertake grievance-based conflicts offer participants several types

of rewards. First are the non-pecuniary rewards, as Gates (2002, 114) explained, or those related to membership and knowing that one "fought the good fight." The second type of reward is solidarity or camaraderie—that is, having personal or group meaning and alliance (Gates 2002). The third type is the ultimate reward: grievance redress and the benefits that come to the winning party. This type of rebel participant is likely when dealing with conflicts that aim to be transformative or to redress social or ethnic grievance and where the outcome may be a significant overhaul of the political system or an entire system change. The objectives of the FDLR in eastern Congo acting against the Rwandan government embody this type of group.

Not all rebel groups aspire to governmental-transformation goals. Some conflicts are more focused on the greed aspects of conflict; they are economically motivated. For these types of conflict participants, benefits of participation will be more direct payouts associated with the loot-seeking behavior. These participants will earn the spoils of war, such as access to mineral resources, drugs, or other greed-associated conflict goals. Thus, participants in the various conflict types will vary.

In summary, Gurr (2011) argued that three factors relate to why men rebel—and those three closely align with the broad conflict-emergence equation defined previously. Gurr (2011, 2) noted that relative deprivation or people's feelings of injustice as well as their belief about the "utility of political action" vis-à-vis conflict activity and their capacity to act both to organize and mobilize and the government's ability to keep them at bay lead to participation in rebellion. In other words, the motivational factors and the feasibility factors lead to the outbreak of conflict.

3.1.6 Conflict Impact

As the number and intensity of armed conflicts have grown, more lives have been lost, livelihoods have been negatively impacted, development has stymied, and chances for long-term stability have declined.

3.1.6.1 Global Impact

The UN, African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and numerous other regional and international organizations all cite the objective to end conflict as a core mission of their organization. They annually dole out millions of dollars to address conflict-prevention measures (through their development-assistance organizations), conflict-resolution measures (through their foreign policy and even military

organizations), and even contributions to one another – in the form of technical, financial, and technological assistance – all in the interest of effectively stemming global conflict and its devastating reach.

Conflict globally brings incalculable loss of life, livelihood, and development costs. Conflicts cost local, regional, and international development-assistance providers on the order of $0.15–$0.41 per capita in annual humanitarian aid following conflict, compared to $0.09–$0.10 prior to conflict, which is twice the standard for developing countries (Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Elbadawi 2007, 5). This is a significant cost implication for poorer countries in Africa and elsewhere that already boost some of the largest receipts of ODA (United Nations Development Program 2011a, 153). Conflict also costs each post-conflict state on the order of $50 billion to $100 billion annually in lost revenue and damages (World Bank 2013b)[22] and is likely to experience a poverty point almost 20 points higher than a country without conflict (World Bank 2011b). Collier (2004, 2) called conflict "development in reverse" —an apt term when human, social, and institutional capital are torn apart; when basic health and life expectancy are significantly limited; and when macro- and micro-economic impacts drive poverty and welfare costs to unsustainable levels. Moreover, the increased security spending that is needed in the post-conflict environment to "keep the peace" further erodes potential development spending.

Collier (2006, 16) found the overall economy to be 15% poorer due to second- and third-order effects of combat on health and infrastructure; recovery of economy was found to take more than a decade to reach prewar levels. Collier (2006, 16) also found that, on average and across a large set of case countries reviewed, the costs to all neighbors (including factors such as "economic decline" and "disease") are cumulatively about the same as to the main country experiencing conflict, thereby spreading the losses regionally even when conflict was internal.[23]

Moreover, achieving lasting peace following conflict requires not only discrete investments in resolving the active armed fighting but also ensuring that conflict does not resume in the aftermath. This is

---

[22]Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) found the typical average costs of civil wars to be approximately $60 billion.
[23]Collier (2006, 16) explained the methodology behind his assertion regarding the shared costs of conflict among regional neighbors. "Further, a lot of the costs accrue to neighboring countries: both economic decline and disease spread across borders. Because the typical country has around three neighbors, all of whom are affected, the total cost to neighbors is about as large as the cost to the country itself. One implication is that most of the costs of a war accrue to either the future or to neighbors and so are not taken into account by those who start them."

especially challenging for post-conflict states where the risk of conflict is highest because they bear – both statistically and theoretically – the most challenges for stability. The threats emerge most directly as a facet of the debilitating impact of conflict on economies, development, and livelihoods (World Bank and United Nations Development Program 2005) as well as the potential for unsatisfying returns for spoilers to peace.

The *Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda* (United Nations 2012b) acknowledges the need to especially address fragile and post-conflict states. These states largely have been left out of the MDG achievements. "As of April 2011, none of the low-income fragile or conflict-affected countries had achieved a single Millennium Development Goal" (World Bank 2013a). The UN 2012 High Level Panel on a Post-2015 Framework (United Nations 2012b, 3) clearly articulates the need to focus on conflict-affected, post-conflict, and fragile states:

- Violence and fragility have become the largest obstacles to the MDGs.
- The narrow approach of MDGs is problematic given the broadening of the concept of development that has occurred.
- The narrow focus also ignores the interrelations among aspects such as security, justice, and development.
- The post–2015 agenda needs to take a comprehensive approach, guided by the Millennium Declaration, which included fundamental values (such as the freedom from fear of violence, oppression or injustice, and equality) and goals on peace, security and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; human rights, democracy, and good governance; and protecting the vulnerable.
- The post–2015 framework should include separate goals related to peace and security and a clear, concise, and measurable target on violence, which can be measured through indicators on battle-related deaths and intentional homicide.

Furthermore, empirical analysis on post-conflict states by Cevik and Rahmati (2013), Collier (2007, 2009), Collier and Hoeffler (2004c), Collier et al. (2003), Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2006), UN (2012b), and World Bank (2011b) showed that in post-conflict states, there is a significant risk that peace will collapse.

Many conflict-affected countries seem to be stuck in a conflict trap of repeated cycles of violence. Countries that experienced violent conflict in the past have a high chance of experiencing a recurrence. About 40 per cent of countries coming out of violence relapse within 10 years and 90 per cent of countries that had civil wars in the 21st century had civil wars in the previous 30 years. (United Nations 2012b, 5)

Walter (2011) also found that 57% of countries that experienced civil war between 1945 and 2009 returned to conflict at some point in the future.

Moreover, not only is instability and failure of peace a problem in post-conflict states but also the absence of broad security. Although many assume that a "post-conflict" state is devoid of outright conflict, it is not likely to be devoid of violence as a reflection of conflict experiences and impact. Kurtenbach and Wulf (2012, 1) explained: "In these contexts, violence and insecurity may be as endemic as in contexts of open armed conflict and more generally in fragile situations." Muggah (2005, 239) expanded the warning in announcing:

> The introduction of a ceasefire, peace agreement or even discrete interventions seeking to disarm warring parties does not necessarily guarantee improvements in the safety of either civilians or former combatants. In fact, many so-called "post-conflict" environments yield even more direct and indirect threats to civilians than the "armed conflicts" that preceded them.

In practical terms, this has meant that development cannot take place where there is no security; therefore, structural problems driving direct violence are virtually off limits for correction in these protracted violent environments. Understanding, then, that most post-conflict environments are indeed party to extreme security challenges, their ability to achieve the basic underpinnings of development required for security while not falling back into armed violence is potentially difficult and extraordinarily costly. A recent report by the IEP (2016, 2) noted that the "economic impact of violence on the global economy in 2015 was $13.6 trillion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms." This is an increase from the IEP (2014, 4) report in which the cost to the global economy in 2012 was $9.46 trillion. Similarly, the IEP (2016, 2) report found that this equates to 13.3% of the gross world product (GWP), compared to the earlier IEP report that found that in 2012 it was 11% of the GWP (2014, 4). According to IEP (2016, 2) analysis, the current cost of violence is "11 times the size of global foreign direct investment."[24] As such, it should be no surprise that engagement in conflict resolution is not only a key tenet of the US foreign policy but also of the UN and other multilateral global institutions.

---

[24]The economic impact of violence containment is defined as "economic activity related to the consequences or prevention of violence where the violence is directed against people or property" and includes costs associated with prevention, protection, consequences, and response to this global violence (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014, 24–27). The report details the methodological steps and is available via web-link in the Bibliography, Section V. Moreover, the IEP, which performed the quantitative analysis for this report, sources its data from and is used by the Economist Intelligence Unit, World Bank, and United Nations. All data for IEP reports are freely available to researchers on its website.

3.1.6.2 National Impact

> War has devastating consequences for a country, including death, displacement of people, and destruction of public infrastructure as well as physical and social capital. World Bank (2003), one of the most recent and comprehensive reports, concludes that the economic and social costs of civil wars are not only deep but also persistent, even for years after the end of the conflict. (Chen, Loayza, and Reynal-Querol 2007, 2)

The experience of conflict has profound and lasting consequences for populations, livelihoods, systems, institutions, and growth; further complicating matters, it can differ across conflict country and region (Justino and Verwimp 2008). Yet, there is no contention that conflict drives households and nations into poverty, with losses in human, financial, physical, and natural capital (Orero et al. 2007). Furthermore, institutional, political, and societal infrastructure often is destroyed and must be rebuilt.

As a consequence of the massive economic and social losses, as well as the inability of state institutions to function normally, broader developmental impacts are felt in areas of nutrition, health, education, household income, burdens on the elderly, and more (Orero et al. 2007). The US Agency for International Development (USAID) (2009b, 5-7) explained that there is likely to be "a lack of security," "high unemployment," "a need for rehabilitation and replacement of physical infrastructure," "weak host-government administrative capacity," "a disproportionate impact on women," and "the presence of multiple donors and aid organizations." Focusing on the impact to potential private-sector investment, a potentially key area for economic-development support, Games (2011, 16) highlighted the following:

> Lack of institutional capacity in government; weak and "balkanised" business associations; high levels of corruption and a climate of mistrust; high levels of informality; marginalisation of small domestic firms; lack of basic infrastructure through neglect or active destruction; deterioration of financial services and diversion of savings into survival activities; spread of disease, eroding already depleted health budgets and affecting economic recovery.

These burdens, coupled with the more standard developing-country problems of economy, governance, and social development, mean that post-conflict countries are at a significant loss when attempting to return to stable development.

Conflict-research experts broadly agree on conflict impacts, conflict indicators, and their close associations indicating that post-conflict states are indeed often pre-conflict states. A selection of research findings is presented in Table 2.

Table 2 **Conflict Impact-Conflict Risk, by Threat Area**

Threat Area	Conflict Impact	Conflict-Resurgence Indicator
Economic	Massive debt Increased household poverty Lack of employment and formal-sector opportunity (often leads to both an over-reliance on natural-resource exports and the exploitation of natural resources by spoilers) Risky partner for trade and investment Absence of foreign investment/capital Flight Non-functioning markets Deteriorated national and personal savings	Stagnant, low, or falling GDP growth Low per capita Gross National Income (GNI) High youth unemployment (especially males) Dependency on natural-resource exports Low economic freedom Low trade openness High horizontal inequality (high GINI coefficient) Over-reliance on natural-resource exports, especially oil and easily excavated/bunkered, high-value, natural resources (e.g., mined minerals and oil)
Security	Increased size and spending on military Increased presence of personal arms, arms dealers, unregistered arms Reintegration of rebels into civil society Reorganization and downsizing of military Learned use of violence to resolve dispute as main tactic, not courts (militarized society) Potential conflict spill over into other regions and countries, potentially destabilizing Presence of large numbers of highly capable rebels/former combatants, often without employment or opportunity	High military spending Large size of military as percentage of population High number of armed non-state actors Militarized/armed society Low peace-keeping expenditures History of violent conflict in the past 10 years Culture and tradition of violence to resolve problems Inability of government to control (i.e., law and order) Regional conflicts Mountainous terrain
Political	Victor/loser psychology (potential dominance) Predation/fear Lack of functioning institutions Enforced (partial) democracy New state/regime Absence of political history	Systematic denial of civil and political rights to particular groups (leading to social/ethnic cleavages, differential social opportunities, and grievance) Dominant control of the state by one group Partial democracy,[25] elections Rapid, frequent state structure shifts
Social	Decreased human development indicators Loss to livelihoods Interpersonal distress	Small diaspora Large population Social cleavages Ethnic or group dominance

---

[25]Authoritarian states are considered more stable immediately following conflict cessation. In addition to sources noted in Table 2, see Diamond (2005) for a good discussion on order of democracy and challenges of implementation in the post-conflict state.

	Fear and post-traumatic stress disorder Lost household income /resiliency Lessened opportunities Refugees and IDPs Conflict-induced social cleavages and fracturing	Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (HDI)

Sources: Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2008); Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2006); Fearon and Laitin (2003); World Bank (2005).

These obstacles have been particularly difficult for countries to triumph over—so much so that, statistically, most struggle immensely with reconstruction of the state building and nation building. These impediments often lead to high economic costs, societal fractures, and developmental expenses for post-conflict states. Rare is the case in which both stability and growth are achieved. This challenge is self-evident in the number of countries that struggle to emerge from conflict and achieve stability, development, and growth.

3.1.6.3 Population Impact

Conflict affects different groups disproportionately, and vulnerable populations often bear a distinct and more significant impact from conflict than other populations. Vulnerable populations face extensive social, political, and economic challenges that often are intensified during conflicts. These vulnerable populations may include women, rural populations, the impoverished, children, the elderly, and disabled people (Orero et al. 2007; World Bank 2013/2014). They are vulnerable because they suffer more "negative consequences" during and following conflict; they are more easily hard-pressed into poverty; and they are "particularly disempowered, as they are less likely to be formally represented or have a voice in decision-making"—which then results in extensive "social exclusion...lack of access to resources...or from dependency on public services" (World Bank 2013/2014). The "lack of effective public voice and mitigation options" for these groups in the face of post-conflict strife makes them particularly vulnerable (World Bank 2013/2014). They are subject to "greater risk," and "an unanticipated shock can drive a vulnerable individual or community...deeper into poverty" (World Bank 2013/2014). These populations are most repeatedly those vulnerable listed previously—but also can include particular social, ethnic, political, religious, and regional groups that have lost in the conflict. Being vulnerable and at risk can be destabilizing, leading to the susceptibility for grievance to develop, spoilers to emerge, and a new class of potential recruits for armed rebellion to arise. When the opportunity to become empowered, provide for

one's own livelihood, and access basic resources is low or absent, [26] the threat of being co-opted as a third-party enabler of conflict – and even of being targeted and victimized – is high (African Development Bank 2011; Ginifer 2003; Justino 2009; Nilsson 2005).

3.1.6.4 Ex-Combatant Impact

Conflict resolution requires a full transformation to address the causes of conflict and ensure that stability takes hold alongside lasting peace. For those who have defected, like the ex-combatants, transitioning into civilian life from a life learned in conflict produces significant challenges for many former combatants in establishing a new livelihood (Table 3). Whereas most countries undertake some form of DDR to support the transition from conflict to post-conflict, the process for reintegrating ex-combatants into society often is lacking (Dzinesa 2006; Leff 2008; Nilsson 2005; Small Arms Survey 2003).

Table 3 **Challenges Specific to Former Combatants Following Conflict Activity or Conflict Resolution**

Ex-combatants experience particular social, economic, and political impacts in the post-conflict environment: they emerge from conflict wounded physically and psychologically and often have fewer opportunities post-conflict than during conflict (Nilsson 2005). Ex-combatants may return home to families that have changed drastically in their absence; they may be viewed without favor by host communities; and most are without formal education, training, or skills with which to contribute positively to their new environment (Nilsson 2005). Although the initial infusion of cash from DDR eases the transition for households and communities alike, it is not lasting (Gilligan, Mvukiyehe, and Samii 2010, 2012). Moreover, some have found that DDR programming has no impact at all on the acceptance of demobilized combatants into communities (Weinstein and Humphreys 2005).

Ex-combatants often are at the extreme end of household vulnerability; they often have fewer opportunities than the remainder of the population because they are routinely underserved and stigmatized due to their conflict involvement (Nilsson 2005). The stress of the post-conflict

---

[26]Justino (2009, 2): "The poorer the household is at the start of the conflict, the higher is the probability of the household participating and supporting an armed group. The higher the risk of violence, the higher is the probability of the household participating and supporting armed groups."

environment with its limited opportunities can exacerbate tensions and make the potential for participation in renewed conflict more attractive (Collier 1994; Mueller 2003; Nilsson 2005). Subsequently, when ex-combatants are not empowered to alternate forms of personal gain and thus invested in a peace dividend, their recruitment cost by spoilers decreases, increasing the likelihood that they will be co-opted (Addison 2003). For these reasons and more, working with ex-combatants as a special group in the post-conflict state is crucial. If the lives of ex-combatants can be improved, so may the chances for stability.

Challenges specific to the ex-combatant following conflict are many. Ex-combatants may retain their weaponry or small arms, which may have a negative impact on the social and economic conditions of their communities for reintegration, including injury and death (Muggah 2005, 2006a; Muggah and Batchelor 2002; Small Arms Survey 2003). If they do participate in DDR programs and the cash handouts run dry, ex-combatants often are left without transferable skills to extend their livelihood when not in conflict (Addison 2003; McMullin 2013; Nilsson 2005; United Nations 2010). Without livelihood opportunity, they may return to skills learned in a life of conflict, such as banditry and criminality (Leff 2008; Nilsson 2005), which results in an increase in grievance, and the likelihood of them being co-opted by negative elements for illegal gain, such as applying disruptive entrepreneurialism; this may increase the use of potential violence to resolve disputes (Nilsson 2005).

Furthermore, when DDR programs are unsuccessful for ex-combatants, this may fuel grievance against a post-conflict state's inability to provide for them. This in turn has the destabilizing impact of providing a significant pool of potentially co-optable forces if new spoilers emerge to politically destabilize the country following conflict. Without targeted attention, the vulnerability of combatants may be even higher than expected.

Ex-combatants are singled out in post-conflict states because they possess the potential to drive instability or stability—that is, to carry out armed conflict or to contribute to reconciliation and peace. Ex-combatants often prove to be the most co-optable entity for a disgruntled, bad actor seeking to redress old or new grievances in the post-conflict state. Indeed, those who have once participated in violent behavior are more likely to participate in violence again (Annan and Blattman 2006). Without formal-employment options or education, and coupled with the knowledge of how to engage in armed

combat, they easily can be targeted for conflict-resurgence recruitment—even if the motivating factor is not their own but simply the opportunity to return to earning a livelihood.

Yet, ex-combatants also are potential engines for the economy. Their role in developing small businesses, reintegrating financially into communities, and contributing to growth can be significant. Furthermore, successful household and social reintegration can yield reconciliation and social stability in areas impacted by conflict. Finally, where former combatants are able to both socially and economically reintegrate, they have the potential to serve as informal mentors for younger generations considering violence and armed activity.

Although they face extensive challenges in returning to a community following conflict, ex-combatants represent the link between the feasibility of conflict or of peace. Ensuring that they are more invested in stability – and at the earliest stages possible in the post-conflict state – than in instability is important; providing them with better reintegration skills and resiliencies is crucial. As the World Bank (2013/2014) noted, "[t]hese efforts can improve people's ability to effectively handle negative externalities as they arise and help them to ensure that their needs are considered in planning for unanticipated situations"—especially risk-prone situations for conflict.

As a result, ex-combatants have significant influence on the direction of country stability. It is crucially important, then, that the appropriate interventions are scoped for these vulnerable communities because this could translate into significantly decreased conflict risk and contribute to peace building (African Development Bank 2011).

3.1.7 Conflict-Cessation Approaches

When actors come together to bring about a cessation of active armed conflict, three tools of influence are traditionally applied: diplomatic, economic, and military. In effect, the "same tools that states use to engage in international conflicts" are the same "employed in efforts to address conflict" (Stern and Druckman 2000, 3). To deter violence among parties, diplomatic actors or alliances may use threats, concessions, and other tools to bring parties to a negotiation; economic sanctions may be deployed to deter access to resources for the purpose of conflict; and kinetic activity – which ranges from passive military observance to protecting civilian safe zones to active military targeting to prevent or stop conflict – may be

applied if conditions warrant. Thus, actors seeking to end conflict often utilize the same tools that are used to enable and drive conflict (Stern and Druckman 2000).

3.1.7.1 Diplomatic Mediation

The first track of engagement (and often, though not necessarily the first applied effort) in conflict resolution from third parties is diplomatic. Diplomatic efforts usually include the engagement of third-party negotiators and mediators. Their efforts and discussions target the issues of conflict motivation (i.e., grievance and greed) for resolution. However, their intervention often is predicated on strategic interests (Aydin 2012; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). (As an objective body, perhaps – although not arguably – the UN can be excused from this particular strategic bent.) As Ramsbotham et al. (2016, 3) explained:

> Traditionally, the task of conflict resolution has been seen as helping parties who perceive their situation as zero-sum – Self's gain is Other's loss – to re-perceive it as a non-zero-sum conflict – in which both may gain or both may lose – and then to assist parties to move in the positive-sum direction.

Mediation to end conflict is a low-cost but not "passive" effort to negotiate an end to conflict (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014, 316). It is "an activity geared towards resolving an ongoing dispute; …it is action by an autonomous, outside party (a third party); …it uses persuasion rather than coercion; and …it aims to reach a solution acceptable to the (primary) parties;" mediation is achieved through negotiations that attempt to appeal to "reason and logic and, ultimately…to the common wishes to end violence and prevent its recurrence" (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014, 316.). Mediations or negotiations, if completed, result in a peace agreement or "a binding mutual deal signed or publicly agreed to" (Högbladh 2012, 42). Diplomatic mediation and peace negotiations can be successful only when both parties believe – or are convinced to believe – that an end to fighting is the best alternative to achieving the goals they seek; however, reaching this point of "ripeness" may take time (Zartman 2001).

Since the Cold War, there have been almost two times as many cases of applied mediation to end conflict, increasing from only 8.4% to 18.4% of conflicts resolved via negotiation (Kreutz 2010, 246). More frequently, it is being applied to internal conflict as well as interstate conflict. Wallensteen and Svensson (2014, 316) explained in their comprehensive analysis of mediation efforts that mediation appeals "to the common wishes to end violence and prevent its recurrence" between parties. Thus, for conflict

mediators to evidence success, conflict participants must have reached a point of ripeness for mediation—

that is, a willingness to put down arms to achieve goals. In essence, this point is achieved when parties have

reached, as Zartman (2001) called it, a "hurting stalemate"; that is, when the cost of continuing violence is

greater, equally, to both parties than not. Or, as Walter (2013) noted, when there is a military stalemate:

unsustainable, increasing costs are occurring, thereby preventing an outright military victory.

When reaching a point for conflict mediation, not only is the context of the conflict to be assessed

for "ripeness" but also third-party actors who are apt to be considered viable and acceptable mediators must

be identified. Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002) pointed out that identifying good, lasting partners

may rely on the third party's own national security or geostrategic interests. This can introduce either a

positive mediating force whose objective is peace or possible bias based on personal needs. To follow best

practices, Nathan (1999) advised that parties cannot be partisan and that all conflict actors must consent to

the mediator (and mediation). Possible mediators identified by Greig and Regan (2008) include

neighboring states, alliance members, and those involved with the conflicting parties in past

engagements—in essence, those in whom both parties have sufficient trust such that the risks of

participating in a negotiation can be overcome (Nathan 1999). When done properly – that is, owned by the

conflicting parties and delivered without punitive action against one or another party (Nathan 1999),

extended over the long term, and with skilled actors – mediation can positively impact the success and

length of lasting peace (Gurses, Rost, and McLeod 2008).[27]

Mediation is considered successful "when it leads to the termination of hostilities and the advent

of democratic governance" (Nathan 1999, 3). Walter (2013, 1) found that civil wars that are resolved

successfully through mediation or negotiation share two traits: (1) they result in a political power-sharing

agreement with both parties involved in the outcome, "based on their position on the battlefield"; and (2)

they plan for a third party that can assist in ensuring that demobilization of combatants takes place safely.

This is because, as Walter (2013, 1) noted, "[i]t's unlikely that any country or the UN will be willing to

send the peacekeepers necessary to help implement the peace." Combatants who are not properly

---

[27]For additional information on mediation styles, arguments in terminology, and approaches, see Wallensteen and
Svensson (2014). They found that different strategies are effective at different points in the conflict trajectory, that most
conflict mediators apply a number of different strategies over time, and that the threat of force is not necessarily
facilitative for achieving a negotiated settlement among parties.

demobilized can potentially destabilize the peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Notably, peace-keeping (i.e., responding to conflict) and peace-building (i.e., developing resilience to conflict) operations play crucial roles in keeping the peace and ensuring long-term stability.

Despite the fact that properly and well-negotiated settlements can lead to lasting peace between parties, several challenges in the area of mediation and negotiated settlements remain. First, as both Wallensteen and Svensson (2014) and Crocker (2011) noted, the field of global mediation has become increasingly populated with a bevy of actors—equally exciting and complicating the arena. As Crocker (2011, 3) explained: "[t]he absence of any recognized 'gatekeepers' and with dramatically lowered barriers to entry, the conflict management space has become undisciplined and something of a free-for-all. This raises problems of institutional rivalry, uncertain tradecraft, and third-party incoherence." Second, the fallout of 9/11 has been twofold on global conflict management and negotiation: there is a tendency to view conflict through the spectrum of terrorism and counterterrorism activity. Moreover, the interest and abilities of states to continue applying a high level of resources to broader conflict resolution are impacted by the rising costs of counterterrorism financing (Crocker 2011). Third, even though negotiated settlements can last longer than military victories, it usually takes a significant amount of fighting to reach a point where actors are willing to negotiate—and even longer for a negotiation to be completed (Kreutz 2010). When an outright military victory does not happen, conflicts protract, become complicated, and – ultimately – require outside intervention to assist in negotiating settlements. Fourth, negotiated settlements are more prone to failure at bringing peace than military victories. When conflicts protract such that they require third-party mediators, they often have reached a point where "complex webs of motives, actors, and funding sources" have emerged, thereby becoming "notoriously difficult to resolve" (Westendorf 2015, 1). Moreover, implementing successful, lasting agreements requires significant and long-term resources:

> It [a successful peace agreement] requires determined and sustained diplomatic leadership and political engagement in keeping the implementation process on track, if necessary, keeping the parties' feet to the fire to implement their commitments, and using the full panoply of smart and hard power tools to support that objective….The post–Cold War period is full of examples of settlements that have become unsettled and peace accords that have collapsed for want of determined, coherent, and focused external leadership. (Crocker 2011, 7)

3.1.7.2 Economic Sanctions

The second popular approach to resolving conflict occurs along economic lines. Broadly speaking, the main approach used in this area of conflict cessation is a sanction. Sanctions attempt to apply pressure and limit a group's financial, political, or resource access (Lektzian and Regan 2016), otherwise known as the materiel feasibility factors of war that allow conflicts to emerge. Sanctions can operate in tandem with their inverse counterpart: incentives. Whereas sanctions are the "sticks," incentives are the "carrots" and can include a bevy of options: membership in groups, power-sharing options, financial remuneration, amnesty, and countless other possibilities.

Sanctions can be applied unilaterally, by individual countries, in tandem or coordinated with other countries, and at the behest of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Each country has its own guidelines regarding the application of sanctions; however, the UNSC has specific rights afforded regarding the actions it can take on sanctions across all global member states. Chapter VII, Article 39, of the UN Charter states:

> The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security. (United Nations 1945)

For a sanction charter to pass, nine members of the UNSC are required—with none of the five permanent members vetoing it.

Sanctions and incentives have a mixed history of success (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2015). In one of the few empirical tests on the application of sanctions and the likelihood that they will lead to hastened conflict resolution via negotiation in civil wars,[28] Lektzian and Regan (2016) found that when sanctions are applied as the sole tool intended to shorten the length of civil conflict, they are largely ineffective. It is interesting, however, that they also found that if sanctions are not applied in isolation but rather along with military interventions, they can positively impact the duration of conflicts (Lektzian and Regan 2016).

In highlighting one of the key concerns of sanctions, Eriksson and Wallensteen (2015, 1390) noted that sanctions have had numerous negative side effects and that they appear to be used without consistency

---

[28]The other comes from Eriksson and Wallensteen (2015).

and "remain a blunt instrument." However, when targeted or smart sanctions[29] are applied, the humanitarian impacts are significantly limited. The primary use of sanctions has been in situations of internal conflict; the UNSC and others remain averse to applying sanctions on interstate conflicts concerning territorial integrity (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2015).

Data on sanctions also show that African countries have been disproportionately targeted for UN sanctions, issued not only for the purposes of encouraging peaceful resolutions to conflict but also to hasten democratic reforms and good governance—an extension of the use of sanctions in other contexts (Charron and Portela 2015).

Best practices in the application of sanctions found that they must be "comprehensively imposed and enforced" to ensure that (1) they are properly enforced, that practice follows policy; and (2) actors being sanctioned understand that sanctioning states will enforce sanctions, if necessary, ensuring that the threat is understood by those sanctioned (Lektzian and Regan 2016, 556). Moreover, when international actors are willing to commit resources to imposing and enforcing sanctions, this indicates to warring parties that an international coalition is interested and committed to ending conflict (Lektzian and Regan 2016). Griffiths and Barnes (2008, 3) further suggested that "Incentives and sanctions are most likely to be effective when they respond to the parties' motivations and support preexisting societal dynamics for conflict resolution. Too often, these measures are either of little relevance to the main protagonists or are counterproductive." Indeed, Wallensteen (2000, 5) found that sanctions have had limited success, determining that only 5% to 30% of sanctions are effective in reaching their goal (depending on the terms of measurement).

Increasing effort and resources to demonstrate commitment, Lektzian and Regan (2016, 557) argued, can be done through a mixed approach of military intervention and an international coalition of coordinated sanctions: "[m]ilitary interventions can operate as a tool of sanction enforcement and a demonstration of resolve somewhat independently of their role in balancing capabilities." This means that military activities, whether covert or overt, can be used to gather intelligence, disrupt supply routes, or engage directly against targets that are violating terms of the sanctions (Lektzian and Regan 2016). In short,

---

[29]Targeted or smart sanctions aim to divorce the impact of sanctions of the intended target from that of the remainder of the population. As Wallensteen (2000, 12) explained, targeted or smart sanctions are meant to be implemented with "more precision, less collateral damage, and thus more efficacy."

Lektzian and Regan (2016, 558) contend that "Being squeezed by increasing costs, constrained by military force, and offered an opportunity to negotiate, targeted states would be more likely to negotiate than fight."

3.1.7.3 Foreign Military Intervention

FMI, the final approach to conflict-resolution efforts, is used to target the personnel and materiel aspects of war. FMI or military engagement can take several forms, including but not limited to the threat of force, application of force on behalf of one or more parties against opposition, financing of force of various parties, implementation of no-fly zones, collection of intelligence, and intervention between forces to prevent fighting. Although the merits of FMI on the impact of conflict resolution can be debated, it is unquestionably expensive. FMI costs result not only from the direct financial costs of armaments and technology but also in lives lost and physical damages to the state(s) by conflict caused by such interventions. Many of these costs are subsequently imposed on the post-conflict state (on the order of $50 billion–$100 billion per average conflict) (World Bank 2013a).

Of course, significant costs also are borne by the engaging third-party military; in fact, hard costs of military engagement are notoriously difficult to calculate, lacking a standardized methodology. For example, review of various US military engagements in the past 15 years (i.e., FY01–FY14) shows that the average annual costs faced by the United States in two conflicts (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively) were approximately $54 billion and $46 billion per year per conflict (not including the long-term health and disability costs of military service members who fought) (Belasco 2014). When health costs are included, the total increases to 3.75 times that amount. These figures make military interventions a questionable undertaking for policy makers facing pressing domestic issues.

Some scholars argue that supporting military and economic interventions to various parties in a conflict increases both the length and violence of a conflict. As Regan and Aydin (2006, 740) explained:

> A potential explanation for the deleterious consequences of military or economic interventions is that these third-party strategies increase the ability of one or both sides to resort to violence with some prospect of prevailing but do not help the adversaries to overcome their distrust and misperceptions of one another. Material incentives encourage the receiver of the support to continue fighting but do not present a conducive environment where the adversaries can communicate effectively and identify their differences. Especially if military or economic support is given to an actor that prefers fighting to settlement with the hope of prevailing on the battlefield, interventions will facilitate the solidification of its preferences and expectations around this position.

Other scholars support this argument, contending that the "presence of troops from other countries poses a serious threat to conflict termination" and arguing that increased resources to parties increases military might, fatalities, and the number of potential external actors who subsequently add to the complication, thereby protracting the conflict (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015, 538-9). Or, as Regan and Aydin surmised (2006, 743): "[i]n general, the rebels have less military capability than the government, and external support for the rebels will increase their expectations for victory, increase the level of demands they make for a settlement, decrease the amount of concessions they are willing to make, and therefore extend the duration of a conflict." Gurr (2010, 5) explained that in Africa, the intervention of foreign powers on behalf of rebels has been the main factor in protracting local conflicts, whether grievance- or greed-based: "External military and political support for contenders has arguably been the single most important factor sustaining African internal wars. The grievances and greed that motivate the insurgencies ordinarily are local, but international support keeps them going."

Alternatively, other scholars argue that external military or economic intervention can be beneficial to the termination of conflict. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004, 268) argued that "external military intervention on the side of the rebels," as well as a decline in primary commodity prices, are the factors that tend to shorten a conflict. Notwithstanding whether military interventions extend or shorten conflicts, those parties that receive additional assistance are more likely to achieve victory (Gent 2008). Moreover, gains to the rebel group – as measured in the likelihood of power sharing in the post-conflict state – increase as it becomes more powerful.

3.1.7.4 Best Practices for Conflict Cessation

There is debate regarding whether military solutions or negotiated settlements are more lasting. Some scholars argue that military solutions rarely ensure lasting peace (Conciliation Resources 2009) because the drivers of conflict (i.e., grievance and greed) cannot be addressed by military might alone. Without a solution to those initial motivating causes, conflict is bound to reemerge. Others argue that military solutions are more lasting because the defeated party has no feasibility to continue fighting (Human Security Centre 2006). Alternatively, if there is a negotiated settlement to conflict, both parties still possess the materiel feasibility factors of war—and, given that conflict emerges due to greed or grievance, parties naturally must commit some faith to the goodwill of potentially untrustworthy partners in situations

of great risk. Attempting to renegotiate numerous times for better terms of a settlement with the threat of

conflict indeed may occur when groups retain strong factors of conflict feasibility (Human Security Centre

2006). For rebels, this can be a positive outcome: "In order to get a favorable outcome, however, a rebel

must both have large and capable military forces and secure shelter from which these forces can operate

from and retreat to" (Aronson et al. 2015, 11).

The data provided on how conflicts end tend toward mediation as the most lasting approach—but

only if done properly: as Crocker (2011) advised, implemented over the long term, with ample resource,

buy-in, and party ownership. Gurr (2010) cautioned that in Africa or other regions where borders are

porous, the spillover effects of conflict must be carefully guarded against to ensure that the conflict

resolution is sustained, and that personnel or armaments do not lie in wait in safe havens.

When pursing negotiations and depending on the type of conflict, we may look at different

optimal solutions. Gurr (2000) suggested that when rebel groups are aiming to gain territory, enhanced

democratic devolutions of power should be the aim; when rebel groups are contesting access to power and

resources, then rebel groups' power sharing with the state should be the aim. This is consistent with

guidance that Downes (2004, 231) stated abounds in both academic and policy circles, where "secessionist

conflicts are best managed by giving regional autonomy to restive ethnic groups, while contests for control

of the state should be contained by sharing power."

Not all conflict types have evidenced the same levels of success from the various conflict-

resolution efforts applied. Problematically, for ethnic conflicts, agreements tend to fall apart more than two

thirds of the time (Downes 2004). Kreutz (2010) agreed, noting that conflicts that seek to have a complete

ethnic takeover as a goal are more likely to recur. However, as Kreutz (2010) explained, intrastate conflicts

are less likely to recur if, after settlement or victory, peace keepers are present. Kreutz (2010) further noted

that fighting in these cases tends to last longer when a conflict becomes more complex and more actors

become involved. Walter (2011) cautioned that any conflict settlement must first ensure that an outside

party can support the demobilization of rebels so that spoilers do not emerge.

3.2 AFTER CONFLICT ENDS

Regardless of the specific conflict type, as discussed previously, there are commonalities among

most conflicts in their feasibility factors and motivations as well as in their stages of emergence and

resolution. Similarities also are found in how peace – once violence has ended – is best addressed. Thus, in

the same way, most conflicts face a similar process of emergence and escalation as they also face similar

stages for resolution and lasting peace. As Walter (2011, 2) explained, "[t]he problem of civil war is not a

problem of preventing new conflicts from arising but of permanently ending the ones that have already

started." Yet, despite broad clarifications offered by authors for ensuring lasting peace, the implementation

remains challenged and often unsuccessful.

3.2.1 After Conflict Ends: Ensure Lasting Peace

Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002) and Ouellet (2004) have addressed the immediate-,

middle-, and long-term issues following the end of violent conflict to ensure that peace takes hold. First,

they highlighted the importance of disarming and demobilizing active, non-state, armed rebel groups in the

early stages following conflict cessation. The fact that they both pointed to the need to address the

challenges surrounding former combatants after conflict ends reinforces the importance of human

feasibility in conflict, and the need for appropriately conceived programming in the post-conflict state for

former combatants who are most likely to become spoilers of the peace, if not well transitioned (Nilsson

2005). Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002) further clarified that not only must rebel groups be

disarmed and demobilized; they also ideally should be converted into political parties and comprehensively

reintegrated into society. Stedman (2001, 5) highlighted the importance of attending to combatants

following conflict as being so critical that "without achieving these two critical sub-goals, civil wars cannot

be brought to an end, and important normative goals – such as the creation and consolidation of democracy

and the protection of human rights – have little chance of success."

In the medium term, Ouellet (2004) contended that peace agreements must be monitored, and the

agreed-on implementation steps formally undertaken (e.g., implementing reforms and power-sharing

agreements along with anything else that was agreed). Simultaneously, Hartzell (2002) contended that

third-party peace keepers must be utilized to ensure that security is held so conflict does not reemerge

during the period in which economic and social institutions are rebuilt. Indeed, Gilligan and Sergenti

(2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), and Fortna (2004) all found that where peace keepers are present, the

likelihood of conflict reemergence is much lower – especially, noted Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon

(2013), where there are more peace-keeping personnel – and, economic growth is higher (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Hoeffler, Shahbano Ijaz, and von Billerbeck 2010).

Finally, in the long term, investment in the redevelopment of institutions, infrastructure, and social welfare services that might have been destroyed or negatively impacted by the conflict must be implemented by the state (alleviating the burden of development and humanitarian agencies while rebuilding citizen trust in the government). This is in addition to long-term political and social forms so that democratization can occur supported by redeveloped institutions. In fact, Paris (2004) contended that "institutionalization before liberalization" (IBL) should be the standard for transformation in post-conflict societies, arguing that without stable societies – as seen in functioning economic and political institutions – the challenges inherent in democratic and market liberalization cannot be tolerated by the post-conflict state. This process appears to be similar to the approach that Rwanda has taken and that international donors have broadly endorsed in that state. To the extent that Rwanda appears to be becoming less rather than more democratic – at least relative to aspects such as constitutional reform for the president's term limits and repression of opposition parties[30] – it does not appear to be aligning with Paris's (2004) theory of post-conflict stabilization, which views democratization and market liberalization as the goals of a peaceful and prosperous state.

Stedman (2001) also reminded practitioners about the importance of addressing direct and structural causes of violence – alternatively known as the negative and positive peace components (Galtung 1964, 1969) – to reach a phase in which sustainable human development can take hold to prevent conflict reemergence. These components include security-sector reform so that the state can assert its role protecting civilians and local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation. Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002) noted that attendance to these additional areas is likely to increase lasting peace. Panić (2008, 12-13) reinforced the importance of these areas, stating that a post-conflict state must meet the following three core requirements to ensure cohesion, prosperity, and peace: "equal rights and equal opportunities for all," "personal security," and "economic security."

---

[30]See Chapters 5 and 7 for more on Rwanda's behavior as a post-conflict state. Also, Reyntjens (2011, 2013, 2015) provided an extensive review of the current administration's approach to constitutional reform and elections.

3.2.1.1 Post-Conflict States and the Conflict Cycle

Post-conflict states[31] are often at the highest risk for conflict resurgence (Collier and Hoeffler 2004c). This usually is due to the residual impacts of conflict and its resolution,[32] which are the leading indicators of renewed conflict. Post-conflict states demand immediate (and emergency) assistance to institutions of governance, economic stabilization, health and humanitarian relief, infrastructure redevelopment or repair, and even social and transitional justice. These areas often are prioritized not by need but instead by donor-funding availabilities and donor priorities, usually focused on infrastructure refurbishment (Kurtenbach 2009). Critically, however, this approach misses the importance of conflict mitigation in some of the most at-risk states: post-conflict states. As the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (2013) explained: "When the killing ends or is reduced, efforts to rebuild war-torn states and societies begin. Despite the creation of new institutions and processes, the international community's record on this front has been inadequate." Kurtenbach (2009) further pointed out that published guidelines on what actually works in post-conflict states simply do not exist. This inadequacy is evidenced by the fact that 40% of countries return to conflict within 10 years of conflict cessation (Collier 2009); 57% of countries that experienced conflict between 1945 and 2009 relapsed into conflict (Walter 2011); and 90% of countries that faced internal conflict between 2000 and 2012 had faced conflict between 1970 and 2000 (United Nations 2012b).

Attending to post-conflict states requires a lens that is geared toward humanitarian relief as well as, critically, stability. Frequently, this second aspect is absent in immediate post-conflict initiatives (Branczik 2004). Humanitarian relief eventually targets stability by building social safety nets, addressing health concerns, and supporting broader developmental goals. However, the duration required for them to show results means that precious time is lost for ensuring that stability takes hold and conflict does not reemerge. Humanitarian and development interventions are not developed or implemented to support stabilization (Branczik 2004). As mentioned previously, the rate at which conflict reemerges in post-conflict states means that there is a need to identify mechanisms that address those immediate factors of risk for instability.

---

[31]See Glossary: "Post-Conflict State."
[32]See Glossary: "Conflict Resolution."

As described in the discussion on conflict emergence, the main risks for instability for conflict reemergence also include issues of grievance, greed, and feasibility. To recap, grievance is the notion that "objective social exclusion" is a motivation for rebellion (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006); greed explains that "predation and sadism" drive armed internal conflict (ibid.); and feasibility is the argument that when armed conflict is materially feasible, it will occur (Collier 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006). Post-conflict states carry significant risk based on the impacts of conflict, including the presence of grievance, greed, and feasibility; this makes them vulnerable to conflict reemergence at both the state and population levels (Collier 2006).

At the state level, as described previously in more depth, conflict impacts include institutional disruption, governance shifts, economic costs, infrastructural damages, and significant damage to natural resources and sources of economic growth. The costs of these damages can be on the order of $50 billion to $100 billion for each year of war (World Bank 2013a). For developing countries, where most significant conflicts occur, these costs can set development objectives back decades.

At the population level, there is an especially high risk for conflict to reemerge with those who experience grievances in the post-conflict state. These impacts include lost livelihoods, unequal losses during conflict, lack of social support, lack of opportunity, and horizontal inequalities. People who experience inequality perceive that they are lacking support, are often without representation, and believe they are losing out on peace dividends compared to other segments of the population. These types of aggrieved actors are especially vulnerable to participating in a resurgence of armed conflict due to the motivation of grievance. Subjective or objective perceptions of unequal dividends of peace as compared to peers may drive incentives to reengage in conflict; therefore, these offended individuals may be easily recruitable by rebel groups and spoilers. The subsequent impact of deterred economic growth, absence of institutions of government, significant political shifts, lost lives and livelihoods, and damages to basic sources of income can be devastating and can lead to second- and third-order effects—notably, driving up challenges to stability following conflict cessation. This is especially true if the dividends in achieving peace are not being equitably distributed (Collier 2006; Gleichmann et al. 2004). As Collier (2006, 21) has observed, "Once a society has suffered a collapse into low trust, it takes concerted action to change

expectations, and meanwhile, many functions which other governments could rely upon simply don't work."

Feasibility factors, also called third-party enablers, are the resources needed to wage armed conflict. In addition to the impediments of war, feasibility factors include the personnel willing to undertake armed conflict, which most often is composed of ex-combatants in post-conflict states. Ex-combatants are a complex group and by no means homogenous; their definition varies by source. The UN defines ex-combatants as those who have been officially disarmed during the DDR process (United Nations 1999a). This definition has numerous challenges, notably: many former combatants are never formally "disarmed"; DDR may be open only to certain formally recognized rebel forces and may not account for paramilitary or guerilla groups; and it may not reach all those who were combatants due to selection-process biases, costs, or other issues of political will. Nilsson (2005, 16) suggested the following definition, which this study uses because it considers many of these inconsistencies: "An ex-combatant can be seen as an individual who has taken direct part in the hostilities on behalf of one of the warring parties. The individual must also either have been discharged from or have voluntarily left the military group he or she was serving in." This includes women, child soldiers, armed fighters, logistics managers, administrative officers, and so forth.

3.2.1.2 Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict States

When considering interventions for ex-combatants, it is important that not all are considered imminently violent. The majority of ex-combatants are not themselves the spoilers of peace who attempt to destabilize in order to achieve gain; however, they are the most frequently recruited to assist in upsetting peace and resuming conflict because of their vulnerability in post-conflict states (Nilsson 2005) (Table 4).

Table 4 **Ex-Combatants in the Post-Conflict State**

Ex-combatants are considered most vulnerable to recruitment by spoilers for several reasons:

1. They are the most capable for waging armed warfare (having already participated) and often remain prepared (Collier 2007; Cutter Patel, De Greiff, and Waldorf 2009).

2. They often are bereft of opportunity following conflict due to the economic insecurity broadly impacting a post-conflict state. Without adequate alternate skills for a livelihood in

peacetime, they have few alternatives, especially where illicit activity remains prevalent (Addison 2003; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; Kelly 2010; McMullin 2013; Nilsson 2005; United Nations 2010). This often leads to re-arming in support of domestic and international guerilla or armed movements (Hill, Taylor, and Temin 2008; Humphrey and Weinstein 2004; Nilsson 2005).

3. Amnesty and DDR programs often are poorly implemented and the "reintegration" aspect is recognized as significantly lacking (Hill, Taylor, and Temin 2008; United Nations 2010).

4. Violence as a mechanism to resolve disputes may be the norm among former combatants—which, in an aggrieved community, could be further destabilizing and problematic for reintegration (Collier 2006).

5. They often are not welcomed back into communities and may be perceived as outsiders or as criminals for their behavior during conflict (Ginifer 2003; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; McMullin 2013; Nilsson 2005).

6. Entry into security-sector positions may not be open to all former combatants—neither may it be a desirable option (Cutter Patel, De Greiff, and Waldorf 2009).

7. They are not considered target actors for the development community in post-conflict states whose definitions of vulnerable populations lend itself more toward the wounded, elderly, youth, and female populations (United Nations 2010).

8. Returning to fighting or armed criminal violence well may be the only opportunity afforded them to make a living (Addison 2003; African Development Bank 2011; Hill, Taylor, and Temin 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; Marshall 2005; Nilsson 2005).

9. There may be a lack of political will on behalf of the government to address former combatants (United Nations 2010).

10. Ex-combatants often face significant psychological stress and trauma from war, health problems following conflict, and substance-abuse problems, and even may have other burdens from the experience of war, including additional families and subsequent responsibilities to them (Collier 1994; Mueller 2003; Nilsson 2005).

11. Peace dividends well may not be in their favor, adding to increased grievance and susceptibility for co-optation by spoilers.

12. Ex-combatants often are not consulted in the development of context-specific DDR programs (Dzinesa 2006; Kilroy 2011; Solomon and Giniter 2008; Willems et al. 2009), thereby decreasing chances of success as identified in the best practices of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (2005) and the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) (United Nations 2006). Worse yet, they often may be used as a political tool by the ruling government in order to garner additional government funds (Torabi and Delesgues 2008).

Subsequently, without adequate and targeted attention to the third-party enablers of conflict, the risk of instability escalates quickly. There are several options to address the broad problem of third-party enablers, including weapons-collection programs, targeting illicit trade routes, targeting international distributors of conflict armaments, and limiting access to training grounds. These interventions are notoriously expensive and difficult to achieve in the midst of challenging, vast, and poorly developed conflict countries. Moreover, in the face of imminent risk to conflict, they can be politically challenging to implement.

Knight and Ozerdem (2004) argued that attention to the grievances of ex-combatants is crucial to avoid their return to armed violence or, worse, armed conflict. Yet, as Nilsson (2005, 24) noted: "In many post-war societies there is no or very limited outside support for the reintegration process. In these societies, ex-combatants, their families and the local communities are usually left to handle these issues as best as they can." Moreover, the DDR process and, specifically, reintegration are poorly understood; despite its normative status and the relatively unchanged mechanism for coping with former combatants, it rarely produces success and frequently fails to achieve its aims of reintegration (Nilsson 2005). The World Bank, in its 2007 report authored by Uvin (2007, 11) on the multicountry reintegration program, stated that regarding Burundi, for example, DDR programs are simply an opportunity to "buy time for peace to produce its beneficial opportunities" and not an opportunity to consolidate and reinforce peace. If not well

addressed, the spoilers will find that the enablers and feasibility mechanisms for retrenching a post-conflict country into conflict are quite achievable (Collier 2006).[33]

Finally, Collier (2006, 19), in addressing how post-conflict states are often higher risk of conflict than non-post-conflict states, explained that experience resolving grievances violently combined with feasibility factors, such as trained rebels, arms, and financing, are significant risks that uniquely exist in post conflict states:

> "Many societies have severe objective group grievances which sustain intense political conflict, without getting close to civil war. Group grievance and intense political conflict are not in themselves dangerous: they are indeed the normal stuff of democratic politics. However, in post-conflict societies, civil war has first built intense political conflict and then conducted that conflict through violence. Whereas most of the societies which have group grievances have no tradition of conducting their political conflict by means of violence, post-conflict societies may have no tradition of conducting their political conflict non-violently.
> The rebel organization usually maintains its effectiveness during the post-conflict period. Compared with a pre-conflict society with the same risk factors, the post-conflict society is therefore much better prepared for war. The rebel organization has already recruited, motivated, armed and saved. For example, Savimbi, the head of the Angolan rebel organization UNITA, was reputed to have accumulated over $4bn in financial assets during the first war, some of which he then used to finance the start of the second."

These challenges can become particularly acute when the structural challenges to stability (e.g., corruption, horizontal inequality, and marginalization) exist or episode-based challenges (e.g., elections and coups) take place.

Considering these challenges of addressing grievance and greed in immediate post-conflict states, conflict enablers (i.e., those spoilers who want to use the former combatants as recruits for conflict resurgence) thus become the most direct target of opportunity for stemming possible conflict. However, as described previously, mechanisms for addressing this issue area are either significantly limited or outright

---

[33]Collier (2006, 19): "Many societies have severe objective group grievances which sustain intense political conflict, without getting close to civil war. Group grievance and intense political conflict are not in themselves dangerous: they are indeed the normal stuff of democratic politics. However, in post-conflict societies, civil war has first built intense political conflict and then conducted that conflict through violence. Whereas most of the societies which have group grievances have no tradition of conducting their political conflict by means of violence, post-conflict societies may have no tradition of conducting their political conflict non-violently.
  "The rebel organization usually maintains its effectiveness during the post-conflict period. Compared with a pre-conflict society with the same risk factors, the post-conflict society is therefore much better prepared for war. The rebel organization has already recruited, motivated, armed and saved. For example, Savimbi, the head of the Angolan rebel organization UNITA, was reputed to have accumulated over $4bn in financial assets during the first war, some of which he then used to finance the start of the second."

failing and unsuccessful. This means that programs addressing feasibility of conflict resurgence require a rethink. The program most commonly directed to feasibility is the same one that most commonly fails: DDR.

> If reintegration fails, the achievements of the disarmament and demobilization phase are undermined, instability increases and sustainable reconstruction and development are put at risk (United Nations 2006, 1).

Thus, when targeting defection for conflict resolution, it is critically important to consider the full life cycle of the ex-combatants in the effort. It is particularly these types of challenges within the state dealing with conflict or immediate aftermath that the input of the former combatants could prove helpful.

3.2.2 Challenges to Lasting Peace

Achieving lasting peace, for many countries, has been elusive. Though while the basic nuts and bolts of what is required for post-conflict states for stability is known, the implementation often suffers from human fallibility, financial limitations, and political reticence.

3.2.2.1 Post-Conflict Programming

As discussed in the preceding sections, post-conflict states must address both structural and direct consequences of war in order to begin effective state building and peace building. Nevertheless, they pose a discrete challenge for implementation. State building and peace building require committed leadership, enduring and coordinated donor support, and at least a tenuous hold on the absence of outright conflict to spur development and the transition to stability. Yet, humanitarian post-conflict interventions rarely are geared toward stabilization goals; indeed, "development assistance is not designed to prevent conflict" (Branczik 2004). Moreover, as the CFR (2013) recently published on international donor institutions: "...these institutions remain disproportionately reactive, and often neglect conflict prevention as a critical tool for managing armed conflicts."[34] The CFR (2013) additionally noted that they often fail to identify and address the needs of the most vulnerable populations relative to conflict transformation and stability. Therefore, they miss the chance of promoting stability hand in hand with humanitarian assistance: "[t]he

---

[34]The author has encountered a similar set of challenges in post-disaster response planning that, although effective in the immediate term, fails to consider local population (especially private-sector) support measures by not including them in the design, implementation, and hand-off of response measures.

international instruments designed to prevent the outbreak of conflict or end fighting remain unwieldy and, at times, ineffective." Furthermore:

> The international community employs a variety of conflict prevention tools that target structural causes of conflict, conduct early warnings and assessments of emerging conflicts, promote cooperative measures such as mediation and dispute resolution, and act coercively. And yet, the multilateral tools currently available to reduce political instability and the likelihood of armed conflict within states are generally underdeveloped, uncoordinated, and deprived of the political authority necessary for effective application. (Council on Foreign Relations 2013)

The criteria for the dual track of structural and direct criteria for state building and peace building are not distinct—in fact, they are related. The concepts are correlated and the presence of one often enables and sustains the other. In post-conflict and many developing societies, this balance is notoriously difficult to achieve. Yet, when states are able to balance the negative and positive conditions of peace, as Galtung (1964) explained, peace will emerge. Empirical literature clearly supports this notion (Cevik and Rahmati 2013; Institute for Economics and Peace 2016). Broadly speaking, countries that have a higher degree of human well-being and appropriately targeted interventions and policy reforms toward economic growth and human development are more peaceful (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016; Muller 2011). Hegre (2014, 168), in general agreement, nevertheless cautioned: "[e]conomic development is unlikely to bring about lasting peace, alone, without the formalization embedded in democratic institutions." Hegre's (2014) findings are consistent with Walter (2011), who noted that states that follow a formal constitution and rule of law and treat their citizens fairly are unlikely to see violence reemerge. She thus argued for a policy focus on formalizing and practicing good policy toward citizens as possibly more important than immediate economic growth following conflict cessation. Ramsbotham et al. (2016, 13) succinctly noted: "[w]e end direct violence by changing conflict behavior, structural violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by changing attitudes."

Interventions that meet quantitatively derived criteria at the macro level in post-conflict countries cannot be assumed to meet the same criteria at the micro level, particularly when considering positive and negative peace aspects of intervention. Successful post-conflict interventions also must meet the needs – real and perceived – of program beneficiaries, in context-appropriate programs, and as a factor of a broader agenda that addresses peace.

> In order to achieve positive peace, therefore, injustice must be removed…(from) unjust political relations between majority and minority groups within a country, to unjust personal relations between individuals. It applies to all the various types of "differences" that distinguish sets of human beings: differences of race (the idea that some races are "superior" to others), gender (male domination), class (perpetuation of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage through birth, not merit), etc. (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 14)

The stable post-conflict state requires both a commitment to reform from national leadership and thoughtful, timely, and consistent donor and international partner support—all of which may drive the ultimate success of interventions at the micro level: regardless of macro level, quantitative measures of peace and stability.[35]

In addition to the absence of tools developed to address post-conflict stability, those analytic efforts that evaluate and identify the causes of conflict and conditions for peace rarely consider ground perspectives, a gap that this study aims to address.

3.2.2.2 Post-Conflict Assistance

In post-conflict states, aid can come in several forms, including ODA, either bilateral or multilateral; private donor or nongovernmental aid; and less-conventional forms, such as in peace-keeping assistance, military aid, and other program-specific funds. Aid following conflict is rarely doled out equally among post-conflict states, and numerous factors impact when, how much, what type, and how long it will last. Kang and Meernik's (2004, 149) analysis found that "national attributes as humanitarian need, economic openness, and regime transition, as well as conflict characteristics such as military intervention and conflict issues, affect aid levels." Furthermore, Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Elbadawi (2007) found that particular patterns of aid are elevated for countries where military intervention was higher, democratic transitions seem more likely, and domestic economic or trade relations are most invested. Nevertheless, the absence of discrete and agreed-on considerations for stabilization priorities in post-conflict states, political will to intervene in at-risk environments, and identification of communities most at risk for driving

---

[35]The presentation of conflict indicators has been driven almost entirely by quantitative, country-level research. The newly developed indicators of peaceful societies – although validated by a broad selection of scholars and think tanks (e.g., the GPI at the IEP, in collaboration with the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Pillars of Peace, also an IEP project) – suffer the same shortcomings. Challenging and exploring the relevance of these indicators and assessments, which ultimately drive multimillion-dollar programming to the beneficiaries at the micro level of impact, should be considered the next step of research and analysis.

instability means that, by and large, the needs of stability-vulnerable communities may be delayed or unattended, driving up the risk for conflict (Council on Foreign Relations 2013).

Notably, identifying at what point different interventions should be implemented can be complicated and dependent on a host of factors. These include but are not limited to the means of conflict cessation (i.e., negotiation or outright victory); duration and impact of the conflict on health, habitats, households, and livelihoods of those in the country; extent to which institutions functioned during conflict (i.e., educational institutions, markets, and banks); and where and to what level the intensity of conflict was experienced—among numerous other criteria and political decisions.[36]

Indeed, this study acknowledges that the challenges faced in many post-conflict states are many. A quick outline, which is by no means comprehensive, reveals the following issues that compound efforts in the post-conflict states:

- Challenges with Donors
  - "Limited donor attention span" (Leonhard and Hahn 2004, 9), overall donor weariness following an initial donor-funding push (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Kang and Meernik 2004), and general challenges in securing broad-based development assistance to fragile states in times of global fiscal austerity (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2014).
  - Prioritization of donor interventions based on funding priorities and not local needs (Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Elbadawi 2007; Kang and Meernik 2004; Kurtenbach 2009) and challenges regarding nonaligned, uncoordinated, incompatible, or competing donor priorities—particularly between financial institutions and development donors whose policy recommendations may differ greatly (Kurtenbach 2009).
  - Donors' funding based on political interest (Kang and Meernik 2004).
- Challenges with Host Nation

---

[36]Several frameworks exist for assessments, including the World Bank's Post-Conflict Needs Assessment and the Transitional Results Framework, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH's* (GIZ or the German Organization for Technical Cooperation) Practical Guide to Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Countries, and the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD – DAC) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States.

- o Management of multiple emergency needs, demands of the population, power-sharing, resource management, and administrative challenges (Dabo et al. 2010).

- o Facing an "Absence of or limited legitimacy and capacity of national government as counterpart. Where national capacity is higher, conflict parties set restrictive parameters for donor needs assessment (e.g. Sri Lanka)" (Leonhard and Hahn 2004, 9).

- o "Low national implementing capacity" (Leonhard and Hahn 2004, 9), bad economic policies and significant debt (Collier 2007), post-conflict–driven challenges with political institutions, and low levels of political and social development.

- o Coping with the transition of violent or criminal leaders into post-conflict leaders: "[t]he related structures do not vanish with the end of war, but influence the developments in politics, economy and society. The diffusion of criminal structures is a case in point, as well as the continuity and adaptation of existing power relations in spite of formally democratic procedures (e.g. through the election of members of paramilitary or warlord organisations into parliaments or local councils)" (Kurtenbach 2009, 4).

- Challenges with Programming

- o An absence of standard, regular community consultations usually attributed to factors such as a "lack of time, insecurity, political considerations"; "ongoing violence, lack of mobility of needs of assessment teams"; and more (Leonhard and Hahn 2004, 9) as well as support to positive deviants—those local parties who develop successful, locally owned approaches to development.

- o Underfunded support to vulnerable populations, including ex-combatants, among others (McKibben 2011; McMullin 2013; Muggah 2006b; Veal 2008).

- o Challenges between "short-term needs of stabilization and long-term peace-building goals; local ownership and external agendas; and peace-building agendas" (Kurtenbach 2009, 9) and "highly politicised international and national agendas" (Leonhard and Hahn 2004, 9).

- o "Short time frame due to dynamics of peace process" (Leonhard and Hahn 2004, 9).

- Challenges with DDR

o DDR programs that are "underfunded, understaffed and too short to facilitate effective reintegration" (Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies 2010, 12; Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 2005) and lack a long-term approach to reintegration, particularly on the part of the host nation (Leonhard and Hahn 2004).

o DDR programs, although widely recognized as lacking in success, do not undergo regular monitoring and evaluation reviews; therefore, broader consultation on bettering DDR is absent (Barker 2008).

o An absence of stabilization-focused interventions among the most vulnerable populations to work strategically to prevent conflict reemergence along with humanitarian concerns.

Moreover, markets in post-conflict states are mostly underperforming, if at all, and unemployment can be as high as 80% (Veal 2008); "innovative" or black-market trade in illicit goods and rampant arms may well be present (Kreutz, Marsh, and Torre 2011); government-sponsored social services are absent (Dabo et al. 2010); and health and development are degraded by the experience of conflict (Haar and Rubenstein 2012). Finally, spoilers may be ubiquitous, including in the foreign-investment area, and may want to capitalize on the vulnerable communities and donor resources therein (United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa 2007).

A Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) report issued by the UN Development Group and World Bank (2007, 3) found the following gaps in post-conflict programming:

- A lack of an agreed overall vision ("storyline") that sets the strategic direction for conflict transformation and peace building;
- Insufficient realism in the timelines for key recovery outcomes, resulting in unreasonable expectations on the part of the population, national leadership, and international partners;
- Inadequate links between priorities in the political and security arena and priorities in the economic and social arena;
- Loss of momentum after the key transition event (peace agreement, international donors conference);
- Insufficient integration of cross-cutting issues; and
- Insufficient coherence and coordination during post-PCNA implementation.

Furthermore, Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Elbadawi (2007, 6) found that "donors may provide too much aid too early and reduce aid flows too quickly just when post-conflict economies are ready to absorb more aid." Subsequently, countries may be at significant risk of lost growth and become more at-risk immediately following a decline in post-conflict interest. Whether an emotional response or political necessity, immediate post-conflict aid is fairly high at 20% GDP or higher in many countries (Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Elbadawi 2007). Research by Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Elbadawi (2007) further showed – at least notionally – that those post-conflict countries that were able to retain high amounts of post-conflict aid (i.e., 20% GDP or higher) throughout the zero to four-year and four- to ten-year periods following conflict ultimately performed much better than counterparts whose aid levels decreased. The Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Elbadawi (2007) study highlighted the strong post-conflict performers of Rwanda, Mozambique, and Nicaragua—all of which managed to garner significant aid at 20% GDP or higher. This is compared to lower performers and less successful post-conflict countries, such as Burundi and Ethiopia, whose developmental and economic broad-growth challenges were more pronounced following conflict (Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Elbadawi 2007).

The immediate post-conflict donor support typically increases standard growth by two percentage points; when paired with strong macroeconomic policies, it can be even more productive across the spectrum (Collier and Hoeffler 2002).[37]

> Social sectors (i.e. education, health, water and sanitation) normally receive large amounts of aid in all three post-conflict periods and receive much more than all other sectors...the productive sector accounts for over 10% of total aid, followed by budget support and government and institutions. Therefore aid composition reflects broadly post-conflict priorities, especially with regard to prioritizing social and infrastructure sectors. (Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Elbadawi 2007, 7)

---

[37]Collier and Hoeffler (2002) relied on the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scoring from which to derive assessments of relative macroeconomic policy strength. Thus, those countries that do better on the assessment were found to have stronger policies. Twenty components in four categories were used to evaluate relative policy strength. The 20 components were ranked on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) and then averaged across all categories to derive an overall CPIA policy score. The 20 components and four categories were A. Macroeconomic Management and Sustainability of Reforms (1. General Macroeconomic Performance; 2. Fiscal Policy; 3. Management of External Debt; 4. Macroeconomic Management Capacity; and 5. Sustainability of Structural Reforms); B. Structural Policies for Sustainable and Equitable Growth (1. Trade Policy; 2. Foreign Exchange Regime; 3. Financial Stability and Depth; 4. Banking-Sector Efficiency and Resource Mobilization; 5. Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance; 6. Competitive Environment for the Private Sector; 7. Factor and Product Markets; and 8. Environmental Policies and Regulations); C. Policies for Social Inclusion (1. Poverty Monitoring and Analysis; 2. Pro-Poor Targeting and Programs; and 3. Safety Nets); and D. Public Sector Management (1. Quality of Budget and Public Investment Process; 2. Efficiency and Equity of Revenue Mobilization; 3. Efficiency and Equity of Public Expenditures; and 4. Accountability of the Public Service).

Despite the acknowledged gaps and lack of success in achieving basic development and stabilization goals, this and many other studies beg the question of how to better consider what opportunities for post-conflict resiliency exist, focusing especially on those populations whose stability poses the most risk for peace development or conflict reemergence (United Nations Development Group and World Bank 2007).

Yet, the absence of an agreed-on framework and understanding of what interventions in post-conflict states are most needed to ensure stability – or the absence of those interventions, despite clearly articulated theory on baseline interventions to avoid conflict resurgence – means that effort is lagging to ensure that post-conflict states do not return to conflict (Council on Foreign Relations 2013).

3.2.2.3 Focus on Ex-Combatants and DDR in Post-Conflict States

Because this study focuses on the role that former combatants (and even potential combatants) can play in extending conflict, it is important to understand the full life cycle of coping with a defecting fighter. In particular, it is important to understand the DDR process and the potential challenges that emerge in this type of context once fighting has ceased (or even if it has not yet ceased) while fighters are defecting. Appropriately coping with the ex-combatants is extremely important for long-term stability. As such, this research would be remiss without addressing the role of DDR.

DDR is the process universally agreed on for dealing with ex-combatants in post-conflict states. DDR programs are the defining mechanism through which countries formalize the cessation of conflict by disarming former combatants and other armed non-state actors, demobilizing rebel groups, and reintegrating these actors back into society.

Because DDR broadly targets the notion of conflict feasibility by controlling the tools of armed violence, it is an important factor for the prevention of conflict resumption as well. DDR addresses three key aspects of armed conflict feasibility in the post-conflict state—all with an eye toward removing the tools of war from the population.

First, the disarmament stage collects weaponry and arms from the former rebels and civilian sector to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict that accompanies a heavy prevalence of arms in post-conflict states. Second, through demobilization, it guides the drawdown of armed groups. In many cases, former

armed rebel groups transition in this phase into political parties or formal security services. Political-party

formation was a critical step in Rwanda, for example, where General Paul Kagame's RPF transitioned into

a political entity, which is the current ruling party. The commitment of these parties to approach conflict in

a functioning political domain is crucial for stability. Third, the reintegration stage – often considered the

most expensive, time-consuming, and difficult aspect of DDR programming – is "the process which allows

ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally

entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and job- and income-

generating projects" (United Nations 2000a, 2).

In overview, the African Development Bank (2011, 4) explained the DDR process in terms of both

stabilization and peace building, thus targeting negative and positive peace, where DDR:

- Separates combatants from their weapons (disarmament) and gives non-state security actors such as rebels the opportunity of putting down weapons without feeling they have lost or surrendered.
- Builds trust among ex-combatants and their communities; this lays the foundation for other peace-building and state-building initiatives (e.g., SSR [security-sector reform]) and for long-term development plans to begin.
- Gives ex-combatants the opportunity to reunite with their families, reintegrate into civilian life, create social networks, and stop living by the gun.
- Provides transitional safety nets in the short term for ex-combatants and their dependents.

The DDR process often is linked to the SSR process, notably when the ex-combatants can be

transitioned into state security forces (e.g., military, police, and gendarmes). This can provide incentive for

ex-combatants to invest in the security of the state; however, it rarely is a solution that is capable of

addressing all ex-combatants' needs. Neither is the state able to regularly afford tens or hundreds of

thousands of new security-sector recruits into a likely austere-budget environment. In many post-conflict

countries, the reintegration process of former combatants into formal security services for the state leads to

heavily bloated security forces. This is a problem unto itself, lending to instability due to the problems with

administrative, political, integrative, financial security-force sustainment, and even potential costs

associated with amnesty programs, which may fail to account for the importance of addressing justice and

reconciliation. Moreover, not all combatants desire or are qualified to continue service under national state-

security agencies. Their joining of these organizations may require extensive training, another drain on

state resources, or even interfere with post-conflict justice programs. Both Burundi and South Sudan are

classic examples of security forces that either through amnesty or reintegration welcomed former combatants at a rate that is highly taxing to the state and may be counterproductive to the assurance of stability.

Despite the challenges of incorporation in security forces or civilian reintegration, a program to cope with large populations of ex-combatants is necessary for stability. Research shows the "overabundance of unemployed, armed fighters in a region that offers limited opportunities for reintegration of former combatants into a peacetime economy...provide powerful incentives for many to pursue post-war occupations in banditry, organized crime, mercenary activities, or 'strong-arm' politics" (Marshall 2005, 4). Former combatants are the most likely party to make a return to armed conflict feasible (Spear 2006). Field research by Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) in Sierra Leone reinforced these findings. According to their study, ex-combatants reported being dissatisfied with the limited training and allowances; many former combatants reported not even having access to participate in DDR; others noted problems reintegrating into their communities and negative perceptions about them; and many noted that they had initially joined out of an absence of security, household economic stability, and educational opportunities, favoring peace but feeling pushed to war—they felt the same following conflict (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004). This study was backed by field research by Hill, Taylor, and Temin (2008) in Liberia, where former combatants felt the absence of "jobs, benefits, or training," especially among those now unemployed, and could "envision returning to war." Hill, Taylor, and Temin (2008) also found that those who struggled with "reintegrating into their home communities and who perceive bias against ex-combatants seem more inclined to return to combat." Finally, by exploring the reasons for joining an armed rebel group among the Mai Mai in the DRC, Kelly (2010) found that many stated that absence of jobs, family, and means to better one's conditions were all driving factors for initially joining. After those who could leave finally did leave, jobs were difficult to find (ibid.).

DDR is acknowledged to be a difficult and often unsuccessful initiative—but one that addresses a critical and vulnerable community (Barker 2008). This failure is due to numerous reasons,[38] some of which are listed in Table 5.

---

[38]Challenges to managing this highly at-risk group of ex-combatants often falls under one of three policy initiatives. Collier (2007) explained that one option is repression or management of this group by forced conscription in order to remain under government control—a process that Rwanda also employs among its former combatants. Collier (2007)

Table 5 **DDR Challenges in Post-Conflict States**

- DDR is a complex and multifaceted undertaking that must contend with numerous actors including former male, female, and child combatants; their families; and the communities in which they live (Barker 2008).

- DDR is reflective of the nature of the conflict and its cessation, contending with existing and historical socioeconomic, ethnic, historical, or geographic tensions and situations—and even the nature of justice (including criminal and transitional) being applied in the post-conflict situation (United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa 2007).

- DDR often suffers from "poor planning and implementation of the reintegration phase of DDR" (African Development Bank 2011, 10).

- DDR often suffers a lack of national ownership (African Development Bank 2011) and a poor management of beneficiaries' expectations of DDR programs (Barker 2008).

- DDR is constrained by resources, staff, and overall capacity of the national economy and donors (African Development Bank 2011; Barker 2008; Muggah 2006a; United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa 2007).

- DDR is complicated by the number of foreign actors involved; unequal amounts of resources; specific and non-matching objectives, distributed irregularly across conflict regions (African Development Bank 2011; Barker 2008; United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa 2007); and "each possessing different and frequently competing goals and visions" (Barker 2008,103).

- DDR relies on early planning and political will (United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa 2007). In post-conflict environments where there are countless competing immediate priorities, DDR may quickly fall from priority status.

---

also discussed the opposite policy: heavy attention through increased social services to the community at risk. However, given the other factors challenging the reintegration of this group into local communities, it is unlikely that they participate or use social services to any extent that would impact risk reduction. The third mechanism is DDR, an unevenly applied program often left to the host government to manage.

- Not all DDR programs should be structured alike—but most are and "there needs to be greater diversity in DDR strategy" (Barker 2008, 104). This is impractical and generally breeds failure (United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa 2007); moreover, most are absent "a consistent means of measuring program goals and outcomes, a complex problem that further hinders program success" (Barker 2008,103-104). Muggah (2005b) argued that the measurement of program success according to the UN as weapons collected rather than security of environment is counterproductive and confusing.

- DDR programs fail to incorporate beneficiary input in planning (Dzinesa 2006; Kilroy 2011; Solomon and Ginifer 2008; Willems et al. 2009); or, worse, the ruling government may use DDR as a political tool or incentive to garner additional government-administered funds for corrupt practice and use (Torabi and Delesgues 2008).

- DDR programs have failed most broadly in the absence of a concerted effort at successful reintegration. As Barker (2008, 105) stated, "UNDDR programs have demonstrated a lack of attention to and effort towards achieving reintegration, the ultimate goal of DDR." The lack of acceptance and isolation are problematic for ex-combatants and hinder their reintegration efforts. Barker (2008, 112) further argued that "Current IIDR standards regarding job creation are unfocused and inadequate, and program designs heavily emphasize vocational training, an approach that conflicts with actual labor market demands."

- In DDR, weapons collection often is more representative than realistic (Spear 2006, 173): "In the contemporary security environment, it is difficult to see what can be achieved by disarmament alone. This is because the market for small arms and light weapons is so permissive and fluid that disarmament today is no guarantee that fighters will be without arms tomorrow; people will always be able to obtain arms on the black market and it is hard to change that situation."

- Spoilers among those who will go through DDR can significantly hinder success, as can other actors who incentivize a return to conflict (e.g., external foreign actors, businesses, and individuals who gained from conflict) (United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa

> 2007). This can be exacerbated by a frequent "absence of mutual trust between participants of
>
> the process" (African Development Bank 2011, 10).

It is important that for those ex-combatants who are not amnestied or recruited in the state security forces (either for political, personal, or other reasons), extensive and long-term support to their livelihood procurement should be a primary concern to avoid risks of instability.

3.2.3 Identification of Appropriate Interventions

Conspicuously, the challenge of successful transformation for post-conflict states *at risk* to those *not at risk* was highlighted in the recent United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Post-2015 Development Agenda and g7+ Group of Fragile States (2013, 1), which noted:

> The post–2015 global development framework must seek to enhance the social contract by promoting integrated action in four major areas not adequately treated in the MDGs: inclusive economic growth; peace building and state building; climate change; and environmental management.

3.2.3.1 Positive and Negative Peace

Together, the two components of inclusive economic growth and state building[39] and peace building form the dual-track approach statistically and theoretically acknowledged for best ensuring that post-conflict states do not return to violence and can sustainably achieve peace.

Echoing the ongoing work of the UN preliminary guidelines is a conflict-resolution and peace-building theory proposed by Galtung that focused on two factors of conflict and their subsequent factors of peace. Beginning with the premise that conflict consists of both direct violence (i.e., armed violence) and indirect violence (i.e., structural violence), Galtung developed a theory of peace that subsequently responded to the dual-track conflict factors with dual-track peace requirements. A framework borrowed from Grewal (2003) and shown in Figure 6 explains Galtung's basic premise.

---

[39]See Glossary: "State Building."

Figure 6 **Galtung Conflict to Peace Framework**
Source: Grewal (2003, 3), recreated by the Author.

Galtung (1964, 1-4) argued that there was a need to address two aspects in post-conflict states to ensure peace: negative peace ("the absence of violence, absence of war") and positive peace ("the integration of human society"). Galtung (1969, 168) later expounded on the construct of the environment that allows for both negative and positive peace, asserting that violence is not driven by the individual actor but rather by structural underpinnings in society: "[v]iolence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisation."

Widely recognized research in post-conflict states that uses the absence of violence or negative peace as its dependent or outcome variable is in the work of Cevik and Rahmati (2013); Collier (2006); Collier and Hoeffler (1999a, 2000, 2004a); Collier and Sambanis (2002); Collier et al. (2003); Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2006, 2008); and many others. Largely, although not exclusively, they point to economic indicators at the household and national levels, along with security-sector spending, age of state, population, Diaspora, and terrain. Their research, conducted in post-conflict countries, identified the following indicators that are found to be associated with a risk of conflict resurgence following conflict cessation (Table 6).

Table 6 **Correlated Conflict Indicators with Negative Peace**

Authors	Indicators	
Collier and Hoeffler	• Low per capita income (GDP/cap) • High poverty rates • Slow economic growth • Exporter of oil (natural-resource dependency) • Economic freedom – not free • More autocratic[40] • Young state	• Elections[41] • % GDP toward military spending • Increase in arms and armaments • Low Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) spending • Small Diaspora • Large population • Fewer years since last conflict • Mountainous terrain
Cevik and Rahmati	• Commodity price shock • Slowed GDP/capita growth	• Prior conflict • High presence of PKO forces • Very low or very high secondary education – U-shaped human capital impact

Sources: Cevik and Rahmati (2013); Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2006, 2008); Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2006). [42]

Positive peace-associated factors emerge in the work of the IEP. Building on eight "Pillars of Peace," the IEP (2015, 85) examined government, business, social, and economic indicators found to be correlated with "peaceful environments," where both "interdependent and mutually reinforcing...the relative strength of any one pillar has the potential to positively or negatively influence the others, thereby influencing overall levels of peacefulness" (Table 7).

Table 7 **Eight Pillars of Peace**

Pillars of Peace

[40]In particular, when other specific groups of individuals are directly disenfranchised, disempowered, and – especially – barred from participation in the formal organs of the state.

[41]To additionally be understood to include not only succession but also challenges emanating from an absence of planning for regime succession in extended autocracies, personality politics, and sudden power vacuums.

[42] The Central Intelligence Agency-funded Political Instability Task Force (PITF) is often cited as having a high success rate, for example, an 85% success for prediction of historical specific conflict type cases between1990-1997 (Goldstone, 2001). PITF focuses on for narrow conflict types (ethnic war, revolutionary war, genocide/politicide, and government upheaval). Because the research is narrowly focused, this research will not include use of the findings. However, it may be noted that the three strongest indicators for the PITF conflict types, partial democracy, high infant mortality and a low degree of openness to international trade are represented in the selected indicators which account for issues of governance, social development and economic freedom.

Sound Business Environment
A sound business environment is signified by strong institutions, a good regulatory environment, and both economic and business growth and productivity.
Good Relations with Neighbors
Gurr (2010) noted that in Africa, porous borders and poor relations with neighbors are significant contributors to the likelihood of conflict protracting. As such, stable and positive relations with neighbors on matters of political, economic, and social importance ranks as one of the important pillars of stability.
High Levels of Human Capital
Education and the promotion of opportunity for citizens are key contributors to development, growth, and productivity. These contributions to a society increase the likelihood of resilience against shocks and promote enhanced political and societal participation.
Acceptance of the Rights of Others
As Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) warned, exclusion of political and ethnic groups leads to grievance-forming divides, setting the stage for potential conflict. As such, protecting every citizen's basic rights, enforcing equality among genders and groups, and ensuring tolerance and freedoms are core facets of a stable society.
Low Levels of Corruption
Corruption drives inequality and inequality drives division. The grievance and greed represented in the outcome and application of corrupt activities are sufficient to motivate conflict intent—particularly when ill-gotten at the behest of significant swaths of society. Alternatively, when countries have low corruption rates, citizens express increased confidence in the state and its institutions to equally advocate for the welfare of all.
Well-Functioning Government
A well-functioning government is described as one that "delivers high-quality public and civil services, engenders trust and participation, demonstrates political stability, and upholds the rule of law" (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016, 56). This type of system ensures that all are able to access, participate, and derive equal and fair value from the government, thereby preventing the emergence of group grievance.
Free Flow of Information
The free flow of information relates to the notion that the public has the right and need to have unfettered access to the chambers, decisions, and information of government in order to serve as a check on its behavior. It facilitates and enhances the relationships between the leadership and its citizens, ensures trust, and assures that both the state and its citizens are informed to make the best decisions possible relative to one another.
Equitable Distribution of Resources
To ensure that grievance does not emerge over the greed and imbalance of access assured to various groups in society, the assurance of equitable distribution of resources – including healthcare, education, opportunity, and so forth – are crucial.

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace (2016) and Author.

The eight Pillars of Peace (POP) concept is unique in that it is the first "to use statistical analysis to comprehensively identify the factors associated with peace" (Institute for Economics and Peace 2011a, 3). The indicators selected are representative of conditions required for political, economic, social, and cultural peace. Each relates to core concepts of positive peace (Institute for Economics and Peace 2011b). The IEP (2016) argued that countries with higher levels of positive peace are more resilient than countries with lower positive-peace levels. It also found that whereas "high Positive Peace countries are subject to

more economic shocks, major internal shocks such as violent political change, violent conflict, and genocide, typically occur in low Positive Peace countries" (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016, 54).

To evaluate a country's peacefulness, the IEP GPI also measures negative peace, or the absence of direct violence or fear of violence. This is measured in 23 indicators, listed in Table 8, that address various areas including but not limited to interpersonal, gang, and state-directed violence; militarization levels; and areas of internal rebel conflict and intrastate conflict.[43]

Table 8 **Associated Conditions for Negative and Positive Peace Frameworks**

Tools for Addressing Negative Peace	NEGATIVE PEACE	POSITIVE PEACE	Tools for Addressing Positive Peace
Negative peace, or the absence of violence, is achieved in great part by economic and political growth and institutional policy reform. Cevik and Rahmati (2013), Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Hacıoğlu, Dinçer, and Çelik (2012) pointed out that removing opportunities and incentives for conflict resurgence are best addressed via economic and political measures to largely ensure that both grievance and feasibility drivers of conflict following cessation are avoided.	Income, Poverty, and Growth Political Authoritarianism Peacekeeping and Aid, Low Military Spending *Source*: Galtung (1964, 1969); illustration by Author.	Business Environment Well-Functioning Government Equitable Access to Resources	The second criterion for stabilization of the post-conflict state embraces deeper notions of resiliency and sustainable peace building. Here, education, good governance, human and social-capital rebuilding, reconciliation, economic liberalization, and horizontal equality are crucial for sustaining growth and building peace. Factors that drive and are associated with a culture of peace are statistically derived from the findings of the IEP GPI.

Avoiding the opportunities of conflict resurgence, assuring stability, and guiding a war-weary population forward importantly requires "enlightened leadership" (Anand and Sen 1994). Leaders must be able to make the necessary policy choices; broker negotiations with former opposition; and ensure that civilians have access to the critical opportunities and needs for household growth, personal empowerment,

---

[43]For a more detailed description of how the GPI measures negative peace, see Institute for Economics and Peace (2016), "Appendix A, GPI Methodology."

and autonomy. At the same time, they must balance the input of numerous international powers, regional actors, former foes, and future partners to promote an environment associated with stability and peace. Furthermore, stability in post-conflict states often requires a strong commitment from the international-donor community—financially and technically.[44]

Theorists, practitioners, governments, and civil-society approaches have yet to settle on a discrete path that would lead directly to nonviolence and sustainable development—and, given the need to focus on context-specific programming, they probably never will. Yet, the recognition that post-conflict states' policy must include peace building (i.e., positive peace) plus those crucial measures that ensure that countries do not return to violence (i.e., negative peace) as core components has begun to emerge in contemporary dialogue, planning, and policy. The UN Task Team on Peace and Security, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC), the World Bank, and numerous NGOs and institutions have presented thoughtful recommendations on different components for ensuring that peace building (i.e., positive peace) is a component of conflict avoidance (i.e., negative peace) in post-conflict states' policy. It is a clear if not indirect recognition of the importance of Galtung's (1964, 1969) negative and positive peace framework with critical contributions from well-known conflict and development thinkers that has driven the recognition of the special needs of post-conflict states regarding development and stabilization programming.

It is important to recognize the role of institutions in developing enabling environments for reconciliation, trust, and growth among the populace and state. This often is critically enabled through transitional-justice mechanisms that aim to address both justice and reconciliation, which – when owned by the state – are considered imperative to peace. This rebuilding of state–citizen trust is at the heart of successful political settlements. This indicates, more broadly as well, the importance of the state in leading the assurance of positive intergroup relations. These factors of trust, legitimacy, and reconciliation among and between the populace and the state, via various mechanisms (e.g., truth commissions and amnesty programs) have emerged as critical facets in the dialogue of post-conflict peace building (Organisation for

---

[44]This study seeks to acknowledge this and other interventions in the areas of health and humanitarian assistance as vital to post-conflict communities, but it focuses on the important dimension of recipient input in targeted programming.

Economic Co-Operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee 2011). Focusing on those who have experienced or been targeted in conflict, as well as those who have targeted, is crucial: "[p]olicy makers and practitioners must understand the needs, experiences, and motivations of the different populations involved" to have effective reconstruction (Kelly 2010). In fact, it is the combatants who are "often the most difficult groups to access, but some of the most essential to understanding the factors driving violence" (ibid., 2).

Statistical analysis by Cevik and Rahmati (2013, 5) of the factors that have the most successful post-conflict models reinforce "implementing growth-enhancing policies, reforming dysfunctional institutions, and addressing urgent social needs—to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence and pave the way to broad-based, sustainable growth in real GDP per capita after the end of a conflict."

Former combatants in post-conflict states are among the most essential for ensuring that positive peace develops, and negative peace is achieved (Table 9).

> Peacekeepers understand all too clearly that our efforts to avoid conflict relapses in fragile post-conflict countries can only succeed if we ensure that all members of society have an equal stake in safeguarding the peace dividend. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (as quoted in United Nations News Centre, 2008).

Table 9 **Contributions to Negative and Positive Peace to Be Gained from Ex-Combatants**

Ex-combatants may play a significant role in household and community stabilization and in "the restoration of social capital" (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996, 18). Whereas there is a recognized gap in successful socioeconomic reintegration guidelines and programming for ex-combatants, the understanding of their role in peace promotion and ensuring stability has been steadily gaining traction (International Labour Organization 2010). The UN has recognized that ex-combatants are crucial for ensuring a stable transition from conflict to peace and development (United Nations 2000a). The reduction of violence and the improved environment for security that emerges from disarmament and demobilization are critical steps toward achieving negative peace (United Nations 2006, 2.20). "Successful reintegration is essential to minimize the wide-ranging difficulties faced by individuals in the post-conflict period. It can restore social cohesion, strengthen community capacities,

and establish the basis for local reconciliation and peacebuilding so that people can look forward rather than becoming mired in the pain of the past" (United Nations 2006, 2.20:3). Moreover, "DDR can help create an environment that encourages national dialogue and reconciliation, and supports local capacities to manage the interactions and relations between receiving communities and ex-combatants" (United Nations 2006, 2.20:9). Furthermore, whereas the cash surplus usually afforded former rebels for turning in their weapons (during DDR) is not a lasting boost to households and communities, as Gilligan, Mvukiyehe, and Samii (2010, 2012) found, it is indeed a valuable one that may ease former rebels' transitions and provide some cushion for reintegrating. In fact, "former combatants can help start the process of broader socioeconomic recovery and reconstruction if they can be absorbed by communities that benefit from their new skills" (United Nations 2006, 2.20:9). Their contributions to the economy, even if largely unskilled, can be significant if policy and training programs are adequately matched with needs and public and private reconstruction programs (United Nations 2006). Moreover, without the successful transition and reintegration of ex-combatants into communities and societies, stabilization may be broadly at risk (United Nations 2006).

3.2.3.2 Sustainable Human Development [45]

Post-conflict states often require both state- and peace-building reforms following conflict cessation. Although the two are inexorably linked, they are not identical. The OECD (2008, 14) offers the following definition of state building, used in this study, as "purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups." The definition of peace building is from Call and Cousens (2008, 4), who defined it as: "Actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics. Post-conflict peacebuilding is the subset of such actions undertaken after the termination of armed hostilities."

Where the two notions most notably come together is in the relationship between development theory and stability; in cases in which theory may underscore programming for peace building, they are

---

[45]Cevik and Rahmati (2013, 6–11) provided an excellent overview of additional theories, including institutional-design theory, political-reform theory, geographical theories, and population- and innovation-based theories.

inherently linked. For example, a state-building approach that neither addresses the importance of human equality, particularly across groups, nor offers the basic freedoms and choices assured each individual under basic human-rights norms may fail to achieve statehood by bringing on conflict over renewed grievance. In these considerations, then, the two are inexorably linked. For this research, where considerations of stabilizing interventions take place in the context of a changed or at times "new" state, the two notions are closely related—and are referred to as such.

Post-conflict state- and peace-building theories have changed over time—and importantly so. Getting the balance right among macroeconomic policy, social support, political growth, and household resilience, among many other critical factors, is crucial for ensuring stability in post-conflict states. When these factors are poorly managed, the motivations for conflict (e.g., grievance) are more likely to emerge. Ensuring that practical application of theory is context-specific, reflexive, and sound should be the first priority for any post-conflict state.

When considering the specific situation of ex-combatants in the post-conflict state, it is worthwhile to consider several important factors—most notably for this discussion, the environment to which they will reintegrate. As explained previously, former combatants go through three basic processes following the cessation of armed hostilities and the implementation of a peace agreement or victory: (1) disarmament, (2) demobilization, and (3) reintegration into the state—whether among civilians or into the formal-security sector. For ex-combatants, in particular, it is especially important that there be a resilient, equitable, and popular state system to which they reintegrate. At the basic level, if the state is unable to manage the needs of former combatants, their likelihood for dissolution and grievance may rapidly increase, driving up the risk of violence, illicit activity, and even armed conflict. For example, the World Bank (2011b) and Hoeffler (2012) noted the problems of youth unemployment as a lowering cost factor for military or militia recruitment in poor economies. Moreover, lack of opportunity, especially when horizontal inequality is perceived among groups, can lead to grievance-based conflict (Gurr and Moore 1997) and insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Yet, it is not only the state that bears responsibility for ensuring that armed conflict does not emerge; individual agency also is a key ingredient in the perpetration of armed conflict. Frequently, however, individuals can and do feel pressed to commit violence when no

other alternative – state or civilian – is available to redress grievance, greed, or another motivating factor toward violence.

Although a clear-cut, chartered path of state building and peace building does not exist, perhaps the best theory to date is that of SHD (United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 1996). SHD emerged in response to the recognized failures of the solely economic- or human-needs models to comprehensively and sustainably address the challenges of development, the role of basic freedoms, and the need for assuring human agency in the development process.[46] The decades preceding SHD were wracked by the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s: extreme poverty often extenuated by poor national policies, serious environmental challenges (e.g., the emergence of "greenhouse gases") incensed by the world market for natural resources, and the misplaced direction of aid and development support driven not by recipient need but by donor priority. "Aid from donor nations has not only been inadequate in scale, but too often has reflected the priorities of the nations giving the aid, rather than the needs of the recipients" (United Nations 1999b). This realization drove the foundation for the refocus of developmental programming priorities and theories to the recipients, the people, and their needs, freedoms, and opportunities. The resulting challenges preceding the emergence of SHD theories had placed many countries, especially in Africa, at lower developmental levels in the 1970s and 1980s than they had been in the 1960s. As the UN (1999b, 24) World Commission on Environment and Development perceptibly noted:

> Many present efforts to guard and maintain human progress, to meet human needs, and to realize human ambitions are simply unsustainable – in both the rich and poor nations. They draw too heavily, too quickly, on already overdrawn environmental resource accounts to be affordable far into the future without bankrupting those accounts. They may show profit on the balance sheets of our generation, but our children will inherit the losses. We borrow environmental capital from future generations with no intention or prospect of repaying. They may damn us for our spendthrift ways, but they can never collect on our debt to them. We act as we do because we can get away with it: future generations do not vote; they have no political or financial power; they cannot challenge our decisions.

It was against this challenging backdrop that a new theory emerged. Coming on the heels of the neoliberal market theorists, globalization, basic human needs theorists, and the rise of the emerging

---

[46]See Rapley (2007) for a good overview of historical development theory.

economies of East Asia, the creation of the SHD model – advocated by capability theorists including

Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum – aimed to rebalance past efforts and incorporate a broader

consideration of factors that would have the "ability to make development sustainable—to ensure that it

meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own

needs" (United Nations 1999b). SHD broadly focused on preserving not only the environment but also the

community; ensuring equality among nations and quality of life; and committing the basic freedoms

assured in capabilities. The most widely recognized definitions of SHD come from the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP), in which human development was first defined as the "process of

enlarging people's choices" (United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 1996,

49); more recently, as "the expansion of the substantive freedoms of people today while making reasonable

efforts to avoid seriously compromising those of future generations" (United Nations Development

Program 2011b, 18); and "sustainable" human development as the "protection of the life opportunities of

future generations...and...the natural systems on which all life depends" (United Nations Development

Program Human Development Report 1996, 63-5).

The UNDP HDR (1996, 55-6) further divides SHD into five core categories, "all affecting the

lives of the poor and vulnerable," as follows:

- **Empowerment** - The expansion of men and women's capabilities and choices increases their ability to exercise those choices free of hunger, want and deprivation. It also increases their opportunity to participate in, or endorse, decision-making affecting their lives.
- **Co-operation** - With a sense of belonging important for personal fulfillment, well-being and a sense of purpose and meaning, human development is concerned with the ways in which people work together and interact.
- **Equity** - The expansion of capabilities and opportunities means more than income - it also means equity, such as an educational system to which everybody should have access.
- **Sustainability** - The needs of this generation must be met without compromising the right of future generations to be free of poverty and deprivation and to exercise their basic capabilities.
- **Security** - Particularly the security of livelihood. People need to be freed from threats, such as disease or repression and from sudden harmful disruptions in their lives.

SHD was influenced by and influenced numerous theories, including the human needs approach,

capability theory, the Oxford poverty and human development theory, and the ongoing refinement of SHD.

Perhaps most notably, the work of SHD theorists led to the adoption and refinement of the *United Nations Human Development Index and Report*, a compilation of indicators broadly intended to measure the "enlarging choices" and "well-being" of people in all societies in terms of their achievement of SHD. In essence, these are the dimensions critical for individuals to have the freedoms (or capabilities) to choose to do and become, as they so desire, in an environment of protected freedoms and assured well-being.

The human-dimension focus of SHD may lead astray thinking on the known centrality of economic needs for state building in post-conflict states to avoid conflict resurgence. Yet, that would be an inaccurate assumption because SHD is widely concerned with the assurance of equality among all actors and an enlarged set of choices to pursue. The condition of poverty – particularly horizontal inequality, a key driver of grievance for conflict (Stewart 2008) – produces a necessarily limited set of capabilities for human agency.[47] This consideration rings true in statistical and qualitative findings. Poorer states are more likely to engage in conflict and, considering the global costs of war (cited previously as between $50 billion and $100 billion annually), government budgets can expect to be strained. Economic impacts of war will drive the need to focus heavily on reconstruction of key production, trade, infrastructure, and employment for post-conflict states. Hence, targeted support and foreign assistance to help populations alleviate poverty and promote national economic growth are critical components for post-conflict programming (Hoeffler 2012). For example, economic growth at the household level evidenced by GDP per capita, driven by and contributing to sustainable development, is a strong component of conflict avoidance, and should be a cornerstone of post-conflict peace building.

> A country with GDP per person of just $250 has a predicted probability of war onset (at some point over the next five years) of 15%, even if it is otherwise considered an "average" country. This probability of war reduces by half for a country with GDP of just $600 per person. Countries with income per person over $5000 have a less than 1% chance of experiencing civil conflicts, all else being equal. (Humphreys and Varshney 2004, 9)

---

[47] It is worth noting that the counter to economic poverty, "opulence," is not the solution in the equation to guard against conflict:

The most basic problem with the opulence view is its comprehensive failure to take note of the need for impartial concern in looking at the real opportunities individuals have. The exclusive concentration only on incomes at the aggregative or individual levels ignores the plurality of influences that differentiate the real opportunities of people, and implicitly assumes away the variations – related to personal characteristics as well as the social and physical environment – in the possibility of converting the means of income into the ends of good and livable lives which people have reason to value. (Anand and Sen 2000, 2031)

It is worth noting that whereas higher GDP per capita is correlated with more stable states – and often explained as an indication of household economic resilience – there are additional means of measuring wealth and equality that provide a greater depth of household information. These include gross national income (GNI) per capita, which is a more representative measure of per-capita wealth; the GINI Index, which measures economic inequality across households by plotting distribution of wealth; and the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Indicator (IHDI), which measures human-development inequality—often a measure of household resilience. To date, these more discrete tools for reviewing household resiliency have not been well incorporated into the quantitative analysis due to the relative novelty of some of the collected indicators (e.g., IHDI was introduced in 2010).

It is clear, however, that macro-economic reform and targeted assistance to household economic-growth–generating activities alone cannot ensure peace. Positive domestic-policy reform is crucial to capturing the benefits of aid assistance (Burnside and Dollar 2004). It is interesting that Hoeffler (2012, 10) wrote that "[a]n analysis of policy reforms found no evidence that any particular area (economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion/equity, and public-sector management and institutions) should be prioritised." This means that a comprehensive, multisector, horizontal-equality approach must be taken regarding state building and peace building in the post-conflict state if conflict is to be avoided.

Critically, as Gurr (2011) noted, the role of the state is a primary factor in the facilitation of stability or the emergence of conflict:

> [G]overnments sustain or create the conditions for conflict at every step in the model. Government-imposed inequalities are a major source of grievances; repressive policies increase anger and resistance; denial of the right to use conventional politics and protest pushes activists underground and spawns terrorist and revolutionary resistance.

Moreover, when weak states cannot provide equally for its citizens, research by Staub (1999, 304) found:

> Poverty, the experience of injustice, and social and psychological disorganization that prevents the meeting of basic human needs in a rapidly changing world tend to lead people to turn to ethnic, religious, national, or other "identity" groups to strengthen individual identity and to gain support and security. This, combined with ideologies that groups adopt in difficult times, whether Nazism, communism, nationalism, racial

supremacy, or something else, frequently leads to antagonism and violence against other groups.

Boudreaux and Tobias (2009, 224) argued that "Satisfaction of basic human needs, such as improved security and more comfortable life conditions, should contribute to conflict resolution and peacebuilding." Annan and Blattman (2006, 5) also found that increased "social support" and "family connectedness," as well as household wealth and education, are highly effective components for better social functioning and conflict resilience.

We should not forget that state building in post-conflict states cannot be distinct from peace building: "Effective and comprehensive strategies are required to ensure that peace is sustainable (peacebuilding) and that capacity and legitimacy of institutions is enhanced (state-building)" (Council on Foreign Relations 2013). Peace building most directly encompasses "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" (United Nations 2000b). Moreover, as guided by the UN Secretary General Policy Committee (United Nations 2007): "Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives." The UN's core areas for addressing peace building are not entirely distinct from those directives to address state building in post-conflict states, which are support to (1) basic safety and security, (2) political processes, (3) provision of basic services, (4) restoration of core government functions, and (5) economic revitalization (United Nations 2009).

Consequently, policies for post-conflict states must address drivers of conflict (i.e., negative peace) as well as criteria for sustainable development and well-being (i.e., positive peace) because they are mutually reinforcing. Notably, achieving this dual track in such a way that promotes an enlarged set of choices and freedoms, absent insecurity, is notoriously difficult and may take a long time. Moreover, it is realistic to note that most post-conflict environments, even in the best conditions, will have problems of group grievance and dissatisfaction with the outcome of conflict. As such, targeting those who may be most liable to committing armed conflict in the post-conflict state- and peace-building environment is important to the broader achievement of the dual tracks of peace and also may be a wise focal area for ensuring that conflict does not emerge anew while broader programming and assurances are put in place.

3.3 BACKGROUND RESEARCH FINDING: GAP IN ALTERNATE COUNTER-HUMAN FEASIBILITY APPROACHES

Data show that conflict emergence, particularly intrastate conflict, is a growing problem. Following years of decreasing incidents of new conflict following the end of the Cold War, conflicts are now emerging anew—or, more specifically, reemerging in places where conflict was thought to have been resolved. These intrastate conflicts take place between state and non-state actors and can be ideological, extremist, or even genocidal in nature. Regardless of conflict type, they all emerge from the same calculus of grievance or greed motivations paired with easy access to personnel and arms with which to rally against the state(s) or other perceived enemies. Unless resolved quickly, these conflicts tend to protract—in fact, most will last more than a decade (Walter 2013).

As discussed previously in greater detail, conflict resolution to stem violence takes place mainly through military, economic, and diplomatic means. Yet, if conflicts are not resolved early and become protracted, the chances of military victory decrease and the likelihood that the conflict will either be resolved at the negotiating table or simply simmer to a low intensity due to lessened resources (human and financial) increases. In some ways, this can be positive, in that conflicts resolved at the negotiating table – with appropriate resources and long-term investment in the peace agreement – tend to be more stable and lasting because they more comprehensively address the conflict motivations in the first place.

Still, rebels will not go to the negotiating table until they believe their chances of outright victory are significantly and irrevocably diminished. To reach that point, rebel groups must be significantly weakened. As previously explored in depth, research shows that to weaken armed rebel groups and push them to the negotiating table, the most important criteria are their factors of feasibility—specifically, their force strength (Aronson et al. 2015; Collier 2000a; Gates 2002) and safe havens (Aronson et al. 2015; Gates 2002). Currently, the main approach applied to address feasibility relative to force strength is a military one. In these activities, the goal is to reduce the force strength of the rebel group such that it is either militarily defeated or its strength becomes so weakened that leaders are forced to the negotiating table to develop a peace agreement. When the military is engaged to support this effort, it is almost exclusively relegated – when discussing issues of force strength – to kinetic activity, which is expensive, deadly, and almost certain to provoke backlash and increased rebel coalescence (Olson Lounsbery 2016).

Moreover, military engagement rarely offers a lasting solution to addressing grievances that motivated conflict in the first place:

> The military balance of power may shape the talks but experience suggests that exclusively military solutions to conflict are inadequate to make lasting peace. First, contemporary insurgency tactics make it possible for many groups to sustain armed struggle against extraordinary odds. Second, non-state armed groups are often an expression of political, social or economic exclusion or the result of poorly addressed historical grievances, even if the armed groups are not the exclusive representatives of these concerns. Strategies aimed primarily at military defeat do not adequately address these causes. Yet unresolved grievances can fuel antagonism and lead to future violence. (Conciliation Resources 2009, 2)

Thus, it is evident that there is a need to review which alternate tools might be applied to address force strength to weaken rebel groups and resolve conflict. The gap that this research identifies recommends that conflict resolution via defection programming may be a tool for conflict-resolution practitioners to apply more broadly.

This gap in conflict resolution – encouraging rebel defection and preventing additional rebel recruitment – addresses one of the most important feasibility factors to a rebel group's success: its size (Aronson et al. 2015; Collier 2000a; Gates 2002). Utilizing this approach may provide a clear opportunity in practical efforts to resolve conflict with fewer lives lost, fewer costs, and increased peace dividends. Moreover, engaging with rebels to encourage voluntary defection and strong reintegration programming may be effective not only for resolving conflict with fewer resources and lives lost but also may positively impact lasting peace—considering that poorly integrated former combatants are the first to be recruited for renewed conflict by spoilers of the peace (Nilsson 2005).

3.3.1 Current Rebel-Group Engagement

Encouraging rebels to voluntarily defect begins with outreach and communication. Engagement with rebel actors during a conflict generally takes three approaches: (1) diplomatic efforts to reach out to rebel leadership during conflict may take place to entertain readiness for diplomatic negotiations, negotiate for humanitarian access, or collect or message other pieces of information in advance of or related to formal and sanctioned state-level dialogue; (2) outreach to rebel actors may take place under the guise of military-information operations: "the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs [information-related capabilities] in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or

usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own" (US

Department of Defense 2014, I-1)[48]; and (3) intelligence activities where operatives engage a limited

number of adversaries with the intent of "flipping" them to act as double agents, providing relevant

intelligence on rebel actors, plans, and operations. Due to the secretive nature of this work, it is not covered

extensively in the literature. Moreover, considering that intelligence-agency efforts are not directed toward

the large-scale defection and reintegration into civilian life of active combatants, it is not explored further

in this work.

3.3.1.1 Diplomatic Engagement with Rebel Groups

Diplomatic outreach to rebel groups typically is limited to rebel leadership, which – after several

months or years of unsuccessful efforts or stalemate – may or may not well represent most of the group.

Leadership of rebel groups, like leadership of countries, is important; however, it may not be the only

avenue through which rebels can be engaged. Nevertheless, even this type of engagement is relatively rare

under most diplomatic efforts (other than formal peace-negotiation discussions), as explained by

Conciliation Resources (2009, 1): "[i]n the aftermath of 9/11 and the 'war on terror,' international policy

has been incoherent on how to talk to armed groups or whether to talk to them at all." Copeland and Potter

(2008, 287) further pointed out that diplomats are not necessarily trained to even deal with armed groups in

conflict:

> Traditional diplomats are running into difficulty because they are equipped primarily to
> deal with other states' representatives. The armed forces of metropolitan countries are
> similarly struggling with asymmetrical confrontations because they are organized –
> doctrinally, culturally and materially – for larger-scale and more structured types of
> conflict.

Direct engagement with rebel groups, at least by official actors attempting to resolve conflict, does

not appear to happen frequently and not with the intention of driving defection to limit the personnel

feasibility of the group and force negotiations.

3.3.1.2 Military Engagement with Rebel Groups

---

[48]Military-information operations generally are used "to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective" (US Department of Defense 2014, x). Information-related capabilities are used in these operations because military technologies are used in the operational or field environment.

The second area of outreach often is led by the military under the guise of military-information operations. This domain is broad and includes the following types of operations: "strategic communication, joint interagency coordination group, public affairs, civil–military operations, cyberspace operations (CO), information assurance, space operations, military information support operations (MISO), intelligence, military deception, operations security, special technical operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, and key leader engagement" (US Department of Defense 2014, xi). Of these, the three that are used to directly engage rebel actors (or "adversaries" in military terms) are MISO, formerly known as psychological operations (PSYOPS), military deception operations (MILDEC), and key leader engagements (KLEs). The means or mechanisms through which information operations can be applied include radio and television broadcasts, blockaded ports, government and commercial websites, and KLEs (US Department of Defense 2014, II-4).

MISO are "planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals" (US Department of Defense 2014, II-9-10). MISO in contemporary tactics might be used to win the "hearts and minds" of a population during military operations, humanitarian-relief interventions, peace-enforcement and stabilization missions, as well as various operations in which militaries are now used globally. MISO is "an alchemy that combines elements of art, combat experience, science, linguistics, and religious and cultural expertise" (Barklay 2007, 2); indeed, determining the most effective means to reach and influence populations is challenging. Primarily, these operations are accomplished by finding "exploitable vulnerabilities and/or susceptibilities that are based on the perceived or real needs, wants or desires of the foreign audience" such that the messaging, in effect, controls the information that the audience receives (Barklay 2007, 4). In adversarial messaging, this generally means mixing truth and propaganda to the benefit of friendly forces.

MILDEC are "actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission" (US Department of Defense 2012, vii). What makes MILDEC unique is that the operations used are meant to mislead via deception such that rebel leaders make decisions that are beneficial to the "friendly forces." An example of MILDEC includes a

possible situation in which a rebel force is set up and effectively led to think that they are entering a safe

zone but in fact are entering another rebel territory. MILDEC might not be the most appropriate

intervention to encourage defection because it purposefully attempts to mislead the adversary in some way,

such as by the following:

> Causing ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding in adversary perceptions of friendly critical information; Causing the adversary to misallocate personnel, fiscal, and material resources in ways that are advantageous to the friendly force; Causing the adversary to reveal strengths, dispositions, and future intentions; Conditioning the adversary to particular patterns of friendly behavior to induce adversary perceptions that can be exploited by the joint force; Causing the adversary to waste combat power with inappropriate or delayed actions. (US Department of Defense 2012, viii)

> The third area of direct rebel engagement under the umbrella of information operations is KLEs.

> KLEs are deliberate, planned engagements between U.S. military leaders and the leaders of foreign audiences that have defined objectives, such as a change in policy or supporting the JFC's [Joint Forces Command] objectives. These engagements can be used to shape and influence foreign leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and may also be directed toward specific groups such as religious leaders, academic leaders, and tribal leaders; e.g., to solidify trust and confidence in U.S. forces. (US Department of Defense 2014, II-13)

KLEs are used in a wide variety of cases, from friendly-forces relationship building to

commander-directed mission engagements with adversaries toward a specific end. KLEs, as with MISO,

can include stability operations, peace-enforcement or peace-keeping missions, humanitarian operations,

and even military-to-military security-cooperation activities.

3.3.1.3 Opportunities for Engagement with Rebel Groups to Encourage Defection

In reviewing the diplomatic and military operations and the mechanisms within them, it appears

that opportunities may arise for reaching rebels that are already covered under current efforts. First,

diplomats may be able to expand their reach and find means of directly or indirectly reaching combatants

engaged on the battlefield to encourage defection. Second, select MISO also may be used to reach rebel

actors with messaging that could increase the likelihood of voluntary defection—a potentially valuable tool

in encouraging defection if used to influence rebel actors to put down arms and voluntarily defect. Third,

KLEs, often pursued more publicly, could be used to influence a specific actor or audience. In this case, in

addition to other efforts, both MISO and KLEs could be beneficial for defection programming.

Alternatively, the application of MILDEC (i.e., purposeful deception) could backfire on those seeking to encourage defection. That is, if rebel actors are deceived into defecting, they may harbor resentment and ill will toward the opposition and may not willingly put down arms to reintegrate, resulting in long-term problems.

However, in the operational manuals guiding the military programming or in the actual messaging, these tools are not used to address force strength in such a way as to encourage voluntary defection of rebels in order to weaken the group along its force strength. Additionally, past discussions with actors involved in these areas of military activity, as well as those who evaluate and develop policy and operational manuals for military engagement, reveal that in no case or manual of recollection was large-scale defection programming a target of efforts to weaken an adversarial group. Although the military certainly is not the only actor involved, when addressing feasibility of rebel forces, it coordinates closely with other lines of effort (i.e., diplomatic and economic) and with classified intelligence activities. It would stand to reason that if the military is not engaged in any way with encouraging defection as an objective in addressing adversarial rebel forces, then neither are other key organs of government or policy. Indeed, in no other policy memorandum, resolution, or directive can the Author identify guidance to diplomats, economic-affairs officials, conflict-resolution practitioners, or negotiators for addressing force strength via large-scale defection programming as a means to push rebel groups to the negotiating table for discussions. Contrary to the finding that peer-reviewed work does not exist that evaluates defection as a tool for conflict resolution (as identified by the Author), this leads the Author to believe that indeed there is opportunity for potential evaluation and future effort on defection programming for conflict resolution. In summary, "Policy makers should presume engagement with armed groups is an effective and essential policy tool in the search for workable formulas to end violence and save lives" (Conciliation Resources 2009).

3.3.2 What Is Known about Defection

Given the broad absence of peer-reviewed work on defection and guidelines, manuals, or policy papers guiding defection programming for conflict resolution, it is not surprising that little is known about the field. The gaps in policy and research, plus an absence of wide-range programming, leave the research field open. This notwithstanding, there are, of course, thousands of non-state combatants who have indeed defected from ongoing rebel activities in the course of history—and even a handful of individual accounts

of high-profile defectors who advise other operations.[49] Yet, the absence of an academic review of their reasoning for defection, the specific experiences that led them to defect, and the litany of information that would be required to make any externally valid statement about defection for conflict resolution means that the area is ripe for review.

Despite the lack of analysis, two clear factors appear evident even in the absence of data. First, those who are voluntarily defecting from rebel groups are doing so because there has been a mismatch between expectation and reality, or between what Weinstein (2003, 12) called their anticipated "selective incentives": "In particular, high quality individuals signal their commitment to the group by accepting promises rather than payoffs…. These sacrifices are a form of investment, with future rewards made credible by ties of social identity." Second, those who defect usually do so under dangerous circumstances, in which they perceive a future threat to their safety to be high, fearing a reprisal. As one defector from the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) stated in an interview: "ISIS wants to kill everyone who says no…. I was thinking all the time, if they arrest me, if they stop me, they will behead me…if you turn against ISIS, they will kill you" (Amos 2014). Arguably, defecting from ongoing armed conflict as an active combatant would pose a degree of risk to any potential defector—not only those from ISIS.

This information about defection, although limited without a comprehensive, cross-case analysis, provides preliminary information: (1) expectations can be exploited by those seeking to influence defectors' decision making; and (2) identifying means of assisting rebels during their physical escape from rebel groups, when they choose to defect, could be helpful in encouraging defections.

3.3.3 Engagement for Defection

Although little is known about defection (and what works to encourage it), there are steps that conflict-resolution practitioners can take regarding rebel groups in advance of evidence-based policy directives. The first step may be akin to what conflict-resolution experts do in the first instance toward resolving conflict: evaluate and understand the group at hand – their motivations, feasibility factors,

---

[49]See, among others, Aukai Collin's *My Jihad: One American's Journey Through the World of Usama Bin Laden—as a Covert Operative for the American Government* (2011); Monsab Hassan Yousef's *Son of Hamas: A Gripping Account of Terror, Betrayal, Political Intrigue, and Unthinkable Choices* (2011) and the corresponding documentary film, *The Green Prince* (2015); and Maajid Nawaz's *Radical: My Journey Out Of Islamic Extremism* (2013).

leaders, relationships, and so on – such that when policy directives to encourage defection are available, they are crafted explicitly to the situation and actors involved.

> Effective strategies to address conflict require a sophisticated understanding of the groups in conflict. It is therefore crucial to understand armed groups and appreciate their political and economic agendas; leadership dynamics and constituency support; internal debates and decision-making processes; connections with allies, criminal networks, and other groups; as well as how their past experiences of the conflict and peace initiatives inform their current strategy and aspirations. (Conciliation Resources 2009, 2)

The second step might include reaching out to the rebel group to gain information on areas of weakness that may be exploited to benefit defection programming. However, care should be taken with regard to the style and tone of the communication, as well as ensuring that the appropriate people are selected to undertake the outreach.

Copeland and Potter (2008) argued that there are three types of communication styles to be undertaken with adversarial groups: coercive, collaborative, and military information strategic communications. Coercive communications involve "carrots and sticks," or threats and inducements, to drive a preferred outcome. Collaborative communication includes using local history, language, and customary information to engage in "cross-cultural dialogue with governmental and non-governmental political and economic networks and hierarchies" to establish "collaborative initiatives" (Copeland and Potter 2008, 285). Military-information operations (defined previously) include MISO or PYSOPS, military exchanges, or military-information campaigns. Of these three, they contend that "dialogic and collaborative forms of communication are essential for the resolution of contemporary conflicts since they address the root causes of these conflicts – identity – in the form of ethnic, tribal and religious differences in the short term, and underdevelopment and insecurity over the longer term" (Copeland and Potter 2008, 280). Given that these fighters eventually will be required to participate in a peace process or to ultimately put down weapons and peacefully live their lives under whomever succeeds, it is necessary to engage them to establish a basis for future peaceful relations.

Engaging rebels carries risks, particularly by official diplomatic actors who may be averse to dialoguing for fear of legitimizing a group or undermining state partners in resolving a conflict. However, there are ways to circumvent these concerns without leveraging diplomatic resources and upsetting a careful balance among negotiators. Practitioners in conflict analysis recommend that civil society or other

non-state actors may be well placed to engage and pursue dialogue, thereby alleviating concerns of

inadvertently legitimizing a rebel group. Indeed, civil-society actors have been influential in pushing rebel

actors to negotiate in past circumstances, such as in Sierra Leone among the Revolutionary United Front

(RUF) (Conciliation Resources 2009). Although notably, work of this nature carries the risk of biasing or

putting at risk other non-governmental actors who work towards humanitarian objectives.

Copeland and Potter (2008) argued that to address non-state actor conflicts that do not occur on

the traditional state–state battlefield (and those that are more likely to emerge), a merger between

diplomatic and military efforts should be considered.[50] They termed this new actor-type who should be

trained and called on to engage with rebels directly a "guerilla diplomat" (Copeland and Potter 2008, 280):

> Foreign ministries will have to field a new type of diplomat – a political officer who is
> effective in counter-insurgency and who has a redefined role in conflict zones. This
> "guerrilla diplomat" will play a catalytic role in drawing together the objectives and
> activities of all the other players, including those drawn from the military, aid agencies
> and civil society.

Furthermore, they argued that getting away from "an over-reliance on military solutions and

traditional…forms of communication in contemporary conflict zones towards a more nuanced…strategy"

(Copeland and Potter 2008, 293) will increase chances for successful, long-term conflict resolution. This

research further contends that this actor would be well placed to engage in efforts to support defection

programming to hasten the point of peace negotiations between opposition parties. Copeland and Potter

(2008, 293) effectively argued:

> Active hostilities and human-centred (sic) development are incompatible; getting on with
> development begins with resolving conflicts, as distinct from the costly alternative of

---

[50]A version of the diplomatic and military merger that Copeland and Potter (2008) discuss was established in 2002 to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The model created for Afghanistan, and later used in Iraq, was known as a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and was composed of team members from development, military, and diplomatic agencies. US Agency for International Development (2011, 7) explains PRTs in its *Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency*: "Designed to operate in semi-permissive environments, a PRT helps to stabilize an area through its integrated civilian-military approach. It combines the diplomatic, military, and developmental components of USG agencies involved in local stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The PRT aims to improve stability by building host nation capacity to govern; enhancing economic viability; and delivering essential public services, such as security, law and order, justice, health care, and education." PRTs were led by military officers with the intention of coordinating and funding development projects in concert with the host nation's central government to prevent build resiliency against insurgent's ideologies and propaganda. PRTs were not tasked with leading outreach to rebels with the intention of encouraging defections; rather, they strictly worked among civilians to prevent susceptibility to recruitment. Numerous NGOs were critical of the PRTs, citing a concern of blurring the lines between military operations and humanitarian, non-aligned, NGOs. The PRTs are no longer operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.

winning them, by addressing the feelings and needs of the antagonists. Diplomats, rather than soldiers, are best equipped to deliver the required results. Because diplomacy is about talking things out, about understanding and negotiating differences rather than fighting over them, diplomacy emerges in conflicts as the linchpin between present hostility and future cooperation.

3.3.4 Defected Ex-Combatants' Roles in Lasting Peace

Engagement with rebels for defection may provide additional dividends as well—especially in the potential for lasting peace. Most of the conflicts of the twenty-first century are not new—they are recurrent conflicts that were not fully or properly resolved (Walter 2011). This could be due to the nature of the resolution in the past, including a military defeat or peace agreement that did not adequately resolve a grievance, problems of implementation of the peace agreement, or reemergence of conditions that led to the first rounds of fighting.

A significant problem in recurring conflicts is that able and competent fighters abound. This is because of failures in past post-conflict situations within countries where the fighters have not been properly demobilized and reintegrated, often serving as the personnel for new iterations of rebel groups. In most cases these problems are twofold: (1) structural reforms following cessation of past conflicts have not been undertaken to effectively address the grievances of all parties, and that actors (primarily former fighters) abound, able to initiate new rounds of armed conflict activity because reforms are not effectively addressing grievances. But ex-combatants need not necessarily be seen only in a negative light – indeed, they can also be significant contributors to stability, both directly (as working citizens) and indirectly (as models for other disaffected citizens who find inspiration in rebels' willingness to put down arms in favor bringing lasting peace and stability). As such, ex-combatants are important to post-conflict states because of their potential contributions to both peace (International Labour Organization 2010) and instability (Barker 2008; Spear 2006).

Spear (2006, 177) argued that "starting off on the right foot" with ex-combatants following conflict is crucial for gearing former fighters toward contributing to peace, as she further explained: "The DDR process is the first opportunity to begin to establish a political economy of peace." As potential contributors to peace, where ex-combatants are trained and rehabilitated, they may become a force for growth and subsequently counter the negative war economy allowing for a more licit economy to emerge

(Spear 2006). "More importantly, their successful reintegration into society will help to prevent the possibility of future conflict in the long term" (Barker 2008, 102).

More often, ex-combatants are viewed as potential factors in instability (Table 10).

Table 10 **Reasons Ex-Combatants are Seen as Risk Factors for Instability**

- They are the main community targeted for recruitment by spoilers of peace (Collier 2007; Cutter Patel, De Greiff, and Waldorf 2009).

- They often undertake illicit or criminal activity (Addison 2003; African Development Bank 2011; Marshall 2005; Nilsson 2005, 20).

- They rarely have the skills to integrate into the informal economy (Nilsson 2005).

- They often are left out of broader development and assistance programs because of their stigma as former fighters (Addison 2003; McMullin 2013; Nilsson 2005; United Nations 2010).

- They struggle to reintegrate into their former communities (Collier 1994; Mueller 2003; Nilsson 2005).

- They continue to rely on violence as a dispute-resolution mechanism (Collier 2006).

- They often lose out on peace dividends when they are not members of the victorious party (Author).

- They may experience significant psychological trauma from conflict (Collier 1994; Mueller 2003; Nilsson 2005). And,

- Political negotiated settlements rarely consider rank-and-file former combatants for the same benefits that are afforded leaders of the rebel groups.

The best-known way to manage former fighters is through a comprehensive DDR process—yet, this is where many countries fail. As explored in this chapter, where DDR fails, often so too does peace.

More important, the DDR process for coping with former combatants in the post-conflict state is recognized to be less successful than most post-conflict programming largely because it is a "theory-less field" (Nilsson 2005, 34-5). This can be significant relative to instability. DDR often is challenged by a number of factors: (1) it often is managed by the host nation and with few resources and often is unable to

fully complete the DDR mission; (2) it requires political will to achieve peace and stability, fully and equally across groups—there often is, in fact, an incentive to retain some armed combatant, informal elements, in the state as a safety; (3) it presumes there is an economy or functioning market wherein to reintegrate; however, in most post-conflict states, this is absent or underdeveloped—leaving an opportunity for newly trained former combatants; and (4) the process and order in which it takes place and knowledge of what works is not fully understood and, therefore, may not be as effective as expectation and need demand (Gilligan, Mvukiyehe, and Samii. 2010).

If states can begin showing during conflict that voluntary defectors are treated well – that they receive comprehensive DDR and ongoing support – it may resonate with other fighters who are considering defection. Showing political will, on behalf of the state, to accept and integrate those who fought against them is an important precursor of lasting peace. Moreover, working to ensure that the life cycle of the ex-combatant is considered before, during, and after the cessation of conflict can be crucial to lasting peace. Notwithstanding the challenges of DDR, properly integrating ex-combatants into society once they have defected can both encourage additional defectors and enhance the peace and development of the society in which they integrate.

3.3.5 Possible Benefits to Promoting Voluntary Defection for Conflict Resolution

The absence of any other academic assessment of the potential for promoting voluntary defection (and preventing new recruitment) of rebel groups as a way to advance conflict resolution means that the ability to draw any preliminary conclusions is limited. Regardless, it is conceivable that there may be benefits if research advances to a more complete evaluation. These potential benefits include a quick resolution to conflict due to diminishing rebel personnel—the factor that numerous scholars identify as critical to a rebel group's success (Aronson et al. 2015; Collier 2000a; Gates 2002); a less-expensive approach to conflict resolution as compared to extensive military interventions, which are financially costly and incur additional environmental and human damages that defection-promotion programming ostensibly could avoid; and promoting voluntary defection into an environment that is primed to reintegrate ex-combatants, peaceably and with long-term economic, social, and physical security assistance or assurances, could go far in bringing about lasting peace.

Although this study is unable to definitively argue any of these conclusions of promoting defection and preventing additional recruitment to rebel groups as a means of promoting conflict resolution, it does seek to set a baseline that future studies can utilize to reach those conclusions through more comprehensive analysis and multiple case studies.

4.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research design for this study was selected to best address the objective of developing a baseline theory on why non-state armed rebels choose to defect from ongoing conflict, what they recommend for increasing additional defections, and what they recommend for preventing future recruitment into the armed non-state groups. Additional input from key experts in the creation of a baseline theory was included to buttress the information collected from the defectors.

4.1 RESEARCH-DESIGN OVERVIEW

This study is concerned with one particular challenge regarding conflict resolution: the human feasibility factor of conflict, which is one of the top criteria that matters most to the success or failure of rebel groups (Aronson et al. 2015; Collier 2000a; Gates 2002). Focusing on the human-feasibility factor of conflict by encouraging defection and preventing recruitment weakens the capabilities of armed groups and forces them to the negotiating table sooner, thus making conflicts shorter and less costly. If successful practices can be identified to encourage voluntary defection and prevent new recruitment, new tools to address conflict can be added to the existing body of empirically tested conflict-resolution practitioners' toolkits.

To identify what works best for defection, this study used a positive-case country, Rwanda. Uniquely, Rwanda has the only government-led program on combatant defection for conflict resolution that the Author could identify and also is home to the largest body of voluntarily-defected ex-combatants, globally. These two factors presented the Author with the opportunity to explore the defection programming, engage with the program planners and implementers, interview those beneficiaries of the program (i.e., the defected ex-combatants), and undertake dialogue with experts in the field on this case study.

The study's primary unit of analysis was the defected former combatants (or program beneficiaries). All the ex-combatants interviewed had defected from the FDLR – an active ideological rebel group in the eastern DRC – and were currently in or had completed a national DDR program in Rwanda (under the RDRC). As explained in more depth in Chapter 5, the DDR program in Rwanda is led

by the RDRC, which works closely with these former rebel members who have found the means to voluntarily defect and return to Rwanda to help them reintegrate and pursue additional defectors who are willing to return to Rwanda. The beneficiaries' input was evaluated along with a secondary unit of analysis or category of informants: key experts. The key experts identified included planners and implementers of the RDRC defection program, government officials, and regional experts. Their input helped to reinforce findings and recommendations from this case.

The main objectives of this study were to identify (1) which factors resonate most strongly in the deliberate decision making of combatants to defect; and (2) what they recommended to both increase additional defections and deter future recruitment among rebel groups, thereby addressing both the supply and demand sides of human feasibility among armed groups. Because conflict resolution requires a full commitment to the life cycle of conflict, this research also discusses the life cycle of the combatants, including their transition to ex-combatant and then back to citizen. This included learning about the RDRC program of reintegration of ex-combatants following defection in Rwanda; however, field work did not focus heavily on this aspect.

The study provided defected ex-combatants with the opportunity to offer input to guide the understanding of what works, what does not work, and what is needed to both encourage greater defection from armed groups and to deter further rebel recruitment. This allowed the Author to develop a baseline theory, applying the grounded-theory approach, on defection and guidance on defection programming from the beneficiary's perspective. This research evaluated the former rebel fighters and key experts on reasons for defection and recommendations both to increase further voluntary defections and for deterrence against recruitment. It aimed to identify those factors that are most important to addressing the human-feasibility factor of rebel groups in armed conflict so that a preliminary model or baseline of what works for defection could be established for further testing.

Questions to ex-combatants were open-ended to allow for novel input. The questions drew on the concepts of negative and positive peace as the driving theory of post-conflict stabilization programming; SHD as the driving theory of development programming; and analysis from leading conflict-resolution theoreticians and quantitative analysts cited throughout this report, as well as experiences of the Author in past cases of evaluating rebel groups and state militaries. Quantitative analysis highlighted that addressing

both structural factors (i.e., those that address grievance motivators and contribute to positive peace) and direct factors (i.e., those that address feasibility and greed issues and contribute to negative peace), along with core SHD factors, are the most common success factors for peaceful, long-term development found among large-N sets of analyses.[1] However, this information was not measured against qualitative input by beneficiaries in the field. In particular, this research evaluated whether the same quantitatively derived factors noted previously emerged as key reasons for defection by the interviewed ex-combatants and key experts. By exploring the input of voluntarily defected ex-combatants, the Author aimed not only to better understand the beneficiary perspective of targeted defection programs but also to utilize the connected theory of analysis to determine whether the input aligned with macro-analysts and theoreticians.

The objective of this study is to contribute to a discussion of new tools that may increase the efficacy of conflict-resolution practitioners by evaluating mechanisms to weaken armed groups by encouraging defection and reducing recruitment. If successful, this could more quickly weaken groups and compel them to the negotiating table, thereby limiting the devastating impacts of conflict.

The following conceptual framework (Figure 7) explains the research approach for reaching the targeted outcome of the study.

---

[1]See Chapter 3 for a discussion on the drivers and stabilizers in conflict.

CONTEXT	POSSIBLE DEFECTION REASONS	INTERVENTIONS	OUTCOME

Context: Armed, non-state combatants in active conflict.

Faced with decision to continue fighting or defect each day.

Reasoning: If choose to defect, why?

Goals:
-Encourage more defections from armed groups

-Prevent new recruitment into armed groups

Sustainable Human Development Theory
- Empowerment
- Cooperation
- Equity
- Security
- Sustainability

Positive or Negative Peace Stabilization Theory
- Structural Peace
- Direct Peace

Other Possible Motivators for Defection
- Force and Feasibility Factors: No Resources, No Safe Haven, No Arms, Mission Failure, Corrupt Leaders, No Cohesion. Deaths
- International Factors: External Military Pressure
- Personal Factors: Family Pressure, Poor Life, No Future
- Grievance Factors: No Justice, Equality, and Development

Options: Address SHD Needs of Combatants to Entice return to Rwanda?

Options: Address Structural Peace, Promote Direct Peace in Rwanda?

Options: Use Outreach by Family, other Defectors. Apply Military Pressure on Safe havens. Expose Corrupt Leaders. Apply Sanctions. Offer Amnesty. Ensure Good Policies in Rwanda on Equality, Justice, Development.

COUNTER HUMAN FEASIBILITY OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS:

VOLUNTARY DEFECTION FROM REBEL GROUP

&

PREVENTION OF NEW RECRUITS TO ARMED GROUP

GROUNDED THEORY: TARGET BENE-FICIARIES

Identified through semi-structured interviews with voluntary defectors from armed rebel group and key experts to establish baseline on why rebels defect; and to hear from target beneficiaries what is recommended for enhancing future defection and preventing future recruitment

Enhanced Conflict Resolution Toolkit: Baseline for Future Research, Policy, and Programmatic Applications

Figure 7 **Conceptual Framework**

The framework is an exploration of questions regarding justifications given for defection. They are based on SHD theory, positive- and negative-peace theory using the work of Galtung (1964, 1969); quantitative findings by Aronson et al. (2015), Cevik and Rahmati (2013), Collier (2000a, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2014), Collier and Hoeffler (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2004a), Collier et al. (2003), Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2006, 2007, 2008), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Institute for Economics and Peace "Pillars of Peace" (2011a, 2011b), and Olson Lounsbery (2016); as well as other potential reasons for defection discussed with the ex-combatants to identify a baseline theory among these defectors for further testing.

At the bottom right on the table, the research goals (i.e., "Outcome") were to develop a baseline of reasoning on voluntary defection and to explore recommendations on how to enhance defection programming and prevent recruitment into armed groups. The left column identifies the "Context" in which non-state armed combatants operate and the daily decision they face: whether to continue another day as an armed combatant or defect and identify another opportunity. The middle column, titled "Possible Defection Reasons," shows the theoretical underpinnings that guided the research questions. The column titled "Interventions" can be used to support the outcome of voluntary defection. Thus, as illustrated in the framework, the research objectives aimed to (1) identify which factors or reasons for defection are cited by defectors and key experts operating in the conceptual and regional areas; (2) establish a baseline understanding of why non-state armed rebels may defect; (3) inquire about their recommendations on how to enhance defection programming as well as prevent recruitment, to cover both supply and demand sides of the human-feasibility factor in conflict; and (4) determine whether those findings constitute a viable framework that can be tested across other cases, evaluated for policy development, and ultimately applied as programming among various types of conflict-resolution practitioners.

Absent from this framework, which narrowly focuses on the input of defecting ex-combatants and key experts, is what might be included in a fully comprehensive graphic of a conflict situation. These other issues include broad considerations in many categories, including situation-specific structural issues, triggers, international relationships and funding, and more in-depth queries on governance and leadership of specific armed groups and units. These considerations are indeed significant when evaluating broader criteria of instability and protracted conflicts, when to intervene, and how. This study is limited in outlook,

however, focusing exclusively on the input of defectors and key experts regarding defection reasoning and recommendations about human feasibility.

4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study explored conflict-cessation programming opportunities through the promotion of voluntary defection and recruitment prevention. The purpose was to build on research that emphasizes the need to address the human-feasibility component of armed groups as a key means of weakening and compelling them to the negotiating table. The core questions addressed include the following:

1. *How and why did the ex-combatants become members of the FDLR rebel group?*

2. *Why did ex-combatants choose to defect from the rebel group?*

3. *Are the reasons for defection cited by ex-combatants:*

   a. *In line with SHD theory?*

   b. *In line with positive- and negative-peace theory?*

4. *What is recommended by ex-combatants to prevent future recruitment by rebel groups?*

5. *What is recommended to promote increased defections from rebel groups?*

6. *Are there lessons learned from the Rwanda case that could be applied elsewhere?*

The main research objective of this study was to determine – from the beneficiaries' (i.e., ex-combatants') perspective – why combatants would choose to defect from armed conflict and what they recommend as the most effective programs to encourage greater defection and to prevent recruitment for other armed conflicts. These findings are intended to be used to (1) develop a preliminary baseline on defection reasoning and thus influence future research; and (2) influence future policy and programming on conflict resolution, globally. Semi-structured interviews with the main community of interest (i.e., the ex-combatants) as well as with experts available in country were the guiding data-collection technique.

The question areas for the two units of analysis (i.e., ex-combatants and key experts) were not identical. Questions for ex-combatants focused on their past experiences, including why and how they were recruited, justifications and reasons for defecting from rebel units, and recommendations for

programming to increase defection and prevent recruitment.[2] The questioning was semi-structured to ensure that key areas of interest were addressed, including concepts of negative and positive peace and SHD, while not limiting unique input and commentary from participants. The Author endeavored to ensure that questions were not leading and that the narrative of informants emerged unfettered. Moreover, to the extent possible, the Author traveled to locations where informants lived or worked and were comfortable meeting. All locales selected for interviews offered private meeting spaces, out of sight and earshot of anyone not associated with the study. Additional interviews with relevant key experts who worked (or are working) in the peace-building, security-sector reform, and stabilization areas, particularly in Rwanda, were undertaken to triangulate discrete areas of information on programming, risk, and criteria thought to be important to decision making and encouraging more defectors. More specifically, key experts from the various communities (e.g., planners and implementers of DDR programming and defection programming, government actors involved in peace building and reconciliation, security-sector reform experts, and rebel group and FDLR specialists) were probed for their thinking on what lessons could be culled from the Rwanda case for utilization elsewhere. Their unique vantage points on Rwanda, the FDLR, conflict emergence and resolution, and defection programming for conflict resolution provided an opportunity for the Author to draw from the extensive knowledge of these theorists, practitioners, and policy makers.

This method offered numerous benefits:

- Qualitative interviews allowed the Author to understand the context in which combatants defected based on more in-depth knowledge of the challenges from the informants' perspectives.
- It allowed the human voice of the informant (i.e., the target of intervention) to participate in identifying appropriate interventions.
- The method allowed for an unconstrained and open dialogue about limitations and opportunities from the ground to be evaluated and interpreted into actionable recommendations based on a more in-depth case analysis of target-program beneficiaries.

---

[2]See Appendix I for guiding questions used during interviews to encourage discussion. This research was not pursued as a survey and the questions were not used as such.

- The semi-structured dialogue technique ensured that dialogue was focused on the immediate issue yet was flexible enough to allow for spontaneous input. And,

- The method uniquely allowed for engagement with a community often considered risky, and sometimes hidden, in a safe and open context, to explore options for applicability in-country and elsewhere.

4.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology for this study was the case-study methodology. As discussed previously, Rwanda was selected as the case country due to its unique position of hosting the largest community of voluntary defectors from an active armed conflict, globally. Moreover, it was the only country identified by the Author that applied defection programming as a key facet of its conflict-resolution approach to the threat of an ideological, extremist group on its eastern border operating in the DRC.

The case-study methodology was selected to develop a more in-depth understanding of the complex input of voluntary defectors from an active armed conflict. By directly engaging the target beneficiary on how to counter the human-feasibility factor of rebel operations through defection, this work explored unique perspectives on how to enhance defection programming and resiliencies against recruitment.

This study used the case-country selection logic as defined by Yin (2009, 18): "An empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a 'case'), set within its real-world context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident." In pursuing this research, in which the study explored both descriptive ("what is happening or has happened") and exploratory ("how or why did something happen") phenomena, the case-study approach was uniquely appropriate (SAGE Publications 2012). Furthermore, by exploring the input of ex-combatants, the Author could exploit the case-study technique for both descriptive and exploratory findings.

In addition, Maxwell (2005, 90) provided a note of practical, relevant guidance: "Selection decisions should also take into account the feasibility of access and data collection, your research relationships with study participants, validity concerns, and ethics." The selection of the case for this research subsequently considered the objective criteria for case selection of countries, as well as the more

practical criteria of the selection of countries, as guided by Maxwell (2005). The choice of Rwanda

reflects these guidelines and was selected using the broad methodological guidelines of Yin (2009) and

Mill (1843, explored in Maxwell 2005).[3]

Pursuing the research in Rwanda, despite it being the best-case country for this particular study

as a result of its unique programs and approaches, presented challenges—specifically related to

bureaucratic issues. First, the approval process took almost nine months – three months longer than

anticipated – which cost the Author significant time and money that otherwise would have been applied to

field work. Second, although the Author endeavored to meet with senior officials from all relevant

government offices and agencies, unforeseen bureaucratic delays prevented some meetings from taking

place. Third, because the research was funded solely by the Author, it was limited to eight months in

country. Nevertheless, with only a few exceptions, the Author was able to meet with all primary

informants to reach information saturation and the majority of secondary-informant key experts.

4.4 RESEARCH SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS APPROACH

The main study population was ex-combatants who had voluntarily defected from a non-state

armed group in the midst of an active conflict in the eastern DRC. In addition to the primary study

population of ex-combatants, the Author reached out to subunits of analysis to discuss and validate

research, including (1) security-sector reform experts; (2) managers of the DDR process in country—

internal or state-led and external experts; (3) international experts in country; and (4) other expert groups

(e.g., those involved in peace negotiations or direct defection support).

The selection of research subjects for the primary study population was guided by the RDS

technique: that is, non-probability sampling in which a select number of initial key informants, known as

seeds,[4] were chosen by the Author; they then recommended additional key informants until information

saturation was reached. The RDS methodology is generally reserved for reaching hard-to-reach or hidden

populations (e.g., HIV/AIDS–positive people and drug users) to fulfill statistical requirements for formal

survey sampling.

---

[3]Of note, the author considered the "feasibility of access and data collection," the "research relationships," and so forth and found these criteria to be strongly in favor of the case-country selection of Rwanda. This is based on both past access and relevant research experiences of other researchers in the case country.
[4]According to the World Health Organization (WHO) and Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (Johnston 2013, 70), seeds are "non-randomly selected members of the survey process who initiate the recruitment process."

This study, however, did not use the survey approach and neither did it aim, under the grounded theory of research, to pursue a statistical sample of the population being researched. However, its rigor and guidelines on selection process – a more methodological means of identifying and recommending key informants – were applied to better reach members of the research population for key informant interviews. RDS does not advise a specific number of seeds that must be selected to reach saturation because sample-size goals may differ. However, the literature advises against too few or too many: too few and the sample size may not be reached; too many and the sample may suffer from an absence of diversification and be overly homogeneous (Johnston 2013). For this study, based on the grounded theory in which the research goal was between 12 and 30 interviews, the Author determined that a starting point of five seeds to represent the interest group in Rwanda would be appropriate. As noted in Johnston (2013, 70-71), more seeds can be added later in the survey, as needed.

RDS advises that a number of characteristics be considered when selecting seeds to ensure that equilibrium and information saturation are reached for the study. The recommendations include selecting seeds that have large social networks, are well connected to other members of the community of interest, are willing to help recruit others, are well regarded by their peers, and are enthusiastic to support and participate in the study (Johnston 2013, 76-7). It is important to note that "equilibrium" in the RDS sense usually refers to a nonbiased sample that meets the representation size required during population surveys. Because this study did not pursue a formal survey, information saturation according to grounded-theory guidance was sought rather than equilibrium.

The Author identified organizations from which the initial seeds or key informants would be selected as well as the preliminary list of subunit organizations identified as experts. This research referred to RDRC management, as well as key experts, for initial access and recommendations of preliminary key informant seeds. Those who were selected for an interview were undergoing current DDR at the training and reintegration facility, had recently completed the process, or were other members of the ex-combatant population recommended by initial contacts with the DDR facility using the RDS technique in Rwanda.[5]

---

[5]To date, the Author is not aware of any DDR process for DRC-based Rwandan combatants who defect from operations occurring in DRC. Information indicates that those who defect, generally to the UN offices in DRC, are escorted across the border into the security of Rwanda because they are not viewed favorably by their former rebel organizations.

Some RDS studies apply incentives to encourage seeds to recruit broadly within their networks. This study, however, did not use incentives out of consideration for potential bias, unethical participation, and difficulties for future studies that cannot afford incentives to gain participants (Johnston 2013, 128).

In implementing the RDS technique, the Author experienced several problems—specifically, problems related to the environment in which the study took place. As a developing country, the communication and transportation networks can be subpar, particularly in the more rural regions where many of the ex-combatants settle. This presented challenges for reaching possible informants by phone as well as accessing them by car. In several cases, the Author was unable to contact potential informants by phone due to recurring network problems; transportation issues, although not insurmountable, led to delays for some meetings. Problems with the methodology also included issues in which seeds and informant ex-combatants were without large networks; mobile phones of potential informants were frequently off or phone numbers were invalid (i.e., the sole means of communication available to informants); and people recommended were unable to find time to meet most often due to work obligations. Therefore, the Author relied more heavily than anticipated on RDRC lists of former combatants to identify additional seeds and informants. When beneficiaries or experts could recommend individuals, they were pursued. However, reliance on the RDRC to provide lists of potential informants was more necessary than anticipated and became a significant means of identifying seeds and informants to reach information saturation. Ultimately, this was successful with 41 interviews.

4.5 PARTICIPANT SELECTION

This study relied on the "purposeful selection" strategy for informants, informed and guided by the RDS technique. As Maxwell (2005, 88) explained, this is "a strategy in which particular settings, persons, or activities are selected deliberately to provide information that can't be gotten as well from other choices." Weiss (1994, 17) recommended avoiding the use of the term "sample" because "people who are uniquely able to be informative because they are expert in an area or were privileged witnesses to an event" are more than representative; they are expert.

Maxwell (2005) highlighted numerous benefits of purposeful selection for key informants. First, it allows the researcher to reach "representativeness or typicality of the settings, individuals or activities selected" (Maxwell 2005, 89). Second, the researcher is allowed to select informants to "adequately

capture the heterogeneity in the population" (Maxwell 2005, 89). Third, it allows the researcher to "deliberately examine cases that are critical for the theories that you began the study with, or that you have subsequently developed" (Maxwell 2005, 90). Fourth, by purposefully self-selecting, the researcher is able to "establish particular comparisons to illuminate the reasons for differences between settings or individuals" (Maxwell 2005,90).

The selection of key informants was not based on a direct quota. However, numerous researchers recommend various sample sizes for grounded theory. An assessment of those researchers' work found that for the main community of analysis, "a sample size ranging from 12 to 30 might be appropriate" (Walden University n.d., 28). This size should be determined by the researcher at the point in data collection when no new input has emerged or when theoretical saturation is reached (Simmons n.d.). For this work, information saturation was reached at 41 informants.

The author chose to focus on ex-combatants who are currently considered to be adults.[6] Notably, numerous studies have found a predisposition to violence among young men[7] and that the share of young men in a developing-country population strongly impacts the risk of conflict (Collier 2007; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2007). According to Collier (2007, 3): "Taking a society with characteristics at the mean of developing countries, they [Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2007] find that if the proportion of young men in the population is doubled, the risk of civil war is increased from 4.7% to 31%." These findings echo among work that found that a "youth bulge,"[8] composed primarily of young-adult unemployed males in poorly performing economies, fuels frustration and subsequently drives down the cost of recruitment by spoilers and increases the number of potential youths for armed conflict or terrorism (Beehner 2007). Furthermore, as Spear (2006, 179) explained: "[t]here is little evidence of women returning to violence to support themselves after an unsatisfactory DDR settlement; a clear

---

[6]The UN (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child cites 18 as the age of majority, ratified by both case countries. The World Health Organization (WHO) (2012) advised that for Africa, it is appropriate to consider 50 as the top end for working-age adults; thus, the Author aimed to limit to those between 18 and 50 years of age.
[7]According to Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2007, 19), young men are defined as the "proportion of the population made up of males in the age range 15–29."
[8]According to an interview by Whelton (2007) with German social scientist Gunnar Heinsohn, who coined the term "youth bulge," it is defined as "A result of rapid population growth. A youth bulge happens when 30 to 40 percent of a nation's males are between the ages of 15 and 29. Even if these young men are well nourished and have good housing and education, their numbers grow much faster than the economy can provide them with career opportunities. Many don't have jobs, and don't have places in society. When so many young men compete for the few places available, they become frustrated, angry, and violent. They are enlisted quite easily into radical groups and terror organizations."

contrast to the behavior of many young, male ex-combatants." Thus, women were not actively sought for this study unless recommended in the course of the RDS technique. Ultimately, 12% of the interviews were conducted with women.

In looking at historical cases of rebel activity, the Author focused on adults older than 18 years (according to the United Nations 1989) but younger than 50 years—the older end of the recognized working age among most African countries according to the World Health Organizations (WHO) (2012).[9] Those who were underage (i.e., younger than 18 years, according to the United Nations 1989) at the time of interview were not considered due to their minority and at-risk status. Consideration of religion was not a significant factor because almost all members in the population are religiously homogeneous. Factors of social status were explored during research as were issues of political leaning. Those who were not physically able to participate in active combat were still considered for an interview based on the definition used for ex-combatant: logisticians, planners, and other support staff not necessarily involved in physical conflict but significantly contributing. Ethnicity was a characteristic manipulated by political elite to achieve particular goals. In Rwanda, the discussion of ethnic group is sensitive, if not outright outlawed. The Author abided by these criteria in pursuing lines of questioning and relied on alternate means of questioning and context consideration to understand drivers of recruitment (e.g., affiliation with past ruling party or rebel group or members of family imprisoned).

The research was informed by ex-combatants who defected from ongoing rebel activity. The Author applied a connecting strategy in the analysis phase of research, wherein broader datasets collected in the interview or another qualitative manner were "analyze[d] and reduce[d]" (Miller 2012, 115). The use of this technique was advised to draw out "relationships that tie the data together into a narrative or a sequence, and eliminating information that is not germane to these relationships" (Miller 2012, 115.).

4.6 DATA COLLECTION

The complexity of the social and human phenomenon of former combatants sharing input on decisive thinking and future programmatic recommendations was not always well understood by random informant selection. The author relied on informants who had the capacity to discuss and express the

---

[9]In its Africa-focused surveys, the WHO suggested that 50 be considered the cut-off age for the transition from adulthood to old age or elderly. For an explanation and the source of this information, see WHO (2012).

complexity of the conditions and decision-making processes they undertook to defect and their recommendations for future defection programming.

The author used a qualitative, key-informant interview method. Interviews were conducted individually using semi-structured and narrative techniques. The author directed questions to former combatants in Rwanda who had defected to understand which factors pull combatants from existing rebellion and what can be done to encourage others to defect from other rebel groups, globally, as well as what factors could deter recruiting efforts by ongoing armed activities. The combination of defection promotion and recruitment prevention most fully addresses the concept of defeating human feasibility of armed rebel groups as a means to push rebel leaders to the negotiating table. In this way, conflict-resolution activities can be enhanced in less costly ways by bolstering counter-human-feasibility programs and by addressing both supply and demand of rebel personnel.

The use of the case-study approach with the qualitative informant-based research led naturally to the application of a grounded theory approach. This analytical methodology was selected for its numerous benefits:

1. **Grounded theory offers "ecological validity."** It "represents real-world settings" on which this research method and selection criteria relied. Because this study was driven by the input of beneficiaries, the requirement for "context-specific, detailed and tightly connected to the data" input was matched by this theory (Walden University n.d., 7).

2. **Grounded theory offers "novelty."** Where this study sought to explore the potential for "innovative" or new theory in addition to assessing input against accepted quantitative findings, Grounded theory was also a strong fit. The goal of the interactive, semi-structured interview technique with program beneficiaries is the emergence of a subject-derived theory of recruitment deterrent. Thus, novelty also matched this method (Walden University n.d., 7).

3. **Grounded theory offers "parsimony."** The findings here were the evaluation of complex situations and beneficiary input, explained "into abstract constructs" and more generalizable "schemata" to understand the situation in theoretical terms (Walden University n.d., 7).

Here, combining the input of narrative with knowledge of the case study allowed the most relevant factors comprising deliberate decision making among the unit-of-analysis community (i.e., ex-combatants) to rise to the surface. The goal was to allow the community at risk to self-identify factors that were most relevant to the analysis.

4.7 OPTIONS FOR DATA ANALYSIS

A number of recommended techniques can be incorporated during the data-collection process to assist in the data-analysis stage. These recommendations, highlighted here, were utilized by the author in the field. They were important to ensure that the author was constantly familiarizing herself with the data, continuing to develop and challenge ongoing hypothesis development, and assessing whether information saturation had been reached (Goetz and LeCompte 1981).

1. **Memos:** Memo-taking during data collection is a technique to assist researchers during interviews and other qualitative processes. The aim is to push the researcher to consider the whole environment during the interactive process between researcher and subject. This Author was proactive about transcribing notes as soon possible in order to describe the discussion in the most detail possible. Walden University (n.d.) describes five different types of memos to consider during research and note taking:

   a. *Textual Memos*: Textual memos are notes that define and orient the direction of thinking regarding coding of discussions. Textual memos are meant to "stop you (briefly) from coding so that you can capture interpretive ideas and hunches" (Walden University n.d., 59).

   b. *Observational Memos*: The observational type of memo is meant to direct the researcher to explore the whole environment during the research process in order to make the data richer and fuller. These memos "describe the context of interviews and observations. These memos focus on what your other senses are telling you in the research: what you have seen, felt, tasted, or experienced while doing research" (Walden University n.d., 60).

   c. *Reflexive Memos*: Reflexive memos are reflections of the self as researcher. These memos are meant to capture the "observations of yourself—your voice, your impact, your challenging roles throughout the process. These memos help you to pay attention to your

rising values, feelings, mistakes, embarrassments, and personal insights, and to reflect on how those qualities might contribute to how you are making sense of the data" (Walden University n.d., 60).

d. *Conceptual/Theoretical Memos*: Conceptual/theoretical memos continue refining the coding and categorization process. Here, the researcher is guided to explore the broader findings throughout the collection process and to "help to develop ideas on the possible pathways for integrating the theory" (Walden University n.d., 61).

e. *Operational Memos*: The final suggested memo type to incorporate during data collection is operational. These memos are essentially an ongoing task list for the interviewer. As questions or reminders arise, it is recommended that they are noted. "These mostly relate to methodological procedures" (Walden University n.d., 62).

2. **Coding or Categorizing:** Coding or categorizing data is an ongoing methodological process that begins during the data-collection process and continues throughout analysis. Coding or categorizing according to specific criteria that can be "organizational, substantive (descriptive), thematic, theoretical (from theory)" occurs throughout; however, the refining, examining, and developing of broader hypothetical or conceptual groups occurs during analysis (Miller 2012; Walden University n.d., 53-4). The categories that arose from coding and categorizing data were the basis for the theoretical concepts that emerged from the research. It was an iterative process that was continually refined, revised, and reviewed until the research was complete.

3. **Connecting Strategies:** Connecting strategies is most often employed as a tool to reduce and organize data (Miller 2012). This is achieved by developing means to tie and connect various aspects of collected data—usually through the use of coding. This can be accomplished via time sequence, context, category, or another discipline-guided means (Miller 2012).

The research analysis incorporated these guidelines, as appropriate, throughout the study.

4.8   DATA MANAGEMENT

To protect the confidentiality of the subjects interviewed, the Author applied several techniques as approved by and in line with Tulane Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements. First, the Author kept all study records (including any codes to the data) locked in a secure location, where only the Author had access. All research records were labeled with a unique code. Second, a master key that linked names and codes was maintained in a separate and secure location. Third, all electronic files (e.g., database and spreadsheet) containing identifiable information were password-protected on the Author's computer. All individual files, including interview recordings and transcripts, also had password protection to prevent access by unauthorized users. Only the Author had access to the passwords. Fourth, any data that would be shared with others were coded as described previously to protect the subjects' identities. Fifth, in this dissertation, information from subjects is presented in summary format and subjects will not be identified in any publications or presentations, unless by code. Any master key, audio recording, and other data described in this paragraph will be maintained in accordance with the security provisions of this paragraph until destroyed by the Author.

4.9   RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND COPING

There are general limitations regarding qualitative studies as well as specific limitations regarding key informant interviews.

4.9.1   Research-Method Limitations

First, qualitative studies often suffer from a lack of convince-ability for policy and decision makers who "expect precise, statistical data with which to design a project or monitor its progress" or effectiveness (Kumar 1989, 3). Moreover, given that the research covered only one case country and one main community of analysis, it was subject to problems of external validity.

Second, because this study was qualitative and relied on the grounded theory, its replicability may be inherently challenging. This is due not only to replication challenges inherent in the RDS technique, where uniquely and anonymously defined informants recommend additional informants, but also to the nature of the interview process (i.e., semi-structured), the point in time of querying, and the author's analytical interpretation of results. (However, the guiding questions used by the author can be used easily for future analysis.) Moreover, whereas grounded theory acknowledges this challenge and relies on the subjectivity of researchers and their analytical skills to draw out common, universal themes,

qualitative case-study and grounded-theory research are more prone to broader validity problems than a quantitative study.

Another set of limitations in the study concerns the case country and the rebel group explored. Both the country (i.e., Rwanda) and the rebel group (i.e., the FDLR) are unique—historically, regionally, politically, and culturally. The following highlights describe the uniqueness of the context that contributes to the broad set of limitations.

4.9.2 Rwanda-Related Limitations

First, Rwanda has made exceptional strides to cope with former opposition members both within and outside of the country, operating in rebel groups. The political leadership and popular will to reconcile with this large group (or, at least, to accept them without violence), to provide resources for their reintegration and social support, and to accept them back into the community may pose considerable hurdles for other countries to replicate. For example, how might American or Moroccan or French citizens in a small community welcome back a cadre of former Islamic State or Al-Qaeda fighters? Even after extensive reintegration training, would they be welcomed and safe in the community? This is difficult to ascertain.

Second, Rwanda is unique in being able to offer complete safety and security to defecting combatants in country. It has had great success not only in achieving negative peace across the country; it also can assure security to defectors who may fear repercussions from the FDLR. As a small country with an extremely comprehensive security apparatus, Rwanda can ensure that those who defect will not have to fear for their lives being killed by members of their rebel group, because they defected; they can live in peace. This may not be the case in other societies in which security services are not as comprehensive.

Third, Rwanda has an extremely thorough DDR program that, by all accounts, is unique and highly successful.[10] After providing housing and vocational training and reeducating returning rebels at a DDR camp facility for three months, they are re-granted citizenship, offered stipends, and given lifetime assistance to reintegrate and become contributing members of society. The integration of programming for ex-combatants among many governmental agencies ensures its comprehensiveness and sustainability. The

---

[10]See Chapter 5 for additional details on the DDR program offered.

lifetime support offered by the RDRC and the government to ensure ex-combatants are successfully reintegrated and supported is not known to exist in other countries.

Fourth, Rwanda has made exceptional developmental and reconciliatory strides as a post-conflict country, housing peacefully both victors and losers of the civil war and genocide. The achievement of strong positive-peace indicators is impressive. Its unique ability to emerge from a conflict of devastating proportion is not often seen in post-conflict states. The state's role in bringing about peace, development, and justice for nearly all citizens likely lays the foundation for a population that is more willing to follow political leadership and take on risks. For example, they may be more welcoming to former rebels coming back into the community, whereas citizens in other post-conflict states who are not as well cared for may not be.

Fifth, Rwanda's socioeconomic developmental success has resulted largely from long-standing ODA, particularly when compared to other post-conflict and African-nation cohorts. This is according to data from the World Bank's Fragile and Conflict Situations (FCS) states and non-high-income countries in SSA—at least when evaluating ODA on a per-capita basis and as a percentage of GNI. The "genocide credit" (i.e., the lack of any international intervention to assist in halting the genocide and subsequent international guilt) (Reyntjens 2015)[11] has been a tremendous help to Rwanda. It stands in stark contrast to other post-conflict states, whose assistance usually diminishes around the 10-year mark following conflict (Collier et al. 2003). As shown in the graph in Figure 8, which depicts net ODA per capita, Rwanda far outpaces aggregates from SSA and the FCS states.

---

[11]Reyntjens (2015, 27) explained Rwanda's use of its "genocide credit" as follows: "Since coming to power, the RPF regime has projected an image of morality, vision, and success. It has astutely maintained and exploited its 'genocide credit' in order tacitly to justify Tutsi dominance; to maintain broad Tutsi support; to keep alive the fear of Hutu revenge; and to keep the international community at bay. By claiming (rightly) that the world abandoned Rwanda in 1994 and let the genocide happen, while the RPF stopped the genocide and defended its victims, the RPF seized a nearly unassailable moral high ground."

Figure 8 **Net ODA, Per Capita, for Rwanda, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Fragile and Conflict Situations**

Source: Data derived from the World Bank (2017b).

A similar graph in Figure 9 for Rwanda's net ODA as a percentage of GNI compared to the same two aggregates, SSA and FCS states, shows that Rwanda takes in twice the amount of assistance as its aggregates. Not only that, but Rwanda continues to receive significantly more than the standard ODA of 10.2% of GNI of post-conflict countries long after the 10-year window closes (Hoeffler Ijaz, and von Billerbeck 2010). It is interesting that it also received more than the average ODA of 7.2% of GNI than developing countries before the civil war and genocide in 1994 (Hoeffler Ijaz, and von Billerbeck 2010).

Figure 9 **Net ODA as Percent GNI, for Rwanda, Fragile and Conflict Situations, and Sub-Saharan Africa**

Source: Data derived from the World Bank (2017b).

These ODA packages for Rwanda have continued unencumbered by international donor pressure to address the absence of freedoms and increasing authoritarian tendencies. In fact, Rwanda is considered by the World Bank (2017a) to be a unique success story on the African continent and among other post-conflict states. It calls Rwanda's achievements in poverty reduction, annual economic growth, almost-universal primary-school enrollment, and reduced inequality (as shown in income distribution measured by the GINI coefficient)[12] a "remarkable development success." The achievements of the country along its human-developmental indicators have kept development assistance strong during the 20 years since the conflict. This is particularly true if donors are following theories described by Burnside and Dollar (2000), who found that in good macroeconomic policy environments,[13] aid can be growth-enhancing, thereby delivering results not only for donors but also for the state. That donors continue to support the country despite its problematic behavior suggests that they are willing to "implicitly accept that authoritarianism is a price worth paying for socioeconomic progress" and "that the regime will someday move in the 'right' direction" (Reyntjens 2015, 30). Indeed, the country has made good use of these donor funds and sustained its peace for now, which is encouraging—particularly when compared to other post-conflict states that routinely fail to achieve stability and growth. Whether Rwanda will be able to hold onto that peace for the long term in the face of structural inequality (at least relative to the application of justice, freedoms of speech and association, and political democratic norms)[14] remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that Rwanda is unique among other post-conflict (and many other poor and developing) countries for the amount of continued aid and strong support it receives from the development community, long after the genocide.

4.9.3 FDLR-Related Limitations

The uniqueness of the FDLR rebel defectors also posed a limitation for this study. For example, FDLR defectors noted deep feelings of connectedness to the Rwandan country that encouraged them to

---

[12]The GINI coefficient measures the income distribution spread of a population, in which a score of "0" represents perfect income equality and 100 represents perfect inequality. The World Bank found that Rwanda reduced its levels of income inequality from a score of 52.04 in 2005 to 50.44 in 2013 (World Bank 2017b). That Rwanda has made achievement in lowering inequality on this measure is laudable. However, the country still ranks very low in the country index, coming in at 151 of 187 countries scored, where 1 is the most equal and 187 is the least, as of the most recent 2013 scoring.
[13]As measured by a country's budget surplus, management of inflation, and degree of trade openness.
[14]For more information on challenges of inequality in Rwanda, see Chapters 5 and 7. In addition, Longman (2010, 2011) and Reyntjens (2011, 2013, 2015) provided comprehensive discussions on various aspects of structural inequality in Rwanda.

return home. In addition, rebels are willing to not only return to Rwanda but most also noted that they felt

comfortable reintegrating into their former communities despite having been away fighting against the

state for as many as 20 years. In addition, given that so many FDLR rebels have defected – from the

highest-ranking commander of the FDLR to the lowest-ranking foot soldier – there is a community on

which to draw for support when returning, which is an unusual occurrence for most defectors. Finally,

after the FDLR defectors return to Rwanda, they peaceably reintegrate and acknowledge that they are

grateful for the chance to become members of society once again. This may or may not be unique to

FDLR rebels who have been fighting in a dangerous forest for 20 years, but it clearly points to strong

programming from the Rwandan government.

4.9.4 Coping with the Limitations

To cope with these challenges and ensure that a study is performed correctly and its findings are

acceptable, it is typically assessed on grounds of validity (i.e., addressing what it purported to address) and

reliability (i.e., replicable across cases).[15] However, grounded theory is "subjective and largely based on

perceptions" and does not "hold that there is one unified Truth" (Walden University n.d., 63). Therefore,

grounded theory relies on different assessments of study acceptability: "credibility, transferability,

dependability, and confirmability" (Maxwell 2005; Shenton 2004, 73; Walden University n.d., 63). These

otherwise are known as "Guba's Four Criteria for Trustworthiness" (Lincoln and Guba 1985), as follows:

1. **Credibility:** Credibility is used "…to demonstrate that the study was conducted in such a manner
   as to ensure that the subject was accurately identified and described" (Jacobs n.d.). Or, briefly, to
   follow "appropriate, well-recognized research methods and analysis" (Shenton 2004, 73).

2. **Transferability:** This is the technique or quality that is applied "…to demonstrate that the results
   of the study are generalizable to others in the original research context or to contexts beyond the

---

[15]"You can ensure quality in grounded theory studies by complete transparency in the data-collection process. Through this transparency, a grounded-theory researcher is able to demonstrate trustworthiness. Typically, terms like validity and reliability are not relevant in grounded-theory research, as those terms are quantitative in origin and are not directly applicable to grounded-theory studies. Grounded-theory studies, after all, don't hold that there is one unified Truth in the world, so it is difficult to claim that one's approach is absolutely "valid" because truth (with a small "t") is assumed to be rather subjective and largely based on perceptions. The same problem exists with claims of reliability in grounded theories. Reliability should not apply to grounded theories because reliability is not actually a goal. You should expect the research process to change throughout the study as the topic evolves and the grounded theory becomes more refined" (Walden University n.d., 63).

original study" (Jacobs n.d.). This is achieved by clearly defining and explaining the background,
context, and "phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be made" (Shenton 2004, 73).

3. **Dependability:** This references the use of discrete, well-detailed techniques to allow repetition of
the study (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Shenton 2004, 73).

4. **Confirmability:** Confirmability assures that researcher bias is not unduly guiding findings, that
triangulation and other techniques to ensure accuracy are being applied, and that outcomes of the
study based on informants' input are being accurately and neutrally presented (Lincoln and Guba
1985; Shenton 2004).

The author believes that this research meets these four criteria.

A number of best practices are associated with the criteria listed previously that the author used,
including techniques such as triangulation of data, in-depth knowledge of the circumstances and
prolonged contact with subjects, validation checks throughout data collection, and reflexivity during
collection. Additionally, strategies for best practices advise "rich," detailed, and descriptive data (Maxwell
2005, 110) and assurances that research-subject data collection adequately reflects typical subjects of their
community—this aids in best determining when information saturation has been achieved (Lincoln and
Guba 1985; Shenton 2004; Walden University n.d.). Finally, Maxwell (2005, 113) also suggested that
researchers be prepared to apply a "quasi-statistical" account of their findings as part of the validation
process. The author applied these techniques throughout the study to ensure that it met the trustworthiness
objectives.

Maxwell (2005) advised the following additional criteria to consider:

1. **Generalizability:** Being aware of the limits of generalizability, including "Internal
generalizability [which] refers to the generalizability of a conclusion within the setting or group
studies, while external generalizability refers to its generalizability beyond that setting or group"
(Maxwell 2005, 115).

2. **Ongoing Analysis or Reflexivity:** This is the suggestion that throughout the data-collection
process, analysis should be taking place: "[w]e should never collect data without substantial
analysis going on simultaneously" (Coffey and Atkinson 1996, 2). The researcher also should

take note so that discrepant and negative case data are fully examined "to assess whether it is more plausible to retain or modify the conclusion, being aware of all the pressures to ignore data that do not fit your conclusions" (Maxwell 2005, 112).

This research endeavored to meet and be cognizant of all criteria and recommended strategies listed previously to ensure trustworthiness of the findings and validity of the study.

Research also is naturally subject to challenges of bias, or "influences that compromise accurate sampling, data collection, data interpretation, and the reporting of findings" (Ogden 2008, 61-2). These types of bias can cover numerous issue areas, including research design, analysis procedures, and inaccuracy or type III errors (in which the questions asked do not address the problem that the researcher wants to solve). These first types of bias are best addressed through development of a methodologically sound research paradigm before reaching the field. Peer review, senior-advisor input, and IRB procedures generally are the mechanisms used to counter this type of potential bias. For this study, these methodological biases were addressed through the dissertation-prospectus and IRB processes.

The second group addresses research relationships in the field and the biases involved therein, including sampling bias, selection bias, research bias, reactivity, and response bias. These biases are explored in more detail with the recommended means for ensuring that they do not influence and therefore contribute to invalidity of the study, as follows:

1. **Sampling Bias (or "Key Informant Bias"):** Maxwell (2005, 91) explained that sampling bias is relatively prevalent in qualitative studies: "Qualitative researchers sometimes rely on a small number of informants for a major part of their data, and even when these informants are purposefully selected and the data themselves seem valid, there is no guarantee that these informants' view are typical." To address this type of bias, "you need to do systematic sampling in order to be able to claim that key informants' statements are representative of the group as a whole" Maxwell (2005, 91).

    Coping Strategy: This study was not configured in such a way as to perform a systematic sampling of the whole universe (or communities of ex-combatants in each case) and, as such, was subject to sampling bias. However, the author endeavored to triangulate information

among the main unit and subunits of analysis for this work. By doing so, and collecting information from as many sources as possible to validate findings, the author hoped to address this known bias to the study design.

2. **Selection Bias:** This is an error encountered when informants are selected on "the basis of their social and economic standing or their fluency in an international language rather than on their knowledge of the local situation" (Kumar 1989, 3-4). Moreover, given that this research relied on those who are considered knowledgeable and reliable by their peers (i.e., the RDS technique of sample selection), they may not necessarily be representative of the entire population of former combatants. A second error that may occur under selection bias covers the case of misrepresentation by informants. Here, it is possible to encounter individuals who are misrepresenting themselves – their history, knowledge, experience, or otherwise – to participate in the interview. This typically is the case when there is some form of remuneration for participation, but it also may be a problem in other settings.

   Coping Strategy: This type of bias may be present in the field research, based on the RDS and basic misrepresentation, which can occur in the field. It typically would be overcome in the use of a quantitative, national survey. However, even in the best of circumstances for this type of survey, efforts would be stymied by the lack of reliable records and data on ex-combatants and their whereabouts in country. This research addressed selection bias by seeking to interview respondents based on their knowledge of the conditions that the study aimed to research. Regarding the second form of bias, misrepresentation, this research aimed to rely on both the author's detailed knowledge of the scenario and conditions on the ground as well as the RDS technique for referring new informants. There is no definitive way to overcome selection bias in the field when key informants are identified. Using the best tools possible – a combination of fact-checking, reliance on other experts (according to the RDS technique), and consistency of response – the author endeavored to ensure reliability.

3. **Researcher Bias (or "Observer Bias"):** Jacobs (n.d.) called this the "…invalid information resulting from the perspective the researcher brings to the study and imposes upon it" — otherwise defined by Maxwell (2005, 105) as the "subjectivity of the researcher." This bias

occurs when the interviewer or researcher is subconsciously or consciously inferring input from subjects that confirm the researcher's "preconceived notions" (Kumar 1989).

      Coping Strategy: This bias is almost always a challenge in research, and this study was no different. The method to overcome this bias for this study was "respondent validation" or "systematically soliciting feedback about your data and conclusions from the people you are studying.... This is the single most important way of ruling out the possibility of misinterpreting the meaning of what participants say and do and the perspective they have on what is going on, as well as an important way of identifying your own biases and misunderstandings of what you observed" (Maxwell 2005, 111). Maxwell explained further that applying "respondent validation" to "rule out the possibility of misinterpreting the meaning of what participants say and do and the perspective they have on what is going on, as well as being an important way of identifying your own biases and misunderstandings of what you observed" is the best mechanism for addressing the bias.

4. **Reactivity (or "Observer Effects"):** According to Jacobs (n.d.), this is "…the impact of the observer's participation on the setting or the participants being studied." This notion that people's presence naturally has an effect on the setting and interviewee is somewhat controversial. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) argued that this notion is one that can be either minimized and monitored or "exploited" for its "informative" purposes (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, 18).

      Coping Strategy: Reactivity is difficult to control and may not be within the purview of the researcher to manage as directly as other biases. However, there are techniques that may help to overcome this bias. First, by collecting "rich" data that is detailed and descriptive, which includes observations about the subject being interviewed in addition to their words, may be helpful. Additionally, ensuring that the subject is comfortable, aware of the content and direction of study, clearly understands the questions and objectives, and feels secure in answering can help overcome this bias. This study, according to human-subject research standards, ensured that the participants were well aware of the intent of the study, understood clearly that their participation was voluntary, that they were anonymous (i.e., their names and any other identifying information

were not shared), and that their data were secured. Furthermore, the author endeavored to ensure that participants were not uncomfortable and regularly inquired as to their level of ease.

5. **Response Bias (or "Social Desirability"):** This is the bias that emerges when informants attempt to provide answers that they think the researchers will find most desirable. This is particularly prevalent when discussing personal behavior of informants (e.g., over-reporting better-than-realistic behaviors and under-reporting less-desirable behavior).

       Coping Strategy: During the course of this research, it was possible that the author encountered the social-desirability bias numerous times. First, given that the author is female and was dealing with a predominantly male population, the subjects may have tended to represent their decision making in more socially desirable terms. However, given that women are actively employed in government and across the formal and informal sectors and that they play key roles in Rwanda (and among combatants), the author believes it was not a major impact or unusual occurrence to be meeting with a female. Second, on issues of defecting, the subjects may be more likely to favor issues that they think the researcher can either influence (i.e., cash handouts) or would prefer to hear (i.e., economic opportunity) as opposed to less-comfortable topics. However, given that respondents routinely brought up similar and unique recommendations, the author believes that this risk was avoided. Third, it is possible that informants were unsure of the ramifications of their honest responses; although the topics discussed were not sensitive, the country in which the interviews took place was less open and perceived to be less free for open dialogue. However, despite this reality, the author believes that the interviews, conducted in private, were as open as possible. Overcoming response or social-desirability bias relies on a number of factors during qualitative interviewing. One potential response is to consider the whole response, including body language and other tell-tale signs of misrepresentation. Another possibility is to return to the same area of questioning from a different perspective (e.g., role playing or using scenario-driven questions). Finally, assuring respondents that no repercussions will emerge from honesty and ensuring an environment of trust between researcher and subject also helps to manage this issue. The author applied these methods to overcome this potential bias.

4.10 ETHICAL CONCERNS

There was minimal risk with this study or to the author coming from the participants who were derived from named and self-associated public groups. Despite the expectation of calm and security with the key informants during interviews, as well as the presence of a full-time translator, the author followed basic protocol to ensure safety. This included ensuring that another person (i.e., the translator) was with the author at all times; attending closely to informants' behaviors and planning an emergency exit from a situation if it became volatile; ensuring that emergency phone numbers for local and US Embassy security were available; remaining aware of the situation and surroundings at all times to ensure that if problems or security issues arose in the vicinity, the author could leave quietly and easily; trusting intuition regarding people or places and, when unsure, exiting immediately and calmly. The author also was cautious about carrying large amounts of cash, dressing in a fashion that was not in line with local norms, and keeping valuables hidden. Finally, the author endeavored to ensure that all respondents felt they were in a nonthreatening environment, could speak freely, and did not have cause to become upset despite the issues and topics to be discussed. This was accomplished by ensuring that each informant was validated and carefully listened to during interviews.

Although neither the UN (1993) nor the World Bank (2013/2014) identify ex-combatants as a vulnerable population, their economic and social status in society may be disproportionately challenged compared to their non-ex-combatant cohorts in particular cases. (However, according to interviews with the RDRC, ex-combatants in Rwanda live on a par with cohorts in country who were not former combatants.) The author was sensitive to their status as a potentially vulnerable group and ensured that expectations were managed, and concerns addressed.

4.11 CONSENT PROCESS AND DOCUMENTATION

Prior to field research, the author followed the Tulane University IRB process to ensure that the study met the requirements of human-subject research. This process included application of the Belmont guidelines, which detail that Respect for Persons, Beneficence, and Justice are granted to each research subject. To ensure Respect for Persons, the author obtained consent prior to interviews from every participant. It was obtained, when possible, by signature or by thumbprint or verbally. All subjects were informed of their right to either not participate or to abstain from participation at any point during the research process. Additionally, participants remained anonymous to minimize any potential harm to them.

Although this study did not anticipate any risk, the concept of Beneficence remained a priority. Finally, the author ensured Justice during the research process. Because the RDS technique was used, the author needed to ensure that the participants were vetted as valid informants. Those who appeared to be unstable or invalid were not considered for an interview.

Throughout the verbal interviews, the author remained sensitive to the needs of the research subjects. They were allowed to respond freely and to abstain, as desired, to any question posed. In addition, questions were open-ended and not leading in order to allow responses from participants to be wholly unfettered and unbiased by the author's own perspective.

5.0 RWANDA

On April 6, 1994, Rwanda's president, Juvenal Habyarimana, was flying back from Arusha, Tanzania, following discussions related to the August 4, 1993, Arusha Peace Accords, when his plane was shot down, killing all those on board.[1] Negotiations in Arusha were taking place with the RPF—a political rebel group formed of Rwandan Tutsis who had sought refuge in Uganda following a spate of mass killings against them in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as Rwanda gained independence from Belgium. Hours after the President's plane was shot down by unknown assailants, the genocide against civilians began. These killings, perpetrated in only three months, took the lives of 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu civilians.[2] The genocide in Rwanda, perpetrated by extremists of the Hutu Habyarimana regime, affiliated parties, their youth wings and militias, as well as other members of society, was a humanitarian disaster— and one that few attempted to stop. As the days wore on, the UN called for peace-keeping forces to be reduced; contributing countries, witnessing the horror but with no international sanction to intervene, withdrew. Few international actors remained in country, and even fewer engaged to halt the mass atrocities taking place across the country. By July 1994, the RPF, intervening from Uganda to stop the killings, had made its way into Rwanda and managed to defeat the regime, running the perpetrators and millions of civilians out of the country. Led by the current president, General Paul Kagame, the victory remains the RPF's alone. This was certainly a point of pride but also of leverage against any effort to judge, critique, and hold accountable the current administration, their actions, laws, and behaviors—from the military's actions after the genocide to the current political activities, policies, and approaches.

---

[1]The Arusha Peace Accords ("Arusha Accords" 1993), also known as the Arusha Agreement(s) or Arusha Peace Agreement(s), were signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on August 4, 1993, between the Rwandan government of Habyarimana and the RPF to set the stage for a ceasefire, government power sharing, political reforms, and much more (Arusha Accords 1993).

[2]The RPF took Kigali on July 4, 1994, but the war was not declared formally over until July 18, 1994 (Des Forges 1999; British Broadcasting Corporation 2004).

Rwanda is situated along the division between East, Central, and Southern Africa, bordering

Uganda to the north, Tanzania to the west, Burundi to the south, and DRC to the east (Figure 10). Rwanda is a small landlocked country, and its population – slightly less than 13 million – places it as the 74th largest country in the world, with a landmass smaller than Maryland.

Rwanda offers a rare case of sustained development following years of conflict, including genocide, instability, and state fragility. Its successes are all the more remarkable following the toll that the conflict took on already low levels of

Figure 10 **Map of Rwanda**
Source: US Central Intelligence Agency 2017.

social, human, and economic capital. In 1994, 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed (i.e., almost 10% of the population) (United Nations Children's Fund 2004; World Bank 2004); almost 3 million refugees fled to neighboring countries (World Bank 2004); almost 100,000 children were orphaned (United Nations Children's Fund 2004); and the country faced significant reconstruction needs in infrastructure, property, natural resources, and social networks following the war. The economic impact of a conflict, much less genocide, can be difficult if not impossible from which to rebound; yet, Rwanda has managed— and well.

Since the genocide ended in July 1994 with the RPA (i.e., the military wing of the RPF) successfully ousting the genocidal Habyarimana regime, Rwanda has been on a relatively stable path. The country has managed to avoid internal armed conflict (i.e., negative peace) and shows signs of staying on course for meeting its cohorts on SHD trends (i.e., positive peace)—even meeting most MDGs by 2015 (World Bank 2016b); however, it remains classified as an authoritarian regime (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016 and Center for Systemic Peace 2016). The Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (2016) found a general trend line of worsening conditions, placing Rwanda in the top fifth of all 178 countries measured (i.e., the top is most pressured, and the bottom is most sustainable). The issues of concern include state legitimacy, human rights and rule of law, factionalized elites, public services, security apparatus, external intervention, uneven economic development, poverty, human flight, grievance, demographic pressures, and refugees and IDPs—with uneven economic development, security apparatus, and refugees leading the worsening factors. For example, the country managed to double its pre-genocide GNI per-capita levels in slightly more than 20 years (Figure 11); in 10 years, it was able to meet pre-genocide primary-education targets at 107% enrollment (World Bank 2004); poverty rates decreased from 57% in 2005 to 39% in 2015; and GDP continues growing past $8 billion per year in 2015 (up from $750 million in 1994) (current US$) (World Bank 2017b). More broadly, the IEP found that Rwanda has not fallen behind on any indicators of positive peace in the past decade but rather is advancing significantly faster than the global average in achieving indicators of positive peace (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015).

However, those still remaining military forces of the previous regime (i.e., ex-FAR), the Presidential Guard, high-ranking officials, the armed civilian militias affiliated with the two main political

Figure 11 **GNI/Capita, Rwanda 1980–2015 (Current US$)**
Source: Data derived from the World Bank (2017b).

parties that largely executed the genocide (i.e., the Interahamwe[3] and Impuzamugambi,[4] also known as "Hutu Power"[5]), and other extremist Hutu ideologists continue to try to instigate war by launching insurgencies against Rwanda and wreaking havoc on the populations of eastern DRC. There, these political refugees have organized and disbanded rebel groups many times over with the intent of retaking Rwanda for the Hutu ideologists, ousted in defeat in 1994.

5.1 CONFLICT HISTORY

Rwandan history and factors impacting the genocide, as many scholars have noted, often are interpreted along ethnic lines (Corey and Joireman 2004; Lemarchand 1998; Uvin 1999). Uvin (1999) and Corey and Joireman (2004) articulated the distinction by pointing out that Tutsis argue that ethnic identity was in fact largely thrust on the population by the colonizers and had been, until the 1960s, peaceful, fluid, and determined by economic status. Hutus, conversely, observe that the division between the groups was more severe, highlighting the impression that Tutsis arrived from east Africa long after the Hutus settled in Rwanda and took over their lands as overlords. To merit some of the interpretation, precolonial Rwanda was ruled by a long-standing Tutsi monarchy, where the divisions between Tutsi and Hutu – at least in government representation – were starkly biased toward Tutsis. This situation was enhanced by both German and Belgian colonial regimes in Rwanda. However, as Corey and Joireman (2004, 75) argued, in reality,

> [t]he average Hutu and Tutsi led comparable lifestyles, held common religious beliefs, spoke the same language, co-developed music and dance and intermarried. The distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was primarily occupational, and the barrier between the two was flexible and permeable. Ethnic identities were malleable, depending on the social status and wealth of the family. For example, those referred to as Tutsis typically owned more cattle.

---

[3]The "Interahamwe" were the youth wing of President Habyarimana's party, the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*, or National Revolutionary Movement for Development and Democracy (MRND). "Interahamwe" means "those who attack" (Human Rights Watch 1994, 18). "The Interahamwe had a National Committee and a College of Advisers. The National Committee was composed of President (Robert Kajuga); First Vice President (Phénéas Ruhumuliza); Second Vice Ppresident (Georges Rutaganda); Secretary-General (Eugène Mbarushimana); and a Treasurer-General (Dieudonné Niyitegeka). The College of Advisers was composed of Chairmen who headed different Commissions: Commission on Social and Legal Matters (Bernard Maniragaba); Research and Development Commission (Joseph Serugendo); Commission on Political Matters and Propaganda (Jean Pierre Sebanetsi); Economic and Financial Commission (Ephrem Nkezabera); Follow-Up and Assessment Commission (J. M. V. Mudahinyuka); and External Relations and Documentation Commission (Alphonse Kanimbe)" (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2008).
[4]"Impuzamugambi" were known as "those with a single purpose," and they were the paramilitary wing affiliated with the Hutu extremist party, *Coalition pour la Défense de la République* (CRD) (Human Rights Watch 1994, 18).
[5]Yanagizawa-Drott (2014, 1952) explained that the two parties and their two youth wings turned into "a coalition that became known as Hutu Power."

Moreover, as Verwimp (2003, 163) explained on the broad equality of everyday citizens in precolonial Rwanda, "The large majority of Tutsi as well as Hutu had no access to power or privilege."

The strong bias held by the colonialists, which escalated ethnic distinction and was prioritized toward the Tutsis in Rwanda (i.e., 15% of the population), reversed around 1959 in an effort to redress past injustices toward the Hutus (i.e., 84% of the population), shortly before the Belgians departed (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1994). By the time the Belgians pulled out completely in 1962, relinquishing power to the PARMEHUTU, or the "radically anti-Tutsi party," killings against Tutsis had already begun (Uvin 1999, 257). These killings pushed thousands of surviving Tutsis to flee to Uganda and elsewhere (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1994). Uvin (1999, 257) explained that "ethnic divisions played a crucial role in the fierce competition for state power" in Rwanda.

In the period between independence and the genocide in 1994, Rwanda experienced only two regimes: the PARMEHUTU President Grégoire Kayibanda (1962–1973) and the military dictator of the MRND party, General Juvenal Habyarimana (1973–1994). Both regimes were considered highly repressive, with strong tendencies to repeatedly disavow the Tutsi minority's connection to the country, arguing that "Rwandan belongs to the Hutus, its true inhabitants, who had been subjugated brutally for centuries by the foreign exploiters, the Tutsis" (Uvin 1999, 258). The 1935 Belgian edict to include ethnic identity on formal government identification cards continued through both regimes, ensuring that Tutsis were excluded from positions of government and other social prestige.

This tendency in Rwanda to view history through the lens of ethnicity did not end with independence; it continued through the interpretation of recent history, including the genocide and following events. Lemarchand (1998), Uvin (1999), and Corey and Joireman (2004) highlighted the various interpretations of recent history in Rwanda and eastern DRC largely based on ethnicity. Whereas the Tutsi norm is to speak of one genocide in 1994 – that is, the Hutu extremists against Tutsis and Hutu moderates – the Hutu norm is to invoke the alleged genocide of Hutu civilians during and after the Tutsi genocide in northern Rwanda[6] and the subsequent alleged "counter-genocide" in eastern DRC refugee camps in 1996

---

[6]Human Rights Watch (1994, 20), reporting after attempting to verify accounts by the regime of alleged RPF massacres in Rwanda, explained: "The self-proclaimed government has accused the RPF of having killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, both last year and in recent weeks, but it has been unable to provide any details of time, place or circumstance where the alleged massacres have taken place. After extensive investigation among reliable sources, both Rwandan and foreign, representing clergy, staff of nongovernmental organizations, and journalists, Human Rights

and 1997; Lemarchand (1998) and Reyntjens (2015) recounted that thousands of lives were taken by the RPF.[7] Lemarchand (1998, 4) noted: "[t]he answers given by Hutu and Tutsi point to radically different interpretations of the same ghastly events. The focus here is on the distortions inscribed in the cognitive maps of both victims and perpetrators, i.e. memory, in response to the exigencies of the moment, in turn providing justification for further killings." Without laying claim to which version of history is correct, the perspective of the Hutu refugee population in eastern DRC, along with Hutu extremists, clearly lays out a strong perceived justification for waging war on Rwanda through the FDLR.

Another factor impacting the emergence of the genocide in 1994 concerns the geographical context. Understanding the genocide and the deep-seated mutual fear and hatred between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups requires understanding the nature of the relationship between the two as well as events in the region, especially between Rwanda and neighboring Burundi. In fact, much of what happened in one country would routinely inspire and impact what happened in the other in the lead-up to the 1994 genocide. Lemarchand (1998) and Uvin (1999) recalled that the Tutsi army in Burundi killed 100,000 to 150,000 educated Hutu in 1972, at the hands of the Tutsi leadership; this overt mass violence inspired the power grab in Rwanda of the extremist Hutu dictator Habyarimana in 1973. Moreover, when only 20 years later, Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi, was killed by a soldier in 1993, it provoked outrage in Rwanda, where "some 20,000 Tutsi men, women and children were hacked to pieces or burned alive in October and November 1993 in an uncontrolled outburst of rage: for many Hutu on the hills, the death of Ndadaye was the harbinger of a reply of 1973" (Lemarchand 1998, 6).

In a more immediate sense, events in 1990 – when Ugandan-based Rwandan refugees, the descendants of those predominantly Tutsi Rwandans who had fled in the late 1950s and 1960s, pushed into Rwanda under a rebel army – comprised a third instigator of the genocide. Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1994, 11) explained that the incursion was borne of decades of frustration with Rwanda national policy and the lack of hospitality in refugee countries:

Watch/Africa has concluded that there is at present no credible evidence that the RPF has engaged in any widespread slaughter of civilian populations, although there are reports of less systematic abuses, including the execution of the archbishop and priests."
[7]The RPF, however, claims they were strictly targeting Interahamwe, Impuzamugambi, and ex-FAR (Lemarchand 1998).

Largely due to the intransigence of the Rwandese Hutu-led governments towards their demands to return, and to the unwelcoming policies of some of the host countries, the exiled Tutsi communities became over the years increasingly militant. In turn, this led to the creation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, the military attack on Rwandese in October 1990 and the ensuing civil war.

The 1990 RPF attack was pushed back by the FAR of Habyarimana's regime, the state military—but not until significant damage was done and thousands were displaced from the northeast corner of the country.

In addition to the military incursion of the RPF in 1990, more troubles were brewing. The Habyarimana regime was facing challenges internally, with allegations of corruption, a demonstrable lack of development (i.e., GDP percent annual growth was quickly trending downward as shown in Figure 12), and increasing criticism from donors to open up the regime to multiparty elections (perhaps after witnessing the increasing ethnic tensions that had been rising in Burundi). To prevent any further outbreak of civil conflict, the Arusha Peace Accords were signed into force on August 4, 1993, between the then–Government of Rwanda and the RPF. The Arusha Agreement was comprehensive in scope, encompassing ceasefire assurances; a power-sharing transitional government executive- and legislative-branch reform; constitutional reform; interethnic-relations programming; state and electoral reforms; civil-administration reforms; a truth-and-reconciliation commission; judiciary, military, and police reforms; DDR; prisoner releases; human-rights edicts; plans for refugees and IDPs; citizenship reforms; plans for economic and social development; donor-funding assurances; monitoring plans; and peace-keeping forces (Arusha Accords 1993).

Figure 12 **GDP % Annual Growth 1980–1994, Rwanda**
Source: Data derived from the World Bank (2017b).

The passing and signing of the Arusha Peace Accords, which validated the RPF as a political party and called for the integration of the RPA with the FAR, angered the more extremist elements of the Habyarimana regime. As Uvin (1999, 260) noted, "The regime was under attack from all sides, and its most radical factions took recourse in the usual, time-tested solution: the revival of ethnicity. Ethnicity could unite the population around the government, take momentum away from the opposition, combat the RPF, and render elections impossible." Thus, the regime – politically, financially, and militarily – launched an effort to delegitimize any further advances by the Tutsis and to find means to blame them for the crisis facing the government.

The dehumanization of the Tutsis, seen in the media and supported by President Habyarimana's inner circle (or "akazu"), became extreme—setting the stage for the mass murder that would follow the downing of the president's plane in April 1994. The regime was in crisis and in need of justifying its extreme political exclusion of the Tutsis.

A final and sometimes overlooked economic factor also contributed to the crisis felt by the regime. This relates to the economic well-being of Rwanda in the years leading to the genocide and the subsequent impact that this may have had on the behavior and motivations of many participants in the genocide. The effects of both the structural adjustment programming prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the 1980s and a massive decline in world coffee prices (i.e., the leading export of Rwanda, along with tea, then and now) led to significant internal challenges—impacting, in particular, the poor farmers. Verwimp (2003, 162) explained, "As long as the international price of these two export crops was high, the Habyarimana regime could afford to pay a high producer price to farmers." Yet, as Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1994) found, when the GDP fell by 40% from 1989 to 1993, it was a shock to the economic system of the regime.[8] Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1994, 11) explained:

> Combined with the effects of the civil war from October 1990, continued demographic pressure on available resources and decreasing agricultural yields, the economic crisis introduced yet another element of stress and instability into the Rwandese political and social fabric. The international community, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, overlooked these potentially explosive political

---

[8]Data obtained from the World Bank (2017b) in 2017 do not show a 40% decrease in total GDP but rather something closer to 33%. It is possible that the numbers, between then and now, have been reassessed. It is impossible to determine for certain. Nonetheless, it is clear that a significant economic impact shook the well-being of the country, especially the majority involved in agriculture and coffee and tea farming.

consequences when designing and imposing their economic conditions for support to Rwanda's economic recovery.

Moreover, Verwimp (2003, 169) explained that in Rwanda, leading up to the genocide, "the power of the regime is determined by the loyalty supplied by the population, which in turn depends on the producer price offered to the farmer producer. There is a mutual dependence between power and budget." When budgets decrease, broad popular support is threatened. Thus, when the price of coffee on the world market dropped, Habyarimana was forced to consider more repressive approaches to ensuring support within the populace (Verwimp 2003). As the farmers and the poor lost money, the regime instead looked to bolster popular support by using those able, unemployed farmers and youth for the militias that ultimately would carry out the genocide (Verwimp 2003).[9] The regime sometimes relied only on the popular messages of fear or greed on radio and television to generate support among the militias for the regime; at other times, it offered incentives:

> Authorities offered tangible incentives to participants. They delivered food, drink, and other intoxicants, parts of military uniforms and small payments in cash to hungry, jobless young men. They encouraged cultivators to pillage farm animals, crops, and such building materials as doors, windows and roofs. Even more important in this land-hungry society, they promised cultivators the fields left vacant by Tutsi victims. To entrepreneurs and members of the local elite, they granted houses, vehicles, control of a small business, or such rare goods as television sets or computers (Des Forges 1999, 62).

Thus, as Verwimp (2003, 178) argued, the decreased earnings from exports threatened the legitimacy of the regime, which – in turn – used "ethnic ideology" to legitimize its power: "the regime was able to hide its own failures (a failed economy and a failed democratization) and put the blame on one

---

[9]The bulk of academic data on genocide figures focuses on those who perished as opposed to those who committed the atrocities. Numbers recruited for the various militia often are not articulated in the literature or, if they are noted, there is no agreement on their size, ranging from estimates of 10,000 to 30,000 (Orth 2005); 50,000 (Public Broadcasting Service 1999); 100,000 (Melvern 2004); 200,000 (Genocide Watch n.d.); and Daly (2002), who cites 650,000 Hutu participants in the killings—or close to one tenth of the Hutu population. (However, Daly (2002) clarified that this includes both direct and indirect participants.) One of the problems, perhaps, is the confusion about terminology. Frequently, the Interahamwe are noted as distinct from the political parties and military. However, over time, "civilians involved in the killings in Rwanda from 7 April were commonly referred to as Interahamwe even if they were not specifically members of the MRND youth wing" (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2008, 111). Additionally, there is evidence that the Interahamwe were considered, at least at times, to be a part of the formal defense service, the FAR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2008, 120). If this is true, then, perhaps figures of the FAR – numbering 40,000 in 1994 and up from 5,000 in 1990 (Orth 2005) – are inclusive of the Interahamwe and other militia. Most likely, the actual number is somewhere in the middle, where Rwandan genocide scholar, Linda Melvern (2004) found the militia recruits to number around 100,000 civilians.

group of people (Tutsi)." The economic stress on the regime threatened its existence, and the leadership

turned to manipulating ethnic ideology as a tool to ensure power retention.

Increasing arms flows, smaller-scale killings, massive hate propaganda, delegitimization of the

Tutsi as human, and calls to violence among the majority Hutu population occurred throughout 1993—directed, funded, and trained to kill by the government leadership (Human Rights Watch 1994; Uvin 1999). Figure 13 shows the formal increase in military spending from the regime in 1989–1994, with more than double the amount spent from 1989 to 1991 (World Bank 2017b). By the time Habyarimana's plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, the country had already become heavily weaponized, desensitized to violence, and emotionally enraged. Blaming the RPA for downing the plane, mass killings by the Presidential Guard, the Interahamwe, the Impuzamugambi, and other extremist groups

Figure 13 **Military Spending as % GDP, 1989–1994, Rwanda**
Source: Data derived from the World Bank (2017b).

started immediately[10] (Human Rights Watch 1994). As Yanagizawa-Drott (2012) explained: "Militia

members participating in the organized and collective violence would erect roadblocks, distribute weapons,

and systematically organize and carry out killings of Tutsis. In addition to collective violence, there was

also large-scale participation by civilians staging attacks which were much less organized and

---

[10]Human Rights Watch (1994, 18) notes that among the first killed were specific politicians and human rights activists—clearly indicating that the killings had been planned and individuals were targeted: "Among the early victims were Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and President of the Supreme Court Joseph Kavaruganda. Others were human rights activists, including Charles Shamukiga, Fidele Kanyabugoyi, lgnace Ruhatana, Patrick Gahizi, Father Chrysologue Mahame, S. J., and Abbé Augustin Ntagara."

coordinated." Within the first week alone (i.e., April 6–15, 1994), 20,000 people were killed (Human

Rights Watch 1994, 18).[11]

In response to the actions of the Presidential Guard and militias, the RPF stormed in from Uganda

to stop the slaughter and to once and for all capture the seat of government. Notably, the international

community, well aware of the extermination, did not intervene to assist the RPA in stopping the killing; in

the first two weeks, it instead evacuated staff from diplomatic, private, and NGOs (Human Rights Watch

1994). Moreover, the UN force of 2,500 sent in to monitor the terms of the peace agreement completed in

Arusha, which included the security of Kigali, "failed to act decisively" (Human Rights Watch 1994, 22).

When 10 Belgian peace keepers in the UN force attempted to intervene to protect civilians, the UN

Peacekeeping Operations headquarters ordered soldiers to lay down weapons and attempt to negotiate with

heavily armed militias, thereby losing their lives. Yet, the UN never gave the peace keepers the mandate to

forcibly intervene (Uvin 1999). Following the deaths of the 10 Belgians, Belgium withdrew all of its troops

from the UN force, followed by Bangladesh.[12] Only three weeks into the genocide, with tens of thousands

of people slaughtered, the UN, led by the United States, opted to formally downsize the presence to 270

peace-keeping officers. By May 1994, under increasing pressure to intervene, the UN passed Resolution

918, which authorized a troop increase to 5,500. However, it was unable to source troops from member

states until October 1994, six months later. In the interim, UN Resolution 929 was passed, authorizing an

emergency Chapter VII humanitarian intervention force. France was the only country willing to engage

and, on June 22, 1994, "Operation Turquoise" was authorized for the purposes of establishing a

humanitarian safe zone in southwestern Rwanda—despite its long-standing military relationship (including

arms sales and military training) with the extremist Hutu regime.[13] McNulty (2000, 107) pointed out that

---

[11]Human Rights Watch (1994, 18) noted, "The Presidential Guard was joined by the party militias, and within a week these forces had killed an estimated 20,000 people in Kigali and its immediate environs."

[12]In October 1993, UN Resolution 872 (1993) established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), with the goal of implementing, monitoring, and supporting the Arusha Peace Agreements terms and protocols. UNAMIR was composed of Belgian and Bangladeshi troops. When soliciting troops, Belgium and Bangladesh were the only two countries to offer available support at 400 troops each. By February, five months later, they had reached the agreed-on full contingent of 2,548 troops. Only two months later, under UN Security Council Resolution 912 (1994), the force was reduced to only 270 personnel.

[13]See McNulty (2000) for a comprehensive review of the literature on the role that arms transfers played in protracting and enhancing the speed and violence of the genocide in Rwanda. McNulty (2000) explained that France and Rwanda established a military relationship in 1975. When Rwanda was invaded by the RPF in 1990, President Habyarimana called on France for support in protecting the country's territorial integrity, claiming it was Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni who had "expansionist" desires on Rwanda. France responded by providing 300 troops and marines to support Habyarimana. In addition to evacuating French citizens from areas of fighting, McNulty (2000, 110) explained

"Rwanda's *génocidaires*[14] killed at five times the rate of the Nazis," which would not have been possible

without the massive military and arms buildup in the years leading to the genocide. Thus, when France

entered Rwanda under the auspices of the UN to provide a safe zone, the RPF, Rwandan Tutsis, and

moderate Hutus were concerned. Indeed, France had an established military and foreign-policy relationship

with the extremist Habyarimana regime since 1975 and upheld diplomatic relations with the country

throughout the genocide. Once in Rwanda, under "Operation Turquoise," France functioned more as

facilitator for *génocidaires* and their escape than in protecting civilians (McNulty 2000). Ultimately, France

did support the humanitarian mission, saving between 10,000 and 17,000 civilian lives in the massive

genocide and conflict taking place, but it also arguably contributed significantly to the protraction, speed,

and violence of the genocide through its ongoing military and diplomatic support to the regime during the

genocide (Kroslak 2008).

Not all the Hutu civilians, police, military, and bureaucrats and politicians were complicit with the

regime and militia. A report from Human Rights Watch (1994, 20) noted:

> Reliable accounts describe the heroism of some Rwandan authorities, both civilian and
> military, who have sought to prevent or halt the slaughter in their regions. In some
> regions, local government officials, known as burgomasters (*bourgmestres*), have done
> their best to protect the targeted populations and to guarantee security within their
> communes. Unfortunately, in some cases, they have eventually been forced to yield and
> permit the massacres. Military officers who have tried to maintain order or to aid the
> threatened to escape have later suffered reprisals for their human (sic) conduct.

By July, the RPF had defeated the extremists and the FAR, captured Kigali, and witnessed the

mass exodus of the entire former regime government, the majority of the FAR, and hundreds of thousands

of citizens seeking refuge in eastern DRC (formerly known as Zaire[15]). They were welcomed by President

---

how France assisted, armed, and further helped expand the FAR: "French personnel were directly responsible, through arming and training, for the exponential growth of the Rwandan Government Army (*Forces Armées Rwandaises –* FAR), which swelled from 5,200-strong in 1990 to 35,000 in 1993. Eventually, a Frenchman, Lt.-Col. Gilles Chollet, was made special military advisor to President Habyarimana and given overall command of operations." Throughout the war with the RPF and until the May 1994 UN arms embargo (and perhaps after), France provided weapons (from light arms to aircraft) to the FAR, worth approximately $6 million (McNulty 2000)—at times through back channels including Zaire and Egypt (McNulty 2000). In his overview of research findings from multiple sources, McNulty (2000) found that there even is evidence that France continued to arm Hutu ex-FAR once in Zaire in the refugee camps until 1996.

[14]Corey and Joireman (2004, 87) defined a *génocidaire* as "one who commits genocide." However, as Kang et al. (2016, 357) noted, "[i]t is not a legal term suggesting that a person was prosecuted for genocide-related crimes."
[15]The DRC was known as Zaire from 1971 to 1997 under the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. The country was renamed Zaire, a take on the Congolese word for the Congo River, by President Mobutu to assert its independence as an African state and not a colonially named holdover. Zaire was previously known as the Democratic Republic of Congo from

Mobutu Sese Seko (among a few other regional countries)—but not before the killing of 800,000 people, predominantly Tutsi and moderate Hutu, in Rwanda (Lemarchand 1998).

Harff (2005, 57), "in response to President Clinton's policy initiative on genocide early warning and prevention," was asked to develop a tool for identifying the causal factors leading to genocide. This work, using both empirical and theoretical groundings to develop a "data-based system," identified six causal factors leading to genocide. Accurate across 90% of cases, they are: (1) prior genocide or politicide; (2) political upheaval or regime crisis; (3) ethnic character of the ruling elite; (4) ideological character of the ruling elite that justifies the persecution of a certain category of the population; (5) autocratic or repressive regime; and (6) degree of trade openness as a proxy for rule of law and fair practices.

Each of the six criteria identified by Harff (2005) were easily met under the Habyarimana regime, as follows: (1) the Tutsi had faced numerous mass killings under the Hutu extremists (Human Rights Watch 1994; Lemarchand 1998; Uvin 1999);[16] (2) the regime felt in crisis, pushed to reconcile with the RPF, thereby threatening the ruling elite (Uvin 1999); (3) the ruling elite were hyper-focused on their ethnic identity and the relationship of the Hutus to Tutsis and Rwanda (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1994; Uvin 1999); (4) the ruling Hutu elite also had a reconstructed version of history, in which the Tutsis threatened their very rights and existence (Corey and Joireman 2004; Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1994; Uvin 1999);[17] (5) Habyarimana was highly autocratic and assessed to be a totalitarian dictator (Verwimp 2003); and (6) there was a clear problem of impunity, illegal persecution, and a struggling economy (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1994).[18]Applying a psychological analysis to the genocide, Uvin (1999 263)

1967 to 1971 and, following Laurent Desiré Kabila's takeover, it was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997.

[16]The most recent examples of mass killings of Tutsis and Hutus who were against the regime in Rwanda prior to the genocide in April 1994 occurred in October 1990, January–February 1991, March 1992, and December 1992–February 1993 (Human Rights Watch 1994).

[17]Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1994, 11–12) explained that there was a "legacy of fear" that took hold in Rwanda: "…the legacy of fear that exists in the Rwandese social fabric as a result of repeated mass killings since 1959, and which has its origins in the process of ethnogenesis and division between privileged Tutsi and under-privileged Hutu during the colonial period. With creation of the ethnicity issue followed a social construct of Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority, contempt and mistrust, which ultimately permeated the entire society and developed into a culture of fear. It largely contributed to the outburst of violence at the time of Rwanda's independence, when the tables were turned and the fear among the majority Hutu gave way to a fear among the minority Tutsi. Since then, it has been repeatedly exploited for purposes of political manipulation."

[18]Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1994, 11) explained that impunity was a significant problem in the many years of Hutu rule leading to the 1994 genocide: "In Rwanda, those who over the years have been responsible for ethnic mass killings have not, however, been brought to justice. For the psychological health of the people, and the political health of the country, the crimes must be addressed. If a culture of impunity is allowed to continue, the spiral of violence seems almost bound to be repeated in the future."

concluded that the participation in mass killings in Rwanda can be reduced to one key trait, immeasurable though it may be: "In Rwanda primarily prejudice drives people to participate in mass violence. It has been maintained and institutionalized by the powers-that-be to protect their power and privileges. Prejudice has been radicalized every time the elite has been threatened." The reality of atrocity outbreak in Rwanda, regardless of analytical tool, is clearly one that is much more complex, involving the social, economic, political, and possibly geographic or environmental factors not only in Rwanda but also across the region.[19]

5.2 POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA: RISKS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Following the initial cessation of genocide and the success of the RPF in capturing Kigali in July 1994, the Government of Rwanda quickly set about to bring all former perpetrators and Rwandan citizens back to the country. The policy, somewhat akin to the "Drain the Sea"[20] technique – which was popularized under Maoist China and used by British forces in the 1950s in Malaya and US forces in the 1970s in Vietnam – is to bring all potential spoilers under the watchful eye of the competent security forces of the Kagame regime, still in power. This approach was intended to bring about justice by identifying, returning, and trying perpetrators of the genocide, as well as to bring about social reform to encourage the reunification of all Rwandans. Yet, when that method did not fully succeed, the Kagame regime ostensibly conducted operations targeting the former *génocidaires* under the guise of state security in neighboring DRC.

The process for dealing with former combatants and refugees in DRC undertaken by the Rwandan government has been considered successful, to a degree. Many have chosen to unilaterally defect from

---

[19]It is worrisome that Reyntjens (2015, 31) pointed out that there are several similarities between the current Kagame administration and the Habyarimana regime, including (1) internalization of statehood as not colonial but an ancient tradition; (2) regimes that both believe in "managing, monitoring, controlling, and mobilizing the population"; (3) the role of Rwandan as a "donor darling" under both administrations, where tendencies toward authoritarianism are ignored; and (4) "the pervasiveness of 'structural violence,' which has given rise to widespread resentment, frustration, marginalization, fear, and even hatred among many Rwandans, both ordinary people and elites, Hutu and Tutsi." Whether these assertions – in particular, those concerning implications of structural violence – have not been clearly measured or assessed in any of the data that this Author was able to identify, and as such, may remain open for academic debate.

[20]In China, Mao Tse-tung led the Communists against the ruling Nationalist's Kuomintang by developing a guerilla-warfare technique, wherein Mao's rebels were able to hide in plain sight, moving freely among the peasants, with whom Mao had developed an interdependent relationship. This meant that efforts by the ruling Nationalists to target Mao's Communists were difficult because the Communist rebels were heavily embedded among the civilian population. Thus, to counter these types of scenarios, wherein insurgents or rebels hide among the populace, the term "drain the sea" came to be used by counter-insurgency movements. Here, then, drain the sea would mean to drain the "ocean" of people to identify the "fish" or rebels, hiding and swimming among them. For applications of this and more explanation, see Grey (2008) and Holmes, et al. (2001).

armed groups formed after the genocide in DRC and return home to be with those who also fled the war

and returned. Yet, the environment is complicated by Rwanda's complicity in stoking war in eastern DRC.

The government-backed, primarily Tutsi insurgents – for example, the rebel groups *Rassemblement*

Congolais pour la Démocratie, or Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma (RCD–Goma), and the

Mouvement du 23 mars, or March 23 Movement (M23) – have caused no less suffering in the region.

Lemarchand (1998, 4) added that "[q]uestions have also been raised by western observers as to whether

Tutsi invaders, under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, were not involved in the genocidal killing

of innocent Hutu civilians" in eastern DRC by the "all-Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Army" between October

1996 and August 1997 (Human Rights Watch 1997).[21] Reyntjens (2015, 26) more forcefully argued how

the RPA responded to the threats of armed elements of the former regime engaging to fight back against

Rwanda from the eastern DRC:

> These armed elements [the former regime's Presidential Guard, ex-FAR, Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias, and others] conducted cross-border raids and prepared to invade Rwanda. In the absence of any international response to this imminent security threat, the RPA cleared the camps in the fall of 1996. It then launched a massive extermination campaign against civilian refugees trekking westward across what was then known as war-torn Zaire. RPA 'search and destroy' units massacred more than some hundred-thousand civilians, including women and children.

Yet, these actions have not been met with any formal proceedings and Reyntjens (2015, 26) noted

that they have "enjoyed total impunity."

---

[21]Human Rights Watch (1997) described a detailed account of killings from October 1996 to August 1997 in eastern Congo by the RPA, ex-FAR, *Forces Armées Zaïroises* or Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), and the ADFL (the armed forces of Laurent Kabila, funded and possibly integrated with the RPA, according to Human Rights Watch 1997).

"The killings and violations of international humanitarian law in this area represent a cross-section of events that occurred throughout Congo. Thousands of refugees, often young men, the sick, and those too weak to flee were killed by soldiers of the ADFL and RPA as they advanced across Congo. Thousands of other civilian refugees were deliberately cut off from humanitarian assistance, resulting in thousands of deaths due to starvation, dehydration, and disease. Many of the remains of refugees that were killed by the ADFL or the RPA have been exhumed, burned, or otherwise disposed of out of sight of potential witnesses. Congolese have been intimidated to keep them from providing information about the killings through arrests, beatings, and killings of those who have dared to speak out. Killings of civilians from several ethnic groups continue in Congo, most notably in the east where the unresolved issues of land rights, citizenship, and customary power have aggravated violence between remnants of the ex-FAR, Mobutu's former Army (ex-FAZ), and other ethnic-based Congolese militia, all aligned against the troops of the Rwandan Patriotic Army still garrisoning the region" (Human Rights Watch 1997, 5).

Furthermore, "According to witnesses, the majority of these killings were carried out by Kinyarwanda-speaking members of the ADFL, ethnic Tutsi from Rwanda, Uganda, and eastern Congo" (Human Rights Watch 1997, 28). Findings also noted "Other killings were more selective: numerous refugees reported being overtaken throughout their trek by military that they recognized as RPA. They described systematic triage of refugees carried out by these troops that resulted in young men, former military or militia, former members of government, and intellectuals being selected for execution" (Human Rights Watch 1997, 16).

5.2.1 The Pursuit of Justice in Rwanda

The lethal activities of the Rwandan government in eastern DRC, in pursuing *génocidaires* and, arguably, civilian supporters of the former regime who also fled to DRC, often not distinguishing between the two, adds significant complexity to the story of the RPF and its attempts to whitewash its historical fiascos. As with many aspects of Rwanda's recent history, the actions of one party are seen as heroic to part of the population whereas repressive and illicit to another part. The pursuit of justice in Rwanda following the genocide has been equally impressive and problematic, depending on which side of history one sits. The following discussion describes the threefold approach to justice that the Kagame administration undertook to address the crimes of genocide, as committed by the former regime against Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda. (However, as explained, this did not include those crimes committed by the RPF, which later became the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) against Hutu civilians during and following the war and genocide.)

The first approach taken in the pursuit of justice in Rwanda following the genocide was in the formal court system. Already challenged by the loss of lawyers and magistrates following the genocide, the judicial and penal system was overwhelmed with perpetrators (Daly 2002). According to some estimates, trying all of the perpetrators in the national courts would have taken 200 years (Corey and Joireman 2004). Before 2003, 100,000 to 125,000 possible perpetrators were incarcerated (Corey and Joireman 2004; United Nations 2012a). The massive costs for the government were more than 5% of GDP for incarceration;[22] thus, a more efficient system needed to be implemented and a policy incentivizing early release was devised. This policy applied only to lower-ranking *génocidaires*. For this group, if they agreed to tell the full truth of their acts committed during the genocide, they could be released early (Longman 2010). By January 2003, the government began applying this new tool: 40,000 who were too old or infirm or who had confessed to their crimes were released. This approach solved two problems: (1) it eased the cost on the national government for their incarceration while still holding them accountable; and (2) it

---

[22]Author interview in Rwanda, 2016, with a key expert. No discrete data were identified in the literature articulating the exact costs of incarcerations to the Rwandan government, although several sources noted the costliness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Tanzania. One source, Daly (2002, 369), provided the following quotation that is attributed to the Rwandan government, but without citation: "[t]he sheer bulk of genocide suspects and cases due for trial has placed severe strain on Rwanda's criminal justice system which is already crippled by poor infrastructure and the death of professionals during the genocide. Rwanda's prisons are heavily congested, and the cost of feeding and clothing prisoners is a drain on the economy."

promoted reconciliation among parties through truth telling. The costs saved by the government were then reinvested in broad development schemes that benefited the entire country.

The second approach the government took to address and balance justice and reconciliation was the utilization of the local-community Gacaca courts.[23] The Gacaca (which broadly means "justice on the grass" in Kinyarwanda) court system was based on a traditional system of community courts originally used for resolving lesser crimes and familial or property disputes, but was revitalized and formalized to support the post-genocide needs for genocidal justice (Corey and Joireman 2004). In this system, communities elected citizen judges (i.e., 260,000 were elected) who were formally trained in judicial proceedings to hold trials for low-ranking genocide perpetrators (Daly 2002; Longman 2010). Until their formal closing in May 2012, more than 12,000 Gacaca courts tried more than 1.2 million cases (United Nations 2014b). In the Gacaca courts, perpetrators would address their victims (or surviving kin), tell the truth of their actions, and ask for forgiveness; the elected community magistrates then would decide an appropriate punishment (ranging from community service to imprisonment) for their crimes. This system allowed both justice and reconciliation to be addressed. It allowed victims to avenge the deaths of loved ones in the genocide through a formal judicial system, and it also promoted reconciliation by allowing parties to confront one another in a safe space. The "active participation contributes to political and personal reconciliation within the Rwandan population, since people are given the opportunity to confront their attackers, tell their stories, and express pent-up emotions all in a secure environment" (Corey and Joireman 2004, 84).

Notably, not all international experts, including Corey and Joireman (2004), believed in the Gacaca process to deliver the promise of lasting reconciliation, citing procedural problems, the absence of legal representation, and the absence of evidentiary support, among other issues of bias in judgment. Moreover, argued Corey and Joireman (2004), for Tutsis involved as perpetrators in alleged massacres of civilians following the RPF takeover, no such justice system exists. According to Longman (2010), there

---

[23]Daly (2002, 376) explained regarding the Gacaca courts: "Traditionally and as applied to the genocide, its aim is to strengthen the communities in which it operates. It does this in a number of ways. Gacaca requires the participation of individuals within the communities. Individuals participate by electing representatives, acting as judges, locating and adducing information about the identity of suspects, and providing violence. Rwandans of all stations will literally be defining justice for the post-genocide society rather than having it defined for and imposed on them. This may be valuable from a rule-of-law perspective, and it may also constitute an important mechanism for promoting democratic values."

might have been an opportunity for Gacaca courts or the National Courts and International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR) to address justice for both Hutu and Tutsi victims of the war and genocide, thereby truly meeting the quest for "restorative justice." However, the government prevented any trials for Hutu victims: "Government officials observing the [Gacaca] process in various communities intervened quickly to quash any discussion of RPF crimes. The lists of the dead were to include only those killed in the genocide, which in practice encouraged communities to list only Tutsi, who were the clear target of the violence. Like the ICTR and national courts, *gacaca* courts thus provided one-sided justice." The government's allowance of trials only for Tutsi victims of the genocide and war not only politicized the court system but also reinforced the notion that the government's goal was to "establish its dominance and exercise power rather than promoting justice" (Longman 2010, 52). Longman (2010, 52) further suggested that the government, in the initial application of the Gacaca system, recognized the potential for implying genocidal guilt among all Hutus: "Government officials also realized during the pilot phase that *gacaca* was an excellent means of intimidating and disenfranchising a large portion of the Hutu population."

The third approach to justice came in the ICTR. It was established in November 1994 (and formally closed in 2014) to try the highest category of perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. Of those who planned, led, instigated, and publicly called for the deaths of Tutsi civilians and moderate Hutus, 92 accused cases were heard and tried at the court. Those who remain at large outside of Rwanda in Europe, across Africa, North America, and elsewhere will be tried at the National Courts in Rwanda.

Depending on the category of crime, as defined by the Rwandan government, perpetrators were tried and reconciled in different judicial arenas. Four categories of crimes were divided among the three routes to justice and reconciliation, as listed in Table 11.

Table 11 **Criminal Acts Categories for Rwanda Post-Genocide Trials**

Category 1: Eligible for National Court System or the International Tribunal for Rwanda
a) Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors, and leaders of the crime of genocide or of a crime against humanity
b) Persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectoral, communal, sector or cell level, or in a political party, or fostered such crimes
c) Notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they passed

d) Persons who committed acts of sexual torture
Category 2: Eligible for Gacaca Provincial Level
Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among perpetrators, conspirators of accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death
Category 3: Eligible for Gacaca District or Commune Level
Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of other serious assaults against the person
Category 4: Eligible for Gacaca Cellule Level
Persons who committed offences against property

Source: Republic of Rwanda (1996).

Ironically, while Rwanda was facing genocide in 1994, South Africa was celebrating the end of its own 43-year struggle and trying to heal its own wounds of a troubled and violent past—one that systematically discriminated against the majority black population under the political system of apartheid. The approach devised to address the violations under apartheid was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC was created by Nelson Mandela's Government of National Unity in 1995 and chaired by South Africa's Archbishop, Desmond Tutu. In many ways, the TRC set forth a model that validated the notion of addressing reconciliation, for both individual crimes and the nation, under a national-led, court-like process that focused on public testimonies of perpetrators and victims, which was meant to bring about forgiveness and reconciliation.

In its efforts, the TRC established national-level, court-like hearings that aimed to provide redress for the narrative that had led to and enabled apartheid in South Africa by retelling the historical truth. This was done in forums in which the TRC would make recordings of individuals' testimonies on their wrongdoings, victims' testimonies on crimes committed against them, and exposés of the systemic discrimination policies of the government during apartheid. These recordings were publicly aired on television and radio; truth telling in these forums was meant to bring reconciliatory justice, forgiveness, and healing—for both individuals and the state.

Some of the perpetrators of criminal acts who participated in the TRC received amnesty for their crimes, whereas others have yet to be tried. This was not the case in Rwanda, where the great majority of the alleged perpetrators have been tried—either at the local Gacaca level, the national-court level, or the ICTR level. Rwanda aimed to address the need for justice through a comprehensive process (and one in

which the judicial apparatuses applied paralleled the needs for individual, state, and global historical criminal justice), utilizing a triage approach. This could be one reason that the Rwandan experience with post-conflict justice, for all its faults, achieved more success – at least in completion of trials (i.e., more than a million cases total in all of the courts) – than South Africa, with only 7,000 perpetrators' testimonies heard and not all yet tried, much less closed.

Arguably, in South Africa, because the reconciliation process did not focus enough on establishing and enforcing requisite policies for equity and rehabilitation of the black and colored populations within society – especially in the form of economic justice for criminal acts during apartheid – much of the TRC's reconciliatory objectives have been missed and benefits of integration have continued to disproportionately benefit the elite, predominantly white South Africans. The failures of the specific program of the TRC and South Africa following apartheid notwithstanding, the approach for coping with institutionalized discrimination and state-wide individual criminal wrongdoing remains a valuable reference in the toolbox for transitional-justice practitioners, worldwide.

Despite the comprehensive efforts at applying justice for Tutsi victims of the genocide – which have been groundbreaking and are evidence of important steps toward the healing and reconciliation process for perpetrators and survivors of the Tutsi genocide – the one-sided approach to justice in Rwanda – which implies impunity for as many as 200,000 killed under the RPF – "undermines the potential impact of trials to promote reconciliation" (Longman 2010, 52). Whether the current regime can find ways to overcome the lack of comprehensive justice for both Hutu and Tutsi victims of the war and genocide in Rwanda and in DRC remains to be seen. There is no doubt that the current strategy of providing social and economic development for all Rwandans has managed to place at least a temporary hold on what might otherwise be a more aggrieved response.

Despite the country's conflict advances in DRC, Rwanda has displayed an incredible tenacity for

ensuring negative peace internally. There has been an absence of violence and credible security in the

country since 1996/1997, when internal fighting finally ceased (Figure 14). Yet, violence in DRC, ongoing rebel activity, and the internal presence in Rwanda of so many former armed, trained, and capable combatants means that the risk of armed conflict, if stoked, could be significant.

Figure 14 **Fatalities - Violence against Civilians, 1997–2016, Rwanda**
Source: Data derived from ACLED Version 7 1997–2016.

The RDRC (i.e., the national DDR program) has worked with more than 20,000 former combatants who fought against the RPF and the successive regime in Rwanda and decamped to DRC undertaking rebel activity for many years (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2016). Rwanda's program of camp-style demobilization with basic education, training, and planning skills for reintegration is largely heralded among its cohorts on the continent as one of the most impressive DDR programs, globally. Informal conversations with ex-combatants in Rwanda,[24] prior to this research, reveal that a life of conflict was undesirable and, moreover, that benefits in Rwanda outweighed fighting in DRC. Benefits cited included the following:[25]

- Reintegration support.

- Opportunity to reengage in former communities.

- Government-protected assurances for reintegration.

---

[24]They defected from fighting with the FDLR in DRC.
[25]This is drawn from the Author's informal dialogue and discussion with former combatants at the RDRC (2013).

- Initial and secondary rounds of funds for successful business and commune engagement. And

- Offers of food, clothing, reeducation, and mentorship.

The DDR process in Rwanda is generally seen as successful due to the long-standing commitment of the Rwandan government and enduring donors, often eluded in other countries.

5.2.2 Risks Faced in Rwanda

Although Rwanda has achieved remarkable success, it also faces potential risks. The first risk concerns ethnicity. The current government, despite the one-Rwanda decree that eliminates "ethnicity" as an identifier of persons (Republic of Rwanda 2001), is perceived as being all Tutsis and exclusionary to Hutus. Reyntjens (2015, 28) stated that "denial of ethnicity is an essential element of the Tutsi elite's hegemonic project: It veils Tutsi domination." Moreover, the government behavior may be instilling a sense of grievance, particularly among those who were children during the genocide. Uvin (1999, 266) stated that "[p]eople who have been victim of violence or close witnesses of it, especially during childhood, tend to perpetrate the same violent behavior later in their life." To date, these issues appear to be under control; yet, faced with uncertainty, conditions may rapidly change.

The second main risk concerns economic inequality, which has eased slightly in the past six years but continues to present a significant problem in the population. For example, 43.2% of national wealth is held by the top 10% (World Bank 2017b) and 39% (as of 2015) are below the national poverty line (US Central Intelligence Agency 2017).

Third, the lack of a political space due to the highly restrictive political and civil environment ultimately may backfire on the development successes already achieved if open, democratic space for political grievances to be voiced is further repudiated by the current regime.[26] Thus, while the heavy-handed policies of President Paul Kagame's government have effectively implemented a "nationalization" policy – wherein ethnic identity has been banned as a means of self- or other identification – ethnic identities persist. The government is perceived as a "Tutsi" monopoly, and Hutus experience checks on

---

[26]Freedom House's Freedom of the World and Freedom of the Press reports both found Rwanda to be "not free" (Freedom House 2016, 2017a). Moreover, the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) presents findings that Rwanda is considered an autocracy and not a democratic state, based on its data analysis of key indicators of democratic states (Center for Systemic Peace 2016).

their options for political and social ascendancy. Reyntjens (2015, 24) called Rwanda "a clear case of hegemonic authoritarianism, where regular, seeming multiparty elections serve only to consolidate a dictatorship." This is exacerbated by the spillage of identity politics into the political and civil space, where liberties are severely constricted, and growth has not been widespread and equitable. In fact, RPF Tutsi leaders in exile have accused the current regime of "having put in place a totalitarian dictatorship based on terror, grave human-rights violations, corruption, and nepotism, and of having committed numerous political assassinations and – quite remarkably coming from four Tutsi – of marginalizing the Hutu population" (Reyntjens 2015, 25). The authors of these accusations have since been tried and indicted, in absentia (Reyntjens 2015). This lack of political space for the development and ascendancy of new access to party, power, and democratic opposition space, if not opened, well may drive the emergence of new threats. Reyntjens (2015, 19) argued, "The RPF has established its hegemony by eliminating political opposition and autonomous civil society, violating human rights, killing scores of its own citizens, and keeping tight control over the flow of information. The regime's increasingly authoritarian rule threatens all the achievements brought by its deft governance." Without attention to how to address the grievous inequality while also opening up the political space to aggrieved parties, with a sense of social respect, Rwanda could be placing itself on a much less steady path.

The fourth area of challenge concerns democratic growth and successive democratic leadership. Despite the glowing praise heaped on the president (from Rwandan and Western key experts alike), there are major challenges to the democratic leadership of the state that have emerged under Kagame's administration that simply cannot be ignored. The current administration in Rwanda has exhibited worrisome traits, setting it on course to a fully authoritarian regime.

First, the government voted to revise the Constitution in order to allow President Kagame the authority to run for additional terms, putting him potentially in power for 34 years. Despite the role President Kagame played in halting the horrific genocide in 1994, introducing justice and reconciliation policies, and setting the country on a fairly strong development course (having met the majority of UN MDGs), becoming a "lifetime leader" holding power until his death would further advance the country along the authoritarian path. Indeed, the very hallmark of a developed, democratic state is a peaceful transition of power, and elections are a core test for Rwanda. Unfortunately, this is a test that the

government has yet to master, considering the extent to which popular contenders for the presidency have

been routinely disenfranchised and deterred from running.[27] Rwanda's (mostly) single-party state has yet to

hold free and fair elections since the rise of the RPF following the genocide (however, the state certainly

was not holding democratic elections prior to the genocide under the earlier authoritarian regimes).

Reyntjens (2015, 24) argued: "Rwanda is a clear case of hegemonic authoritarianism, where regular,

seemingly multiparty elections serve only to consolidate a dictatorship. Given the government's repression

of opposition parties and voices, Rwanda does not even meet the requirements of electoral authoritarian

regimes: Its elections are insufficiently pluralistic, competitive, and open."[28]

Second, the country has imposed serious limits on free speech and free association, not hesitating

to actively limit journalists – for example, through imprisonments, murders, and disappearances – for

expressing perspectives and criticisms about which the regime does not agree (Sundaram 2016). The

security state that the regime has enabled is less a hold on peace and, at times, more an oppressor of free

will in the country, as evidenced in the manipulation of election results, media, and tamping down of

opposition parties and leaders. Yet, despite these concerning tendencies, foreign assistance to Rwanda

continues largely unfettered by domestic political behavior largely due, most scholars argue, to a

combination of the evidenced socioeconomic-developmental accomplishments (Reyntjens 2015) and guilt

over inaction in the genocide (Uvin 2010).

Third, a majority of the population seems unbothered by the Kagame administration's

Singaporean tendencies toward "the peculiar combination of rigid autocracy and free-market capitalism,"

prioritizing economic growth over human rights albeit with a heavy dose of socioeconomic support for the

population, including free education and a national healthcare plan (Caryl 2015). In other words, opposition

has not been evidenced, with strong support, against many of the strong-arm policies as seen at the ballot

box, where among millions of Rwandan citizens, "Rwandan lawmakers found only 10 people in nationwide

---

[27]If past elections in Rwanda can be used as a guide (which they may not arguably be able to show), there is not yet a popular contester for the presidency considering that none of the other parties or candidates has evidenced more than a 5.15% showing (attributed to Jean Damascene Ntawukuriyayo of the Social Democratic Party in 2010). However, this is hardly evidence of a multiparty, democratic state that holds free and fair elections. As Reyntjens (2015, 19) argued: "The RPF has established its hegemony by eliminating political opposition and autonomous civil society, violating human rights, killing scores of its own citizens, and keeping tight control over the flow of information. The regime's increasingly authoritarian rule threatens all the achievements brought by its deft governance."

[28]See Reyntjens (2011, 2013, 2015) for a comprehensive, peer-reviewed analysis of elections in Rwanda.

consultations who opposed a possible constitutional change to allow strongman Paul Kagame a third term in power" (*Agence France-Presse* 2015).

Even if the findings of the constitutional referendum on Kagame's power could be taken at face value, the lack of a groomed, clear successor, even within his own RPF party, is cause for concern. This is particularly true when issues of leadership, political will, and governance are ranked so highly by combatants and experts alike to ensure that an environment of peace, opportunity, and sustainable development exists for returning combatants. Concern regarding the future of Rwandan leadership vis-à-vis ex-combatant reconciliation policies and lasting peace is merited. Moreover, that President Kagame embodies an entirely unique historical role in Rwanda – where he has been able to introduce, as Samset (2011) called it, a non-democratic, "repressive peace," that seems to be holding at least for the short to medium term – is not something to be embraced as a formula for lasting peace.

5.2.3 Achievements in Rwanda

Statistically, Rwanda has done well in areas of growth, foreign investment, development achievements, gender equality, policy reform, and achievement of internal security (Table 12), for several reasons. First, the genocide of 1994 served as a rally to the international donor and investment community to stay committed and involved in Rwanda, far past the standard donor window of interest in post-conflict states. Furthermore, leadership in Rwanda was adept at capitalizing on its history (in particular, by exploiting Western guilt for increased aid and assistance)[29] as well as being forward leaning in its willingness to embark on economic reforms. For example, the international exploration of genocide in Rwanda revealed significant early warning signs which were willfully ignored by members of the international community, including the UN, and countries such as the United States, France, and Belgium. The culpability of the international community, under conditions of a known genocide underway, translated into more sustained international support following its cessation. However, this argument, as explained by Reyntjens (2015) and drawing on the Rwandan Sénat (Senate) report (Republic of Rwanda 2006), would constitute a violation of the genocide-ideology laws in Rwanda wherein the genocide and accomplishments

---

[29]For example, see Reyntjens (2015) and McGreal (2012).

of the current regime for all Rwandans are minimized and its success is seen through an exclusively ethnic lens.[30]

Second, Rwanda implemented significant *Doing Business Reforms* to garner international investment and liberalized key sectors of the economy to push forward local private-sector development and entrepreneurship (World Bank 2017c). It has led to strong economic successes (e.g., 7% to 8% annual economic growth every year since 2003), which have further translated into lasting human-development achievements and national investments in education, health, infrastructure, and socioeconomic progress.

Table 12 **Data Chart on Rwanda, 1990 versus Current Statistics**

	Rwanda 1990	**Rwanda Current**	**Data Source**
Conflict Cessation	Not Applicable	Conflict Victor	UCDP Conflict Termination Data Set (Kreutz 2010)
Leadership and Ethnic Distribution of Power	Majority Hutu Leadership	Minority Tutsi Leadership	Minorities at Risk Project (2009)
Ethnic Distribution	Hutu (84%), Tutsi (15%), Twa (1%)	Hutu (84%), Tutsi (15%), Twa (1%)	The World Factbook (2017)
Donor Support (Net ODA % GNI)	11.3%	13.3% (2014)	The World Bank (2017b)
Main Donors (Top 5, in order of most to least)	N/A	International Development Association, World Bank), United States, United Kingdom, Global Fund, African Development Bank (2016)	Aid Statistics, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2016)
Top Five Sectors	N/A	Social Infrastructure, Production, Multisector, Economic Infrastructure, and Humanitarian Aid	

---

[30]Drawing on a 2006 Sénat report entitled *Rwanda Ideologie du Genocide et Strategies de Son Eradication*, Reyntjens (2015, 23) noted that various areas constitute genocide ideology under Rwandan law, including "assertions that the international community's feelings of guilt cause it to be too lenient on the post-genocide regime." The report (Republic of Rwanda 2006, 18) includes the following examples of what it called the "ethniste, anti-Tutsi" or ethnist, anti-Tutsi belief system that aims to minimize or revise the genocide: "*Ceci s'élabore sous diverses formes: régime totalitaire muselant opposition, presse, liberté d'association et d'expression; accusations de divisionnisme contre opposants politiques et associations de la société civile; mauvaise conscience de la communauté internationale qui ne condamne pas assez le pouvoir post génocide; refus de rapatrier les réfugiés; appels à suspendre l'aide internationale*; …" Or, in English: "This (the genocide ideology of the anti-Tutsi) is elaborated in various forms: the totalitarian regime is muzzling opposition, the press, and freedom of association and expression; accusations of divisionism against political opponents and civil society associations; the guilty conscience of the international community which did not sufficiently condemn the genocide; refusal to repatriate refugees; calls for suspension of international aid and cooperation…due to the regime being led by a Tutsi."

GDP (Current US$)	$2.55 billion	$8.1 billion (2015)	The World Bank (2017b)
Annual GDP Growth	-2.4%	6.9% (2015)	
GNI/Capita (Current US$)	$350	$700 (2015)	
Gini Index (0 Is Perfect Equality, 100 Perfect Inequality)	N/A	50.4 (2013)	
Income Share Held by Highest 10%	N/A	43.19% (2013)	
Population below National Poverty Line	N/A	39% (2015 est.)	The World Factbook (2017)
Population Size	7,259,740	11,609,666 (2015)	The World Bank (2017b)
Median Age	N/A	19 years (2016 est.)	The World Factbook (2017)
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI % Net inflows, GDP)	0.30%	4.0% (2015)	The World Bank (2017b)
Doing Business Indicator Score (1 Is Best, 185 Is Worst)	N/A	56/185 (2016)	The World Bank (2017b)
Corruption Perception Index Score (100 Is Best, 0 Is Worst)	N/A	54 (2016)	Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2016)
Corruption Perception Index Rank (of 176)	N/A	50 (2016)	
Human Development Index Score (Where 0.8 and Above Indicates Very High Human Development and 0.550 and Below Indicates Low Human Development)	0.244	0.483 (2014)	Human Development Reports, UNDP
Human Development Index Rank (1 Is Best, 186 Is Worst)	N/A	163/186 (2015)	
Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Indicator Index Rank (1 Is Best, 186 Is Worst)	N/A	163/ 186 (2015)	
Life Expectancy at Birth	33.5	64 (2014)	The World Bank (2017b)
Mean Years of Schooling	N/A	3.7 years (2014)	Human Development Reports, UNDP
Expected Years of Schooling	N/A	10.3 years (2014)	
Adult Literacy Rate	57.9% (1991)	71.2% (2015)	The World Bank (2017b)
Fragile States Index Rank (1 Is Worst, 178 Is Best)	N/A	32/178 (2016)	Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace (2016)

State Fragility Index Score (0 Is Best, 25 Is Worst)	N/A	16/25 (2015)	State Fragility Index and Matrix 2015 (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2015)
POLITY Score (10 Is Full Democracy to -10 Full Autocracy)	-7	-3 (2015)	Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) (2016)
Political Regime Type	Autocracy	Autocracy	State Fragility Index and Matrix 2015 (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2015)
Military Expenditure %GDP	3.73%	1.16% (2015)	The World Bank (2017b)
Freedom House Country Ranking	N/A	Not Free (2017)	Freedom in the World 2017, Freedom House (2017b)
Freedom House Score (0 Is Least Free, 100 Is Most Free)	N/A	24 (2017)	
Freedom of the Press Ranking	N/A	Not Free (2016)	Freedom of the Press 2016, Freedom House (2016)
Freedom of the House Score (0 Is Most Free Press, 100 Is Least Free Press)	N/A	79	

Third, Rwanda has taken significant steps toward reconciliation between the two ethnic groups, albeit flawed in some ways. Following the genocide, according to key experts, the leadership of the country recognized that in order to move forward, a plan for reconciliation and unity needed to be introduced—not least of which because the minority Tutsi well recognized that internal strife would continue if the majority Hutu population was not appeased under the new leadership. To manage both the reconciliation process within the country, writ-large, and the reintegration of Hutu refugees who had fled into DRC and returned, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was established in 1999.

Among the early leadership at NURC, it was recognized that a holistic approach was needed. The genocide had roots in bad governance – precolonial and postcolonial – with rampant discrimination, exclusion, hatred, impunity, and inequality. Thus, there was a need to establish mechanisms to address the root causes and manage those issues that led to recurring conflict. To those in charge of the government at the time, there appeared to be no other option. Reconciliation was viewed as a matter of survival; it was needed to stabilize, prevent future conflict, establish a foundation for harmony, and develop socioeconomically.

Under Law No. 35/2008 (Republic of Rwanda 2008), NURC was given the following mission:

- To prepare and coordinate the national programs aimed at promoting national unity and reconciliation;
- To establish and promote mechanisms for restoring and strengthening the Unity and Reconciliation of Rwandans;
- To educate, sensitize, and mobilize the population in areas of national unity and reconciliation;
- To carry out research, organize debates, disseminate ideas, and make publications on the promotion of peace and the unity and reconciliation of Rwandans;
- To propose measures and actions that can contribute to the eradication of divisionism among Rwandans and reinforce unity and reconciliation;
- To denounce and fight actions, publications, and utterances that promote any kind of division and discrimination, intolerance, and xenophobia;
- To make an annual report and other reports that may be deemed necessary on the level of attainment of national unity and reconciliation;
- To monitor how public institutions, leaders, and the population in general comply with the National Unity and Reconciliation policy and principle.

NURC undertook four main programs (some in concert with other agencies) to address the post-genocide reconciliation. First, it embarked on a plan of providing civic education, or "Ingando." This was a series of initiatives and programs that sought to address the psychological, emotional, and ideological challenges that the country faced moving forward. Ingando programs sought to "clarify Rwandan history and the division amongst the population, promote patriotism and fight genocide ideology" (United Nations 2014b).

Second, NURC established "Itorero," or leadership academies, to cultivate local leaders across the country to implement teaching of the Rwandan values of reconciliation and unity and a collective Rwandan identity, such as the "Ndi Umuryarwanda" ("I am Rwandan") initiative. Ndi Umuryarwanda is an ongoing program to address personal and interpersonal challenges, share stories, and establish trust to break through stereotypes across the population to ensure that past beliefs are not passed on to younger generations.

Third, NURC undertook national seminars and summits that were launched across the country, aimed at all levels and sectors of society, to address and educate the public on issues relating to topics as varied as gender, justice, history, and politics, among others.

Fourth, NURC undertook routine research and policy recommendations for the government to better craft policies to address reconciliation across the country. This included recommendations for national education programs, policies, events and summits, and future research, among other areas. The

NURC programs were cross-cutting, touching areas relating to refugees and ex-combatant community sensitization, local governance and reconciliation, justice through Gacaca,[31] and more. One key expert highlighted that the agency's overarching focus was on ensuring programs were "homegrown and culturally relevant" for implementation in Rwanda.[32]

Finally, the most relevant successes for this study are related to the experience of how Rwanda has managed former rebel combatants. In Rwanda, following the ceasefire and victory of the RPF capturing Kigali, former military (i.e., ex-FAR) and the Presidential Guard, Impuzamugambi and Interahamwe militias, and high-ranking officials escaped under refugee cover into DRC. There, they regrouped, hidden in plain sight, in the refugee camps. In the immediate years following the genocide, many of those who escaped were brought back to Rwanda and resettled—under close watch of the new government. Those who remained in DRC developed into new armed units and continued to advocate an extremist Hutu ideology, with the goal of retaking Rwanda. Some of those who stayed in DRC have continued in the years since to return to Rwanda to undergo DDR and reintegrate. These individuals chose to defect from ongoing rebel hostilities, mostly departing the FDLR rebel group—largely composed of members of the former Rwandan government and its willing *génocidaires*. Although these defectors to Rwanda from the FDLR may remain at risk of recruitment for continued violence emanating from DRC against the state, most are more secure inside Rwanda. The individual agency of these defectors was a key aspect of this research.

5.3 THE RWANDAN DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION COMMISSION

The RDRC is the implementing body and the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP)[33] is its main project; they were established first in January 1997 as a government commission, and then formally decreed by the president in 2002.[34] Broadly, the aim of the RDRC is to

---

[31]See Glossary: "Gacaca."

[32]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda with key experts, 2016.

[33]In practice, the two are referred to almost interchangeably; this study uses RDRC.

[34]Although not explored in any of the literature, incidental stories during the course of interviews conducted by the Author in Rwanda in 2016 with key experts suggests that the RDRC and RDRP to encourage defection of combatants came about unexpectedly. As the Author was able to ascertain, in the late 1990s, when a sizeable population of refugees was still in the eastern DRC (between 1996 and 1999), government health resources in the northeastern area of the country, near the border with DRC, started witnessing an uptick in reported pregnancies. The pregnancies were cited by women who did not report husbands to the health providers – an unusual occurrence – leading intrepid health providers to understand that the women were getting pregnant by husbands who were refugees or fighters in the eastern DRC, crossing the border to visit their wives in secret. This realization by the government inspired the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission and the Ministry of Gender to devise programs that would engage women – wives, daughters, and mothers – associated with fighters from the eastern DRC to urge their family members during visits to Rwanda to return home permanently. This notion that women could have a key role to play in encouraging spousal

"contribute to consolidation of peace in the Great Lakes Region, especially in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and foster unity within Rwanda" (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2016, 9). The commission oversees all aspects of planning for ex-combatants, including defection, demobilization, reinsertion, reintegration, and mainstreaming. In the *Annual Report 2015* (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2016, 9), the Commission states its objectives as the following:

- Demobilize members of armed groups of Rwandan origin and members of the RDF.[35]
- Provide socioeconomic reintegration support to the said ex-combatants following demobilization, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to female, child, and disabled ex-combatants.

Further, as noted in the *Revised Project Implementation Manual* (Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission/Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2015, 7-8), it states that to achieve the previously stated goals, the program will:

- Maintain capacity required for repatriation, demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of returning members of Armed Groups and their dependents.
- Maintain capacity required for demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of up to 4,000 members of the RDF.
- Maintain capacity required for completion of reintegration activities for ex-combatants demobilized in late 2008.
- Ensure that ex-combatants access mainstream services at the national and local level.

The RDRC is tasked with supporting all ex-combatants of Rwandan origin (unless considered to have been involved in the genocide), regardless of military or rebel-group affiliation. This includes female, child, and disabled ex-combatants. The majority of the returnees are coming in from eastern DRC, having fought with the FDLR (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2016). The commission is funded by the Government of Rwanda and the World Bank. The World Bank established a trust fund, to which other international donors and partners contribute, including the governments of Sweden, The Netherlands, and Germany, as well as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

---

returns was codified later in 2002/2003 when the then-Minister of Defense found that the wife of the FDLR Chief of Intelligence was willing to go into rebel-held territory in the eastern DRC to convince her husband to return home to Rwanda. She did so successfully and even returned to the eastern DRC to help the Commander of the FDLR to defect.
[35]The demobilization of the state military, RDF, is no longer covered by the RDRP or RDRC.

The Government of Rwanda committed to the following principles in implementing the program

(Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission/Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration

Program 2015, 8):

- In the interest of national security and reconciliation, the Program targets all ex-combatants irrespective of previous military affiliation.
- The RDRP allows ex-combatants to choose their community of settlement and path to economic reintegration.
- To ensure consistency and fairness, all assistance to ex-combatants will be provided through the RDRP and supervised by the RDRC.
- Reintegration assistance will seek to foster community participation.
- The RDRC relies on existing government structures to the extent possible in order to build sustainable capacities beyond the program's duration.
- Pension and social security issues for ex-RDF are addressed outside the RDRP, in accordance with their respective terms and conditions of service.

The RDRC has operated under three stages: Stage I, from 1997 to 2001, was funded by the

Rwandan government and the UN; Stage II, from 2002 to 2009, was funded by the World Bank and the

Multi-Donor Trust Fund; and Stage III, from 2010 to 2017, is funded by the World Bank, the governments

of Sweden, The Netherlands, and Germany, and JICA, with a total budget of $19.1 million (World Bank

2009).

Table 13, from the RDRC *Annual Report 2015*, notes the total number of ex-combatants (EC)

(including adults, child soldiers, and dependents[36]) repatriated from 2009 to 2015.

Table 13 **Summary of Repatriation of Adults, Child Soldiers and Dependents, January 2009 to December 31, 2015 (Cumulative)**

	Rubavu	Rusizi	Total	Target	Percentage
Total Reception Center	9,713	4,608	14,321	15,500	92.394
Total Ex-Combatants	4,642	1,938	6,580	5,500	119.64
Of Which Female ECs	21	7	28	N/A	N/A
Of Which Male	4,438	1,853	6,291	N/A	N/A
Child Soldiers	183	78	261	500	52.2
Dependents	5,071	2,670	7,741	10,000	77.41
Reinsertion Kits for Dependents Delivered	5,071	2,670	7,741	10,000	77.41

Source: Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission *Annual Report 2015* (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2016).

---

[36]Dependents include spouses, children, and other family members of the ex-combatants.

According to the *Annual Report 2015* (Rwandan Reintegration and Reintegration Program 2016, 22), from November 1997 to December 31, 2015, the commission resettled 10,797 former combatants, child soldiers, and dependents, and 12,938 ex-FAR—all of whom have gone through the demobilization program at the RDRC.

Basic Process of Return and Reintegration for Rebels

Figure 15 represents the basic process that rebels undertake from defection to reintegration under the auspices and support of the RDRC in Rwanda. The stages are derived from interviews with key members of the RDRC in Rwanda.[37] Each stage is described in more depth below.

| **Defection and Demobilization** | |
| Go to UN, IO, or NGO, or Rwandan authorities for disarmament and demobilization | Transported to Rwanda for processing |

| **Pre-Discharge Orientation Programming** | |
| Three-month stay at Mutobo Camp: courses, training, health, and civic education; prepared for reintegration | Two-week Reinsertion Phase to visit family, identify housing, plan post-Mutobo |

| **Discharge** | | |
| Present to Reserve Forces , local authorities, and Provincial Reintegration Officer (PRO) | Move into housing in community of choice with Basic Needs Kit, 60,000 Rwandan francs | Pursue employment |

| **Reintegration** | | | |
| Receive business grant for 120,000 RWF | Constant contact with PRO | Assessed for needs and vulnerabilities | Social and economic reintegration support |

| **Mainstreaming** | | | |
| Continue to receive follow up assistance from PRO | Rely on standard government support services | Become full member of community | Reintegrate as citizen |

Figure 15 **Basic Process of Return and Reintegration for Rebels**[38]

Defection and Demobilization

When rebels decide to defect, their first step is to present themselves to a formal support office, usually in eastern DRC. This office can be with the UN or another local organization known to be

---

[37]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[38]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

supporting ex-combatants and their transit back to Rwanda for reintegration. For example, rebels may find

assistance through another international organization (IO), NGO, religious organization, or even direct

Rwandan authorities in eastern DRC. Almost all ex-combatants interviewed for this study reported to

various *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies de Stabilisation en République Démocratique du*

Congo/UN Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) offices in eastern DRC following

defection.[39] Because of their seniority within the FDLR, the others were facilitated directly by senior

officers in the Government of Rwanda. On arrival, rebels are immediately disarmed. They are offered a

shower, given food, and provided with clean clothes—often the first they have had in some time.

Next, rebels are taken to a transit center, located at the border between DRC and Rwanda, either at

Rubavu (across the border from Goma, North Kivu, in eastern DRC) or Rusizi (across the border from

Bukavu, South Kivu, in eastern DRC) and screened. Screening is performed by authorities of the state to

determine Rwandan nationality or origin, status (e.g., ex-combatant, non-ex-combatant, civilian, or

Rwandan), affiliation with armed group, and proof of military knowledge (Rwanda Demobilization and

Reintegration Commission/Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2015, 16).[40] Once it has

been determined that they are of Rwandan origin and are indeed ex-combatants, they are handed over to an

RDRC repatriation officer and taken to Mutobo camp, RDRC, in Musanze, Rwanda (approximately two

hours northwest of Kigali and an hour east of the DRC border) (Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration

Commission/Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2015, 16).[41] Rwandan refugees (non-

combatants) who are repatriating are reintegrated with the assistance of the United Nations High

---

[39]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

[40]To determine that combatants are of Rwandan origin, they may be queried on a number of different issues, such as family history and lineage, Kinyarwanda language skills, proof of identity from the previous regime's identity cards, memory of local events, and neighbors or others who can vouch for combatants, or with assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and their work to help refugees or other displaced Rwandans to identify family in Rwanda (Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016). Proof of combatant status is validated through questions on weapons, military tactics, regional history, and military terminology or history in the region, which all other combatants can confirm.

[41]The *Revised Project Implementation Manual* (Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission/Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2015,16) specifically notes: "The Commission verifies the eligibility of armed group members on the basis of the following general criteria: Rwandan nationality; Self-identification of combatant status; Proven affiliation with known and organised armed group that engaged in military fighting against the RDF in Rwanda or the territory of the DRC; and Proof of military knowledge (e.g. weapons handling, espionage, etc.)." Additional information on eligibility is in Annex A5 of the report.

Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Rwandan government's Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR).[42]

Pre-Discharge Orientation Program at Mutobo Camp, Musanze, Rwanda (Three Months)

The Pre-Discharge Orientation Program (PDOP) is the core program offered by the RDRC. It is here that over the course of three months, ex-combatants will learn about how Rwanda has changed, their role in the country, how to fit in, where to find employment, and more. Ex-combatants attend various courses and receive several tutorials (Table 13). At Mutobo, all ex-combatants are screened for medical and psychological ailments and receive the appropriate counseling and care, along with information about how to access the national health system. Ex-combatants also receive basic necessities for their stay, including blankets, soap, and clothing. They are registered (or re-registered) as citizens and receive their National Identity Cards from the National Identification Agency (NIDA) along with their demobilization certification card.

Dependents of ex-combatants who are not classified as combatants attend a two-week PDOP mini program and then are released to reintegrate and wait for their sponsors.

Reinsertion Phase (Between Discharge and Reintegration)

Halfway through Mutobo, a two-week pre-discharge break is afforded the ex-combatants. During this time, the ex-combatants are expected to present themselves to family (most have extended family in Rwanda or know where they came from in the country and return there), plan for housing once they leave Mutobo, and consider which work options would best suit them once they are discharged. All ex-combatants are free to choose where they want to live and what they want to pursue to support themselves.

Discharge (Following Three Months at Mutobo)

Ex-combatants depart with all necessary citizenship papers, information about access to health and basic services, skills training and business plans, and directives on next steps they must take.

Once in their chosen resettlement communities, ex-combatants must present themselves to the Regional Reserve Forces Office (where able ex-combatants will be enlisted in the Rwandan National Army Reserves) and to the local authorities. RDRC trains local authorities (e.g., Village Chiefs) to engage with

---

[42]For more information on the return and repatriation process for Rwandan refugees into Rwanda, see UNHCR–Rwanda (www.unhcr.org/rw) and MIDIMAR (www.midimar.gov.rw).

ex-combatants and to help manage potential issues that may arise, such as lack of employment and land disputes. Ex-combatants are introduced to their Provincial Reintegration Officer (PRO) to whom they also will report on progress, challenges, needs, and so forth.

On discharge, ex-combatants will receive a Basic Needs Kit (BNK) with 60,000 Rwandan francs (RWF) and dependents will receive in-kind pots, pans, food, seeds, tools, and so forth. This is intended to cover three months' rent and basic needs. All ex-combatants also receive cell phones and sim cards.

Reintegration

The reintegration phase focuses on the social and economic reintegration of combatants into the community. The following principles apply according to the project implementation manual (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission/Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2015, 22):

- Ex-combatants receive a similar amount of assistance irrespective of their previous rank or military affiliation.
- Ex-combatants receive reintegration assistance in relation to their degree of vulnerability.
- Ex-combatants are allowed to choose their reintegration destination freely.
- Assistance seeks to minimize market distortions and maximize beneficiary choice.
- The Program seeks to involve and benefit communities of settlement.

In addition to contracting various local organizations to support reintegration for ex-combatants, ex-combatants become eligible three months after discharge to receive a reintegration grant (RG) of 120,000 RWF to support their economic-reintegration efforts. Ex-combatants receive the money for their business in the form of a bank voucher. Primarily, funding from the economic reintegration grants goes to plans developed with instructors at Mutobo (80% do agricultural work, 20% do trade or vocational work sometimes pursued through cooperatives). To receive the economic RG, ex-combatants must submit a request form to the RDRC through their PRO. "Ex-combatants are required to demonstrate that they intend to use the RG for meaningful economic or social reintegration purposes (sub-projects) in order to receive the RG" (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission/Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2015, 22). Eligible areas of funding by the grant include: "access IGAs [Individual Economic Reintegration Grants], Formal Education, Vocational Training, Agriculture and access to employment" (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2016, 35). For those who do not qualify to receive the economic

reintegration grants, they also may receive funding under the Vulnerable Support Window (VSW) assistance program or through cooperatives with which they are working.

Ex-combatants are routinely traced by the regional PRO post-BNK and reintegration to ensure that all is going well and to address any reintegration challenges and needs. Those who are faring poorly will receive access to VSW specialized support. This is following an assessment by local authorities who determine an ex-combatant to be especially vulnerable. There are no formal criteria or benchmarks of vulnerability; however, various issues that may contribute to it include lack of employment, lack of land, no access to shelter, numerous dependents, extreme poverty, and illness and disability. Women, elderly, and other most vulnerable groups receive special social support and have all needs met by the government (e.g., monthly allowances, housing, and healthcare). Those declared "vulnerable" are given VSW status, which can include skills-training funding, educational opportunities, and vocational support.

Ongoing support to ex-combatants following discharge also includes social-reintegration support, which encompasses psychosocial counseling, medical care, and health insurance. To ensure that ex-combatants are living in harmony with their neighbors and integrating well, the RDRC conducts "Community Perception" studies to determine how both parties are feeling. The RDRC may hold sensitization meetings in the community to address challenges covering reintegration, unity, and reconciliation; meetings also can take the form of joint ex-combatant–community sports and theatrical events.

Support also includes economic reintegration. PROs advocate for employment for ex-combatants with different groups and companies; RDRC-hosted conferences to promote hiring ex-combatants (e.g., National Conference on Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Industrialization); communications outreach to the broader community to integrate and use ex-combatant businesses through radio, television, and the *Demob Rwanda Newsletter*; and support in accessing financing or financial-literacy programs via Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations (SACCOs) and microcredit linkages.

Mainstreaming *(Exit)*

The final stage for ex-combatants is the mainstreaming phase in which they are weaned from specialized support from the RDRC and encouraged to benefit from existing government programs that

support all citizens. They are encouraged to become full members of their community, to integrate, and to become fully Rwandan citizens.

5.3.1 Main Approach to Defection Programming at the RDRC

The office in charge of most of the broad defection programming at the RDRC is the Media and Communications Office. The following programs are implemented by the office in support of defection programming:

1. **Weekly Radio Programs:** The main purpose of the radio programs is sensitization messaging. This is accomplished via interviews and theatrical debuts, about how the country has changed, "hook them to return" stories often using elderly parents or persons with family in DRC, interviews with those who have returned, current information about the country, and other programs to familiarize combatants with the reality of life in Rwanda.[43]

   There are two main programs hosted on the radio that target combatants for defection, refugees, ex-combatants who have already defected, and the community at large in Rwanda:

   a) Interviews with former combatants, officials, family, community members, and RDRC officials, and

   b) Theater-style plays on the radio.

   Programs began around 2005 with the aim of encouraging combatants in DRC to return home. Interviewees talk about life in the forest and their return home, as well as current life in Rwanda. Programs are 30 minutes each. There are no formal templates for how the interviews are conducted; however, it is recommended to allow ex-combatants to do most of the talking—to be the ones asking former rebel colleagues to come home, telling them about the bad politics in the forest, that they are being lied to, and that life is really good in Rwanda. None of the participants on the program is paid and all interviewees are volunteers. It is not clear how far the radio signals carry but many returned ex-combatants comment about hearing programs in the forest.

---

[43]Radio, notably, has been a popular means of conveying information in Rwanda. The infamous *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*, or Thousand Hills Free Radio and Television, which broadcast from July 1993 to July 1994, was one of the key means used by extremists to propagate the genocide.

2. **Monthly Newsletters:** The newsletters are taken to refugee camps in DRC and include information on those who have returned, their projects, and so on. MONUSCO occasionally takes copies to the FDLR when possible.

3. **Joint Communications and Sensitization Plan between RDRC and MONUSCO:** Two main programs take place with the UN and Rwanda for encouraging defection. The first is on the UN's Radio Okapi, which is broadcast across DRC. It is a joint effort with the UN to share stories about those who have repatriated to Rwanda and information about Rwanda and the RDRC programmatic support to former combatants. The second effort includes documentaries filmed by MONUSCO staff on the success stories of former combatants and refugees who repatriated to Rwanda and their lives today. These programs are geared toward refugees living at both UN camps and in nearby communities, as well as combatants with radio access in the forest.

4. **Skype Calls:** The RDRC hosts Skype calls between returned ex-combatants and those Rwandans in the UN refugee camps in DRC. This provides the opportunity for real-time conversations to counter the propaganda from the FDLR leaders about refugees and FDLR members being killed when they return to Rwanda. It also allows those who have returned to share firsthand their stories and successes and to reach out to specific people and groups to entreat them to return home.

5. **"Come and See, Go and Tell":** This is a program offered in conjunction with NURC, MIDIMAR, and UNHCR, in which refugees and other Rwandans who are living in DRC can come and visit Rwanda and then return to DRC to share what they learned.

In addition to this, targeted outreach to specific members of the FDLR (and affiliated rebel groups) happens routinely. Much of this outreach is furthered by the fact that the former Chairman of the RDRC was himself the former head of the FDLR, and that key commissioners and advisors to the RDRC also are former top brass within the FDLR. Their access, knowledge, and camaraderie with the current leadership are key to the return of many FDLR senior officers.

5.3.2 RDRC Flagship Program: Mutobo Demobilization and Reintegration Center in Musanze, Rwanda

Mutobo is the core program offered by the RDRC to prepare the returning combatants for life back in Rwanda. The space itself is a sprawling complex with housing, classrooms, sports, and childcare facilities, where returned combatants spend their first three months back in country.

According to the interviewees,[44] there are five main objectives of the combatants' stay at Mutobo:

1. **National Identity:** The program helps the ex-combatants to grasp the approach that the Rwandan government has taken following the genocide to reconcile and face the internal challenges of the war.

2. **National Programs and Policies:** The program provides an overview of the services and policies of the government domestically and internationally, as well as an overview of services available to them and all citizens of the country.

3. **Local Reengagement Preparation:** The program teaches skills and gives recommendations to the ex-combatants on how to handle reengaging their families, communities, finding work, and so on.

4. **Home Visits:** The program provides an opportunity for ex-combatants, midway through the Mutobo stay, to return to their home community, visit family, and identify living quarters. To be slowly reacclimated to their former community, they return to Mutobo following the home stay.

5. **Financial Literacy, Vocational Skills, and Project Preparation:** The program offers courses tailored to learning a trade, managing a budget, and thinking independently about how to find or develop work opportunities.

Table 14 lists the courses and services provided for the ex-combatants at Mutobo.

Table 14 **Discussion Topics Covered during PDOP**

S/No	Lesson/Discussion
1	Introduction to politics and citizenship
2	Social coexistence of society
3	The history of Rwanda
4	The role of Rwandan culture in socioeconomic development
5	The ethnicity conflict in Great Lakes Region and Hutu–Tutsi in Rwanda
6	The genocide and its origin
7	The history of genocide ideology
8	Armed conflicts in Great Lakes Region

[44]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

9	Patriotism in Rwandan culture
10	The role of justice in security and development
11	Unity and reconciliation in Rwanda
12	Rwandan legislation and the New Constitution
13	The role of political parties forum in enhancing unity and peace
14	The role of the international community in the Rwandan genocide
15	Fighting corruption, favoritism, nepotism, and embezzlement of public funds
16	Refugee and its effects
17	Government policy on cooperatives
18	Social security in Rwanda
19	Investment and exportation in Rwanda
20	Medical insurance (*Mutuelle de santé*)
21	Fight against HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria
22	HIV/AIDS voluntary test and counseling
23	Government policy on population growth
24	Economic empowerment through training in entrepreneurship
25	Rwanda revenue authority functioning; taxes and duties
26	Banking system in Rwanda
27	Gacaca courts[45]
28	Good governance
29	Government agricultural policy
30	Rural development programs
31	Natural resources and their impact on Rwandan economy
32	Bush life versus reintegrated life
33	Tourism development in Rwanda
34	Environmental policy in Rwanda
35	The role of police in peace and security
36	Education policy in Rwanda
37	Regional integration
38	The role of media in the national development
39	The role of civil society in national development
40	Gender promotion in national development
41	Prevention of gender violence
42	Microfinance institutions in economic development
43	Income-generating projects
44	Agriculture policy in Rwanda
45	Psychosocial services
46	Economic development and poverty reduction strategy
47	Vision 2020
48	Skills development by Rwanda Workforce Development Authority
49	Testimonies by male and female ex-combatants from members of armed groups
50	Gender issues with the main focus on female ex-combatants
51	Role of religion in unity and reconciliation
52	The use of Reintegration Grant
53	International law against genocide: Case Rwanda (referred to as "International Law against Human Discrimination and Segregation" on another listing)
54	National Identity Cards
55	Medical screening
56	Social economic survey, ID photography

[45]See "Glossary" for more information on the Gacaca Courts and Chapter 7 for more information on the application process of Gacaca vis-à-vis combatants in Rwanda.

57	RDRC principles and government policies on DDR
58	Reintegrated ex-armed group members' testimonies
59	Ex-armed group members' field visits
60	Discussion on RDRP benefits
61	Updates on national/international laws

Source: Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission.

Adult Literacy and Mathematical Skills Provided by RDRC

In addition to the comprehensive courses listed in Table 13 to support the economic, social, and political reintegration of combatants, programs to address literacy and basic mathematics are afforded former combatants and dependents in need. Basic computer-skills courses are available at Mutobo for those who are interested and able.

Medical Support from RDRC[46]

All ex-combatants are afforded medical care from the Government of Rwanda. When they arrive at Mutobo center, the Medical Rehabilitation Unit (MRU) screens every combatant for medical, psychological, and emotional problems. This may include "consultation, treatment, surgery, hospitalisation, physiotherapy, prosthetics, orthotics, psychosocial support, and referrals" (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2016, 16). Those problems are classified among four categories deeming various levels of coverage and treatment. Those with the most severe ailments receive 100% health and hospital insurance coverage, monthly allowances, and homes. Those with less-severe ailments receive varying levels of assistance. Those who do not have severe ailments in the four categories receive national health insurance, which is offered on a sliding-pay scale. Those who are extremely vulnerable (according to the decision of the RDRC) receive full coverage (as do ordinary citizens who are deemed too poor by the state). The coverage offered to the former combatants is the same offered to ex-RDF soldiers. Any injury incurred while "on duty," whether for the RDF or the FDLR, is fully covered according to the 2007 Law on Protection of Disabled War Combatants.

Psychological Services at Mutobo and Beyond from RDRC

---

[46]A cumulative accounting of medical support services received by ex-combatants through December 31, 2015, is available in the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission *Annual Report 2015* (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2016).

All ex-combatants receive psychological support in varying forms. On their arrival at Mutobo, the psychologist screens all ex-combatants and their dependents for any ailments or disorders. A treatment and intervention plan is developed based on the classification of the disorder. There are three categories:

1. Neurosis: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), sleeping disorders, phobias, hypochondria.
2. Psychosis: schizophrenia, paranoia.
3. Mood disorders: depression, bipolar disorder, mania.

The most commonly noted disorders are PTSD and related symptoms (i.e., nightmares and delusions), depression, epilepsy, and hypochondria. Treatment plans depend on the guidelines, which commonly follow the WHO: for example, psychotherapy (i.e., narrative exposure therapy advised by WHO); homogeneous group therapy or testimony; and chemotherapy (for violent, no-sleep, flashback, and manias) are used for PTSD cases—10 sessions over six weeks.[47]

Other issues can emerge post-reintegration (i.e., after graduating from Mutobo). Experts explained that it is important to address psychological issues at Mutobo first because, they warned, issues could worsen once reintegrated in the community or if individuals are unable to find work. Once ex-combatants are discharged from Mutobo, there is routine follow-up through district hospitals with psychologists for those requiring ongoing psychological services.

Female and Children Ex-Combatants

Female adult ex-combatants receive the same level of care and tutoring as their male counterparts. Female ex-combatants are screened for healthcare needs by female MRU officers. Children of ex-combatants have special playrooms, classes, and facilities at the main site in Mutobo.

Children ex-combatants who are repatriated without family are known as children "*sans adresse*."[48] They are sent to a separate camp especially designed for child ex-combatants without family. They receive literacy-skills training, basic education, healthcare, and vocational training at the facility. From the beginning of their return to Rwanda, in concert with the ICRC, the RDRC attempts to identify

---

[47]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[48]"*Sans adresse*" is a French term that translated literally means without an address or, in this context and more broadly, as homeless; however, the more proper term for "homeless" in French is "*sans domicile fixe*." In this case, the children "*sans adresse*" are homeless children without family ties.

whether there are any surviving family members in Rwanda. Those with families identified in country will be reunified following their stay at the children's camp. Those without families will stay at the camp until age 18 until they have completed vocational training. At discharge, they will receive a BNK, tools, and 60,000 RWF. The children will routinely receive follow-up visits from RDRC social workers, as well as options for higher-education support and additional vocational training or apprenticeships subsidized by the government.[49]

Provincial Reintegration Officer Support

PROs are located in each of the five provinces across the country. They work with ex-combatants directly as well as with other government offices that support them (e.g., local authorities, regional reserve forces, police, SACCOs, and private employers). The main responsibilities described to the author include the following:

- Serve as the main information point to ex-combatants for accessing support services from the RDRC, the government of Rwanda, and other affiliated supporting organizations.
- Provide referrals for ex-combatants to various government or NGO services.
- Help with community-based reintegration at the local level.
- Provide employment advocacy for ex-combatants with public and private businesses.
- Undertake follow-up visits with ex-combatants to check on progress and challenges.[50]

PROs interviewed cited support for addressing social problems including alcoholism, psychological issues, and problems with the police as the most common.[51] PROs also noted that those without families have the most difficulty reintegrating because they often lack familial land, support with shelter, and social networks. Rarely are there issues regarding politics or ideology; however, it was noted by some experts that in the early years of reintegration, these types of problems were more common.

---

[49]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[50]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[51]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

6.0 THE FDLR IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

> Whatever the political, ethnic and social tensions that characterize the history of eastern Congo, there is little doubt that the seemingly permanent crisis in the Kivus dates from the arrival of more than two million Rwandese refugees in July 1994, including soldiers of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwandan Armed Forces), known as the ex-FAR, and their allies, the Interahamwe militia. Their activities, and those of the groups which express their political interests and aspirations, and which fight on their behalf, for example the Republican Rally for Democracy (RDR), the FDLR and the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD/Urunana), are at the source of the violence, mistrust and sense of hopelessness which feed on each other in the Kivus. (African Rights 2007, 6)

6.1 EMERGENCE OF RWANDAN REBEL GROUPS IN EASTERN DRC

In 1994, as the RPF successfully captured Kigali from the MRND and those allied to the Habyarimana regime – including the hardline Republican Democratic Movement (MDR-Power) and the Committee for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) – more than a million refugees, FAR soldiers, political leaders of the former regime, and members of the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias fled to eastern Zaire. Having advised Habyarimana on how to counter the perceived Tutsi threat, Mobutu Sese Seko, the dictator in Zaire, welcomed the Hutu refugees and members of the regime.

Table 15 **Brief History of the Democratic Republic of Congo**

The Democratic Republic of Congo, originally called the Kingdom of Kongo, has faced a tumultuous history since its colonization by Belgian King Leopold in the late 1870s, whose brutal rule over the large territory, renamed the Congo Free State, was said to have led to the deaths of millions of Congolese. Following massive protests, the country finally gained independence from the Belgians in 1960, and was renamed *République du Congo* or Republic of Congo.[1] Yet its problems did not end there. Patrice Lumumba, the country's first Prime Minister, barely lasted a year before he was murdered in 1961 by alleged US and Belgian actors who sought to stem what they feared was the former Soviet Union's growing influence in Africa under the Cold War. After Lumumba was

---

[1]In order to distinguish from its neighboring country which had chosen the same name at independence, the DRC became commonly known then as Congo-Léopoldville and later as Congo-Kinshasa, upon renaming of the DRC's capital city in 1966, and the ROC as Congo-Brazzaville.

murdered, the President, Joseph Kasavubu, assumed the position of Prime Minister. Dealing with internal threats of secession of the mineral-rich Katanga region under the leadership of its President, Moises Tshombe, Kasavubu agreed to a power-sharing arrangement, appointing Tshombe as the country's Prime Minister in exchange for an end to the secessionist fighting. Yet, even the Kasavubu-Tshombe leadership team did not last long; in 1965, a soldier named Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, with the assistance of several western powers, led a successful coup d'etat, ushering in 32 years of a dictatorial regime.

Shortly after taking power, Mobutu christened himself *Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa za Bang,* or "the all-powerful warrior who because of his endurance and inflexible will to win will go from conquest to conquest leaving fire in his wake;" he also renamed the country, *Zaire*, from the Kongo language meaning "the river that swallows all rivers," in an effort to Africanize and unite it following years of foreign colonization. His policies were disastrous: he nationalized foreign firms and forced out foreign investors; he took hundreds of millions from the state budget, annually, for his salary; and oversaw the economic demise of the country thanks to enormously corrupt activities. His policies failed the country and its people, and resulted in a massively deteriorated economy, cancelled international development assistance, a clampdown on civil society and multiparty political space, and significant internal strife. Under domestic and global pressure, Mobutu finally accepted the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1994.

Despite nominal national political advancements in 1994, Mobutu allowed the genocidal regime officials of Rwanda to seek refuge in the country's eastern region, angering local and regional Tutsis and their supporters—especially the newly empowered RPF administration in Rwanda and its Ugandan government supporters. Frustrated by Mobutu and his support to the Rwandan génocidaires, Rwandan and Ugandan leadership brokered a relationship with Laurent Désiré Kabila, a pro-Tutsi Congolese, with Presidential aspirations. Along with several Zairean politicians who had fallen out of favor with Mobutu, Rwanda and Uganda helped Kabila march on Kinshasa in May 1997, installing him as President while Mobutu was out of the country for medical treatment. In exchange, Kabila agreed to

help Rwanda and Uganda pursue the former Rwandan regime officials and supporters they accused of committing genocide who had fled to the eastern regions of the country.

Ongoing conflict in eastern Congo by a multitude of regional actors overturned Kabila's support for the Rwandan government, leading him to change alliances. But his tenure, too, was short-lived, as in 2001 he was shot by a bodyguard, leading to the ascendancy of his son, Joseph Kabila, to the presidency. Over the course of his first year as president, from 2001-2002, Kabila undertook numerous negotiations to stabilize eastern Congo and rid the region of those various actors warring for control of the rich natural resources there, as well as those hunting the Hutu génocidaires from Rwanda. Several peace agreements were signed, with varying degrees of success, including the Sun City accords in 2002, in which six vice presidents were approved to participate in a power-sharing agreement, each representing different rebel groups, in an effort to bring peace. As the country slowly inched towards peace, multiparty elections were held in a tense 2006 race, in which Kabila faced off against opposition candidate and warlord, Jean-Pierre Bemba. Kabila was ultimately declared the winner, but Bemba and his supporters did not go without a fight, leading to significant clashes which sent Bemba into hiding at the South African Embassy.

Despite Kabila's efforts to address internal instability through negotiations, fighting in the east among rebels continued, driving tens of thousands of civilians to routinely flee for their lives—much due to Rwandan-backed General Laurent Nkunda, and his *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP), or National Congress for the Defense of the People, rebel group. Among ongoing fighting, and the emergence of numerous other rebel groups in eastern Congo, Kabila won another term at the polls in 2011—though the election was widely disputed, with many arguing that results were hugely flawed. Meanwhile, a bevy of rebel leadership began to face international justice for their massive human rights violations and war crimes against civilians, including former presidential candidate Bemba, who faced trial at the ICC for crimes committed in the Central African Republic (CAR), and Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga, who was sentenced at the ICC for his use of child soldiers in eastern DRC. Despite the efforts against rebel leadership in the east by the ICC, yet another rebel group

emerged called M23, this one led by Bosco Ntaganda with the alleged backing of Rwanda, yet again. M23 finally signed a peace deal in 2013, but conflict among local rebel groups in the east continued.

Elections slated for 2016 brought increased tension, with fighting in the capital and elsewhere in DRC under allegations that Kabila unconstitutionally had electoral laws modified to let him remain in power longer than allowed by the Constitution. Finally, a settlement was reached in 2017 which allows for election to be postponed to 2018 while local and international communities undertake efforts to establish a safe, credible, and violence-free election season and transfer of power.

Once in Zaire in the refugee camps, former regime government officers and key political actors came together. They reorganized and formed the *Rassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et de la Démocratie au Rwanda*, or Republican Rally for Democracy (RDR)[2], a political group that called itself the "government in exile" advocating for the return to Rwanda (African Rights 2007, 12). Notably, the ex-FAR in the camps offered their full support to the RDR (African Rights 2007). The camps were of great concern to the newly established government in Rwanda because they held surviving Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, former government leaders who endorsed the genocide, an array of significant propagandists from the former regime responsible for inciting genocide, and countless others whom the government was seeking for committing acts of genocide.

The arrival of the Rwandan refugees in eastern DRC (followed by the incursion of Rwandan and Ugandan forces trying to capture the *génocidaires* fleeing Rwanda) was the catalyst for two successive and massive wars in DRC: the First Congo War (1996–1997) and the Second Congo War (1998–2003). On Mobutu's acceptance of the political refugees whom the new Rwandan government considered to be *génocidaires*and enemies of the state, the Rwandan government quickly pulled together a regional alliance to overthrow Mobutu, relying heavily on Ugandan support. By 1996, Laurent Désiré Kabila was installed in power and more than 700,000 refugees had been returned to Rwanda (some were a result of the destruction of the camps by various forces of the alliance) (Debelle 2014, 2). Supported militarily and financially by Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila initially sided with Rwanda in addressing the Hutu extremists

---

[2]RDR was previously known by the fuller acronym of the Rally for the Return of the Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda.

hiding out in eastern DRC. To flush out the extremists and force them back into Rwanda to be dealt with by Kagame, Kabila bombed the refugee camps in November 1996 (especially the Mugunga camp, where the RDR had formed), sending civilians and ex-FAR running back to Rwanda or deep in the forests of eastern DRC for safety.

The attacks on the camps and the loss of Mobutu as a benefactor of the political refugees forced out those among the RDR who could afford exile across Africa and Europe; those who stayed went in different geographic directions—but with clear intentions of continuing their armed struggle against Rwanda. Despite the regional direction taken by the armed combatants, they all believed that the massacres committed by Kabila and the Rwandan regime of Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern DRC (following the genocide in Rwanda) required a military response. Some went into exile in the forests of the Kivus and formed a new group, *Peuple en Armes pour la Libération du Rwanda*, or Party for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALiR), and the military wing, *Armée de Libération du Rwanda*, or Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR). Others went west, by foot, to the Republic of Congo (ROC) to help reinstall Dennis Sassou Nguesso into power. They later helped Laurent Désiré Kabila against Rwanda when the two fell out in 1998, which began the Second Congo War (De Veenhoop 2007). The group that went west to assist Nguesso and Kabila against Rwanda called itself ALiR II; thus, ALiR I operated in the east and ALiR II in the west. Notably, those who supported Nguesso and Kabila were promised quid pro quo support in return for reclaiming Rwanda, none of which ever materialized, leading to resentment. Numerous rebel groups, backed by Rwanda (e.g., RCD-Goma) and others, emerged to counter the ALiR rebels and support Kabila as well as for self-defense against all of the violence in North and South Kivu.

6.1.1 Evolution of the FDLR

The FDLR was created in 1999 and formally established in Lubumbashi in 2000. It included both a military wing (for fighting and local relations in North and South Kivu) in DRC and a political wing (for international fundraising and international negotiations) based in Europe. The FDLR was, in essence, a renaming and reorganization of PALiR snd ALiR. In 2003, the FDLR renamed its military wing the *Forces Combattantes Abacungunzi* (FOCA) or Abacunzi Fighting Forces, although most still refer to the group, as a whole, as the FDLR. The change arose due to a targeted massacre of American, British, and New Zealander tourists in Bwindi National Park in Uganda in 1999. ALiR rebels specifically targeted the

Americans and British for their lack of assistance to the forces fighting the Tutsis first in Rwanda and later in eastern DRC (Tribune News Service 1999). The assassination of the Americans pushed the US government to place ALiR on a terrorist-designation list. The rebels, fearing implications, thus reorganized and renamed themselves to distance their objectives and group efforts from the terrorist designation.

When the FDLR was first established, it was an impressive 20,000- to 50,000-strong force (Debelle 2014); others claim that membership even reached 70,000 (De Veenhoop 2007). In the early years of the FDLR, as noted earlier, it received support including funding and weapons from Laurent Désiré Kabila after he and the Rwandan government fell out. Kabila relied on FDLR assistance in pushing back RCD-Goma, the Rwandan-backed rebel group, whose tenure ended under a negotiated settlement and incorporation into the Congolese military in October 2003. However, support from the Congolese government for the FDLR eroded significantly when Kabila was assassinated in 2001. His son, Joseph Kabila, took power from his father and displayed a significantly different leadership style. Whereas Laurent Désiré Kabila relied on a military strategy to defeat the rebels in eastern DRC, his son preferred diplomacy. Upon ascendancy to the Presidency, Joseph Kabila quickly began addressing the FDLR problem, first welcoming the UN into DRC to help demobilize the FDLR in 2001; outlawing the group in 2002; and then forcibly disarming an FDLR military camp, Kamina, in 2002. Debelle (2014) pointed out that the current FDLR leader, General Sylvestre Mudacumura, was in the Kamina camp when it was attacked by the Congolese military and forcibly disarmed—leading to long-standing distrust.

6.2 LEADERSHIP AND DIVISIONS WITHIN THE FDLR

When the western division of ALiR II, under the leadership of General Sylvestre Mudacumura, lost the support of Laurent Désiré Kabila and returned east to the Kivus to reunite with the FDLR, following its efforts to rebrand and distance from the actinos of ALiR I, problems emerged. The FDLR had appointed General Paul Rwarakabije, a young leader, from within the ranks of ex-FAR, to lead the group in the east. He was disciplined, trusted, and a capable leader, according to the Author's interviews.[3] Additionally, and most important, Rwarakabije had not been involved in perpetrating acts of genocide in Rwanda or in the killings in Uganda. Thus, for the FDLR, he represented the "clean-slate" approach that

---

[3]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

the organization sought following the Bwindi National Park killings. As De Veenhoop (2007, 43) noted, at

its founding:

> The FDLR has tried to distance itself from the 1994 genocide. Its web site, pamphlets and leaders claim that the FDLR is a movement of "oppressed and excluded Rwandans," including the (Tutsi) survivors of the Rwandan genocide – although, this hardly seems to be the case. Moreover, they have stated on several occasions that they are ready to collaborate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The attempt to create a new movement with no links to the genocide may have been sincere for some of its leaders and members, but it has proven impossible.

Moreover, General Rwarakabije led numerous (although not fully successful) incursions into

Rwanda from 1997 to 2001. Working with limited resources, Rwarakabije was considered a capable

leader—at least until the 2001 assault on Rwanda in which nearly 2,000 FDLR soldiers were killed by the

Rwandan military during an FDLR incursion.

General Mudacumura, alternatively, was a suspected *génocidaire* (i.e., he was the Deputy

Commander of the Presidential Guard under Habyarimana) (De Veenhoop 2007). Whereas Rwarakabije

was disciplined, not allowing alcohol, cigarettes, and women among the troops, Mudacumura was reported

in interviews to be relatively lax on these issues, although also more dictatorial.[4] Mudacumura and

Rwarakabije faced quick challenges and competition for leadership. Arriving from the west with new

weapons and ammunition, Mudacumura believed he should take the lead. Having led the group on several

successful operations into Rwanda from the forests of the Kivus, fighting to retake Rwanda, Rwarakabije

believed he should remain commander. Tensions escalated between the leaders, notably impacting morale

and force operations.[5]

Shortly following the merger of the ALiR I and ALiR II groups and the forming of the FDLR, the

FDLR faced two significant breaks. First, in 2003, because of the tension with Mudacumura, the FDLR

commander in the east, Rwarakabije, defected to Rwanda, following the Chief of Intelligence who had left

shortly before.[6] Thus, full leadership of the FDLR went to General Mudacumura. Second, the FDLR

political wing, based in Europe, faced its own challenges. The vice president and treasurer split to form

Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie–Urunana (RUD-Urunana) or Rally for Unity and Democracy-

---

[4]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[5]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[6]See Chapter 1.

Urunana, followed by FOCA splitting to establish an armed unit for RUD-Urunana, the *Armée Nationale-Imboneza* (AN-Imboneza) or National Army-Imboneza (Debelle 2014).

These divisions weakened the group considerably, as noted by many ex-combatant interviewees.[7] Moreover, the arrival of Mudacumura and the departure of Rwarakabije caused additional problems, as cited by the defectors.[8] First, old regional alliances with those of the northern region in Rwanda (where power and wealth were concentrated under Habyarimana) against those of the southern region reemerged. A shift of power that mimicked what the regime looked like under Habyarimana, with the extremists and *génocidaires* taking power from the military ex-FAR, began to emerge: those from the southern regions, where the military and leadership had attempted to hold out against the genocide, were discriminated against internally. Second, under Mudacumura, as noted by the interviewees, overall nepotism increased.[9] Those who had served with Mudacumura in ALiR II in the west earned preferential treatment over their cohorts, sowing division among the integrated troops. Third, whereas General Rwarakabije was considered a trusted leader and a respected strategist, many interviewees noted that General Mudacumura acted more like a dictator.[10] These divisions were among the reasons cited for defections according to the interviewees.[11]

6.3 MEMBERSHIP WITHIN THE FDLR: RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

Membership in the FDLR, and its predecessor ALiR, was originally composed of ex-FAR, former members of the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, and other able-bodied men who had fled with ex-FAR members into the forest when the refugee camps were attacked in 1996. As the group struggled against incursions from the Rwandan military – battles on behalf of and against the Congolese government, against other rebel groups in the region, and at times against themselves – membership numbers were estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 (International Crisis Group 2003). Over time, this dwindled to 1,500 to 3,000 in 2014 (Debelle 2014) and possibly as low as 500 to 2,000 in late 2016 (as cited by key experts during interviews).[12]

---

[7]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[8]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[9]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[10]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[11]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[12]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Ensuring that FDLR members are both retained and recruited is an essential function of the group. Interviewees, backed by reporting from Debelle (2014), reported that the main source of FDLR recruitment is the refugee populations currently in eastern DRC.[13] According to MONUSCO, as of November 30, 2016, there were still 245,000 refugees from Rwanda in DRC (United Nations 2016b). Many of the refugee communities, although not in camps, "live under the influence of the FDLR" (Debelle 2014, 8), which is consistent with input from defectors.[14] As reported by interviewees, the FDLR views its responsibility as protecting the refugee populations from enemies in the region.[15] Debelle (2014, 8) further explained: "The group retains stringent control over these refugees, requiring travel permits, punishing efforts to repatriate, and doing their best to prevent outside communication, from radio use to telephones." In return, the FDLR expects all young men between the ages of 13 and 15 to enlist. Those who do not voluntarily submit to the FDLR are taken by force, according to the interviews.[16] Findings by the UN note that in 2015, 40% of the violations against children in DRC were attributed to the FDLR, and that 89 children (i.e., almost half the number recruited by armed rebels in DRC) were taken by the FDLR (United Nations General Assembly Security Council 2016). The 2016 UN Secretary General's report on children and conflict found that a two-pronged approach of military pressure against armed groups and radio messaging targeting rebel actors in the bush is most effective for driving the defection of children from armed groups in eastern DRC (United Nations General Assembly Security Council 2016).

Once recruited, interviewees explained that they were required to go through military training lasting from several weeks to several months.[17] Courses in basic military skills including tactics, operations, intelligence, and military strategy were taken by future combatants, along with ideological training covering FDLR propaganda.

Interviews with key informants who had defected explained that retention within the FDLR was addressed through two key avenues: propaganda and fear.[18] They cited daily doses of propaganda regarding the strength of the FDLR, the anticipated successes they would witness, the rightful ownership of Rwanda

---

[13]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[14]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[15]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[16]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[17]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[18]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

by the Hutu, and the goods they would earn by returning Rwanda to the Hutu.[19] Despite massive failures, lack of international support and resources, weakened recruiting options, and the absence of any viable military action in Rwanda since 2001, fighters are still convinced to continue with the mission. De Veenhoop (2007, 44) found that "The main reason they continue planning attacks on Rwanda is to provide the troops with a political goal and motivation. Without such an aim, the morale of the rank and file would deteriorate rapidly and massive desertions would likely follow." Additionally, as noted by the interviewees, religion was increasingly used as a tool of propaganda.[20] They told of a Bible version, drafted by a Rwandan scholar under the Habyarimana regime, that was made to echo the FDLR propaganda and was used routinely. De Veenhoop (2007, 47) shed further light, explaining that many see the FDLR as "the 'Ingabo za Yesu' or the 'Army of Jesus'…. They believe that God has given Rwanda to the Hutu and, consequently, the recuperation of power is a mission of God. This spiritual justification for the FDLR's struggle is an integral part of the FDLR's propaganda." Many former combatants related that those who were uneducated or who had never been in Rwanda were more likely to buy into the propaganda. This is consistent with research by Yanagizawa-Drott (2012, 30), who noted that "mass media aimed at stimulating violence may be more effective when the targeted audience lacks basic education."

The second aspect of retention, as reported by informants in the interview process, concerned fear.[21] Ex-combatants noted that fear – instilled through overly harsh policies and punishments, stringent rules, and routine internal intelligence collection by peers – was an effective mechanism for retaining combatants – but did not increase morale. Many former combatants cited the desire to defect sooner but explained that their fear concerning treatment of family members left behind prevented them from acting. Nearly all combatants departed with family in tow or at least with assured safe hiding or future passage for those remaining.

6.4   OBJECTIVE AND IDEOLOGY OF THE FDLR

> Much the same sort of hiatus between perception and reality can be seen in Rwanda and
> eastern Congo. Consider the case of Rwanda: astounding as it may sound, to this day
> many Hutu will vehemently deny the reality of a genocide that killed an estimated
> 800,000 people (of whom approximately one fourth were Hutu from the south-central
> regions). Not that they would deny the existence of massacres; that they were
> systematically planned and executed is what they contest. The war, they say, was the

---

[19]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[20]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[21]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

principal cause of the massacres. Had the RPF not invaded the country, on October 1, 1990, the massacres would not have taken place. The onus of guilt, therefore, lies entirely with the RPF. (Lemarchand 1998, 7)

The original messaging of the FDLR, as told during interviews, explained first that the current regime in Rwanda (presumed by FDLR to be dominated by Tutsis) is controlled by outsiders. They are not Rwandan, argued FDLR, but rather Ugandan; not even Kinyarwandan-speaking but rather English-speaking. Second, the government and the military are all Tutsi-controlled, and their objective is to kill all Hutus. Third, the Tutsis have taken the country from the Hutus, the God-given rightful owners of the land; therefore, they must be removed. There can be no coexistence because the Tutsis forced out the Hutus from their land. They must fight to kill all of the Tutsis – "the cockroaches" – and take back Rwanda by force.[22] The FDLR thus reasoned that if the Tutsis could go into political exile as a minority party and take control of the state, then the Hutus, as the majority, could do the same and reclaim the leadership. However, since its founding, the mission of the FDLR appears to have experienced some change or, at least, an effort to cleanse the mission language of the old extremist objectives known to incite concerns of a renewed genocide.

More recent objectives of the FDLR, as restated during interviews, are the overarching goals of Unity, Reconciliation, and Justice for the Genocide.[23] Although interviewees were loath to clarify the genocide to which the FDLR referred, it is likely that it includes both the original genocide of the Tutsis and especially the alleged genocide of the Hutus.[24] This is consistent with previous findings by De Veenhoop (2007, 45), who noted that "First, they insist that it is necessary to establish the truth about the 'Rwandan catastrophe'," referring to both massacres; and "Secondly, they call for a 'highly-inclusive' inter-Rwandan dialogue. The implication here is that the FDLR should be included in such a dialogue, and that *génocidaires* should be allowed to participate in the political decision-making process." Allegedly, the FDLR went so far as to declare in December 2013 its wish to lay down arms and return to Rwanda, en masse, for political negotiations (Debelle 2014). The notion, however, that the current Rwandan government would consider engaging in political negotiation with *génocidaires* is highly unlikely—and

---

[22]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[23]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[24]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

would be extremely unpopular politically (Debelle 2014; Author interviews 2016). Given that the

leadership of the FDLR remains ensconced in eastern DRC, accused of playing active roles in the genocide,

it seems likely that this mission – to return by military success wherein no fear of justice could undermine

their potential freedom – is indeed the remaining mission of the FDLR, despite some of the softer language.

De Veenhoop (2007, 45) argued: "The continuation of the armed struggle is thus their best prospect for a

life in relative freedom. Given the current military balance, their only alternative to spending the remainder

of their life in the bush is to accumulate enough money to assume a new identity, flee to a third country,

and establish a new life there."

6.5   STRUCTURE OF THE FDLR

The FDLR is organized in a political wing and a military wing. The political leadership of the

group in Europe does not appear to have much influence because most leaders have been arrested, and

many supporters have disavowed the group due to corruption and mismanagement (Debelle 2014). From

2002 until his arrest in 2009 on charges of genocide, Ignace Murwanashyaka led political operations.

Assistant to the President, Straton Musoni, also was arrested in 2009 on charges of genocide, as was the

Secretary General, Callixte Mbarushimana. Although, the political wing was responsible for fundraising for

the organization from among Rwandans in exile and other sympathetic groups. According to interviews,

there did not appear to be significant interaction between the political wing and the military operations.[25]

According to Debelle (2014), the military wing (or FOCA) is divided by regional sectors, all

overseen by FDLR Commanding General Mudacumura. There are two regional sectors or brigades, one in

North Kivu and one in South Kivu, both with military academies. Those two brigades, each led by a

colonel, are then subdivided into smaller regional battalions and field units. The two sectors have special

battalions to protect the headquarters, as well as reconnaissance units, which undertake various

responsibilities in addition to gathering intelligence, such as developing and issuing propaganda, increasing

recruitment, and identifying high-profile targets. The groups performing these actions are highly trusted

members of the FDLR, according to interviews.[26] Being selected to participate in one of the forward-

operating groups, otherwise known as *Commandos de Recherche et d'Action en Profondeur* (CRAP) or

---

[25]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[26]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Reconnaissance Commandos, means that one is trusted to operate far from headquarters without significant oversight but with agility and intelligence. Some defectors cited their personal efforts to become a CRAP team member simply to be able to defect quietly, and far afield, away from headquarters.[27]

6.6 REBEL LIFESTYLE WITHIN THE FDLR

Daily life in the forest for the rebel group was difficult, as explained by ex-combatants. They were forced to live off what the forest provided and were regularly pursued by various rebel groups and militaries in the region. Many noted daily fighting in the early years and monthly later. Resources including weapons would come from Kinshasa or whatever government they were supporting; however, most of those relationships evaporated in 2001 when Joseph Kabila took power following the assassination of his father. Salaries for the fighters were nonexistent, but various leaders in certain regions took ownership of small mining concessions through ill-gotten means to fund themselves and their families. Senior leadership and political officers residing outside of DRC would fundraise from expatriate Rwandans and heavily skim from the pot, frustrating the lower ranks, who received nothing.

The forest itself also posed dangers. Wild animals attacked, vicious storms caused major damage to the fragile banana-leaf dwelling, and disease spread quickly—often causing serious injury or death. Moreover, without access to medicine, treatment facilities, and safe housing, minor injuries could quickly become life-threatening.

For most FDLR fighters, years were spent living off the forest, with no income, no security, and no formal home—often stretching into decades. Families struggled alongside or near the fighters— unwanted and unwelcome as Rwandans in eastern DRC. Although land, where available, may have been fertile, due to the level of fighting among groups, soldiers and families were rarely able to stay long enough in one area to properly cultivate it.

6.7 FUNDING AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE FDLR

Debelle (2014, 5) explained that the FDLR continues to earn money from "taxation of mines, trade routes, and markets" including gold, timber, charcoal, and cannabis (Debelle 2014). Autesserre (2007) added that raw minerals are smuggled across borders by the FDLR; it has a stake in illegal mining operations and engages in the hemp trade (Spittaels and Hilgert 2008); and particularly faith-based charities

---

[27]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

donate to the FDLR (Baldauf 2009). Furthermore, in the early years of the conflict and at various points throughout, either the DRC government or the FARDC collaborated or offered support to the FDLR in exchange for favors against various regional actors; this is according to interviewees and numerous reports (Debelle 2014; Spittaels and Hilgert 2008; United Nations 2015a).[28]

Finally, although the political wing is largely diminished, the FDLR still manages to generate support from within Rwanda, including the opposition parties: *PS-Imberakuri* (*Parti Social-Imberakuri*, or Social Party-Imberakuri); and the Rwandan Dream Initiative of former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, the first prime minister under the RPF following the 1994 victory (Debelle 2014, 6).

Interviews with ex-combatants, however, did not allude to any access to monies raised through smuggling, mining, or taxation.[29] Two ex-combatants noted that very-senior leaders may have access to secret sources of funds through the management of mines; many others noted that these leaders must have had access to money because none of their families lived in the forest, their children went to school abroad, and they had access to computers, Internet, and telephones—more than most of the ex-combatants had ever witnessed. However, none of the interviewees was entirely certain where the money came from, but all believed that not redistributing was unfair. All ex-combatants interviewed reported that salaries were not paid to any of them and that foodstuffs, clothes, weapons, and ammunition had to be stolen. Lower-ranked ex-combatants said that what they stole or what little trading or market sales of goods stolen, or crops raised, called "*logistiques*," was required to be given to their leaders, who then determined what would be redistributed to the group—if anything.[30] This contributed to frustration and low morale, as indicated during interviews.[31]

Finally, Debelle (2014) reported that the FDLR collaborates frequently with other armed groups in the area, with whom they barter for supplies, military assistance, and training. Those groups include Nyatura, *Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain* (APCLS) or Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo, and the Burundian *Forces Nationales de Libération* (FNL) or National Liberation Forces.

---

[28]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016
[29]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[30]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[31]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

6.8 PROFESSIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE FDLR

According to interviews with ex-combatants recounting the early founding years of the organizations, the FDLR was structured similar to the state military (i.e., ex-FAR) from which most of its ranks originated. It had a strong command and control, was considered professional, abided by a rule-of-law handbook, trained and educated soldiers in professional courses including strategy and tactics, and generally functioned efficiently.[32] However, this period of smooth functioning did not last long for the FDLR because the groups that had split in different directions eventually reunited, undermining its organizational structure and functioning.

The regrouping resulted in the significant leadership divides discussed previously, primarily between the leader of the troops coming from the west, under General Sylvestre Mudacumura, and the leader of the troops who stayed in the forest in the east, under General Paul Rwarakabije. The infighting trickled down in various forms, impacting the troops. Nepotism and preferential treatment based on region of origination (in Rwanda) and other factors undermined basic professionalism among the troops. The different lifestyles of the forces impacted the command-and-control capabilities and introduced disputes among the fighters. Jealousy and allegations of corruption and distrust increased, threatening formal divisions. This was in addition to an already-stretched-thin assemblage with limited basic communications; an absence of a secure home base and safe haven; a lack of reliable resources, food, clothing, shelter, and weaponry; and a mission that was plagued by regional fighting with Congolese—not to mention gaining access to the main opposition state across the border into Rwanda.[33]

More recently, divisions have emerged among younger troops that, not having been implicated or participated in the genocide, would like to lay down arms and return to Rwanda for political negotiations against those who are of the older generation, are implicated in genocide, and who refuse to stop fighting.[34]

Various reports on degrees of camaraderie, trust, and good internal relations emerged from interviews with former combatants. Some noted feeling safe and protected among colleagues-in-arms,

---

[32]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[33]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[34]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

whereas others expressed stress living under constant spying. It is likely that differing divisions, ranks, and regional or other factors impacted individual experiences within the group.[35]

All interviewees reported that the group ultimately followed a code of law—albeit one that was strict offering no freedom to soldiers.[36] Infractions of violating orders, overstaying off time and leave, not reporting intelligence, attempting communication with those in Rwanda, losing weapons, and showing signs of weakened morale could result in significant repercussions, often including death. Informants explained that a legal codebook existed along with military tribunals and judges meting out punishments, which were harsh, sometimes too harsh, for the level of infraction. Examples cited included death for overstaying leave, making or accepting telephone calls to and from Rwanda, and allegations of considering defection.[37]

Ultimately, many ex-combatants noted that weakened morale among troops due to various circumstantial issues (e.g., defecting leaders, unsuccessful operations, poor treatment, and more; see Chapter 7) undermined the professionalism and relationships in the group.[38] A vicious cycle for those stuck in the group emerged; many noted feelings of being held hostage by a violent, abusive rebel group, yet respect for that same group because of the power the leaders wielded over rebel soldiers, Rwandan refugees, and Congolese citizens in the region.

6.9   THREATS TO THE FDLR

The main enemy of the FDLR, according to its mission, is the Rwandan government of Paul Kagame and the RPF. However, numerous Rwandan-backed rebel groups have attempted to undermine the FDLR since it first began operating in eastern DRC.

The first group, which the Rwandan government is accused of funding and supporting to attack the Hutu rebels, is RCD-Goma. From 1998 to 2003, RCD-Goma was supported, financially and militarily, to engage in rebel warfare with the FDLR (first ALiR). The fighting with RCD-Goma ended shortly after Joseph Kabila took power; in October 2003, he negotiated a settlement that allowed the Congolese fighters in RCD-Goma to join the national military, FARDC.

---

[35]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[36]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[37]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[38]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

The second main group that the FDLR has had to counter, allegedly funded by Rwanda, is the CNDP, headed by Laurent Nkunda. From 2006 to 2009, CNDP actively battled with the FDLR in eastern DRC, increasing insecurity in the region. Finally, in 2009, Nkunda was arrested and the CNDP was incorporated (as had RCD-Goma) into the FARDC, following negotiations between Rwanda and DRC. The agreement brokered by Rwanda and DRC authorized the deployment of Rwandan troops into DRC to go after the FDLR in the forests. According to Debelle (2014, 3), these operations – known as *Umoja Wetu* (Our Unity), *Kimia II* (Peace II), and *Amani Leo* (Peace Today) – led to the defection of 3,905 FDLR troops between January 2009 and April 2012, approximately 60% of the force. Other scholars disagree with this conclusion, believing instead that military force against the FDLR has not been a successful strategy (Grignon 2009). Notably, none of the defectors interviewed directly cited military operations against the FDLR as a significant motivator for defection—rather, that increased military action against them often contributed to increased recruitment efforts, and validated propaganda claims of the FDLR. However, many of those interviewed did report that the difficult life and loss of forces (due to defection or death) were demoralizing.[39]

The final rebel operation against the FDLR, allegedly funded by Rwandan authorities, was the M23 rebel group, named for the date of the CNDP negotiation settlement with the DRC government. From April 2012 to October 2013, the M23 engaged in an active rebellion against the FDLR in eastern DRC. The M23 group was related to the CNDP—an offshoot of disgruntled former CNDP soldiers who resented the handling of the CNDP within FARDC and with the DRC government. The M23 allegedly was to be a Tutsi-led, Rwandan-backed operation, as was the CNDP. The leader, Bosco Ntaganda, was nicknamed "The Terminator" for the violent operations launched in eastern DRC. The group predominantly sought to fight the FDLR and the Congolese government. The March 2013 UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) is widely credited with successfully pushing the M23 into submission and a ceasefire. In November 2013, the group agreed to lay down arms and pursue political negotiations.

Among local rebel groups, the most current threat to the FDLR appears to be the Raia Mutomboki, founded specifically to address the FDLR (Debelle 2014). Meaning "outraged citizens" in Swahili, the Raia Mutomboki employs a strategy of targeting FDLR family members and dependents. Some FDLR soldiers

---

[39]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

have called the Raia Mutomboki the biggest threat to FDLR soldiers in the eastern Kivus. The Raia

Mutomboki appears to be a decentralized group whose main mission is to protect civilians against the

FDLR and to militarily attack the FDLR. Some are concerned that the Raia Mutomboki are being supplied

by the Rwandan military to attack Congolese Hutu populations; however, to date, it remains unclear

whether the rumors are true.

Finally, although the Rwandan government currently is not involved in operations in eastern DRC,

apparently there were efforts by special-operations forces targeting FDLR leaders, including a Chief of

Staff (General) in January 2012. According to Debelle (2014), this may have impacted the defection of 200

combatants (although, none of those defectors interviewed cited this or any other targeted killings of senior

leaders as a reason for defection).

As Debelle (2014, 1) aptly noted:

> [o]ver 50 different armed groups persist across this region. Arguably the most important
> of these is the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)*. The Rwandan
> rebels number between 1,500–3,000 troops and regularly carry out rape, extortion and
> killings against civilians. Perhaps more importantly, they are a major reason for regional
> instability – they are the main justification for Rwandan interference in eastern Congo
> and, through their alliances, exacerbate the threat of several Congolese militias.

6.10 EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE FDLR

Numerous approaches have been taken to address the threat posed by the FDLR in eastern DRC,

including military and diplomatic efforts, as well as sanctions.

6.10.1 International Military

International military operations against the FDLR led by the UN under the auspices of

MONUSCO, DRC-sanctioned operations to allow Rwandan forces to enter, and tactics by the Congolese

military (FARDC) have yielded limited success. The troops interviewed, from all ranks, stated that military

operations against the FDLR – whether or not many combatants were killed or captured – always drove up

support for the FDLR among the refugee populations and enhanced recruitment.[40] This is consistent with

research by Olson Lounsbery (2016) on foreign military operations and their effects on rebel groups.

---

[40]Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

More pointedly, regarding the most recent operation against the FDLR in 2009, Debelle (2014, 9) noted: "During the last major offensive against the FDLR in 2009, for every FDLR combatant demobilized, at least one civilian was deliberately killed, seven women raped, eight homes destroyed, and over 900 people forced to flee." These figures reinforce previous discussions about the costs associated with military incursions against civilians—humanitarian costs are often severe, and operations in eastern DRC are no exception. Furthermore, when the incurring forces are not abiding by human rights – as FARDC has often been accused (i.e., targeting Congolese Hutu and Rwandan populations) – damages to local populations can escalate even further (Debelle 2014). Moreover, financial costs associated with ground or air incursions, reparations, and rebuilding are clearly more significant than those costs associated with encouraging voluntary defectors. Regarding three operations in 2009 and 2010 (i.e., Umoja Wetu, Kimia II, and Amani Leo), Debelle (2014, 10) argued: "These [military] operations, together with MONUC[41] media campaigns in these areas, provoked the defection of nearly 1,500 combatants, 2,000 dependents and 13,000 refugees in 2009." Again, however, none of the ex-combatants cited military incursions or activities as to the reason for their defection—not directly. Therefore, although there may be a relationship, it may not be a causal one, as pointed out by Debelle (2014). Conversely, Grignon (2009), opining in *The Africa Report*, wrote:

> Three clear lessons can be learnt from Umoja Wetu and Kimia II: military force alone will not dismantle the FDLR, poorly planned actions trigger massive retaliation by foreign combatants against the Congolese population, and an untrained Congolese army often becomes a major human rights violator when left to its own devices.

6.10.2 International Diplomacy

The United States has remained an active player with the UN, AU, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and the DRC and Rwandan governments to enable, apply, enforce, and monitor various discussions, agreements, and efforts to address the FDLR in eastern DRC and the instability it brings.

The United States enacted legislation in 2010 under the "Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act," Section 1502, which aimed to limit gains through illegal mining (predominantly

---

[41]MONUC stands for the United Nations Organization Mission in DRC. MONUC was the predecessor to MONUSCO. MONUC ceased on 30 June 2010 and was replaced by MONUSCO on July 1, 2010.

by militias and rebel groups) of conflict minerals in eastern DRC, requiring companies to take active

measures to ensure that conflict minerals are not being used in their products. Findings on the impact of the

sanctions by Parker and Vadheim (2017) showed that the sanctions – intended to target the resource

motivation of conflict – increased violence, targeting, and looting of civilians by militia and moved rebel

and militia groups to minerals not targeted under the Act. Thus, the impact on the FDLR, among other rebel

groups, appears negligible based on peer-reviewed sources, which instead suggest that new actors have

taken up the mining space—predictably, the corrupt Congolese police and military (Maclin et al. 2017)

who presumably work with the rebels. Moreover, it has "taken away the livelihoods" and displaced

thousands, if not millions, of citizens who worked for the various rebel groups in eastern DRC (Maclin et

al. 2017, 117). The United States also committed a Special Advisor to the Great Lakes Region and provides

financial and technical support for the democratic efforts of the government and its military capacity to

address insecurity caused by the FDLR.

The governments of Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands financed efforts of the RDRC to

target voluntary defectors of the FDLR for the purpose of weakening the group. The ICGLR, SADC, and

AU also have been actively committed to limiting their involvement in conflict in eastern DRC. Finally, the

UN deploys a diplomatic lead, the Special Representative to the Secretary General, and a security lead

under the auspices of MONUSCO.[42] In addition to its mandate to protect "civilians, humanitarian

personnel, and human rights defenders," MONUSCO – with support from Congolese security personnel

and the UNSC – authorized a limited-force intervention brigade of 19,185 troops in March 2013 (extended

to March 31, 2015) with the "responsibility of neutralizing armed groups and the objective of contributing

to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to

make space for stabilization activities" (United Nations 2016a). Table 16 provides an overview of key

international agreements pertaining to the FDLR.

---

[42]The UN mandate for MONUSCO follows the previous mission, "United Nations Organization Mission in DRC (MONUC)," which ended on June 30, 2010, followed by MONUSCO on July 1, 2010. MONUSCO's mandate was set by UNSC Resolution 1925 (United Nations 2016a) and "was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts."

Table 16 **Agreements Pertaining to FDLR**

Agreement	Date	Parties	Objective
UNSC Resolution 1804	March 13, 2008	UNSC Members	The UNSC called on all Rwandan armed groups to "to lay down their arms"; reassured MONUC's support for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRRR) of armed actors; and commits to supporting FARDC efforts to disarm armed groups in eastern DRC (Boshoff and Hoebeke 2008). A joint monitoring group of Congolese, Rwandan, and international partners was established to monitor implementation of the agreement.
Nairobi Agreement	November 9, 2007	DRC and Rwanda	The Nairobi Agreement, signed by the DRC and Rwandan governments, agreed to finding a "common approach" to the various threats in eastern DRC posed by armed groups in the region. Both governments committed to ceasing political and material support to armed groups in the region. Additionally, the Congolese government promised to work to (forcibly) disarm the FDLR (and other former ex-FAR and militia members in other armed groups) and to hand over those that the Rwandan government and ICTR sought for crimes of genocide. Those members of armed groups of Rwandan origin who did not want to return to Rwanda would be placed in camps with planning on their status to be discussed in the future. (Nairobi Agreement 2007)
Rome Agreement	March 31, 2005	FDLR	In a statement delivered by the president of the FDLR, Ignace Murwanashyaka, in March 2005, the FDLR attempted to unilaterally cease armed offensives and engage in political negotiations. "The FDLR condemn the genocide committed against Rwanda and their authors. It is committed to fight against all ideologies of ethnic hate and renews its commitment to cooperate with international justice…. From this moment forward (the FDLR) announces that it is halting all offensive operations against Rwanda" (Prevent Genocide International 2005). Notably, this effort failed. Not being involved in the negotiation at Sant'Egidio wherein discussions with the FDLR took place, Rwanda refused to accept the terms and negotiate a political settlement with genocidal suspects leading and within the FDLR.
Pretoria Agreement	July 30, 2002	DRC and Rwanda	The Pretoria Agreement was negotiated between the DRC and Rwandan governments. It called for the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from DRC, the disarming and dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe and the rebel groups they created, and an inter-Congolese dialogue (Pretoria Agreement 2002): "The Pretoria agreement amounted to an acknowledgement by the DRC government that it had been supporting the Interahamwe/ex-FAR/FDLR, and a commitment to cease such support. In turn, Rwanda

			committed itself to the withdrawal of all its forces from the DRC" (Boshoff and Hoebeke 2008).
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement	July 10, 1999	Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, RCD, Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)	The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which included members of SADC (i.e., Angola, DRC, Namibia, ROC, and Zimbabwe), Rwanda, Uganda, and the party MLC, called for a ceasefire and withdrawal among all actors operating in DRC, highlighting the need to respect DRC's sovereignty and security. Additionally, the terms set forth plans for inter-Congolese and partner dialogues to address issues of security, with the support of the UN and Organization of African Unity (OAU) (the forerunner of the AU) as independent observers to the processes defined. Further, a UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mandate was established wherein the UN would "observe and monitor" the agreement and ensure protection of civilians but also "tracking down and disarming armed groups; screening mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals; handing over *génocidaires* to the ICTR; repatriation; working out such measures (persuasive or coercive) as are appropriate for the attainment of the objectives of disarming, assembling, repatriation and reintegration into society of members of the armed groups" (Lusaka Agreement 1999).[43] Armed groups included ex-FAR and the Interahamwe, or the "armed militias who carried out genocide in Rwanda in 1994" (Lusaka Agreement 1999).

6.10.3   International Sanctions

The United States and the UN have enacted sanctions against members of the FDLR and/or the organization. On October 31, 2005, US President George W. Bush enacted sanctions against Ignace Murwanashyaka, president of the political wing of the FDLR, that limited access to any US–held properties or interests (President of the United States of America, 2006). Moreover, the UN Security Council enacted several sanctions against the FDLR for failing to adhere to peace-agreement terms, inciting violence, and causing instability in eastern DRC. The sanctions are against both the FDLR as an armed rebel group and specific members of the group, including Gaston Iyamuremye, FDLR Interim President; Callixte Mbarushimana, FDLR Executive Secretary; Sylvestre Mudacumura, FDLR–FOCA Commander (also indicted by the ICC on nine counts of war crimes); Leodomir Mugaragu, FDLR Chief of Staff; Leopold Mujyambere, FDLR–FOCA Chief of Staff (currently held in Kinshasa by the Congolese security services); Ignace Murwanashyaka, FDLR President (currently serving a 13-year sentence in Germany for leading a

---

[43]Notably, it was under this agreement that the UN Mission in Congo, MONUC (now MONUSCO) was established.

foreign terrorist organization and aiding in war crimes); Straton Musoni, former FDLR Vice President; Felicien Nsanzubukire, FDLR–FOCA Sub-sector Commander; Pacifique Ntawunguka, FDLR–FOCA Sector Commander; and Stanislas Nzeyimana, former FDLR–FOCA Deputy Commander (his whereabouts are unknown) (United Nations Security Council Sanctions 2017).

6.11 THE RISK OF THE FDLR TODAY

During the past 20 years of FDLR (and its predecessors) activity in the eastern DRC, the group has faced formidable challenges to survive, including military operations of numerous governments, UN FIBs, defection programming, judicial proceedings of key leaders, constant battles with other rebel groups, and more. Throughout, the group continues to stand, although at a markedly decreased status and size.[44] In its diminished state, the FDLR has faced internal divisions as well. Currently, one offshoot of the group is angling for political negotiations with the Rwandan government whereas another continues to insist on a military victory. Nevertheless, the Rwandan government has little appetite to negotiate with any aspect of the FDLR. However, for those non-*génocidaires*, Rwanda offers the benefit of returning, participating in RDRC DDR programming, and reintegrating as a contributing member of society in country—but not as an FDLR political-party member.

By all assessments, the FDLR does not currently pose a strategic threat to Rwanda. Its size, capabilities, access, resources, and even grievances do not hold significant threat against the current regime. Nonetheless, the emotional sway that the FDLR may hold over the government and the populace – a genocidal regime that once attempted to annihilate key members of the population – remains psychologically relevant.

According to Debelle and Florquin (2015, 198), writing on successes in 2013–2014 countering the FDLR:

---

[44]There are numerous disagreements about the size of the FDLR. Debelle (2014, 2), writing in 2014 in the most recent full assessment of the FDLR, highlighted the distinctions: "There are contrasting estimates of the FDLR's current strength. The UN Group of Experts estimates the group to include around 1,000 combatants in North Kivu and 500 in South Kivu, while the Government of Rwanda cites a total between 4,000 and 4,200 combatants. The Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), on the other hand, believes FDLR/FOCA to be 3,000 strong. The Enough Project offers a range of 1,500 to 5,000 combatants, while some FDLR/FOCA defectors and UN officials have placed the figure between 700 and 800. RUD-Urunana/AN-Imboneza figures are equally diverse, with United Nations and Rwandan officials citing around 300 combatants, while the RDRC put their strength at 1,500 and the Enough Project offers a range of 400 to 600. According to sources within the organisation, FDLR-Soki numbers 180 to 200 combatants, while data offered by the Enough Project cites 60 to 100 troops. Field work commissioned by the Affinity Group leads us to be sympathetic with the lower estimates for these groups."

> Recent changes are due to a convergence of interlinked factors, including improved collaboration between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, a succession of military operations targeting the group, international judicial proceedings against the FDLR leadership members who were based in Europe, and ongoing efforts to encourage the demobilization and repatriation of remaining combatants. The initiation of a series of military interventions in 2009 proved to be a turning point, beginning with Umoja Wetu, an operation conducted jointly by the Rwanda Defence Forces and the FARDC.[45] The FDLR retaliated with particularly gruesome attacks against civilian communities it accused of aiding the enemy.

This reaffirms that lethal military options can be a double-edged sword, whose application may be worthy of review for alternate mechanisms to address personnel feasibility.

Meanwhile, a report by the Small Arms Survey (Florquin and Seymour 2016, 3) recalled that although the size of the FDLR indeed has diminished, it still remains a viable rebel group, claiming that it is a "militarily weakened FDLR, albeit not yet defeated…. In short, while the FDLR may have lost a few hundred fighters in 2015, its core leadership and structure remained relatively unaffected." Indeed, the same leaders remain in place, a refugee population from which to draw fighters remains ensconced, weapons and armaments are still accessible, and the politically manipulated use of the group by various governments is yet another possible avenue for continued tenacity and resources. The fight against the FDLR is one from which the Rwandan government is by no means ready to disengage.

---

[45]In Chapter 7, it is noteworthy that the ex-combatants argued strongly against the role that military operations can play in encouraging more defection. To the contrary, they explained, military operations tend to drive up morale and recruitment efforts and often serve to validate propaganda, thus having the opposite effect on a rebel group.

7.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS

Research for this case study was conducted in Rwanda during a period of approximately eight months in 2016. Qualitative, semi-structured interviews with the main unit of analysis (i.e., the ex-combatants) and the subunits of analysis (i.e., the key experts) were conducted in support of the grounded-theory approach to develop a baseline theory on why ex-combatants voluntarily chose to defect from armed rebel groups as well as what programming is recommended to encourage more defections and prevent future recruitment into non-state, armed groups. Subjects were identified using the RDS technique, explained in Chapter 1. For the main unit of analysis, 41 ex-combatants were interviewed across all five regions of the country (north, south, east, west, and Kigali City);[1] for the subunits of analysis, 28 key experts were interviewed. For each unit, interviews continued until the Author believed that information saturation was achieved—the point at which grounded theory advises that the researcher may cease interviews because new input has not emerged, and theoretical saturation is met (Simmons n.d.). All of the ex-combatants, the main unit of analysis, were older than 18 years of age, had completed or were in the process of completing the national DDR program in Rwanda, and had voluntarily defected and returned home to Rwanda.

The information in this chapter answers the core Research Questions presented in the study, as follows:

1. *How and why did the ex-combatants become members of the FDLR rebel group?*

2. *Why did ex-combatants choose to defect from the rebel group?*

3. *Are the reasons for defection cited by ex-combatants:*

    a. *In line with SHD theory?*

    b. *In line with positive- and negative-peace theory?*

4. *What is recommended to prevent future recruitment by rebel groups?*

5. *What is recommended to promote increased defections from rebel groups?*

---

[1]See Annex II for a brief review of descriptive data about the 41 ex-combatants interviewed for the study.

6.   *Are there lessons learned from the Rwanda case country that could be applied elsewhere?*

By exploring input from both former combatants and key experts, this research attempts to identify common themes and recommendations that could be applied to research in other case countries. The input generated herein may form a baseline for future analysis and prove relevant to efforts at conflict resolution in other contexts.

7.1   RECRUITMENT INTO THE FDLR

Research Question 1 of this study regarding rebels and rebel groups is: How and why did combatants become members of the rebel group (i.e., the FDLR)? The analysis shows that in addition to voluntarily deciding to join a rebel group, people may be pressured to join by friends, family, and mentors; they may be forced or kidnapped as children or adults; or they may even approach rebel activity as a kind of profession, where in certain environments, there may be limited alternative means for gainful employment. Understanding how and why people are recruited into rebel groups is an important facet of developing interventions to help rebels defect from non-state armed groups and to prevent those groups from acquiring additional recruits, thereby addressing the supply and demand factors of human feasibility of viable rebel activity. If personnel can be encouraged to defect and prevented from recruitment, the rebel-group feasibility becomes significantly diminished and the likelihood of its leaders to be encouraged to negotiate increases.

7.1.1 Reasons Cited for Personal Recruitment: Ex-Combatants

Rebels who are long-term, committed fighters engaged in grievance-based conflict agree to join rebel movements based on the potential for future payoffs rather than the benefit of immediate returns, as with greed-based conflict combatants; that is, their membership is conditioned on the "promise" of "future rewards made credible by ties of social identity" (Weinstein 2003, 31). This justification certainly rings true for members of the FDLR. Of the 41 ex-combatants interviewed, the main reason the subjects cited for joining the FDLR was to continue the fight to preserve and take back Rwanda until success was achieved. As one subject stated, "I was proud [to be a soldier in the FDLR] because we had a goal to get back our country, and I wanted to be a part of this movement."[2] For the subjects interviewed, being in the FDLR

---

[2]Author interview 3, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

meant continuing to fight those Tutsi Rwandans whom they perceived as outsiders who entered the country (after seeking exile in Uganda for 30-plus years) and initiated a civil war. It also meant fighting from the bush, without significant long-term benefactors, salaries, food, clothing, safety, or new weapons—a significant concession for an uncertain payoff.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the group leading the alleged outsiders' effort in Rwanda was the RPA commanded by General Paul Kagame, the current president of Rwanda. Kagame was among the thousands of Rwandans who fled in the late 1950s and 1960s to Uganda (and elsewhere) following a rash of Hutu extremist violence against Tutsis. The ex-FAR was the state military apparatus under the regime of then-president Juvenal Habyarimana, with whom the RPA fought. The ex-FAR was considered at the time a professional force, cohesive if not uni-ethnic (i.e., Hutu majority) but not human-rights–abiding, with strong command and control.[3]

When aspects of the conflict turned genocidal – killing civilian Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda and perpetrated by the Interahamwe, Impuzamugambi, Presidential Guard, and others – not all members of the military participated (Human Rights Watch 1994).[4] Many remained on the frontlines of the civil war fighting against the RPA, whom they believed to be attempting a governmental coup.

Subsequently, when the ex-FAR – along with other societal units including most sitting members of government, prominent academics, and those connected to the regime – understood it had been defeated by the victorious RPA in June 1994, nearly all fled to neighboring eastern DRC. In the weeks and months following the genocide and war, one million to two million Rwandans fled there, mostly into refugee camps in the North and South Kivus.

Once those fleeing from the RPA had settled in the refugee camps, planning among the ex-FAR members to reclaim the country quickly commenced. More than half of those interviewed said that they voluntarily and willingly joined the FDLR (Figure 16). Those young men who were able and of fighting age were encouraged to join – and many did so voluntarily and patriotically in their eyes – in preparation for their return to Rwanda to reclaim the country from the RPA invaders. This was the main reason cited by

---

[3]Based on Author interviews conducted in Rwanda, 2014.
[4]In reporting on the genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch (1994, 18) explained, "In their attacks on civilians, the militia are often accompanied by a small number of soldiers or national policemen, but the militia have killed far more people than have uniformed members of the armed forces." Here, "the militia" refers to the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi.

ex-combatants interviewed for joining the ex-FAR in the camps: to establish a return rebel movement to recapture Rwanda. According to interviews, this recruitment from inside the camps was very successful.

Those who joined the FDLR years later were generally the children of ex-FAR or Rwandan refugees who had grown up in refugee camps in DRC. As one ex-combatant explained: "I joined FDLR at age 15 in 2004—they [FDLR] come with guns and force you into their army. We are just cows, with nothing in our heads."[5] Some voluntarily joined youth wings of the FDLR and subsequently graduated to full-fledged fighter status, noting that they felt proud to be a part of the FDLR and believed in the mission. "I was recruited and proud to protect the country," stated one ex-combatant.[6] Others felt pressured to join, remarking that joining was not a choice once young men reached a certain age: "In Congo [DRC], everyone has to be a soldier."[7] Others were kidnapped, abducted, or tricked into joining.

Figure 16 **Ex-Combatants' Reasons Cited for Joining FDLR (% Cited)**

Personnel to fight, strategize, manage logistics, fundraise, and motivate are critical to a rebel-group's viability and, ultimately, success (Aronson et al. 2015; Collier 2000a; Gates 2002). Predictably, then, what emerges from the interviews are clear objectives within the ranks to routinely recruit and ensure a steady stream of new fighters—particularly as time passed. All interviewees cited the refugee camps and Rwandan populations living in eastern DRC as the main body from which the FDLR recruited (Debelle

[5]Author interview 35, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[6]Author interview 4, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[7]Author interview 30, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

2014). Early on, they noted, recruiting fighters was not difficult; people were eager to join to reclaim the country.[8] "From the outside, soldiers look strong and people [refugees] want to join."[9] In the camps, Hutu extremist propagandists found a new home for promoting their beliefs and vision, where they continued preaching their distorted version of the war and genocide that had occurred in Rwanda. This reinforcement of propaganda happened in the homes, schools, and playgrounds of the camp, and it was routinely engrained among the FDLR fighter units. As one former fighter noted, "With a gun you were feared, respected, could have food [stolen], so years can go by and you can live an OK life as a soldier [in the FDLR]."[10] For some subjects, indoctrination took place almost daily, in which the "ideology to hate the President of Rwanda because they [Hutus] were chased from their country" was frequently put forward by FDLR leaders.[11]

Of those who did not voluntarily join the mission (almost 40% of those interviewed), half were forced to join because of community expectations. Recruiters regularly came to the camps and Rwandan refugee communities to track the young men. "It is very hard," said one ex-combatant, "because the kids live among the FDLR, they are born in the forests, they don't know Rwanda—only the FDLR."[12] At about age 15, young men would be expected to join the rebel group; some were forced verbally, others physically. An ex-combatant interviewed explained: "The FDLR have spies in the camps. Someone in the population [at the refugee camps or in Rwandan communities in DRC] would spy and tell the FDLR when young men were ready to be recruited. Then the FDLR would come and order you to go with them. If they take you and you escape, they kill you."[13] Another ex-combatant aptly noted, "Since 15, I have been raised by the FDLR."[14] The remaining half who did not voluntarily join were kidnapped as young students in

---

[8]Notably, as the years have passed, recruitment for the FDLR has become more difficult. There are fewer refugees in DRC; the population is tired of fighting; and an absence of any military success makes the group less appealing. These recruitment challenges mean that more children are being forced into the FDLR to make up for shortages. According to the UN Secretary General (UNSG) report on children and armed conflict (United Nations General Assembly–Secretary General 2016), almost half of the 488 documented children recruited into armed rebel groups were attributed to the FDLR.
[9]Author interview 33, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[10]Author interview 17, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[11]Author interview 14, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[12]Author interview 22, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[13]Author interview 35, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[14]Author interview 14, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Rwanda during raids across the border by the FDLR in the early years following the genocide, between

1997 and 2001. One ex-combatant shared the following experience:

> *In 1998, I was abducted. I was with a group of students [in Rwanda] and going back to school. When we had half-way reached school, we saw fighting [between FDLR rebels and RDF soldiers] and decided to go back home by foot. But we were spotted and beaten [by FDLR rebels]. I pretended to play dead, but they took me and forced us to become soldiers [in the FDLR] to liberate the country [Rwanda].[15]*

Those tricked into joining were found in Uganda, the ROC (Brazzaville), and among other rebel

groups. Some believed they were gaining formal employment in the mining sector but then found

themselves forcibly conscripted into the FDLR. One former fighter explained that he was recruited in

Uganda where he was looking for work, following completion of his studies in Rwanda. The former rebel

met a recruiter in Uganda and was told that he could find a job in Congo mining gold. The subject thought

it would be an opportunity "to make a lot of money and get rich" and "didn't ever consider he was lying."[16]

Another ex-combatant interviewed for this study explained that when he was recruited, he also was tricked

by an offer of employment: "They [FDLR recruiters] said jobs were waiting for us in the DRC, and only

those who were injured could stay [and not go to "work"]. When they took us at night, in a boat, across the

water, it looked like they were stealing us."[17]

7.2   DEFECTION FROM THE FDLR

"No one will ever know I died here."[18]

7.2.1 Reasons Cited for Defection: Ex-Combatants

Research Question 2, the core question of this study, asks: "Why do combatants defect from

ongoing armed-rebel activity?" At what point does the promise of a future payoff become less of a

motivator to continue fighting and why? To develop an understanding of this question and a baseline on

which future studies can compare, rebels from eastern DRC who returned to Rwanda were queried about

factors that influenced their decision to voluntarily defect.

---

[15]Author interview 6, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[16]Author interview 28, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[17]Author interview 27, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[18]Author interview 26, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Each ex-combatant interviewed defected voluntarily, under no outside pressure from the Government of Rwanda, DRC, UN, or any other external party (i.e., no one was forced to leave the rebel group according to his own version of the events, as told to the author). No one was paid, offered financial incentive or other payouts in exchange for defecting, and no one was held involuntarily once they returned.

The chart in Figure 17 lists the most to the least commonly cited reasons for defection among the ex-combatants interviewed. Table 17 provides a more detailed explanation of the reasons cited, in the same order. Subjects could give more than one reason for defecting.

Figure 17 **Reasons Cited for Defection by Ex-Combatants**

Table 17 **Description of Reasons Given by Subjects for Personal Defection**

(Most- to Least-Frequently Cited)
Learned of Good and Improved Life Opportunities in Rwanda - The reason cited most frequently by subjects regarding cause for defection was that they learned of positive changes in Rwanda from trusted sources. One former combatant noted that when he learned of the improved development, the safety and security afforded all citizens (especially those combatants who had defected before them), and that the

populations were accepting one another as they had historically (i.e., meaning before the colonial years that enforced ethnic divisions), "there was no reason to stay in the forest anymore."[19] Subjects noted that they found cause to defect on learning of the ethnic equality achieved, strides in development and reconciliation, assured personal safety from state or individual justice seekers and national security, and achievements in justice and good governance such that the divisions between ethnic groups had been significantly reduced and replaced with an equitable system. Another former combatant, speaking about RPF efforts at unity and reconciliation, stated, "I saw the reconciliation [achieved by the current administration] and felt like I had a place in Rwanda. Rwanda took the first step; they brought reconciliation and unity and made us all in the forest see that all was OK."[20] Many related that it took time and information from numerous sources to convince them—and that many were still not sure when crossing the border. Yet, when they did reach Rwanda, all stated that they found that everything they had been told was true. They were eager to for those still fighting in the forest to return and reap the benefits the country offered.

Experienced Disillusionment, Lowered Morale

- Without morale, subjects noted, one cannot fight. Or, more directly, as one former combatant stated, "A soldier with no morale is a dead soldier."[21] Indeed, many cited low morale as a significant motivator for defection. Ex-combatants explained that diminished morale came from the leadership lying to them (often about the reality of life in Rwanda, sources of personal wealth for rebel leaders while troops starved, and presence of global support for their efforts) or not being willing to commit the same asked of combat soldiers. Others cited frustration with the group's benefactors: specifically, promises over time from leaders in DRC, ROC, CAR, and SADC members to assist the Hutu FDLR in reclaiming Rwanda, which were all abandoned. This meant that the FDLR lost significant

---

[19]Author interview 38, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[20]Author interview 39, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[21]Author interview 24, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

time and resources fighting for other countries, without anything in return. Frustration with the absence of support (i.e., financial, materiel, and personnel) was significant enough to lead many subjects to ultimately leave the group through voluntary defection.

Experienced Harsh Life in Forest with No Future Prospects

- Another reason cited most frequently by combatants was the harsh life in the forest. Many shared details regarding challenges to one's basic livelihood, the absence of safe shelter, the danger of wild animals, and routine weather-based threats. Soldiers recounted that they lived in makeshift homes in the forest, seeking shelter under banana leaves or other brush for protection. They lacked regular access to foodstuffs and clean water and were forced to steal from local Congolese to survive. If a member became ill or injured, no health services were available. Many said they simply did not want to die in the forest with no one knowing what had happened to them. With no future in the forest, subjects said they felt compelled to leave. One ex-combatant explained:

> *There [in the forest in the FDLR], they tell you, if you come home they [the current Rwandan administration] will kill you and mistreat you. I was afraid for my personal security and of being jailed. The FDLR tell us even kids can hit you if they see you in the streets and you are FDLR. But at some point, I felt I had no choice because life was so bad in the forest. There in the forest, there was no value for life. You just steal. So, I decided to return and face whatever consequences came my way.[22]*

Witnessed Rebel-Group Mission Failure

- For many combatants, the inability of the FDLR to achieve its aim of retaking Rwanda, or even evidencing meaningful successes during the past 15 years, was sufficient reasoning to consider defection. As many noted, they simply were failing. One former fighter shared that they were "getting weaker" and that the FDLR was "not strong enough to achieve their objectives, to fight the Rwandan government with the decreased money, soldiers, and guns. And since I didn't want to die for a mission impossible to achieve, I wanted to leave."[23]

---

[22]Author interview 35, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[23]Author interview 35, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Changed Beliefs or Ideology (i.e., Do Not Believe in Mission Anymore)

- A changed ideology or change of belief in the FDLR ideology was cited often by subjects. Those who had been with the group for many years related that they began to wonder what they were fighting for if Rwanda had achieved so much unity and reconciliation. One ex-combatant shared, "If I have been fighting for justice, peace, and reconciliation – and I know that Rwanda has achieved those things – why would I still be fighting?"[24] Those who came to DRC as children and were raised among the FDLR reported that having never been in Rwanda, they often did not know or understand for what they were fighting. When they learned about the reality and conditions in Rwanda, their beliefs changed. Regarding ideological beliefs, one former fighter said, "I didn't care, I had no hope, I didn't believe [in the ideology of the FDLR]. I did not join voluntarily, I had no choice. I was vulnerable."[25] Others shared that they became aware of their leaders lying to them in various situations and this influenced them to change their beliefs. All of the subjects explained that the moment that they no longer fully believed in the mission was when they felt their lives were on the line. Without full belief and commitment, ex-combatants explained, the fight suddenly felt much more dangerous.

Decreased Force Strength/Weakness of Rebel Group

- The ability of a rebel group to survive and achieve success depends on its relative strength compared to the opposition. Several subjects expressed that the composition, infighting, size, absence of armaments, and overall strength of the group had diminished significantly over time and that it was simply not capable of engaging with a state military apparatus (in Rwanda). One former combatant explained that after 2006, although it was not clear why, some of the group began discriminating against others. "This started the divisiveness and I felt affected. We lost power and had to fight harder. But we became weak. We never really regained power. We started losing more people [rebels], like when General

---

[24]Author interview 18, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[25]Author interview 7, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Rwarakabije defected. It made people lose morale and wonder why they shouldn't go home too because they were so weak."[26] Being part of a weakened force with no chance of success motivated some subjects to consider defection.

Insecurity and Fighting in DRC, Unwanted by Congolese

- Eastern DRC, which includes the North and South Kivus, has seen active fighting and countless rebel groups emerge since the Rwandan refugees (and the affiliated militia) crossed into the region. Popular among fighters for the rich and readily available resources (including minerals, timber, and other easily extracted resources), the region has been awash in insecurity for decades. Many in eastern DRC, however, blame the insecurity on the influx of Hutu extremists from Rwanda following the cessation of hostilities there. Indeed, many of the more significant groups were composed of either predominantly Hutu or Tutsi Rwandan rebels. Congolese have made their feelings of frustration with or anger at these foreign fighters in their land known to the Rwandan refugees and fighters. This constant messaging of blame and rejection from local Congolese, as well as the constant danger from other rebel groups and the Congolese military (FARDC), drove many subjects to defection.

Experienced Traumatic Event, Friends or Family Dying

- For some subjects, significant events and traumas stood out as the defining moments of their decision to defect. Illnesses among family members and deaths of friends and family were cited as common reasons for deciding to defect from the FDLR.

Defection of Friends

- In addition to the impact that leadership defection levied on the soldiers, the defection of friends was considered significant. Many subjects recounted stories of hearing from friends who had defected to Rwanda about how welcoming the country had been to them. This information was a serious motivator to defect for several of the subjects.

---

[26]Author interview 22, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Pressure from Spouse or Family to Stop Fighting (and Seek a Better Livelihood)

- Many of the fighters noted that their spouses (predominantly wives) expressed a desire for them to leave the bush life and seek better opportunities in Rwanda. Some of those who shared this reasoning explained that their wives had had opportunities to visit Rwanda, to see family, and to explore conditions therein. When they returned to DRC, they tried to convince their husbands to leave. Whereas all male combatants noted that wives "do what their husbands tell them to do," they also noted that they considered their wives' input. Other fighters remained in contact with family in refugee camps in eastern DRC or Rwanda. The family members, as some subjects noted, asked the combatants to consider returning home or to lay down arms for safety. Although none of the subjects interviewed cited this as a sole reason, many noted that this input influenced their ultimate decision to defect.

Poor and Corrupt Leadership

- Several times throughout the interviews, subjects expressed frustration with the behavior and decisions of the rebel-group's leadership. Most frequently cited were two key problems: (1) leaders did not make the same sacrifices expected of soldiers; and (2) many were frustrated with the leadership's significant level of corruption. For example, leaders sent their families and children abroad to live and go to school in Rwanda, Uganda, elsewhere in Africa, or even Europe. That they would not assume the same risks as their troops undermined confidence and frustrated the soldiers. Furthermore, one subject recounted the corrupt behavior exhibited by senior leaders throughout their time in FDLR as follows:

> *Among all the leaders, none of their children study in the Congo. The leaders' children all study abroad, but they will take the refugees' children and force them to be soldiers and fight on their behalf. The leaders don't want the refugee kids to study because then they will know they are fighting for no reason, and they will leave them [the leaders of the FDLR] alone.*[27]

---

[27]Author interview 42, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

They explained that leaders kept resources (i.e., food, clothing, money, and weapons) for themselves; that even when items were promised to soldiers, they often did not share; and that their business dealings (i.e., trade in minerals or other ill-gotten gains) were managed and run by soldiers but that profits never reached them.

> *Instead of helping the soldiers fight, the money FDLR raised [from overseas, refugees, and others], the leaders would steal the money. The FDLR had a lot of opportunity, but could not be strong when so corrupt. The money never reaches the soldiers; soldiers just work for leaders who are corrupt.*[28]

Moreover, decisions by the leadership often were questioned. Many wondered why a political solution could not be achieved. Also, how could regional favoritism be eliminated by leaders? Moreover, many subjects noted that most of the FDLR leaders were former extremist *génocidaires.* They felt that the leaders cared only for themselves and thought nothing of the youth. One former rebel said he wondered, "Even if we fight and succeed, can we even govern?"[29] The problems of leadership were recounted throughout interviews and cited as another significant motivator for defection.

Battle Fatigue

- Both older and younger fighters cited battle fatigue – or simply being tired of fighting – as a reason that influenced their decision to defect. After years and often decades of fighting, many simply wanted to lay down their arms and return to a more peaceful existence.

Abused or Not Cared for by Group and Leadership

- A common refrain during the interviews concerned the strictness and harshness of life in the FDLR. They explained that leaders were mean and meted out extreme punishments for even minor offenses. For example, if a member stole from a leader or within the group, he received 300 floggings; if a member disobeyed an order, it was 200 floggings—

---

[28]Author interview 42, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[29]Author interview 37, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

or even death. If a soldier even considered defecting, much less actually tried and was

caught, he was killed on the spot.[30] Those who were not relegated special privilege within

the group often experienced even more extreme abuses than their cohorts. For many of

those interviewed, this mistreatment and abuse—including floggings of themselves and

family members; denials of freedom to pursue healthcare for ill or wounded loved ones;

and exclusion of benefits based on age, region of origination, and other distinctions—was

a significant cause for defection. As one former fighter explained:

> *The reason the FDLR failed is because the leaders don't treat the*
> *troops fairly. There are internal divisions because of where you are*
> *from [i.e., preferences based on regionalism and familial ties]. Also,*
> *they [the leaders] use ethnic slurs against you based on the shape of*
> *your nose. They say you are collaborating with the Government of*
> *Rwanda if your nose is not the right shape.[31]*

Absence of Force Cohesion (Infighting)

- During the nearly two-decade existence of the FDLR, it has had only two force

  commanders. However, the group frequently splintered and fractured along regional and

  other lines of division, which led to near-constant infighting and problems with group

  cohesion. For example, as one former combatant noted:

> *In the FDLR, it was a dictatorship, and you had to respect the leaders*
> *who gave the orders. But they were not all treated fairly.*
> *Discrimination of soldiers was based on region where people were*
> *from. So, if you were from a different region than the troop leader, then*
> *you would have to go first into heavy combat before the other people*
> *who went into combat who were from the same region as the leader.*
> *There was no choice.[32]*

The problem of cohesion weakened command and control, diminished professionalism,

increased abuses, and undermined the overall ability of the group to function as a single,

committed faction. The challenges within the FDLR were captured by one former

---

[30]Author interview 10, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[31]Author interview 21, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[32]Author interview 25, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

combatant, who noted, "In the army [FDLR], every soldier is a spy on the other."[33] These problems led some to consider whether it was worth the investment to fight with a force that exhibited so many internal issues, threatening its very viability.

Defection of Leaders

- Many of the ex-combatants interviewed noted the impact that the departure of senior leaders had on the group. They stated that the defection of General Paul Rwarakabije, the former Commander of the FDLR, was particularly significant. His departure, among other senior leaders, increased antagonism and friction within the group and contributed to others' defections.

> *That both a Colonel and a General returned to Rwanda had a big impact on the group [the FDLR]. It demonstrated mission failure and had even bigger impact on the FDLR because then they both integrated, along with other officers that returned into the RDF. So those who stayed said, "If a General or Colonel can return, why can't I, a simple soldier?"*[34]

That these senior leaders would leave and join forces with the opposition was deeply unsettling and led many to question their fight.

Seeking Better Medical Care, Educational Opportunities, and Food for Children and Family

- Life in the forest was difficult for families, leaving them vulnerable to disease, hunger, and insecurity. Although the families of fighters sometimes lived a short distance from the active conflict zones, they still struggled to deliver even the basics needed to survive: families frequently were uprooted when conflict pushed fighters beyond their bounds; had no educational or health resources; managed, as the soldiers did, without money; and, often were pressured to find foodstuffs. Occasionally, families were able to find shelter in Congolese communities that were more welcoming to Rwandan refugees and immigrants. However, even in those situations, as reported by the ex-combatants, life was hard because Rwandans were seen as the instigators of decades of conflict in eastern DRC. As

---

[33]Author interview 23, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[34]Author interview 37, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

one ex-combatant interviewed noted, "At some point, I got tired of stealing, and not being treated as one should be treated, and just left."[35] Due to these ongoing challenges, many of the subjects expressed a desire to find better conditions in which to care for their families, with healthcare resources and educational opportunities for their children. They became aware, over time, that Rwanda might offer those resources.

Lonely, Missing Family and Friends in Rwanda

- Most of those interviewed had family and friends in Rwanda that had either returned after the refugee-camp bombings in 1997 or had never left the country. Many were in intermittent contact with those family and friends, and they expressed grief and loneliness in being apart. This was an especially significant reason expressed by combatants who cited aging parents and recently deceased or ill close family members.

Missing Rwanda (Home)

- For those who were old enough to remember Rwanda, some ex-combatants explained, they simply missed home. The connection they felt to the country – whether a result of the ideological underpinnings of the FDLR and its belief that Rwanda was God-given to the Hutu or simply the feelings for the land of their origin – was strong for many and enough to be cited as a reason for wanting to defect and return.

Seeking Better Overall Quality of Life and Opportunity for Children and Family

- Life in eastern DRC – whether at a family camp, in the bush with other soldiers, or in a Congolese community – was difficult and bereft of opportunity. The lack of development meant that small trading and subsistence farming was the best one could hope to do. Subjects noted that they wanted to find a better livelihood and opportunities for their families—beyond what the difficult terrain of the forests in eastern DRC offered. As one former combatant shared, the concerns for his children, their education, and the inability "to plan a future for them" had a major impact on his decision to defect.[36]

---

[35]Author interview 34, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[36]Author interview 22, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Absence of Freedom

- Subjects frequently related how every action and movement taken was managed and directed by leadership. The lack of personal empowerment to make decisions about both minor and major issues (e.g., taking a child to the hospital or wanting to pursue an alternate livelihood) heavily impacted some of the subjects. One subject said he just "didn't feel free. I couldn't just go see my wife, I had to get permission by the leaders— and if you violated the rules, you were beaten. I changed my thinking [about the group]. I was not happy and did not want to be there anymore."[37] They noted that this was a motivator for defection—the lack of freedom to pursue what one wanted to do.

Seeking Better Life for Oneself

- For those without family, life in the forest with the FDLR was not only difficult but also lonely, limited, and without reprieve. Some subjects noted the desire to search for a better overall life as a reason for defection.

Guilt over Actions Committed in Rebel Group

- One former combatant shared that feelings of guilt for the destruction, death, and hardship caused by the FDLR overcame some and influenced them to decide to defect. Although only one former combatant expressly cited guilt as a reason for defection, several combatants noted similar feelings of regret for having caused stress to their families in being absent so long.

Seeking Gender Equality

- One of the more interesting reasons cited for deciding to defect came from a combatant who expressed a desire to have more gender equality. This subject noted that when she learned that the sexes were equal in Rwanda, she was amazed and motivated to consider defection to see and experience this gender equality. Another former combatant who did not directly express an interest in gender equality shared her fears in the FDLR. She said

---

[37]Author interview 12, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

that FDLR soldiers would begin raping girls at 10 years of age. At 18, she said, "I was

afraid of getting raped, so I looked for a husband to protect me."[38]

Searching for Personal Freedom

- Many of the stories and experiences shared by combatants indicated a lack of freedom: of

  opportunity, belief, movement, speech, and more. Whereas some subjects called the

  absence simply a problem, others expressed the desire to find personal freedom as a cause

  for defection.

7.2.1.1 Ex-Combatants' Motivations for Defection: Push–Pull Reasoning

Understanding the dire context in which the combatants and their families lived; the challenges

within the group relating to leadership, corruption, abuse, division, insecurity in the general region; and the

increasing knowledge of the reality in Rwanda – as opposed to the propaganda conveyed by the leadership

in the forest – set the stage for the thinking and decision making that combatants undertook to defect and

return home.

---

[38]Author interview 15, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Was it more likely that individuals were pushed out of the life of a rebel because of bad experiences or pulled into Rwanda in search of a better life? In most cases, the rebels reported that the negative push was much more significant than the pull of positive opportunity (Figure 18). This is consistent with the reasons given by those who felt pushed away from the negative life (73%) versus those pulled to more positive opportunities (27%).

Figure 18 **Push-versus-Pull Defection Reasoning**

It is interesting that four of the top leadership of the FDLR interviewed (i.e., two generals and two colonels) believed that defecting and returning to Rwanda was inspired more by positive changes within Rwanda pulling them (e.g., reforms achieved, justice pursued, reconciliation policies implemented, and so forth) than negative experiences pushing them. This may be related to better access to diverse sources of information at the higher levels of leadership within the rebel organization. It also may be related to educational levels and analytical capabilities that uneducated forces did not have or that they were comfortable relying on their skills for decision making. Moreover, it may have been that senior leaders, based on their experience, were more confident simply making major decisions than lower-ranking enlisted rebels, who perceived themselves as implementers rather than decision makers. And finally, that senior leaders felt more confident about their future opportunities due to their educational training and professional experience.

7.2.2 Ex-Combatants' Motivations for Defection: Fundamental Categories

In examining the thinking behind ex-combatants' motivations for defection, several potential analytical findings emerge. One way to review the findings is to group the reasons into fundamental categories that arise without the benefit of theoretical underpinnings. These findings are categorized as follows, according to six general groupings, as illustrated in Figure 19: rebel-force–related issues, trauma and harsh lifestyle experiences, Rwanda-related communication and information operations, individual and personal causes, family-related causes, and inspiration by others to defect.[39]

Reviewing the findings in this way allows for a baseline understanding and thematic grouping of core issues relevant to the rebels, unencumbered by theory that may or may not align. This direct presentation of data also allows for an easier cross-case comparison with other research.

Figure 19 **Ex-Combatants' Defection Reasons Classified by Fundamental Categories (% Cited)**

7.2.2.1 Fundamental Categories for Defection: Ex-Combatants and Key Experts

In the most general approach to categorizing feedback from the ex-combatants, poor internal rebel-group cohesion, decreased strength, corruption, lowered morale, poor leadership, and mission failure

---

[39]See Appendix III for a complete listing of which reasons were assigned to the fundamental categories shown in Figure 19.

were cited as the most important factors driving them to defect. Key experts[40] interviewed for this study

agreed that significant reasons for the defection of ex-combatants from the FDLR concerned the

experiences within the rebel organization and the circumstances in which they operated (Figure 20).

Figure 20 **Ex-Combatants' and Key Experts' Cited Causes for Defection**

Additionally, key experts believed that external pressures – specifically, military pressure from the

UN force (MONUSCO), the Congolese military (FARDC), the Rwandan military (RDF), and other rebel

groups limiting their access to safe haven and security – were a significant driver of defection. It is

interesting that the key experts' belief that these military-pressure–related concerns resonated seriously

with ex-combatants was unfounded; not one defector cited military pressure as a reason or even a

consideration for defecting. This suggests that efforts that undermine rebel-group cohesion, strength, trust,

and success should be considered in developing programs to target defectors.

The second thematic group cited most commonly by ex-combatants when tallied according to

fundamental categories concerned issues of trauma and a difficult, harsh lifestyle in the bush. To explain

the harshness, one former combatant stated that there was no payment for their services and no uniform or

food provided, only the expectation that they (i.e., Rwandan Hutus in DRC) had a responsibility of "just

---

[40]The subunits of analysis for the research, as described in Chapter 1, were key experts from across the security, peace, development, and policy-making sectors. These experts hail from domestic and international NGOs; IOs; local, national, and international governmental agencies; domestic and international academic organizations; and others considered to be experts in the field of ex-combatants and conflict resolution.

giving blood as a Rwandan" with no immediate payout in return.[41] Some key experts echoed these sentiments; they believed strongly that trauma and loss heavily impacted decision making and the ideological shift.

The third most common category cited by ex-combatants, totaled and organized by fundamental category, encompassed Rwanda-related reasons as learned from communications and information operations, which included the changes Rwanda had undertaken in policy, governance, and justice as well as simply missing Rwanda. Experts agreed that combatants considered defecting because of the draw of development and peace in Rwanda. Combatants, the experts explained, learned of the country's progress and changes through different channels: (1) telephone conversations with family members and friends who had already returned or had never left Rwanda; (2) radio programs that they could hear in the forest; (3) family members living in Congo who participated in the Rwandan government's "Go and See, Come and Tell" program, which allowed refugees and others living outside of the country to return home, see how it had changed, and return to exile to share the news with others; and (4) local Congolese traders with whom they lived.

Key experts strongly believed that learning about Rwanda and the benefits of returning were a result of efforts in communications and information operations. Communications included: telephone calls; skype meetings; family-featured radio programs; and letters between rebels and family members and friends that were not controlled, directed, or scripted by any actor, whether in government or an NGO. In some instances, the telephone calls, skype videos, and radio frequencies were funded by or part of a governmental or organizational program, but they were not scripted or forced on friends and family or the rebels to participate. Ex-combatants cited these communications as also impacting their decision making. One former combatant explained that he was receiving news from friends that people were doing well in Rwanda and that life was good, but it still took him four years to be convinced to defect. This ex-combatant noted that he could hear the news on the radio but "thought all the positive news about Rwanda was a trap to catch them [FDLR defectors]."[42] Because he could communicate by letters and telephone with family and friends – people he trusted and believed – he finally was able to leave. These communications from

---

[41]Author interview 22, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[42]Author interview 6, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

trusted sources included topics such as the current lifestyle in Rwanda, policies the government had

implemented, and living conditions of family members, among other more personal topics.

However, not all of the communications established between or directed toward combatants in the

bush and family members could be considered unfettered by governmental or organizational directive.

Much of the information reaching the combatants could be considered part of a campaign by various actors

to influence the thinking, behavior, decisions, and actions of the FDLR and its members. This type of

communications is called information operations.[43] Numerous experts cited the radio programming

sponsored by the RDRC and reaching deep into eastern DRC as a key facet of the information operations

managed by the Government of Rwanda. The radio programs included interviews with former FDLR

members and government officials, all who called for the active fighters to return home. Other efforts cited

by experts included MONUSCO's information-operations campaign that dropped leaflets by helicopter

with telephone numbers and locations of its offices, as well as messages offering support for repatriation.

This was in addition to the efforts of the UN's DRC-focused radio station, Radio Okapi.

The fourth most common category of reasons cited by the ex-combatants concerned issues that

impact an individual's sense of self and beliefs about the group. Ex-combatants shared that many were

dealing with internal struggles or psychological challenges experienced within the group. Many explained

they simply no longer believed in the mission or never had in the first place, and they felt a strong change

of ideology. Others felt they were being abused and no longer wanted to feel uncared for and taken

advantage of by their leadership. Furthermore, other ex-combatants shared that they experienced guilt over

their actions in the group and that they wanted equality and freedom. These personal experiences motivated

many to defect.

Experts also contend that ideological shifts in belief were the cause of defection. Some experts

argued that the change in beliefs about the group's objectives (i.e., to retake Rwanda by force and return it

to its rightful heirs, the Hutus) or the more extremists beliefs in Hutu power and the extermination of the

Tutsis may have resulted from disillusionment and lack of success. Others argued that the information

operations undertaken by the Government of Rwanda were the reason for the change of heart. In this case,

experts believe that realizations based on radio and other news outlets, along with information from family

---

[43]See Glossary: "Information Operations."

and friends, convinced combatants that they were being lied to by their leaders. For example, rebels were told that once in Rwanda, they would be killed immediately for being Hutu; that Tutsi children in Rwanda were allowed to throw stones, in public, at Hutus on the street; and that even former colleagues who had defected and spoke on the radio had been forced to deliver the messages and then killed. That none of these assertions was true – that perhaps the entire rebel enterprise was based on lies – upset combatants who were risking their lives and families, leading them to defect. Some experts also believed that after years and decades of fighting in the forest with no real gain, it was simply better to walk away than risk being killed or captured there.

Many experts believed that those who had family in Rwanda would ultimately return, if they were in contact and aware of their mutual existence. This reasoning aligned with the fifth most common fundamental category cited by the ex-combatants: family-related causes for defection. Reasons including spousal or familial pressure, seeking improved living conditions, health and education for children, and missing family and friends all clearly aligned.

The sixth fundamental category that emerged from reasons cited by the ex-combatants concerned the impact of prior defections of both leaders and friends. Ex-combatants shared that the loss of trusted leaders often shook their core understanding of the group and its objectives and forced them to reconsider their membership. Others noted that the defection of close and trusted friends undermined their will to continue without trusted allies in the group. Some even heard by telephone or radio from friends who had defected to and reintegrated in Rwanda and who encouraged them to return home. This was not an issue echoed by the key experts.

These findings suggest that undermining group effectiveness, pressuring rebels to question the relationship with leadership, promoting positive opportunities available in Rwanda, and limiting shelter and other basic needs (some of which Aronson et al. 2015, Collier 2000, and Gates 2002 noted as important to limiting rebel success) may have provided, in fact, a meaningful approach to changing the rebels' decisions about defection.

7.2.3 Combatants Who Choose Not to Defect from the FDLR: Ex-Combatants and Key Experts

Reviewing the reasons cited for defection by ex-combatants suggests two decades of a difficult life lived in the forest without regular access to food, clothing, and shelter; distanced from family; bereft of

educational opportunities; and without the freedom to pursue other livelihoods. What then sustains the rebels fighting in the first place? Theory suggests that rebels join organizations for the promise of future dividends of success (Weinstein 2003). This current research seeks primarily to understand what motivates the "cashing in" (i.e., defection from) of one's investment in the group. Whereas this is important to understand, it is equally important to understand what motivates rebels to stay so long and to continue fighting—even when the odds of any return have diminished significantly and, especially, when virtually no returns have been paid out to the rebels in more than 20 years of fighting.

Almost 90% of the FDLR members (if conservatively gauging the one-time high of 20,000 and generously gauging the current estimate of a one-time low of 2,000 members) have returned to Rwanda, perished in the forest due to disease or a natural or fighting-related death, or otherwise left the FDLR. For those 10% remaining, it begs the question of why, after more than two decades fighting in the bush with no success, no salary, no opportunity, and no progress – and in a dangerous environment with no basic needs for health, education, and shelter being met – continue to wage war? This question was posed to both the key experts and the ex-combatants.

The two groups queried (i.e., ex-combatants and key experts) both provided insight into the reasons FDLR rebels stayed in eastern DRC. Much of their reasoning resonated closely with the stories and decision-making processes the combatants faced when deciding whether to leave or stay. Seven possible reasons (Figure 21) emerged about why rebels in the FDLR would stay in dire conditions in the bush in eastern DRC instead of returning to Rwanda or laying down arms elsewhere, as so many have. Three reasons for staying overlapped between the ex-combatants and the key experts; one reason was unique to the ex-combatants; and three reasons were unique to the key experts.

**Fear of
Facing Justice
for Genocidal
Acts
Perpetrated
during the
Genocide in
1994**

The

first reason

suggested

about why the

rebels continue

Figure 21 **Reasons for Staying with the FDLR: Ex-Combatants and Key
Experts**

to fight and live out their lives in the bush in eastern DRC, despite the dire circumstances, is fear of justice

for acts perpetrated during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Both ex-combatants and key experts routinely

noted that most of those who remain fighting with the FDLR in the forest are *génocidaires* who refuse to

return to Rwanda for fear of facing justice in the formal court system. One ex-combatant explained, "Those

with the strongest ideology [i.e., an ethnic or genocidal ideology] are the *génocidaires*. You can't change

their minds because they know if they come back, they will be persecuted."[44] Engaging as an active

combatant against the state is not a crime in Rwanda, whereas participating in the genocide is considered

criminal activity. In fact, numerous senior leaders of the FDLR, including General Sylvestre Mudacumura

and others, remain on the Government of Rwanda Genocide Fugitive Tracking Center's most-wanted list.

As Gettleman (2010, 74) noted regarding rebels, "[w]ith the prospects of prosecution looming, those

fighting are sure never to give up."

Role of Propaganda

Another reason why combatants continue to fight, and where the ex-combatants and key experts

agreed, was cited as the role of propaganda in keeping them engaged. According to ex-combatants,

propaganda sessions led by leaders or "religious" officials (i.e., those whom the FDLR used to deliver

"God-given" messages meant to manipulate troops) were a daily occurrence and played a significant role in

---

[44]Author interview 23, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

the training provided to all new recruits. "Some are really committed," said one ex-combatant, "and the religious propaganda tells them to wait for God to fulfill the promise of Rwanda as a homeland for the Hutu. They pray, are very religious, but the pastors lie to them."[45] Another ex-combatant agreed, "The priests say, 'God sent me, I have a vision from God, you must be the saviors for those in Rwandan, you must go and save them' and then tell them to do things."[46] The FDLR even utilized a revised version of the Bible that was rewritten to align with their goals and objectives. It included notions that the Hutus are God's chosen people, God gave Rwanda to the Hutus, and the rebel fighters working to reclaim Rwanda for the God-granted Hutus are engaged in a holy war. This brainwashing and propaganda, particularly effective with uneducated troops (Johansen and Joslyn 2008), was used to control the soldiers. Threats, cruelty, and violence also were used to frighten the soldiers into submission, and extreme punishments were meted out for violations of FDLR laws. Finally, the leaders espoused a propaganda that rewrote history, a revisionist version wherein the genocide did not occur—or, if it did, it was Tutsis perpetrating crimes against the Hutus. Many of the younger fighters, noted the ex-combatants, did not know a world different from that of the forest in which the leaders' messaging was considered the gospel truth. As one ex-combatant explained, "People don't have information [about Rwanda and the world], they are isolated on islands, and don't know if life will be OK, where to go or what to do. Even if they knew where to go, they didn't know what they would do."[47]

Afraid or Do Not Know How to Safely Flee

The third area in which the key experts and ex-combatants agreed about why combatants stay with the FDLR for so long is the idea that many, despite wanting to leave, are afraid or do not know how to safely flee. Many of those interviewed reported waiting years for the exact opportunity to flee without being caught. For those who were caught, the punishments were severe. One ex-combatant recounted that the FDLR tried to kill him, and his wife, when they suspected that he was thinking of defecting. He said that he had "lost morale, and didn't feel like he wanted to be FDLR anymore" and that he "hated living in the forest." Even though he had not yet planned to leave, the FDLR suspected he was going to defect, so another FDLR soldier was ordered to shoot him. However, that soldier missed the shot – although the

---

[45]Author interview 6, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[46]Author interview 7, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[47]Author interview 19, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

suspected defector was injured badly – so he had to kill him. Afterwards, he was put in a jail in the forest. After she learned about what happened, his wife visited Rwanda to see what it was like there. When she saw that all was good, she returned to get him. However, when the FDLR learned of her return, they poisoned and then tried to kill her because they were convinced she was trying to get him out of jail so they could leave. She became so ill from the poison that she had to be hospitalized for a year and a half to recover. Her husband was finally released from jail because he convinced the FDLR leadership that he wanted to visit his wife one last time before she died. When he met her at the hospital, they quickly made plans to escape and ultimately made it safely to Rwanda.[48]

The life of an FDLR member is one in which every aspect of one's existence is restricted, controlled, and confined. It is reported that every combatant is a potential spy; any indication of planning to leave was immediately considered a treasonous act to be reported on to leadership. It also was considered a criminal act if someone knew of another's plan and did not report it. In the FDLR, treason carried an automatic death sentence. If anyone was able to leave without getting caught, the risk was still high because any family members left behind would be killed. This fear of personal death or retribution levied against one's loved ones was heard consistently in discussions with the subjects, preventing their defection.

7.2.3.1 Additional Reasons for Staying with the FDLR: Ex-Combatants

Along with the previous reasons noted for staying with the FDLR and not returning to Rwanda, or laying down arms and resettling elsewhere, was one other consideration expressed by the ex-combatants for not defecting.

Fear of Returning with Nothing

The ex-combatants related that some fears of returning to Rwanda were rather practical; many were afraid to go back to Rwanda with nothing—no money, no skills, no home. However, they nonetheless were relatively certain that they would not face justice or be killed. They felt that being in the forest – a life they knew how to manage – was preferable to the poverty they feared they would face in Rwanda. As one ex-combatant explained, "I didn't return sooner because I didn't have any money. So I wanted to earn money and be able to have a home and support my family [in Rwanda]. But I just got caught up."[49]

---

[48]Author interview 2, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[49]Author interview 19, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

7.2.3.2 Additional Reasons for Staying with the FDLR: Key Experts

The key experts provided three other reasons that combatants might be loath to defect.

No Active Connection to Rwanda

First, they suggested that those without an active connection to Rwanda would not have a trusted source for information on the reality in-country and thus no reason to question the messaging of leadership. This group would largely although not exclusively consist of younger Rwandans who were either small children when they were brought to DRC or had been born there. Others in this group included those who had lost all family – or lost contact with them – during the war period in Rwanda and/or subsequent fighting in DRC. Furthermore, those with no family or friends in Rwanda had no emotional connection to the people or the country that would further pressure them to return.

Reluctant to Give up Power of the Gun

A second reason experts suggested that combatants within the FDLR might not defect is that, although unhappy, they may be reluctant to give up a life of moderate power with a gun. Those who own guns and have achieved a significant rank may yield a relative degree of power. They can steal at will from the population, command and direct troops, and – if they follow the FDLR rules – gain some notoriety and popularity within the group. The key experts argued that this pull of power likely impacts the decision among some combatants for staying in the forest. The idea that some power comes with being an armed soldier in the forest was reinforced by discussions with ex-combatants, but none considered it a sufficient reason to stay because of the danger, fear, and difficulty of being a soldier who must fight to live and steal to survive. Gettleman (2010, 73) contended that those with guns are "opportunistic" and "predators," where "terror has become an end, not just a means." However, it is not certain that FDLR rebels are all predators or opportunists; given the social-reform objectives of the conflict and decades-long commitment by many without any significant financial payouts to members, it may be that this understanding proposed by Gettleman (2010) does not align—at least not with those queried for this study (although admittedly not a representative sample).

Fear of the Unknown

Finally, combatants may not defect and return to Rwanda, explained the key experts, because of their fear of the unknown. Although combatants hear from former colleagues or family speaking on the

radio or by telephone, FDLR leaders tell them that the messages are falsified and that the people are speaking under duress and will be jailed or killed once they have delivered their messages. Without real-time video feeds or other sources of information to triangulate against the propaganda espoused by the FDLR leaders, the combatants fear what will happen if they return. For many, leaving their known life in the forest with friends and family – even if it is sometimes difficult – might be preferable to that of the unknown.

These findings and input from both key experts and ex-combatants suggest that defection programming can have an impact on those who are staying for reasons of fear, propaganda, and not knowing how to escape. During interviews, former FDLR leaders explained that hardliners and ideologues – for whom the propaganda has had a strong impact – struggle with the decision to return due to issues of trust. Information operations can allay their fears of Rwanda and loss of livelihood with stories shared by cohorts and other trusted actors who did return. Information operations also can address the problem of propaganda by providing consistent messaging across numerous mediums, undermining the relationship and trust between soldiers and leaders and driving them to question their membership and beliefs, among other efforts. Last, these findings suggest that international organizations can play a greater role in helping those who are interested in escaping to develop plans, find safe routes, and ensure that families are protected during the defection process.

7.3 EX-COMBATANTS' MOTIVATIONS FOR DEFECTION: SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PEACE

This discussion about ex-combatants' reasons for voluntary defection addresses Research Questions 3a and 3b: Are ex-combatants' reasons for defection in line with SHD theory and positive- and negative-peace theory? The discussion reviews the ex-combatants' reasons for defection aligned first with SHD theory and then with positive- and negative-peace theory.

7.3.1 Ex-Combatants' Motivations for Defection: SHD Categories

A more informative approach to understanding the rebels' input about their reasons and motivation for defection aligns feedback with the core categories of SHD theory. This answers one of the key questions of the study (Research Question 3a): Are the findings cited for defection in line with SHD theory?

SHD theory relates directly to factors driving conflict emergence and stabilization following conflict. As noted by the UN (1987, I.4), "[a] world in which poverty and inequity are endemic will always be prone to ecological and other crises." This argument supports the basic conflict-equation motivators discussed throughout this study on grievance and greed. However, the broader goal of "satisfaction of human needs and aspirations," which underlies meeting inequity and addressing capabilities are less specifically defined concepts (United Nations 1987, I.4). In endorsing the SHD theory, the UNDP (1997, 10) report on good governance explained the objective of SHD as "expanding the choices for all people in society," especially those who are burdened with poverty or exclusion and those of future generations. It is important that this definition includes both structural reforms to ensure opportunity and freedom as well as direct reforms to ensure that environmental and other life-dependent systems are protected. This echoes the structural and direct conceptual thinking espoused by Galtung (1964, 1969) in the positive- and negative-peace framework. Ensuring that the "basic needs of all" are met and that "all (have) the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for a better life" is the foundation on which SHD is built (United Nations Development Program 1987, 3.27). This is consistent with the UN report, *Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*, which described the goal of SHD to be the making of "development sustainable to ensure it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (United Nations 1987, 2.1).

The UNDP (1997) further divides the SHD objectives into five themes: empowerment, cooperation, equity, sustainability, and security. These themes do not have discrete indicators associated with them. However, to further the five core themes of SHD, two additional products were developed to measure the achievement of human development (United Nations Development Program 1997). The first is the *UNDP Human Development Report*, an annual report that evaluates country achievements in human development, defined by people, opportunities, and choices (United Nations Development Program 2015a). The second product is the supporting *Human Development Index*, which measures people's capabilities using proxy indicators along three dimensions including a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living (United Nations Development Program 2015b). These two tools, along with the five core categories in the UNDP (1997) policy-guidance document on governance and SHD, provide ample information to measure the concepts first articulated by Sen in his promotion of the

capabilities theory as it relates to the SHD research aspect of the study (Sen 1993, 1999). The five themes are explored as they compare to the ex-combatants' input.

The concept of empowerment articulated by the UNDP (1997) relates to the opportunity for every person to exercise choice with regard to the pursuit of livelihood (among other areas) as a completely free agent. It addresses the conditions within which one functions that allow for empowerment to be experienced and pursued. From this, the findings from the study's subjects that indicate a desire to seek a better life for one's family and children as well as a better life for oneself, family pressure to allow for the pursuit of a better life, search for personal freedom, and escape from the absence of freedom easily relate to this notion of empowerment.

The other selected reason added to the empowerment category as an explanation for defection is disillusionment and lowered morale due to lies and lack of promised support. In context, this marked the subjects' expression of frustration over the lack of support to pursue one's goals, the loss of decision-making abilities for one's self and family due to the unfulfilled promises or lies told, and the inability to expand one's choices due to being held hostage to others' promises. These frustrations most directly place this reason in the empowerment classification.

Cooperation, or the sense of belonging and combined effort for shared purpose, also related directly to several of the subjects' motivations for leaving the rebel group. Both missing family and friends in Rwanda and missing Rwanda were expressions of loneliness and the absence of compassion and fulfillment in the forest among members of the rebel group. In conversation, these discussions concentrated on ideas of belonging, friendship, and togetherness. Feeling out of place – like one's life purpose was not meant to be fulfilled in the forest – also came through in the interviews, placing these two motivations in the cooperation category.

The expression of poor treatment, such as feeling abused and uncared for and facing internal infighting and an absence of force cohesion, also reflected the subjects' longing for cooperative and fulfilling relationships. Although not as personally hurtful but related was the notion that the loss of trusted leaders and friends, either to defection or death (i.e., defection of leaders, defection of friends, and trauma), also detracted from the shared purpose, meaning, and feelings of group cohesion and cooperation. Finally, the mission failure experienced by the group – the inability to come together to succeed and the lack of

fulfillment or expression of disappointment – also broadly related to the cooperation concept. These reasons for defection cited by the ex-combatants also fit within the cooperation category outlined by the UNDP (1997).

In exploring the concept of equity, not only in the direct sense of assured equal opportunity but also in the administrative sense of equal representation and access to a participatory governance system (Kates, Parris, and Leiserowitz 2005; United Nations 1987), two clear motivations from the interviews stood out. The first was the feeling that there had been a change of heart, or a changed system of belief and ideology, different from the Hutu extremist view espoused by the rebel-group leadership and more toward a democratic view, as represented in Rwanda. Many expressed that they no longer believed in what they were fighting for—to the contrary, that what they understood Rwanda had achieved in areas of equality, reconciliation, and unity was what they wanted to support. The second reason that fit into the equity category was the search for gender equality, one that directly fulfilled the concept of equity.

The next category identified as a key objective for SHD is sustainability, or the notion that each future generation should be endowed with the same capabilities, resources, and opportunities to fulfill their basic needs. This is the core foundation for SHD theory, one that encompasses broad-ranging concepts from employment and shelter to natural-resource protection and climate change. Two clear reasons emerged from the subjects that best matched the sustainability category. The first reason, seeking medical care, educational opportunities, and food for one's children and family, clearly articulates the desire to provide for the next generation. The other reason, guilt over actions committed in the rebel group, also fits in that subjects expressed guilt at limiting others of their personal sustainability, rights, and opportunities to meet their basic needs.

The fifth area addressed by the UNDP (1997) is security, or the right to pursue a livelihood free of dangers, insecurity, and risk—whether directly or structurally. The three justifications for defection from combatants that fit most directly in this category were insecurity and fighting in DRC, unwanted by Congolese; experienced traumatic event, loss of friends and family due to death from fighting or preventable disease; and poor and corrupt leadership. The first two justifications represent direct aspects of security, including death, violence, and trauma. The third justification of poor and corrupt leadership relates to the structural aspect of security and therefore is included in this category.

Because the interviews and justifications were derived in qualitative and narrative discussions, some of the reasons provided did not clearly fit with the concepts outlined individually but instead related to SHD as a whole. The two that stood out in this regard address (1) the pull to the good and improved life opportunities in Rwanda; and (2) the push from the rebel group due to a litany of issues regarding a harsh life in the forest with no future prospects, in which the subject has little opportunity, choice over destiny, or alternate livelihood to pursue. These two reasons – which, incidentally, are the most popular reasons cited by the subjects – address the entire notion of SHD theory and therefore do not fit in any one category. Rather, they fit best in an overarching category that has been so designated.[50] Figure 22 shows the graphic breakdown of respondents' answers as organized along the SHD categories.

Figure 22 **Ex-Combatants' Defection Reasons Classified by SHD Categories (% Cited)**

Analysis shows that the reasons for defection cited by the ex-combatants align with the SHD themes. The results suggest that attention to messaging (along with legitimate policy backing the concepts) that articulates the thematic areas (i.e., empowerment, cooperation, equity, sustainability, and security) would be useful to encourage defection among rebels. For example, messaging could address the lack of

---

[50]See Appendix IV for a complete listing of the reasons selected for each category as reflected in Figure 22.

support received within the group to highlight the theme of cooperation and target notions of personal fulfillment absent in the organization. Moreover, messaging could reinforce the failures of the group and the successes in Rwanda to achieve the aims of unity, justice, reconciliation, and development. These types of targeted discussions could be impactful in encouraging rebels to consider laying down arms.

7.3.2 Ex-Combatants' Motivations for Defection: Positive- and Negative-Peace Categories

Another area that this study sought to evaluate was the alignment of ex-combatants' reasons for defection as compared to the positive- and negative-peace framework. Are the concepts found in large-N sets of analyses that link peace and conflict aligned with input from beneficiaries? Or, as stated in Research Question 3b: Are findings cited by defectors in line with findings on peace and stabilization found in positive and negative peace? Here, the reasons given are compared to findings from the IEP GPI analysis, based on Galtung's (1964, 1969) positive- and negative-peace framework for stability, and consistent with the guidelines directed for peace and stability under the UN Sustainable Development Goal (UNSDG) 16.[51]

Negative peace is the absence of direct violence and positive peace is the absence of structural violence. The IEP provides criteria for evaluating these two aspects of peace that guide both stabilization planning and peace building. Positive-peace indicators and pillars are statistically associated with negative peace; where positive-peace indicators are high, negative-peace indicators also are high. Thus, where the pillars of positive peace are being met within a country, there is less likelihood for fragility and the outbreak of conflict; where they are not being met, a country is less resilient to disruption, violence, and the absence of peace. The eight pillars used to measure positive peace are sound business environment, good relations with neighbors, high levels of education, acceptance of the rights of others, low levels of corruption, well-functioning government, free flow of information, and equitable distribution of resources (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016). The one pillar used to measure negative peace is simply the absence of violence (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016).[52] Given that these factors are statistically derived as leading to stability, it is informative to understand whether ground-level reasoning for defection from combatants resonated with these notions.

---

[51]See UNSDG 16 at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16 and Chapter 2 of this study.
[52]See Chapter 3 for more on the Pillars of Peace.

The statistically derived indicators for each pillar of peace, however, do not directly align with or mimic the motivations cited for defection by the subjects. However, taken as a whole, the pillars of positive peace and the indicators of negative peace do represent the ex-combatants' reasoning when evaluated as distinctions between structural and direct violence or, more broadly, as "the presence of the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies" versus "the absence of direct violence or fear of violence" (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016, 55). Thus, reviewing the subjects' reasons in this light reveals the following: reasons for defection that relate to issues regarding health, development, quality of life, equality, freedom, unity, governance, and trust in leadership are categorized as structural or positive peace-related issues. Reasons cited by the subjects that refer to violence, fear, insecurity, trauma, and disunity are categorized as direct or negative peace-related issues. There were some outlier issues that the subjects highlighted, predominantly those related to the competence and size of the rebel group and defections from it. These motivators for defection did not fit in either of the first two categories and therefore are classified as non-aligned for this discussion (Figure 23).[53]

The findings that emerge when aligning input from subjects with positive and negative peace suggest that in developing programming and evaluating conditions for encouraging defection, issues of


Figure 23 **Defection Reasons Classified by Positive and Negative Peace (% Cited)**

---

[53]See Appendix V for a complete listing of the reasons selected for each category of Positive and Negative peace as reflected in the figure.

positive peace – or those areas that address the educational, health, and development needs of society, as well as the regulatory frameworks for business development, strong and democratic institutions, and equitable treatment of all citizens – should be prioritized when considering how to structure an environment that is appealing to combatants considering defection. However, because 25% of the most popular reasons are aligned with negative-peace achievements (i.e., those relating to the absence of violence) also means that information about security and safety is important to rebels. Overall, these findings suggest that defectors reached a point at which peace and security were prioritized over the objectives of the rebel group.

It is interesting that despite the cautions of many Western academics regarding the relations between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda – specifically arguing that the current administration in Rwanda is biased toward Tutsis, that Hutus are systematically oppressed, and that justice has not been fairly applied to both Hutus and Tutsis following civil war and genocide – none of the ex-combatant interviewees expressed concerns regarding ethnicity. However, this does not mean that those concerns were not present. As explained in Chapter 5, distinguishing anyone on the basis of their ethnicity was outlawed in Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda 2001); subsequently, few people openly discuss or even use the terms *Hutu* and *Tutsi*.

While exploring the challenges faced by ex-combatants within their communities, among other Rwandans, and their perceptions of the government, many expressed gratitude simply to be in a place where no armed fighting or physical threats existed. As one ex-combatant said, "The Rwandan government are like parents—they treat us like we are their kids. They give us money, useful tools, and in a few months they check in!"[54] Another ex-combatant, in expressing his gratitude, said: "We come back [from DRC] inhuman, and at Mutobo, they show us another angle, they show us people [Hutus and Tutsis] from another angle. They give us vocational training, teach us, and really change our minds. If we returned and didn't go to Mutobo, we would probably just start killing again."[55] It was impossible to discern whether this was a sincere emotion among the subjects or a programmed response to an outside interviewer. When the ex-combatants were pressed for more in-depth discussions about the challenges they experienced on returning, most expressed frustration over their own lack of skills, employment, education, and means of survival.

[54]Author interview 20, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[55]Author interview 33, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

These limitations, they said, were their own fault for fighting in the forest for so long and not coming home sooner. Many said they were frustrated after seeing how far their cohorts who had not continued fighting had progressed.

That the IEP (2015) consistently rates Rwanda as high and as improving in areas of positive and negative peace aligns with the reasons cited for defection by the ex-combatants and their perceptions of the progress Rwanda has made. These findings are despite the limitations of the constitution exhibited in the decision to change the presidential term limits for President Kagame, the limits on free speech and free association, and the human-rights protections in the state. It is possible that the former rebels simply value peace, security, and development over personal freedoms. In conducting large-scale, population-based surveys in eastern DRC (and elsewhere in-country), where the population was subject to widespread violence, Vinck et al. (2008, 2) found that a majority of the civilians prioritized peace and security over other needs:

> The population of eastern DRC views peace (51% of respondents) and security (34%) as not only their two priorities, but also the two priorities that the Congolese government should pursue. Concerns about peace and security are followed by various social security concerns such as money (27%), education (26%), food/water (26%), and health (23%).

It is possible that former combatants, when subjected to questions about priorities moving forward after defecting from an armed rebel group, responded similarly regarding preferences and priorities for the Rwandan regime.

The "cashing in" of their commitment to the group and the promised pay-out of membership, viewed through the positive- and negative-peace lenses, certainly suggests that both the absence of violence and the presence of institutions and environments that align with positive peace are important to combatants. Whether these same findings would emerge when querying rebels after two or five years of fighting versus after 15 or 20 years of findings to explore broader case relevance would require larger study resources. For this case, however, these findings offer relevant insight for potential programming to encourage the defection of remaining FDLR combatants by addressing the positive and negative peace achieved in Rwanda during the years they spent isolated in the forests of eastern DRC.

7.4 PREVENTING FUTURE RECRUITMENT INTO ARMED REBEL GROUPS

Rebel groups operate most successfully when they have a reliable supply of able-bodied, recruitable fighters. In implementing programming that targets human-feasibility factors in rebel groups, it is important to focus not only on measures that encourage defection but also those that can prevent future recruitment. Among the FDLR, this supply of personnel comes predominantly from the Rwandan refugee population still living in DRC (i.e., those who fled the war in 1994), current rebel-fighters' children, and Congolese children who are kidnapped by various units. Questions posed to the defected ex-combatants on how to stymie future recruitment resulted in five core recommendations specifically applicable to the case of the FDLR in eastern DRC but also to other environments with similar challenges. These recommendations answer Research Question 4: What is recommended by ex-combatants to prevent future recruitment into rebel groups?

7.4.1 Programmatic Recommendations for Preventing Recruitment: Ex-Combatants

The primary objective raised by ex-combatants regarding the prevention of a supply of personnel for the FDLR to continue fighting is to deny the group access to recruitable, vulnerable populations, which means limiting or halting the disinformation and propaganda campaign about the conflict. However, many ex-combatants cautioned that, in many ways, preventing recruitment is impossible: children are physically kidnapped from their home areas; people are kidnapped and held without ransom, forced to fight for their freedom; vulnerable individuals are lied to and manipulated into joining; children may see soldiers with guns as powerful members in the community and join regardless of their parents' and families' objections; and yet others will continue to believe in the mission and will join to fight for a cause in which they believe. One former fighter said, "There is no way to prevent the recruitment. From the outside, soldiers look strong and kids will want to join. Until they are inside, then they will see life is not good and soldiers are not as strong. But the FDLR gets new soldiers by forcibly recruiting Rwandans [refugees] or Congolese. They can't be stopped."[56] For many, the ex-combatants cautioned, there is no stopping the recruitment. However, for others, there are steps that, in their estimation, could slow or halt certain recruitment aspects, as illustrated in Figure 24.

---

[56]Author interview 35, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Education

By far the most common recommendation cited the ex-combatants to limit recruitment was to ensure that education was provided for children at the refugee camps (as well as for other Rwandan populations in the area). First, they said, when it can be ensured that children attend school regularly and that their schedules are monitored by family or community groups, they

Figure 24 **Ex-Combatants' Recommendations for Preventing Recruitment to Rebel Groups**

are less vulnerable to being physically targeted by rebel recruiters. More important, however, is that children who are educated are more critical thinkers and more difficult to convince to join a rebel group. Second, they advised, it is important to ensure that education is objective—that it teaches an objective version of history, that it depicts an authentic version of Rwanda, and that it addresses the extreme challenges of a life fighting in the forest. Moreover, they said, children too often learned falsehoods from teachers who themselves were uninformed, biased, or propagandists for the FDLR. Third, if children are taught peaceful ways to manage their conflicts, they will learn that there is a way other than armed fighting and not be tempted to pick up a gun.

International Organizations

The next recommendation to prevent recruitment involved the role of the IOs operating in the region and at the refugee camps. Ex-combatants first recommended that MONUSCO and other regional IOs relocate closer to the camps to provide better and more visible security, which would deter rebels from entering, engaging, and kidnapping youth for rebel-group activity. Too often, they said, rebels were freely entering and exiting the camps, influencing youth, and threatening them if they were not planning to join the FDLR when they were old enough or physically capable.

The second recommendation on the role of IOs in the region pertained more broadly to spending priorities of groups in the region. According to some ex-combatants, the UN, under MONUSCO, spent too much money on military responses to the FDLR instead of on developmental programs in the region. This was problematic on two fronts: first, the lack of investment in development projects meant that there were limited direct and indirect alternative professional opportunities for youth and others in the community, which elevated the role of a rebel fighter as a professional prospect. Second, the military engagements (including both Rwandan and Congolese military elements) often were harmful to the local population. This encouraged more people to fight against these actions, thereby driving up recruitment for the rebel group. Development projects, some argued, could provide alternate occupational options; support local populations; and provide a positive, stabilizing force across the region. As one ex-combatant explained:

> *Putting MONUSCO in the DRC to do military interventions was a waste. If they take half the money to do infrastructure, like roads and water, it would create jobs and people would be too busy to fight. They should spend UN money on development. The military is not a good strategy because the populations become the victims [i.e., they get wounded in crossfire, lose land, and get recruited to fight with the rebels]. Militaries can apply pressure, but it is not worth it.[57]*

Third, if military operations are not successful and when rebel groups or their leaders are not eviscerated, this can have negative repercussions by driving up recruitment, playing into the rebel propaganda, and negatively impacting local populations. If adults and youth in the refugee camps and other impoverished communities in eastern DRC could pursue viable alternatives to becoming an armed rebel to provide for their family, argued some of the ex-combatants, fewer people would be influenced to join in the first place.

Fourth, many ex-combatants believed that the IOs in the region – particularly those managing the refugee camps – were incentivizing people to stay as refugees in DRC and not return home. This is because at the camps, the ex-combatants explained, people received food, housing, and education and generally were not required to fend for themselves. Thus, why would anyone leave? The lifestyle in the camps, they argued, needed to be seen as contributing to the problem of recruitment and reevaluated. As one ex-combatant explained, "The international community does it wrong. They only help and feed the refugees at

---

[57]Author interview 40, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

the camps. So, then they stay because they know if they go home, they will have to work for food. Why would they leave when they can get food for free? And since they stay, they are used by the rebels. They [i.e., the IOs] need to make it less easy to stay."[58] The continued presence of refugees in the camps, reluctant to return home to Rwanda, created a population from which the rebels could recruit. Some thought that if the refugee camps were more focused on getting refugees back to Rwanda – or into stable communities in DRC, away from the fighting with self-sustaining opportunities – there would be fewer sources from which the FDLR could recruit.

Repatriation Programming

Another issue many of the ex-combatants highlighted was the need to develop broader repatriation programming. Many argued that if large-scale repatriation to Rwanda could be encouraged among the refugees, there then would be no population from which the rebel groups could recruit. They recommended programming that could help refugees to understand that returning home to Rwanda is a safe option. Some recommended that former combatants who had defected, or refugees who had returned home, could speak to them about the reality of life in Rwanda. This would counter the misplaced beliefs about Rwanda not being safe for them (as Hutus), which they had harbored for years. They believed that increased contact – in person, by telephone, or by skype – with those who had returned home before them could encourage more returnees.

Information Operations

To encourage the repatriation programming, many of the ex-combatants interviewed recommended finding multiple avenues through which to share information about what refugees could expect on their return to Rwanda. Many thought information-operations campaigns that explained contemporary Rwandan policies on reconciliation, development, and refugee-assistance programming would help to overcome the uncertainty about returning. The programs could sensitize families to their options on return, explain where and how they would live, and reconnect them to family and friends in Rwanda. Whatever information could be shared to encourage an understanding that going home to Rwanda was a better option than staying and allowing their children to become fighters in the forest was viewed by the ex-combatants as positive for limiting recruitment.

---

[58]Author interview 39, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Incentives

Finally, some of the ex-combatants considered whether offering incentives with the information operations might encourage refugees to return home and not be liable to recruitment. They recommended that educational and vocational training programs be offered on return as a way to incentivize people to leave the camps. Others thought that disincentives to becoming a rebel by the host country would be a good approach. For example, they explained, in DRC when rebel groups become strong, the government negotiates a deal, pays them off, and then incorporates them into the national military. This system encourages rebel activity instead of limiting it and should be halted to prevent the growth of existing and new rebel factions. As one ex-combatant explained:

> *When small groups in the DRC rise up, they lay with the FDLR and learn how to fight until they grow to be big. Then the government [of DRC] approaches them to come into the government. It is a huge problem because they are incorporated into the government. So, to have a good life [in DRC], you become a rebel first and then get into the government.*[59]

7.5 ENCOURAGING FUTURE DEFECTIONS FROM ARMED REBEL GROUPS

A key area explored in this research is the beneficiary input about possible future programming presented in Research Question 5: What is recommended to encourage increased defection from armed rebel groups? Those beneficiaries who are targeted for programming are not engaged often enough for participation in planning and future programmatic development. This study actively sought to close that gap by exploring concepts, input, and recommendations from the target beneficiaries – that is, ex-combatants who have voluntarily defected – and what they would recommend to encourage future voluntary defections from non-state armed rebel groups. A report by African Rights (2007, 78) noted: "The FDLR fighters who are now living in Rwanda are the best vehicle for convincing those who are still in the DRC to lay down their arms. It is clear that they themselves had been influenced by the information they had obtained, regarding their families, the fate of ex-combatants in Rwanda and about conditions in the country, from those who had preceded them."

Whereas incorporating the input of beneficiaries is crucial and not covered extensively in most programming concerning ex-combatants, key experts with global experience, advanced training, and

---

[59]Author interview 40, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

practical field experience also can contribute important insight for considering new programmatic approaches. Therefore, they also were queried (separately) for the study about recommendations for developing enhanced programs to increase voluntary defections from non-state armed groups.

During the discussions, subjects from both units of analysis were asked to imagine development programs based on their knowledge of "what works" and without any financial limits. They were invited to consider the acute situation in eastern DRC with the FDLR or to think more broadly about how other conflicts (e.g., Burundi, Somalia, Nigeria, South Sudan, and others) might benefit.

Findings from the discussants revealed that there was significant overlap on several of the key recommendations presented. Figure 25 shows the core recommendations and areas of overlap between the main unit of analysis (i.e., the ex-combatant defectors) and the subunit of analysis (i.e., the key experts). The shared concepts are the five categories listed in the center of the figure. That both beneficiaries and experts highlighted these principal areas for future enhanced programming suggests that they are areas to be seriously considered. However, strong concepts also emerged repeatedly, independent of the shared categories by each group, which also merit serious evaluation for future programs.

7.5.1 Recommendations for Defection Programming: Ex-Combatants and Key Experts

Ex-combatants and key experts shared numerous programmatic recommendations for encouraging defection (Figure 25), including enhanced information operations, communications technology support, targeting of specific groups or individuals for defection, broader IO support, and application of defection incentives. The recommendations often were linked to personal experience, whether from the defected ex-combatant or the key expert, and therefore were quite detailed. Each of the following suggestions, in the author's assessment, merits additional research and, if modified and tailored to a specific case, could be evaluated for broader application to cases outside of Rwanda.

Information Operations

As discussed previously, information operations are communications directed by a government or other organizational entity with the goal of

Figure 25 **Recommendations for Defection Programming from Ex-Combatants (L) and Key Experts (R)**

delivering specific messaging, often intended to undermine group cohesion, sensitize beneficiaries to outside information, or pass along threats or warnings to an opposition party. The group directing the messaging often will not identify itself or will use intermediaries or messengers to carry out its programming. The ex-combatants seemed well aware of these techniques and objectives (perhaps due to tactics deployed by the FDLR in areas of information operations) and offered sophisticated input covering how such messaging could be carried out, by whom, in what format, and to what end to support increased voluntary defection. This was an area echoed by the key experts.

Ex-combatants suggested that information about Rwanda, its changed policies, where to get help, and how to defect would best be passed along to active combatants by persons of trust, authority, and respect, including the following:

- Family members.

- Trusted and well-known combatants who had already defected.

- Local (Congolese or other) friends in the community who can act as "ambassadors" for Rwanda by delivering information.

- Local NGOs and churches where rebels may go to pray. And,

- Trusted and senior figures from the *muzungu*[60] community who would have the authority and access to share information and address the troops.

Like the ex-combatants, key experts believed this medium for outreach offered several strong options for accessing and engaging combatants to return home. Their recommendations included suggestions that the messaging target concrete issues, such as in areas of development and propaganda. For example, they suggested highlighting familial strain in the forest and the lack of education and healthcare for children. Concerning propaganda, they suggested countering the false information of the leaders with factual information to undermine the propaganda. For example, providing pledges that non-*génocidaires* would not be prosecuted because of their time spent with the FDLR; reassuring rebels that when they return, they will be welcomed back into the community; and using real-time video feeds or skype to prove that defected rebels who returned to Rwanda were not killed but instead received education, training, and support. One key expert explained that "to encourage defection, we need to work with those who have experienced the positive sides of the country [Rwanda], and show how well they [the rebels] were received to those still in the forest. We need to show how they are the force of the country, that we work together, and that they are well received. Also, when they are well received, they try to do good too."[61] Key experts noted that any messaging should be current and context-specific. Like the ex-combatants, they also recommended that convincing messengers would be those who already defected and reintegrated, were strong communicators, and were well known to many in the bush.

The ex-combatants suggested that messaging tone and information delivery should be consistent across outlets and delivered regularly. This type of approach will allow rebels to triangulate diverse sources of information to reach the same outcome. To most effectively reach the rebels, ex-combatants recommended that first, messages should be reflective of the conflict specificities, such as the history in the region, local politics, traditions, and cultures. As one ex-combatant explained:

> *We know why they don't want to come back to Rwanda but we can change their thinking. For example, people who think they will have to come to Rwanda by force must see that it is an impossible mission. They have to understand that the ideological thinking is over in Rwanda and must come to see there is equality. They need to see how much development*

---

[60]*Muzungu* is a Swahili word broadly meaning "foreigner," usually pertaining to white Europeans and Americans.
[61]Author interview with the village chief, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

is achieved. Some think life is easy in Congo, but the kids have no education, no rights.
They need to see at least in Rwanda you can come and have a good life and a future.[62]

Second, messaging should always be respectful: when speaking directly to combatants, via radio or other mass-messaging medium, rebels should be addressed by their proper rank and title; their knowledge and experience should be respected; and their roles understood to demonstrate that the equality promised in Rwanda is practiced and not only a policy on paper. This will build trust and reassure rebels that their life's work, albeit as rebels in the forest, will be considered valuable if they return to Rwanda.

Third, some ex-combatants suggested using female interlocutors to deliver messaging because women are naturally better communicators, more emotive and passionate in their speaking, and more sentimental. This, they argued, would drive messages more directly to the heart of the combatant, not only the head. One combatant wisely noted, "[i]n the forest, people can lose their humanity—if you speak to them in a way that helps them regain their sense of self and humanity, they will make the right decision and return home."[63]

Finally, rebels suggested that the content include both peace messaging, such as success stories of those who have already defected and returned, and political and policy-related information about the country, as well as targeted messaging to sow discord and disunity in the group. Specific recommendations included reassurances to rebels that they will not face justice for their acts within the FDLR, they will receive support from the government, their families and communities are ready to welcome them, there is equality among ethnic groups, development and good governance have taken the country far—and they can be a part of the success.

Communications Technology Support

The second thematic recommendation category routinely cited by both the ex-combatants and the key experts was communications technology support. Many ex-combatants cited the importance of being able to communicate with friends and family in Rwanda while still fighting in the forest and, once they returned, of being able to communicate with those still in the forest to help them leave. Many suggested increasing support in this area by providing free prepaid SIM cards to reach DRC; encouraging more radio

---

[62]Author interview 18, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[63]Author interview 27, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

programs with former combatants who have returned and can share their stories (e.g., the RDRC weekly radio program, "Isange Mu Banyu"[64]); and providing video feeds or real-time skype calls to reassure those in the forest that when their comrades defect, they are not killed. This will begin to undermine the propaganda their leadership delivers.

Communications technology support also was recommended by the key experts. They suggested working with various organizations, such as Voice of America and Radio Okapi (i.e., UN radio in DRC), to message information to the combatants. Ex-combatants offered to work with MONUSCO and other organizations to show them where the FDLR hides in the dense forests so that messages can be directly targeted to them.

Targeting Defectors

A third area of programming that ex-combatants and key experts both recommended was the targeting of specific individuals or groups for defection. Many ex-combatants noted that when learning of trusted leaders or friends who had defected, they felt inspired to consider the idea themselves. One former fighter interviewed said simply, "I was convinced by my friends who had come before me."[65] Thus, in offering programmatic recommendations, many suggested this as an approach that may be successful. It is interesting that lower-ranked ex-combatants suggested it was important to target senior and respected leaders in the organization for defection, arguing that the loss of respected authority figures would diminish morale and lead troops to question their own allegiance. Key experts agreed and suggested that organizations should target leaders for defection programming because their departure might undermine the strength of the group. The notion is that if trusted, respected leaders defect, their defections may force others to confront their efforts as rebels in the forest. Indeed, many combatants cited the impact of the defection of General Paul Rwarakabije and other senior leaders on the declining morale within the group.

Senior or higher-ranked subjects suggested targeting large groups of junior-enlisted ranks to eliminate force strength and demoralize leadership. Regardless of whether senior- or junior-ranked staff in the rebel organization is being targeted for defection, both sets of informants qualified their

---

[64]See Chapter 5 for more information about this radio program.
[65]Author interview 12, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

recommendation based on their belief that the *génocidaires* in the group will never leave because of their fear of persecution as well as their extremist beliefs.

Another area concerning targeting included other resources—both financial resources and armaments. All ranks of ex-combatants argued that targeting weapons or financial resources is more difficult and less effective. Weapons are always available: they can be stolen, purchased on the black market, and acquired through clandestine means. Financial resources, which those among the FDLR did not rely on heavily, are difficult to target because of the secretive transactions conducted by senior leaders.

International Organizations

The fourth area highlighted by both ex-combatants and key experts concerned the role of IOs and the support they could provide. Ex-combatants suggested providing more total resources for resolving and addressing conflict with the FDLR. Many of those interviewed thought that applying pressure on DRC, as well as other countries that offer safe haven to rebels, would be an effective strategy to disrupt the rebel groups and cause combatants to consider defection. Other ex-combatants felt that the rebel group could be easily overcome if simply more resources were applied, but they warned that increasing military pressure would likely not be an effective strategy. Ex-combatants advised caution because they explained that military pressure from the UN, FARDC, and Rwandan military generally led to increased membership within the FDLR. The FDLR was able to manipulate efforts for propaganda purposes among the refugee camps, telling the refugees in essence, "You see, we told you the Tutsis were trying to kill us; this military effort is proof they want us all to die."[66] This is consistent with Olson Lounsbery's analysis (2016), which explained how repercussions against governments for accidental killings of civilians routinely backfire by increasing support for rebel groups.

Furthermore, on the role of IOs, many ex-combatants believed that more rebels would defect if they were confident that they could find a safe place to pursue an alternate livelihood, perhaps with support from various organizations. For example, many ex-combatants thought that if they could have been granted small plots of land elsewhere in Congo, away from the fighting, they could easily live peaceful and productive lives. An ex-combatant explained that many of those in the forest now are "young, poor, and don't know what they will do in Rwanda. They have needs to be met. They are not really concerned about

---

[66]Author interview 11, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

justice because they heard on radio and from family that they will be OK. But they wonder. If there was a way to give them small house or land, it could help [encourage others to return from the FDLR]."[67] Indeed, unemployment is linked to facilitated rebel recruitment (Fjelde 2015). Others argued more broadly that if IOs invested in bigger development schemes in the bush areas where rebels ran rampant, less conflict would emerge in the first place—and opportunities for employment would result from the development investments that rebels could pursue instead of stealing and fighting for their livelihood.

The key experts agreed and suggested that IOs such as the UNHCR and MONUSCO could provide support to potential defectors by providing information, offering safe haven in their offices, and safely transporting them to Rwanda. MONUSCO currently provides this type of assistance to defecting rebels, and UNHCR supports refugees (i.e., civilians and non-rebels) who want to return home to Rwanda.

Defection Incentives

The fifth recommendation of both the ex-combatants and the key experts that emerged during discussions addressed incentives. Ex-combatants did not believe that financial incentives were an effective tool for encouraging defection. Financial incentives do not change people's minds or "how" they think; rather, they provide only a short-term solution, not long-term change. As a former fighter explained, "You can't change the ideology with money. You need to be able to make a decision for yourself. You need to find what triggers those feelings of human emotion – that to kill is not human – and find how to trigger that emotion to change their minds."[68] However, several other suggestions emerged, including educational and vocational training, housing assistance, and land-acquisition incentives.

The key experts also recommended that offering incentives might be an approach for encouraging voluntary defection. For example, incentives such as granting safety and freedom from the pursuit of justice for possible crimes committed in DRC in exchange for participating in rebel-group activity against a sovereign state are important for those considering laying down weapons. The rebels who defected agreed that the support provided in Rwanda was appealing, although none cited incentives as impacting their own decision-making process.

7.5.2 Additional Recommendations for Defection Programming: Ex-Combatants

---

[67]Author interview 14, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[68]Author interview 20, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Although ex-combatants and key experts shared many recommendations, three additional concepts unique to the ex-combatants routinely arose in conversations about how to encourage defection. Recommendations usually referred to suggestions for those specifically still with the FDLR in eastern Congo, as opposed to objective recommendations for any non-state, armed group.

Return Policies of the Government

The first recommendation unique among the ex-combatants concerned the return policies of the government. The policy of the Rwandan government that welcomed rebels back (without prosecution and with assistance) was supported by many of the former rebels. They expressed their gratitude for the policy that allowed them to return to reintegrate and build new lives. While expressing appreciation, many also noted important specifications regarding the return-policy programming.

They said it was important to ensure that clear guidelines are established for returning ex-combatants who have defected. Many are afraid to return because of FDLR leaders' threats. They fear facing justice for crimes in DRC and being killed for having been a FDLR member or for being a Hutu; others fear having no money, no skills, and no home or employment opportunities. The interviewed subjects suggested having clear guidelines to address and cope with these issues, consistently and equally among returnees. Most important, they noted, were the policies as in Rwanda wherein only *génocidaires* are pursued by the courts for their crimes, not rank-and-file combatants. They said that this is crucial for defecting combatants to return in large numbers. They also strongly suggested that future programs include an RDRC-like program at Mutobo[69] to manage returning rebels and to provide training and support on how to reintegrate, find employment, and rebuild successful civilian lives and livelihoods. As one ex-combatant shared:

> *At Mutobo, you are taught to develop yourself. To make a cooperative or a business, with vocational training. You learn to develop. If you come straight from the forest, it is not possible to integrate [in Rwandan society] because you are like an animal, and cannot take that into the community. You need to have help to get rid of that and learn how to cool down and integrate. From Mutobo, we can have a very good life. They give us money and knowledge. Our part is to implement what we learned from Mutobo.*[70]

---

[69]See Chapter 5 for more on the DDR program at Mutobo.
[70]Author interview 27, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

Defected ex-combatants also recommended that government policies on national unity and reconciliation be demonstrated in practice. The communities need to be willing to embrace and welcome home the defectors; returning ex-combatants want to be accepted members of society and not perceived as outsiders or villains. Research agrees: exclusion based on corruption and inequality between groups leads to grievance (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015; Neudorfer and Theuerkauf 2014). Sensitization programs, for both returnees and communities, about how to deal with one another are important for ensuring that when the defectors come home, they stay and do not become spoilers of the peace. Interviewed ex-combatants also agreed that ensuring that the government will always be there to help them – just like the other citizens of the country – is crucial to making sure they can prosper and will not be held back any longer than they already have been. "If the government is welcoming, and we are allowed back with assistance, even though we are poor, it helps because we know we come back to something."[71] They noted that if they do well – find employment, make money, have cell phones and homes for their families – the rebels in the forest will be so jealous that they too will want to return.

Policies of change also need to be documented in law, advised the ex-combatants. Examples cited by the voluntarily defected ex-combatants included the importance of Vision 2020,[72] in which the government stance on reconciliation, unity, and continued development for all Rwandans is codified.

Countering Ideology

A second popular issue cited – and the one that generated great emotion and enthusiasm – concerned recommendations for countering ideology learned in the forest. Informants strongly believed that this aspect of programming – that is, identifying ways to change people's minds – was one of the most important programmatic objectives to undertake. "If," as one ex-combatant said, "you understand why people join rebel groups, you can understand how to help them leave."[73] For example, if people join

---

[71]Author interview 7, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

[72]Vision 2020 (Republic of Rwanda 2012, i) is a government-issued set of development objectives built on six thematic areas of development and intended to "construct a united, democratic and inclusive Rwandan identity, after so many years of authoritarian and exclusivist dispensation." The six thematic areas are "good governance, an efficient state, skilled human capital, vibrant private sector, world-class physical infrastructure, and modern agriculture and livestock" (Republic of Rwanda2012, i).

[73]Author interview 20, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

because they have no job opportunities or money, then the propaganda is countered with the means to find jobs and income. A positive step-by-step approach, ex-combatants thought, would work best.

The interviewed subjects also suggested that another strategy to address and counter hate ideology is to undermine the trust built between the soldiers and the leaders who espouse propaganda. If it can be proven to soldiers that the leadership has been lying to them, it will break their bond and lead them to question the leaders and their messaging. For example, it would be helpful if it is proven that when combatants return to Rwanda they are not killed, but rather welcomed.

As with the information-operations recommendations cited previously, ex-combatants believed that the delivery and tone of messaging to counter the hate ideology must come from trusted and multiple sources—and be delivered consistently.

Safe Egress and Passage

Safe egress and passage from the forest to the border with Rwanda or other safe locations to turn oneself in emerged as the third programmatic recommendation unique to the ex-combatant discussions. Many shared harrowing stories of escaping not only the guards of the FDLR but also other rebel-held territory, in the dangers of the forest—just to reach a community or a road, much less one of the few MONUSCO offices. Worse still was if they were caught by the Congolese military (i.e., FARDC), which routinely patrolled and would incarcerate rather than delivering them to the UN or Rwandan government. Therefore, many suggested that finding ways to help rebels physically find their way out – safely and without detection – from the confines of the FDLR and other regional threats would be helpful. Perhaps more MONUSCO (or other organizations able to help) offices could be established or moved closer to FDLR locations. Numerous ex-combatants indicated that they would be willing to guide MONUSCO to the areas the FDLR bases, deep in the forest, so they would know where to offer directed assistance.

7.5.3 Additional Recommendations for Defection Programming: Key Experts

As explained previously, many recommendations to enhance combatant defection through programming were shared by both the ex-combatants and the key experts queried. In addition to the five shared areas of recommendation already noted, key experts offered the following three suggestions: engagement of families and spouses, application of military operations, and assurance of good governance and freedoms for returnees.

Spousal and Familial Engagement for Defection

One of the recommendations most cited by the key experts for developing programming to encourage voluntary defections of active combatants in non-state armed groups focused on the inclusion of spousal and familial engagement. In Rwanda, spouses and families have historically played a pivotal role in advancing voluntary defections.

In the early years following the genocide and the onset of fighting in eastern DRC between Rwandan Hutu rebels with local Congolese groups backed by the Rwandan government, the Rwandan government was already considering how to convince its citizenry that had fled to DRC to return. A key charter of the RPF Constitution included the belief that Rwanda should be a nation for all Rwandans, not one group over another.[74]

The government's return efforts initially were focused on refugee populations living in camps across the border in eastern DRC. However, unusual circumstances near the border on the Rwandan side began to emerge, generating government attention. Many women living alone were beginning to seek health clinics for pregnancy support. The government soon took notice, realizing that their husbands, who were engaged with the Hutu rebel group in DRC, were secretly visiting them. This realization, explained interviewees, prompted the Rwandan government to develop gender-focused programming for women, sisters, mothers, and daughters on how to engage, share information with, and report on family members who were crossing the border from the FDLR.

The NURC, with the Ministry of Gender, hosted various events to engage women in the communities, encourage patriotism among them, and involve them in supporting government efforts to recall Rwandans who were in exile, whether refugees or FDLR rebels. According to the key experts, this program was successful in many instances. Interviews revealed that there were numerous cases in which wives sought out their spouses fighting with the FDLR in Congo and encouraged them, often successfully, to return home. Even today, argued one interviewee, "A lot of women have husbands fighting with the FDLR who would come home if women went to get them. Women are the best to explain [why they should

---

[74]This should be understood as in addition to the Rwandan government's objectives to capture and try all those who perpetrated crimes of genocide in 1994.

return home] because they are sentimental, understand hardship, and are emotional and good communicators."[75]

Good Governance and Leadership

A second area that consistently emerged throughout the interviews on how to better encourage defection focused on good governance and leadership. Many key experts argued that ensuring that defectors know they have a place to return where they will be safe, welcomed, and supported is crucial for generating voluntary defections. It is important that leadership is committed to reconciliation and reintegration—and that programming and policies support these objectives. General good-governance practices and freedoms are essential to successful return and reintegration—and to a lasting peace between the ex-combatants and the populace.

All of the key experts interviewed believed that if rebels witnessed that the policies of development, equality, opportunity, and security were afforded citizens equally, they would find no reason to continue fighting. One expert succinctly noted, in referring to policies of good governance, equality, and unity: "Either we win together, or we lose together."[76] Certainly, efforts to bring about development, equality, opportunity, and security would eliminate some grievance-based motivations. This aligns with the considerations on stability proposed by Galtung (1964, 1969) and with SHD theory, explored in Chapter 3.

Military Operations

The third suggestion among the key experts concerned military operations. Contrary to the input of many ex-combatants, several experts recommended that military operations be utilized to weaken and undermine the rebel group. Specifically, some believed that if a core group of senior leaders could be successfully targeted and eliminated, it would have a significant impact on group direction, organization, and cohesion. This could provide broader opportunity to access individual fighters and convince them to return home voluntarily.

The key experts cautioned that military or kinetic actions should be undertaken carefully so as not to harm any civilians, which would increase support for the rebel group. One expert warned:

> *If you undertake a military attack, you must plan slowly and then launch. If you have the location of the [rebel] leaders, you can strike and remove them. Then the other soldiers*

---

[75]Author interview with the former head of the RDRC, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[76]Author interview with the former head of the NURC, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

will leave if you are successful. But if you make a mistake and hit the population, that population will turn against you and take the problem back to the beginning [i.e., you will be where you started]. You need to be very careful using military force.[77]

Olson Lounsbery (2016) agreed with findings that military efforts that harmed civilians had a negative impact on the supporting government and a positive impact on the opinion of the rebel group. When rebels harmed civilians, however, the civilians' opinion change about the rebel group was negligible.

7.6 LESSONS LEARNED FROM RWANDA

The final discussion topic for the research findings emerges in response to Research Question 6: Can the findings from Rwanda be applied elsewhere? Drawing on the unique expertise of the key experts, as well as input from the ex-combatants, several lessons are to be learned—some of which may be applicable to other situations and others that may require modification to suit the local context.

7.6.1 Defection Programming and the Combatant Life Cycle: Key Experts

The key experts queried for this research were among the founding developers of defection programming in Rwanda. Many led and participated in various aspects, including some who were both former FDLR combatants (predominantly officers) and administrators of the program, following defection and DDR. Others served as senior security-sector–reform partners, political and conflict-history scholars, managers of key justice and reconciliation programs, and other core areas in programming to end conflict with the FDLR in eastern Congo, encourage the voluntary defection of fighters, and

Figure 26 **Lessons Learned by Key Experts in Rwanda on Defection and the Combatant Life Cycle**

---

[77]Author interview with the former head of the RDRC, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

reintegrate them peacefully to ensure a lasting peace in Rwanda. Their intimate experiences and expertise during the past 20 years in Rwanda provided a unique vantage point for explaining defection programming for conflict resolution. During interviews, this unique cadre of experts was queried about the lessons learned to encourage voluntary defection and ensure a lasting peace. They offered eight insightful lessons learned in the Rwanda case (Figure 26).

Leadership and Political Will

The first lesson – and what many experts considered the most important in programming for defection and the life cycle of combatants in Rwanda – encompassed leadership and political will. The lessons apply at both the national and local levels: ideas and ownership must come from both the top and the grassroots to ensure participation, buy-in, and success. As one expert explained, "Leadership starts at the top. You need to have shown moral authority to establish the trust of the population to allow others to follow you."[78]

Leadership, they continued, must be both visionary and disciplined. Visionary leaders have both the vision and the strength (as measured by the buy-in of constituents) to implement policies. Visionary leaders also engage their citizens to identify problems and develop solutions and then guide those ideas through implementation. Finally, visionary leaders generate support and countrywide endorsement by delegating responsibility to encourage local ownership of programs benefiting and impacting the people. For example, a telling case might be the ability of government leaders in Rwanda to engender national support for the former commander of the FDLR (who defected) to lead the government program for encouraging defection and reintegration among his former troops in eastern DRC.

The interviewed experts also cited discipline as an important characteristic of a leader managing defection and reintegration programs for conflict resolution. Disciplined leaders, they explained, possess the moral authority to lead and can engender unity and reconciliation based on their own actions. Disciplined leaders act by example; they demonstrate to the people the reasoned and just approaches that they must aim to emulate. Only when this type of leader is present can monumental programs (e.g., what Rwanda has undertaken to welcome back its citizenry, both rebels and *génocidaires*) succeed with the majority support of its populace. Without leaders who are willing to appoint former political refugees to the

---

[78]Author interview with NURC, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.

cabinet, for example, a country cannot overcome its fears and biases to welcome former rebels who fought against the country.

Both of these qualities highlighted by experts lean toward a charismatic leader or a "Great Man Theory" of leadership, as proposed by Thomas Carlyle (1841). The terminology used by some of the experts to describe the leadership qualities attempted to qualify their input in a meaningful way but may reflect more of an effort at measurably distilling their understanding of President Kagame's unique qualities. Indeed, in the perception of many experts, Kagame's participative style of engagement – such as routinely communicating with everyday Rwandans via Twitter, in which both citizens and the president frequently exchange views, identify policy problems, and share stories and observations – put him in a singular category. This is due to his efforts at decentralization and bureaucratization of power at all levels of government, as well as his transactional and balanced approach to economic growth and development, all combined with a moral authority and earned through modeled public behavior and leadership in the genocide cessation. In discussion, the key experts seemed to indicate as much; indeed, many of those qualities are redemptive and have earned Kagame the trust of much of the population.

Nonetheless, President Kagame's constitutional approval to hold power until 2034 (following the vote to change presidential term limits)[79] should not provide comfort in addressing the succession issue in Rwanda—and, certainly, his authoritarian leadership qualities should not merit emulation in other contexts as a lesson learned for establishing an environment conducive for ex-combatants to defect.

Government Policies and Programming

The second core lesson learned concerned governmental policies and programming. Experts routinely noted the overall importance of good governmental policies. Development that promoted benefit to all and not only some; social services that ensured equal access and opportunity among groups; and policies or laws that reinforced notions that everyone is deserving of support, access, and opportunity went a long way to ensuring an environment capable of safely welcoming back the returning rebels. If groups were not threatened by one another's existence, and division were not sowed through biased and exclusionary policies, citizens would be more able to tolerate governmental efforts that encouraged even regime foes to come back home.

---

[79]See Chapter 5 for more on this.

Again, although these lofty considerations are worthy of repetition in other contexts, they may not entirely capture the reality of the current policy environment in Rwanda. In particular, challenges to the current administration on equitable justice – applied to both Hutus and Tutsis to ensure a stable footing on which the country can continue to advance in areas of peace and development – may serve better as recommendations as opposed to the policies applied by the current administration, which bear the risk of systemic structural discrimination. It is a concern that the current scenario, although held under wraps with fairly strong development indicators and the heavy hand of the security state, may not hold during future transitions of power. History is not on the voters' side: the discrimination issue led to a significant change of power during the first presidential elections in 1965, which ushered in the highly discriminatory government of the PARMEHUTU under President Grégoire Kayibanda. From that period onward, Rwanda has operated as a single-party state, without a fair multiparty election to date (Reyntjens 2015). The risk that a future transfer of power, as yet untested following the genocide, could result in violence may escalate if more opposition voices are not welcomed into the government.

Locally Developed and Locally Owned Context-Specific Solutions

A third lesson learned and highlighted in discussions addressed the importance of locally developed and locally owned context-specific solutions to problems. The key experts noted that there are core best practices for many areas of development in post-conflict programming, but they must be developed and incorporated in concert with local traditions and culture. They further explained that if countries cannot own the problems they experience, they will not be able to address them. In practical terms for Rwanda, explained some experts, this meant that the country was forced to accept blame for the genocide among their own practices, beliefs, policies, and actions. Only then could they work to identify and implement the solutions required to address the problems. As applied to the programming lessons learned for dealing with the ex-combatants, this meant understanding that divides had emerged within society and that concrete programs and policies to address and eliminate them were necessary. For example, Rwandan-government programs that financed the reintegration of rebels were supported by campaigns for both the ex-combatants and the broader population, which guided them on how to live together through mutual understanding.

Comprehensive, Cross-Sectoral Programming

Comprehensive programming from across the public, private, and civil-society sectors was heralded as a fourth key lesson learned for addressing defection and the reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda. Many experts noted that the government alone cannot fix problems; rather, it can facilitate the implementation only through policy development and guidelines. Policies to ensure unity among ethnic groups and the welcoming back of rebels, as well as refugees, must be owned and implemented by local communities. The government, the experts argued, can develop the reconciliation policies; however, to ensure that they are mainstreamed and implemented, the private sector must abide by the guidelines in its hiring and delivery of services; the civil-society groups must act on the policies and develop supporting programs; and the local communities must engage one another for the betterment of all by not excluding or repressing other groups. Experts felt strongly that one sector alone cannot ensure the lasting peace and successful management of any policy, much less one that carries the emotional burden of welcoming back former rebels among neighbors.

Justice and Reconciliation Policies

The fifth area of lessons learned cited by the key experts addressed policies for justice and reconciliation. They cautioned against applying collective punishment, arguing that this approach could create collective grievance. Instead, countries should identify mechanisms that allow for both the pursuit of justice and the achievement of reconciliation. They noted that the most serious cases should be prosecuted in the courts to ensure that a culture of impunity does not exist and that lesser crimes should be addressed fairly and judiciously to hasten justice and reconciliation. This lesson allowed Rwanda to move forward expeditiously with reconciliation programming while still addressing concerns of justice, explained the key experts. As discussed in Chapter 5, the strategy for pursuing justice in Rwanda included three main approaches: the formal court system, the ICTR (in Arusha, Tanzania), and the Gacaca system.[80]

It is interesting and somewhat surprising that during the Author's research in Rwanda on the pursuit of justice and reconciliation and the successes evidenced in contemporary times – in particular, the consistent growth of positive and negative peace (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015) – were perceived by the key experts as having proved successful overall. The applicability elsewhere, the experts cautioned, may be limited because systems were built using local and culturally-traditional mechanisms for

---

[80]See Chapter 5 for more on the pursuit of justice in Rwanda.

addressing grievance and wrongdoing. Nevertheless, they urged other cases and countries to look within

their own heritage to develop similar systems that would be accepted by their populace. Certainly, if efforts

were made elsewhere to mimic the application of justice at the local level, utilizing a culturally appropriate

yet nationally-aligned court system to try criminal perpetrators following a war or genocide, it would be

wise to adhere to the lessons and the cautions learned from the Rwandan and South African experiments of

post-conflict justice.

Ex-Combatant–Focused Programming

Whereas many programs cited as important lessons learned addressed the entire society, key

experts noted that special attention must be given to the defected ex-combatants. Specifically, they cited the

need for strong and coherent repatriation and reintegration programming to ensure long-term stability and

peace. Marginalization of groups, whether ethnic, religious, or otherwise, leads to the emergence of

grievance and violence (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014; Buhaug, Cederman, and Rod 2008;

Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010):

> Conflict with the government is more likely to erupt (1) the more representatives of an
> ethnic group are excluded from state power, especially if they experienced a loss of
> power in the recent past, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity is, and (3) the more
> they have experienced conflict in the past (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 88).

Given this risk, special care and attention must be given to returning fighters to ensure that they

are not held outside the bounds of society. They must be reintegrated and welcomed back among the

citizenry, with the same freedoms and rights afforded the rest of the population. This sixth lesson can be

difficult to implement when the populace is still reeling from the impact of conflict; however, as directed

by the key experts, it is necessary to address early in the process.

Moreover, argued the experts, reintegrating ex-combatants should be of interest to every sector of

society and, as such, should incorporate and delegate responsibility to all sectors. One organization, such as

the RDRC, cannot and should not handle all aspects pertaining to the defection and return of ex-

combatants. Rather, to ensure lasting success, programs must be implemented with the support of local

organs of government, communities, and families. This approach, advocated by experts and implemented

by the RDRC with support from the entire Government of Rwanda, allows for both social and economic

reintegration to be supported, measured, and reinforced in the long term—an approach that is required for successful reintegration programming (Özerdem 2012).

Experts also observed that a smooth transition based on a "fresh start" for returning voluntary defectors can engender an indebted foundation on which ex-combatants are inspired to rebuild their lives. In addition to the educational, skills-training, psychosocial services, and other support provided by the RDRC to former combatants and dependents, this is a good calculus for ensuring that they can successfully transition from soldier to citizen—for the long term.

Finally, key experts noted that establishing a demobilization center, like Mutobo, should be common practice for the pursuit of DDR programs. They further clarified that such a center should be open, free, and not guarded or fenced in to reinforce for the ex-combatants the sense that they are trusted, equal citizens of the state. Moreover, the experts argued, the center should support only those who voluntarily defect; if the rebels are forced, the commitment for change will not be present among their sentiments. When the desire for change does not come from within, they cannot be helped, the key experts claimed. Furthermore, it is important that among the courses offered at the camp there be sensitization for the former rebels about what they can expect to encounter when they return to the community. The demobilization center should provide the tools and skills needed to be successful in their civilian pursuits. Finally, the center or its parent agency should ensure that no former combatant falls far behind; a lifeline of support for the needy, sick, and aged should be assured. These types of input and investment in the ex-combatants, explained the key experts, should set them on a course for success and recommitment to the country.

Sensitization Programming

The seventh lesson learned in Rwanda as discussed by the key experts was that sensitizing the achievements of the country to potential defectors, as well as the refugee populations among whom they socialize and are related, is a good way to encourage defection. The experts suggested several ways in which the information can be shared. First, they advocated for the "Come and See, Go and Tell" program that was instigated by the MIDIMAR to encourage refugees to come home. This program promoted visits to Rwanda for refugees living in eastern DRC (and elsewhere) so they could go to their communities and see how the country had changed, returning afterwards to their refugee camps to share the success stories among their friends. Utilizing media and emissaries also was recommended by the key experts as a lesson

learned. Radio programs hosted by the UN and the RDRC, they observed, influenced many to return. Hearing stories about how the policies had changed and what that meant in practice to other former combatants who had visited and then defected was a lesson that could be learned from Rwanda and applied to other situations.

Good Governance

The eighth important lesson – good governance in the country receiving the defecting ex-combatants – was crucial for ensuring a successful defection and reintegration program. Willems and van Leeuwen (2015) pointed out in their research that good reintegration programming must be situated within the broader post-conflict environment and not isolated. Therefore, good governance is critical for ensuring that returning rebels are successfully managed. As the key experts explained, rebels must be able to return to a country where the seeds that sowed the grievances have been removed; where every group works together toward shared goals; and where every person believes that they are equally accepted in the community, both legally and in practice. Moreover, the application of good governance, they explained, can contribute to ongoing efforts to counter the ideology that led to conflict in the first instance. As one expert noted, bad leadership and poor governance lead to ideologies of hatred, but strong leadership and good governance can lead to positive and inclusive ideologies.

Many of the lessons learned highlighted by the experts have a common refrain among the theories known in the more general areas of good governance and development, whereas other lessons apply to specific issues regarding the plight of reintegrating combatants. However, the complexity of the Rwandan post-conflict development environment in areas of democratic leadership, economic growth, and moral authority again makes it difficult to fully observe this suite of lessons learned in Rwanda (despite being exalted by nearly all of the key experts interviewed). Nevertheless, they are strong and admirable recommendations for future cases to observe. Moreover, in their entirety, they articulate a position that argues for a message of active policy making to address root causes of the conflict, engagement and innovative thinking to promote defection, and long-term solutions to ensure lasting peace in the reintegration of voluntary defectors. Although much of the thinking is situated in the Rwanda context, the lessons of this positive case study about defection programming and coping with former rebels certainly should be learned for future cases.

7.6.1.1 Coping with Returning Ex-Combatants: Key Experts

Rwanda has had a clear program of encouraging rebels to defect and return to Rwanda for almost two decades. Many of the key experts interviewed have been involved with the program (as administrators, funders, consultants, and contributors) for almost as long. The program has seen success in its efforts to encourage the voluntary defection of ex-combatants from the FDLR in eastern DRC to resolve regional conflict as well as in its impressive programming to reeducate and reintegrate the former combatants into society. Although this study focuses primarily on developing effective programming to encourage the voluntary defection of armed combatants, the process is not completed at the point when combatants defect. Rather, for the stability and interest of the country, the entire life cycle of combatants must be considered to ensure lasting success. Lessons learned in the administration of the program from the RDRC and other experts in country were discussed in interviews to add depth to programming for future applications and analysis elsewhere.

The key experts interviewed for this study cited five areas that stood out in the past two decades of addressing conflict resolution with returning ex-combatants (Figure 27).

Building Trust

One of the first and most frequently cited lessons learned by experts working with the defection program in Rwanda was the importance and challenge of building mutual trust between the community and the returning fighters. All experts agreed that achieving a place of mutual trust takes time but must be pursued. Some experts suggested addressing issues of perception among the parties to begin the process of building trust. For example, when


Figure 27 **Key Experts' Thematic Lessons Learned about Coping with Returning Defecting Rebels in Rwanda**

fighters defected and returned, they expected to be killed, imprisoned, or tortured. To address this fear and

begin building a benign relationship, the country enacted a program to welcome former fighters, treating them generously with subsistence support and training. Addressing the fighters' stereotypes about the current Rwandan government meant treating them the same as other citizens. This realization among former rebels – that they were being treated the same and sometimes with added benefits as citizens – stemmed their fears that the community and country would not trust and welcome them.

Balancing Justice and Reconciliation Policies

Trust between the community and the fighters, wherein the community might fear the rebels for their past activities, was linked to another lessoned learned: balancing justice and reconciliation policies in the country. The experts reported that fears in the community primarily concerned welcoming back fighters who had participated in and perpetrated acts of genocide in 1994—650,000 are alleged to have actively participated in the killing, one-tenth of the then-Hutu population (Daly 2002). Thus, the Government of Rwanda devised a policy (implemented by the RDRC) for those who did not participate in the genocide but were willing to voluntarily defect from the FDLR and return home. This program, described in detail in Chapter 5, provided defectors with benefits and reintegration assistance after participating in the RDRC's three-month reeducation program at the Mutobo center. For those who were allegedly *génocidaires* – either returning rebels or otherwise – a different strategy addressed both justice and truth-telling to help the country pursue criminal acts and reconciliation (see Section 7.6.1).[81]

Interpersonal Relations

A third area in which experts cited important lessons was interpersonal relations between former fighters and individuals in their communities. Although national policies of reconciliation regarding returning ex-combatants were clearly articulated and observed under law, face-to-face confrontations between ex-combatants and local community members arose early in the process. Not surprisingly, animosity reemerged between the returning fighters and locals who still regarded one another as enemies. To respond to these local-level conflicts, the government, under NURC, embarked on a countrywide sensitization campaign. Ex-combatants were engaged to tell their stories to the community in which they were resettling. The government sponsored groups of ex-combatants to travel to other communities to share

---

[81]All alleged perpetrators of genocide were tried in a court of law, whether the Gacaca courts, the National Courts, or the ICTR. Being accused by the state of participating in the genocide was not a verdict—trials took place and, indeed, some were found not guilty of the crimes and acquitted.

their experiences and feelings about the country. They discussed their motivation for returning and their recommitment to Rwanda, and they asked for acceptance. This approach, reasoned the government, put the onus of responsibility for repairing damaged relations on the ex-combatants who had returned after fighting against the country. This eased local fears and increased understanding and compassion on the part of the communities welcoming back the former rebels.

Recurring Ex-Combatant Challenges

The fourth area cited, which is ongoing, concerns individual challenges to the ex-combatants. Over time, the key experts noted, recurring personal problems faced by the defecting ex-combatants merited discrete programmatic attention. These problems included feelings of guilt and trauma, for which psychosocial support was added to the Mutobo program; lost familial property, for which the National Land Commission and local authorities were trained to address disputes; family-related challenges of reintegrating, for which regional RDRC workers were coached to mediate; and challenges concerning loss of self-worth, for which the government developed employment schemes to help validate their value as contributing citizens. Bringing in government support to ensure that these personal problems would not translate into large-scale frustration and grievance was crucial, according to the key experts, for a successful transition to civilian life and a commitment to addressing challenges without violence.

Civic Reeducation and Identity

The fifth issue affirmed by the key experts as a lesson learned was the importance of civic reeducation and identity for those who returned. Ensuring that rebels reclaimed their identities as citizens of Rwanda rather than as Hutus, combatants, refugees, or otherwise was considered a key objective. This was consistent with national policies that were enacted to address reconciliation across the entire country. The "Ndi Umuryarwanda," or "I am Rwandan," campaign, launched by President Paul Kagame to reassert national unity following ethnic divisions, had to be applied to the ex-combatants so they could feel united with the populace, the key experts explained. Rebuilding trust and a relationship with the country and engaging them as patriots were considered critical for the long-term stability of the country and the successful reintegration of the ex-combatants. Programs such as those offered at Mutobo, as well as the long-term commitment and support from the government to ensure that the returning rebels received the assistance they needed, have been successful in addressing the former rebels' identity challenges.

7.6.1.2 Next Steps for Coping with Defected Ex-Combatants in Rwanda: Key Experts

Although Rwanda has made significant strides and accomplished much in resolving the conflict with the FDLR by encouraging voluntary defection and repatriation, challenges to the process remain. The program undergoes routine monitoring and evaluation from donors, consultants, and even past rebel graduates of Mutobo, who offer suggestions for future refinement. In conversation with many of those who participated in these reviews (among the key experts interviewed), two areas consistently emerged as needed for continued growth, progress, and refinement: (1) continued improvement of ongoing programs that support the transition from ex-combatant to civilian; and (2) continued countering of hatred ideology and radicalization.

Transition from Ex-Combatant to Civilian

In the first area cited for ongoing improvement – the transition from ex-combatant to civilian life – two themes routinely arose in conversations with both key experts and ex-combatants: independence and employment. Many former combatants noted how difficult they found life as a civilian because of their background as soldiers. Soldiers take orders and execute them, whereas civilians had to think independently and come up with ideas and solutions for everyday challenges, for which the former rebels were not familiar. This ability, which civilians may consider commonplace, often was cited as an area of challenge—indeed, many ex-combatants had not known any life outside of the forest and were unsure about where or how to obtain help. Some cited feeling left behind and without knowledge of where to gain support. The key experts interviewed agreed that the absence of conditioned independent thinking required ongoing attention.

Similar feelings were cited by ex-combatants when discussing employment—sentiments that the key experts echoed. Without an education or knowledge of how to access the formal sector, many ex-combatants were relegated to subsistence farming—earning about 700 RWF per day (i.e., approximately 1 current US dollar). The experts agreed that challenges for those who were not well educated or uneducated in the forest certainly remain; however, they are subsisting on a par with Rwandan peers in the areas in which they live. This was not always evident in conversations with ex-combatants who indicated being far behind their counterparts and families; however, no data were requested of former combatants and their families. One key expert raised concern over whether the lack of employment and feeling of lagging far

behind other Rwandans might contribute to grievance that, if harbored long enough and among enough former rebels, could contribute to a more significant problem and an ultimate return to violence. Another expert considered the impact of returning rebels on the children, noting that the parents (i.e., FDLR fighters) do not complain because they are grateful to have returned to Rwanda. However, the children are different; they feel punished or stigmatized and thus frustrated, even though they did not commit any crimes. Indeed, this has been the case in other countries. In Burundi, ex-combatants cited disillusionment and a return to criminal activity as necessary just to "get by"; they have cautioned that they are indeed recruitable if able spoilers emerge.[82] However, other experts disagreed with this likelihood in Rwanda, observing that even for those ex-combatants who are not gainfully employed, simply being safe with family and friends is a far better life than that lived in the forest with the FDLR.

Counter-Ideology and Counter-Radicalization Programming

The second area that key experts raised requiring ongoing refinement and resources involved counter-ideology and counter-radicalization programming. Given Rwanda's recent history, the reemergence of radical thinking – among returned rebels and especially among refugees in eastern DRC – is still a concern. Moreover, unsettling events in the region (e.g., in DRC, Burundi, and potentially other nearby areas) always bear the risk of impacting sentiments among Rwandan citizens and especially refugees. Whereas some experts felt that Rwanda had passed the threshold for resilience from outside shocks, others were less certain, believing that equal opportunity and equal assistance, along with countrywide development, must continue to be reinforced to ensure that hatred ideologies do not reemerge if – or perhaps when – the country is faced with structural shocks. Undeniably, events such as price shocks, regional conflict spillover, and administration changes have proven to be highly destabilizing in Rwanda's past, and the country must ensure that the achievements made thus far following the cessation of hostilities in 1994 are not lost on future generations.

7.6.2 Preventing and Countering Extremist, Hatred Ideologies

A key issue to address when investigating groups such as the FDLR, which are based on extremist, ethnic-hatred ideologies, is understanding up front how they emerge (and reemerge). Equally important is understanding on the back end how to counter the ideologies when they do emerge (e.g.,

---

[82]Author research conducted in Burundi, prior to this study.

among those combatants that might be encouraged to defect from a group such as the FDLR). Given the importance of both issues for the context of this study, as well as for future research applications, the author briefly explored with the key experts the notion of prevention and response to extreme hatred ideologies, based on their experiences in Rwanda.

7.6.2.1 Preventing the Rise of Extremist, Hatred Ideologies: Key Experts

In previous chapters about the rise of the FDLR in eastern DRC, the emergence and perspective of the Hutus who founded and joined the FDLR was discussed. Yet, understanding under which conditions grievances and greed can transition into large-scale hate groups is not the only important aspect to consider; ensuring that conditions for emergence do not occur anew is perhaps even more critical. As previously cited, intrastate conflicts have a higher likelihood of repeating than emerging anew (Collier 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004c; Collier et al. 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2006; United Nations 2012b; Walter 2011). Therefore, how to prevent the emergence (and reemergence) of hatred ideologies, as identified by actors who contributed to the various programs in Rwanda and elsewhere, is important to the study. Significantly, the issues raised here touch on the types of policies that countries managing the return of defected combatants may want to consider when dealing with similar scenarios.

Concerning the issue regarding policies for preventing the emergence of hatred ideologies, all of the key experts agreed that the best prevention is equal opportunity: where equal opportunity exists, conflict (extremist, rebel, and otherwise) is denied the motivation for and environment in which it can breed. This belief is central to SHD concepts, Galtung's (1964, 1969) positive- and negative-peace framework, guidelines for peace and development under the UNSDG 16,[83] and the IEP's GPI. The challenge to ensure that the environment is not conducive for extremist beliefs to emerge, however, is in the details. How policies are constructed and grassroots support is ensured can be difficult to discern—and varies widely among different environments.

One of the first areas highlighted by the key experts interviewed for this study for which attention should be given is at the national level. An investment in peace and equal opportunity – where laws and policies dictate equality among people, equal access to resources, and equal chance to pursue their livelihood free from state or social repression – is where the foundation should be grounded. The key

---

[83]See Chapters 2 and 3 for more on UNSDG 16 and positive- and negative-peace theory.

experts explained that educational systems and laws must be reformed to ensure that all groups have equal access to equal education; that educational materials are objective; and that practical, peaceful approaches to conflict resolution are taught. Governments also can prevent the reemergence of misinformation campaigns by being transparent—thereby providing citizens access to evaluate policies for themselves. Finally, the experts believed that governments can engender trust and patriotism by educating their citizens about the history of their country, as well as the role they play in monitoring and policing government and society to ensure that extremist and hatred ideologies do not reemerge. The experts explained how without national investment in reforming the laws and policies of the nation to protect the rights of all individuals, conflict reemergence becomes more likely. This is because where people do not have equal access to resources and are excluded based on ethnicity, religion, and so forth, the seeds of grievance are sowed. This is consistent with statistical and historical analysis by numerous scholars, including Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013), Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann (2015), Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011), Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010), and Gurr (1970, 2011).

Civil society was another area for engagement in the prevention of hate ideologies recommended by the key experts. The origination of the problem first must be understood, they explained. To prevent hate ideologies from reemerging, there must be a clear understanding of where and why the ideologies emerge so that programs to prevent this can be crafted. In addition, the experts believed that civil-society organizations, faith leaders, and families have a role in ensuring that messaging to the community emphasizes peaceful approaches to resolving conflict and that education is valued over ignorance. Indeed, many argued that ignorance enables manipulation of fact—a notion that several ex-combatants raised as well.

These recommendations, although brief, are aligned with the theoretical concepts and the statistical indicators found in scholarly documents about peace and stability.

7.6.2.2 Countering Extremist, Hatred Ideologies Once Emerged: Key Experts

Rwanda has made significant progress in coping with the civil war and genocide ideology that deeply permeated the country for decades. Throughout interviews, key experts touted that its success was a result of "homegrown" solutions to local problems. This success has been critical to the country's ability to

successfully advocate for the return of defectors from rebel groups in eastern DRC and to reintegrate them on a path toward lasting peace.

Understanding the efforts of the Rwandan government to create an environment that overcame genocide and hatred ideologies is important for future policies that other countries may want to contemplate when addressing their own programming to ensure that the environment is suitable for rebels to return. Ensuring that a stable environment exists to which defecting rebels return is part of the cycle of coping with defection. Many of those interviewed were deeply involved in the development of policies to address these issues in Rwanda.

As practitioners know, once hatred or extremist ideologies emerge, they can be difficult to counter: "strategies must erode the justifications" of violence (Maynard 2015, 79).[84] The key experts interviewed agreed that there are practical steps to be taken. The input that key experts shared (Figure 28) with the Author is based on experiences in Rwanda and should be considered with this limitation in mind.

Comprehensive, Consistent, and Continual Effort to Counter Hate Ideologies

The key experts cited that one of the most important considerations when developing programming to counter hatred ideologies after they have emerged is that these efforts must be comprehensive, consistent, and continual. In developing recommendations for countering ideology in the rise of possible mass-atrocity–type violence, Maynard (2015, 76) advised that "cross-scale mobilization, cooperation, and coordination" are necessary for success. The key experts firmly believed that the fight against hatred ideologies must be ongoing until they no longer

Figure 28 **Recommendations to Counter Extremist, Hatred Ideologies by Key Experts**

---

[84]Maynard (2015) wrote comprehensive guidelines on how to strategically counter the emergence of ideologies that promote mass atrocity. His preventive guidelines discuss countering messaging, in particular, by opposition groups who seek to perpetrate these types of crimes. Although his guidelines are titled as preventive, they clearly address ethnic and hatred ideologies once they have already emerged and potentially pose a threat.

exist (if that can be achieved). This recommendation is relevant when considering how frequently intrastate conflicts reemerge, decade after decade. In Rwanda, the programs developed to bring about national unity, reconciliation, and justice, as well as broader development and growth, are continuing more than 20 years after the cessation of genocide and violent hostilities in the country.[85] Moreover, frequent programs in the public space reinforce remembrance of conflict history and prevention. These types of ongoing efforts also have contributed to Rwanda's success, according to the key experts.

Sound Reconciliation Policies

In support of the efforts to counter hate ideologies, the role of the government, advised the experts, should be to reconcile, educate, and address propaganda among citizens. In Rwanda, the government created national reconciliation policies to ensure that all people in society were considered equal in law and practice, regardless of ethnic, religious, and other differences. It removed any ethnic identification on formal identity cards and criminalized the depiction of individuals as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa as genocide ideology. As Corey and Joireman (2004, 75) observed, "[t]he Rwandan government is trying to create a unifying historical narrative that will contribute to, and not inhibit, political reconstruction and ethnic reconciliation." Legal efforts such as these ensure that equality can eliminate grounds for grievance and inspire trust in a system, thereby preventing the emergence of armed conflict—if these efforts allow for the preservation of identity and cultural integrity while balancing against grievance-inducing or hate policies.

Not all scholars view Rwanda's efforts as entirely positive. In reviewing Rwanda's programming post-genocide with a critical lens, Reyntjens (2015, 29) guarded against seeing the administration's attempts as too optimistic: "[t]he regime has imposed de-ethnicization and reconciliation in a top-down, authoritarian fashion" despite the fact that the "daily truth experienced by oppressed Hutu and Tutsi point to a very different narrative." Although the Rwandan administration routinely faces accusations of bias against Hutus in various forms (commonly articulated among Western academics), informants and key experts were reluctant to draw attention to this sensitive issue—perhaps from fear of inadvertently breaking the law about classifying Rwandans by ethnic heritage (Republic of Rwanda 2001).

---

[85]Endeavors to ensure that policies and ideologies of hatred do not reemerge are entrusted to NURC, which is responsible for ongoing programming, monitoring, and evaluating the country's progress toward the achievement of unity and reconciliation. NURC's success is based on coordination with many other governmental agencies as well as NGOs working with civil society. (Republic of Rwanda, 2016)

As articulated by academics and policy makers who fear Rwanda embracing an authoritarian and Tutsi-biased administration, versus those Rwandan and other African academics who advise outsiders to limit criticism in the face of internal economic growth, the problem is that eliminating or making illegal any discussion of ethnic realities limits the ability to articulate and address whatever is the nature of the problem. Thus, the issue with assessments of ethnicity and its role in society in contemporary Rwanda primarily is the lack of any hard data that would legitimize analysts' arguments. It is not possible to propose valid arguments on the ethnic issue without explicit data about ethnicity relative to access to power, wealth, education, opportunity, and so forth. Unfortunately, such data simply do not exist due to the illegality of classifying Rwandans on the basis of ethnicity. Moreover, even if an attempt was made to draw preliminary conclusions based on, for example, senior members of government or business leaders, there would be no way to determine who is Tutsi or Hutu due to shared names, physical traits, and general areas of residence across the country. This challenge makes it particularly difficult to argue in favor of or against that which the government articulates versus that which many academics articulate regarding ethnic relations in post-genocide Rwanda.

Educate Society

Whereas efforts at the policy level are important, so also are those at the local level. Educating society is correspondingly important, the key experts noted. Education should take place not only in the schools to counter the propaganda that may emerge but also in broader social settings. The experts stated that programs to encourage civilians to engage local police when a problem arises instead of addressing it among themselves were particularly important. Likewise, they also advised that programs to educate police on how to develop trusting relationships with communities, teach communities and individuals to abandon violence, and pursue alternate conflict-resolution paths must be pursued to stem violent activity linked to extremist ideologies. Finally, some experts suggested that civic reeducation programs for offenders of the peace (i.e., hate propagandists) that culminate in government assistance packages and the opportunity to restart in the community with a clean slate are options for addressing the emergence of hate ideology. The experts noted that this has been an effective approach to the reeducation and reintegration of rebel combatants coming from Hutu extremist circumstances.

In critiquing the reinterpretation of history that the current Rwandan regime has promoted, Reyntjens (2015, 28) again cautioned that addressing education can easily go too far: "If history does not suit the regime, the regime constructs a new history." Reyntjens (2015) further argued that the current government promotes a version of precolonial history, wherein Tutsis and Hutus were equal on all counts and rarely found cause to distinguish themselves from one another by ethnicity. Reyntjens instead blamed the division between ethnicities on the European colonizers.[86] Nevertheless, as explored in Chapter 5, this version of history is up for debate.

Actively Counter Propaganda

It is also crucial for the government to actively counter the radical or extremist propaganda, noted the key experts interviewed for this study. When propaganda runs rampant, a society risks underestimating its impact, spread, and effects on the population; instead, the experts advised, it must be countered. Three key recommendations emerged to address this problem. First, the propaganda and hate-ideology lies must be proven wrong through policy and practice. Laws must address the root grievances and communities must take their practice to heart. As Maynard (2015, 76) noted, "[i]mpartial strategies…have the advantage of maintaining actors' credibility," although it may not be effective in addressing "really pernicious justifications of violence."

Second, the media must be engaged to confront radical beliefs, encourage nonviolence, and dialogue to address and identify problems as they emerge. In writing about prevention of the outbreak of hostilities, Maynard (2015, 78) stated that media can be a force for good, but only under certain conditions: "Where media function effectively to promote rights, democracy, and nonviolence, it has not been due to the stripping away of all regulation but due to an effective balance of standards and checks... This makes it much harder for dangerous local or national ideological monopolies to emerge." Unfortunately, the press in Rwanda is considered "not free," scoring in the lowest 20% for freedom of the press (Freedom House

---

[86]Chapter 5 provides more detail on precolonial relationships between the Tutsis and the Hutus. Most studies found that in precolonial Rwanda, everyday Tutsi and Hutus were generally equal, with mobility between the two groups based on income and ownership as opposed to rigid birthright. For additional information, see Corey and Joireman (2004), Uvin (1999), and Lemarchand (1998).

2016). Therefore, the ability for the press to act against bad policies and be a force for good is significantly challenged.[87]

Third, the government must be open to working together, even with those aggrieved, to address the challenges that inspired the emergence of hate and radical ideologies in the first instance. As one key expert noted, "We win together or lose together."[88]

Engage Female Peace Builders

Several key experts also cited the role of women as peace builders in countering hatred ideologies in society. Indeed, the role of women in peace and security has been examined often by scholars and IOs.[89] The key experts interviewed for this study believed that women have the potential to be peace builders in their homes and communities. In Rwanda, there is a long history of engaging women as peace builders and in countering hatred ideology—especially among those whose husbands fought with the FDLR. Women were taught by the Ministry of Gender, in coordination with the NURC, how to encourage their husbands who were FDLR members to reconsider their views and positions and to lay down their arms. Thus, many in Rwanda know the practical role that women have in this regard. Indeed, "peace broadcasting" or "saturating a society with moderate voices and ideological restraints on violence could fragment violent campaigns, encouraging desertion and non-participation" (Maynard 2015, 77).

Given the specific focus of this study on the life cycle of defecting ex-combatants, the author also queried experts about recommendations for policies to address hate ideology and extremist views among combatants—specifically, as they return to their home country and community. Two core recommendations were highlighted by the experts, as described in Table 18.

Table 18 **Recommendations and Findings to Counter Hate Ideology among Ex-Combatants**

First, given that combatants are voluntarily defecting, it is likely that many are already open to the fact that the propaganda espoused by their FDLR leaders about Rwanda may be false. To ensure this realization, experts recommended combating the fears implanted by the old ideology. The first step,

---

[87]For more information on press and journalistic freedom in Rwanda, see Freedom House (2017a) and Sundaram (2016).
[88]Author interview with the former head of NURC, conducted in Rwanda, 2016.
[89]For example, see UN Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security.

they suggested, is to respectfully and warmly welcome rebels who voluntarily defect back into the country. The experts contended that this immediately counters the lies they have been told, rejects the antagonisms and the fears that they may still harbor, and creates a foundation for rebuilding trust. In fact, many ex-combatants noted this exact feeling when they returned. As one quipped, "I couldn't believe it; they brought out officers and they saluted me. From that moment, I knew it would be O.K."

The second recommendation specific to the defecting combatants to counter the hatred and extremist ideologies they harbored for many years is to utilize a reintegration center, such as Mutobo. It is critically important to offer the defecting ex-combatants a safe reeducation space with their peers, where they can learn, question, be counseled, receive practical vocational training, and share their experiences and fears before moving back into the community. Through storytelling, therapy, education, and controlled reintegration, the key experts believed that many could be reformed and reject their extremist beliefs. Indeed, many ex-combatants agreed, stating that "without Mutobo, we could be very dangerous."

Overall, the key experts interviewed for this study concluded that countering a hatred ideology is a process—one that requires long-term input from government and civil society. The process must attend to specific and direct threats and also address the structural reforms needed to ensure that the hatred ideology cannot reemerge.

8.0 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

This study addresses a gap in the field of conflict resolution by identifying alternate means to weaken rebel groups through their human-conflict feasibility factors (i.e., the rebel personnel), a leading factor of rebel-group success (Aronson et al. 2015; Collier 2000b; Gates 2002). This was achieved by evaluating programming to encourage defection and prevent recruitment, the supply and demand aspects of human feasibility in rebel groups, and generating beneficiary recommendations on how to further enhance defection and recruitment prevention programming. This work has established a baseline theory of reasoning on defection, testable across other cases. Rwanda provided a prime case study to explore this notion.

Since 2003, Rwanda has sought to undermine the strength of the FDLR operating in eastern DRC by encouraging active combatants to defect from the rebel group to weaken it to such a point that it no longer posed a threat.[1] The Rwandan program has been successful: not only has the FDLR been weakened such that it no longer poses an active threat but also more than 20,000 former armed non-state FDLR combatants voluntarily defected and returned home to Rwanda (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 2016)—the largest globally known community of voluntary defectors from an active, non-state armed group.

8.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH IN FIELD

This research applied the case-study methodology in Rwanda because of the unique nature of the defection programming undertaken to end the two-decade-long conflict with the FDLR, as well as the large study population of voluntary defectors available for interview in country. This study then used the grounded theory of analysis to develop a baseline and preliminary framework of reasons and recommendations for defection and recruitment-prevention programming for conflict resolution. The

---

[1]Although the RDRC program was established as an autonomous commission in 1997 and by Presidential Decree in 2002, its efforts before 2003 were focused on DDR for combatants who independently returned or were captured by the RDF or other forces and returned to Rwanda—not on actively promoting defection among the FDLR. According to this Author's research, that did not begin until 2003 when the FDLR Chief of Intelligence defected, followed shortly thereafter by the Commander of the FDLR (see Chapter 1). Notably, efforts to encourage rebel defectors did not take place in isolation from kinetic military operations, various attempts at diplomacy, and international sanctions undertaken by Rwanda, DRC, the United States, the UN, and others (see Chapter 5).

absence of peer-reviewed academic research on encouraging large-scale defection for conflict resolution meant that the research area was open for exploration. Additionally, this author did not identify any studies that evaluated whether the macro findings of quantitative analysis on conflict stabilization (via positive- and negative-peace theory) and development (via SHD theory) were validated against input from the ground on reasons for combatants ceasing to engage in armed conflict. This study sought to begin closing these gaps by (1) allowing voluntarily defected ex-combatants' input to guide the understanding of the context of recruitment into and defection from rebel groups; (2) contributing recommendations for future programming to encourage defection and prevent recruitment of new rebels into armed groups, thereby addressing supply and demand aspects of human feasibility of conflict; and (3) determining whether the findings constitute a viable framework that can be tested across other cases, evaluated for future policy, and ultimately applied as a new tool in the conflict-resolution practitioner's toolbox.

From April to November 2016, 41 ex-combatants and 28 experts were interviewed in Rwanda. Respondents were identified using the RDS technique, and qualitative interviews were conducted across the country until information saturation was reached, with no new concepts or recommendations emerging from the respondents. The study, including travel, translations, lodging, and all other required fees for pursuing research in Rwanda, was financed independently by the author without assistance (financial or otherwise) from any outside organization.

8.2   BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions posed to the two main units of analysis (i.e., voluntarily defected ex-combatants in Rwanda and key experts) guided this study:

1.   *How and why did the ex-combatants become members of the FDLR rebel group?*

2.   *Why did ex-combatants choose to defect from the FDLR rebel group?*

3.   *Are the reasons for defection cited by ex-combatants:*

   a.   *In line with SHD theory?*

   b.   *In line with positive- and negative-peace theory?*

4.   *What is recommended by defected ex-combatants to prevent future recruitment by rebel groups?*

5. *What is recommended to promote increased defections from rebel groups?*

6. *Are there lessons learned from the Rwanda case country that could be applied elsewhere?*

8.3 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANSWER TO QUESTIONS

This study posed six core research questions exploring reasons and recommendations for defection and recruitment prevention with the objective of developing a baseline or framework of reasoning that could be more broadly tested against other cases. Below is a brief overview of each of the research questions posed and the respondents' inputs.

8.3.1 Research Question 1: How and why did the ex-combatants become members of the rebel group?

The first question explored in the study, and posed only to the ex-combatants, sought to understand their primary motivation for joining a rebel group—in this case, the FDLR. Understanding the conditions under which members joined – for example, whether voluntarily or by force, to achieve lasting change or receive a quick payout, and other explanations – was deemed important to evaluating when, why, and how combatants might decide to defect from the group, as well as what programming for preventing recruitment and encouraging defection should be considered for further testing.

More than half of the 41 ex-combatants interviewed (i.e., 56%) voluntarily joined the FDLR; 39% were forced, kidnapped, or abducted; and 5% had reasons or conditions that did not fit in any category. For those who were willing members, their objective was lasting social, political, and historical change—they firmly believed in the FDLR mission to return Rwanda to the rightful heirs of the country: the Hutus. As such, their membership in the rebel group was not preconditioned on a quick payout, salary, or other tangible returns (as would be in a greed-motivated conflict). Rather, they were committed for the long haul, ready to stand the tests of time as rebel fighters to participate in the recapture of what they believed was the Hutu's God-granted land, Rwanda.

8.3.2 Research Question 2: Why did ex-combatants choose to defect from the rebel group?

The study's second core research question addressed defection directly; both ex-combatants and key experts were queried about reasons for voluntary defection. Findings from the interviews show that the two groups shared many common reasons, but not all. Following are the five shared reasons offered by both the ex-combatants and the key experts, followed by one unique reason offered by each group.

Ex-Combatants' and Key Experts' Shared Reasons for Defection

Rebel-Force Issues

The most frequently cited category of reasons by ex-combatants for personal defection concerned rebel-force issues, including areas such as mission failure, problems with the FDLR leadership, corruption among leaders, and reduced force strength. Key experts agreed, citing mission failure and problems within the rebel group as core reasons for defection.

Trauma and a Harsh Lifestyle

The second most common category of reasons cited for defection by the ex-combatants was trauma and the harsh life in the forest. This category included reasons such as experiencing the trauma of friends and family dying, insecurity in the forest, feeling unwanted in DRC, having a harsh life with no future prospects, and experiencing disillusionment and low morale. Again, the key experts' reasons coincided with those of the ex-combatants; they believed that trauma and loss, as well as security concerns about life in the forest, were the leading causes for defection.

Communications and Information Operations

Learning about the current situation in Rwanda from both independent communications and government-sponsored information operations was another popular category of reasons for defection cited by the ex-combatants. Included in this category was the draw of better and improved life opportunities in Rwanda – specifically noting that the changed policies in Rwanda on unity, reconciliation, and justice – and the developmental achievements. Key experts also believed that when ex-combatants learned of the positive developmental achievements through the government's information operations, they would be persuaded to return.

Individual or Personal Causes

Individual or personal causes for defection comprised the fourth most commonly cited category of reasons for defection among ex-combatants. Their reasons included changes in beliefs and

ideology, a desire for freedom, seeking a better life for oneself, and missing family and friends. Key experts agreed that ideological shifts could be a motivator for the voluntary defections.

Familial Pressures

The fifth most commonly cited category of reasons for defection by the ex-combatants concerned familial causes: seeking a better life for one's family, being pressured by family to stop fighting, and other family-related reasons. Key experts also believed that the draw of family in Rwanda would be significant in encouraging voluntary defections.

Ex-Combatants' Additional Reason for Defection

Influence of Other Defectors

Finally, ex-combatants exclusively cited the influence of other defectors as a significant motivator to defect—specifically, the defection of trusted leaders and friends. Key experts did not consider this to be a motivator and therefore did not cite this reason during interviews.

Key Experts' Additional Reason for Defection

External Military Pressure

Key experts believed that external military pressure was a significant motivator for the ex-combatants to defect, citing the efforts of MONUSCO, FARDC, and even the RDF. The ex-combatants disagreed, explaining that fighting these forces made them (and others) feel that their cause was more important. The military pressure showed that the propaganda of their leaders was correct; specifically, the current Rwandan government wanted to kill the Hutus of the FDLR, whom they accused of being dominated by Tutsis. Therefore, reasoned the ex-combatants, this type of pressure – although difficult to battle in the field – was not a motivator for defection but rather one for continued combat.

Push-versus-Pull Reasoning for Rebel Defections

Ex-combatants' decisions to defect aligned more with feelings that pushed them out of the FDLR for negative reasons (61%) as opposed to motivations that pulled them into Rwanda for positive reasons (34%).

8.3.3 Research Question 3: Are the reasons for defection cited by ex-combatants
a. In line with SHD theory?
b. In line with positive- and negative-peace theory?

Both the SHD and positive- and negative-peace theories have proven to be critically important in development, conflict avoidance, and lasting peace; and these findings have been validated using numerous quantitative measures. This study sought to evaluate whether there was a link between the reasons cited for defection by the ex-combatants and those quantitatively derived measures of development and peace found in these theories. If so, which areas were prioritized as reasons for motivating their defection from the rebel group? The objective of this line of questioning was twofold: (1) to validate findings in the field regarding the value of SHD and positive- and negative-peace programming; and (2) to explore whether policy reforms that support or align with SHD and positive and negative peace are considered a draw for potential defectors.

a. Are the ex-combatants' reasons for defection in line with SHD theory?

After evaluating justifications for defection provided by the ex-combatants, the author found a positive link between the defection reasons and the core concepts of SHD theory. All of the reasons for defection cited by the ex-combatants neatly aligned with the core categories (or an overlapping category) of SHD (Table 19).

Table 19 **Ex-Combatants' Reasons for Defection Relative to SHD**

SHD Core Category	% of Reasons Cited by Ex-Combatants that Aligned with the Category
SHD Category Overlap	26%
Empowerment	26%
Cooperation	25%
Security	14%
Equity	6%
Sustainability	3%

This finding suggests strong support for SHD policies as a draw for combatants when deciding whether to defect, lay down arms, return home, and peaceably reintegrate.

b. Are the ex-combatants' reasons for defection in line with positive- and negative-peace theory?

On the structural and direct issues of positive- and negative-peace theory, the author also was able to identify a moderately strong alignment among the reasons for defection cited by the ex-combatants. In this area, the author found that 81% of the reasons cited aligned with areas linked to positive and negative peace (Table 20).

Table 20 **Ex-Combatants' Reasons for Defection Relative to Positive- and Negative-Peace Theory**

Positive- or Negative-Peace Category	% of Reasons Cited by Ex-Combatants that Aligned with the Category
Structural or Positive Peace	57%
Direct or Negative Peace	24%
Nonaligned	19%

This finding suggests that both structural reforms, which are positively associated with positive peace (e.g., education, health, and economic development), along with reforms associated with negative peace (e.g., absence of physical violence) are important to potential defectors. Thus, the areas covered under positive and negative peace should be prioritized for state reforms that aim to encourage fighting combatants to return through voluntary defection.

8.3.4 Research Question 4: What is recommended by defected ex-combatants to prevent future recruitment by rebel groups?

Targeting human feasibility among rebel groups requires addressing not only the available supply but also the future demand. Therefore, this study interviewed the main unit of analysis (i.e., the defected ex-combatants) about their recommendations for preventing future recruitment into active rebel groups. Five core recommendations emerged from the discussions; however, the single-most important factor, argued the ex-combatants, was that populations vulnerable to recruitment must be protected and denied access by rebel-group recruiters. Once propagandists and recruiters from the rebel groups reach vulnerable populations, preventing them from joining becomes more difficult—and sometimes even impossible. That challenge notwithstanding, ex-combatants strongly advocated for the following five recommendations to be applied to recruitment prevention.

Provide Education for Recruitable Populations

The first recommendation from the ex-combatants concerned the provision of comprehensive, routine, and objective education at refugee camps and communities. This type of education, they explained, could guard against propaganda and recruitment by rebel groups by ensuring that youth learn to think critically and pursue alternative opportunities.

Enhance Role for IOs

The role of IOs also routinely arose in interviews. IOs, the ex-combatants argued, must be moved closer and focus more on security to deter rebel recruiters from entering the refugee camps. They also must spend less on military engagements and interventions against the rebels because not only are they expensive and counterproductive, they also prevent money from being spent on developmental projects that could provide immediate alternate employment options to civilians in the region and establish lasting benefits to advance the welfare of those in the area.

Promote Repatriation Programming

The ex-combatants believed that repatriation programming was another important issue that must be emphasized if preventing recruitment were a priority. If there are no refugees, then there is no population from which to recruit. To promote large-scale repatriation, ex-combatants suggested finding more ways to demonstrate to the refugees that going back home is a safe and preferable option to remaining a refugee.

Utilize Information Operations

Ex-combatants believed that government-sponsored information operations are valuable tools for engaging refugees to be more informed about the reality in Rwanda. Increasing the refugees' knowledge about Rwanda, from various sources, could help them understand the rebel group's propaganda as lies.

Consider Incentives

      The fifth area that ex-combatants believed might help to prevent recruitment of additional personnel into rebel groups by preventing access to recruitable populations was incentives. Some of the ex-combatants interviewed thought that the likelihood of joining a rebel group could be diminished by offering opportunity-based incentives if the youth, and other recruitable civilians, return home. They suggested that educational opportunities and vocational training – especially for those youth at risk of being recruited without any other professional opportunity – were good options to consider.

Many of the recommendations that emerged from the discussions resulted from personal experiences of the ex-combatants in DRC areas with refugee camps and populations. However, some recommendations may be applicable to other environments that suffer similar recruitment-prevention challenges.

8.3.5 Research Question 5: What do ex-combatants and key experts recommend to promote increased defections from rebel groups?

The fifth research question addressed recommendations on how to encourage increased defections of rebel-group combatants. This line of questioning was intended to further contribute to a preliminary framework for encouraging defection from armed groups for future testing. Findings from the interviews revealed that among ex-combatants and key experts, there are both overlapping and unique recommendations for how to increase defections among rebels in non-state armed groups.

Summarizing the discussion points on how best to encourage enhanced defection – gleaned from interviews with ex-combatants who voluntarily defected and key experts whose expertise encompasses all phases of the combatant and conflict life cycle – suggests the following five shared and three unique recommendations from ex-combatants and key experts. These recommendations comprise thematic areas for programming considerations for future analysis and cases.[2]

Ex-Combatants' and Key Experts' Shared Recommendations to Increase Defections

---

[2]See Annex VI for a modified measurement-error test of the reasons that ex-combatants cited for defection against recommendations suggested by ex-combatants and key experts.

Enhanced Role for IOs

Both ex-combatants and key experts highlighted the beneficial role that IOs, especially the UN, can (and sometimes do) play in assisting voluntary defectors to safely transit home. However, they also suggested that to increase their effectiveness, the UN and other IOs should be located closer to the rebel group in question to make it easier to reach potential defectors.

Ex-combatants also suggested that if IOs engaged in broader regional developmental activities, some rebels would be incentivized to leave the group in favor of vocational opportunities supporting these initiatives. Furthermore, argued some, when IOs focus heavily on military operations (e.g., MONUSCO), they actually strengthen the rebel group and increase recruitment rather than diminish and weaken it.

Utilize Information Operations

Another conclusory recommendation theme shared by the ex-combatants and the key experts addressed the use of information operations to reach and convince combatants to lay down arms and return home. First, ex-combatants recommended that the objective of messaging should be twofold: (1) promote peace messaging; and (2) undermine the trust between leadership and troops so that they begin to question the utility of the mission. Second, ex-combatants recommended that tone and messaging should be consistent, respectful, and frequent. This would ensure that rebels feel trusted, that they find the information reliable, and that the information is consistent across different media and fora. Third, both ex-combatants and key experts recommended using trusted actors, such as former combatants who had already defected and returned home, to deliver messaging.

Broader Safe-Communications Options

As a complement to the information operations, key experts and ex-combatants agreed that finding ways to support broader safe-communications options with those in the forest, who are still fighting with the rebel group, is another important component for programming. Individual and

personal communications with friends and family, as opposed to government-directed information operations, can be important factors in a potential defector's decision-making process to return home.

Targeting Specific Potential Defectors

Another theme that routinely emerged in conversation with ex-combatants and key experts addressed the potential to target specific defectors within the rebel ranks. Targeting trusted senior leaders would lower morale among the rank and file as well as targeting large units of enlisted soldiers to frustrate senior leaders were both cited as possible options that could increase the likelihood of increased defections.

Promotion of Incentives for Defection

The final shared recommendation of both the ex-combatants and the key experts concerned the use of incentives to encourage defection. Both units of analysis believed that incentives (i.e., educational, vocational, and possibly financial) had a potential role; however, the two groups differed on the efficacy of using financial incentives to change hearts and minds.

Ex-Combatants' Additional Recommendations

The ex-combatants, the main unit of this analysis, were queried about their recommendations to encourage future defections from armed rebel groups. They offered three unique policy recommendations that were not shared by the key experts.

Ensure Accommodating Domestic Return Policies

First, ex-combatants wholeheartedly believed that accommodating domestic return policies from the home country were crucial to encouraging defectors. Specifically, ex-combatants highlighted the following recommendations for home countries to undertake to support ex-combatants' return: assurances of freedom from legal repercussions stemming from their activities with the rebel group;

financial, educational, and vocational support to reestablish oneself and family; and social-safety-net

programs for oneself and family, including health and medical care.

Undertake Counter-Ideology Programming

The second area routinely raised by ex-combatants to encourage more defections addressed the

development of counter-ideology programming. Rebels, they said, are held hostage by their beliefs.

However, these beliefs can be changed; there are ways to address hate ideologies and demonstrate that

the leadership's propaganda is false information. Once rebels stop believing the propaganda, stated the

ex-combatants, they will no longer want to fight.

Provide Assistance for Safe Escape from the Rebel Group

The third unique recommendation from ex-combatants to encourage defection was the

provision of assistance for safe escape from the rebel group. The ex-combatants interviewed shared

harrowing stories of escape, often planned years in advance. Assistance from IOs and even local people

on how to safely escape the group and the region would be a practical step to support rebels who are

eager to leave.

Key Experts' Additional Recommendations

Key experts shared three additional and unique recommendations to encourage defection.

Promote Good Governance and Political Will in Home Country (or Country to Which Rebels Would Defect)

First, the key experts believed strongly in the importance of good governance and political will

for encouraging defectors. They felt that a strong development environment, with advances in

economic growth, education, healthcare, and equality, were important criteria considered by potential

defectors. Additionally, the experts cited the importance of political will toward reconciling with the

rebels as important for decision making among potential defectors.

Engage Spouses and Families to Encourage Defection

Second, the key experts interviewed for the study highlighted the role that spouses and families play in encouraging defection, as well as in promoting reconciliation and unity. Continuing to actively identify and promote communication between family members in Rwanda with rebels in DRC, they argued, is a necessary programmatic undertaking to ensure that rebels return home.

Apply Military Pressure on the Rebel Group

The third unique recommendation offered by the key experts addressed the use of kinetic military operations. Increased military pressure, some of them believed, is an effective way to pressure rebels to defect. Despite the ex-combatants' caution about this approach, and without the advantage of any additional research, it is impossible to determine whether military pressure impacts defections. Therefore, it is included for purposes of future research.

8.3.6 Research Question 6: Are there lessons learned from the case country that could be applied elsewhere?

Rwanda has demonstrated considerable success in weakening the almost 20-year-old FDLR rebel group – which was designated by the US State Department (2004) as a one-time terrorist organization – much of it through the RDRC defection program. This approach is cost effective, requires limited resources, and demonstrates impressive successes. The RDRC program encouraging defection and reintegration of ex-combatants provided a valuable case study, with possible lessons for other countries that seek to address conflict resolution through the lens of defection programming. The most salient lessons learned from Rwanda highlighted by the key experts in addressing the final research question include the following nine suggestions.

Possess Leadership and Political Will

Countries that seek to implement a defection program to recall the voluntary return of active combatants must have the political will to find peace and reconciliation. They must have an effective

leader who possesses leadership qualities that can guide the process and ensure its acceptance and practice among the broader population.

Develop Government Policies and Programs to Support the Defection and Return of Ex-Combatants

A second lesson from the Rwandan case is the development of formal government policies and programs that support the returning defectors. Policies that support defections, throughout the life cycle of the combatants, must be enshrined in both law and practice to ensure success and adopted across both public and private sectors.

Develop Locally Driven, Context-Specific Solutions

Third, it might be appealing to directly copy Rwanda's programming for implementation in other contexts. However, to ensure success, solutions in other countries must be locally driven and context-specific to be aligned with their particular historical, political, and cultural norms. Local buy-in will be easier to achieve if programs are situated within a familiar model.

Ensure Comprehensive Programming

A fourth lesson learned from the Rwandan case is that the drivers of conflict between groups may not be situated far below the surface. Thus, when considering how to reintegrate defecting combatants, and to ensure lasting peace among groups, ongoing efforts to counter historical grievances must be implemented as part of a comprehensive national program.

Ensure Justice and Reconciliation (but also Guard Against Impunity)

Fifth, countries that are willing to accept combatants returning home may need to consider a variety of justice and reconciliation programs that both encourage them to defect and also guard against impunity. Rwanda's approach may not work in all cases; however, its approach to triaging cases along three levels (i.e., community-level Gacaca courts, state-level national courts, and the international-level ICTR) based on perceived crime may be a template for other countries on which to build and modify, as appropriate.

Develop Ex-Combatant-Focused Programming

Rwanda provides a sixth important lesson for countries seeking to launch a defection program: to ensure that the particular needs of the ex-combatants are addressed, the program should be comprehensively and specifically designed for their life cycle and the unique issues they face.

Provide Sensitization Programming

A seventh lesson from the Rwanda case is the need to develop comprehensive sensitization programming for both the defected combatants and the communities accepting them. Ongoing reconciliation, educational, and civic peace-building efforts are important to consider in any future cases.

Ensure Good Governance

The eighth lesson from Rwanda concerns the application of good governance—especially with regard to addressing grievances or motivators of conflict. Countries that have not made a significant and concerted effort to address the drivers and causes of conflict may not be able to successfully encourage defection or manage ex-combatants on their return.

A Final Consideration (Not Attributed to the Experts): Ensure Adequate and Lasting Resources

The ninth lesson learned is that any country seeking to implement defection programming must be able to commit – either independently or with assistance – adequate and lasting resources to back the programs launched. Efforts should be both cross agency and cross sector and tailored to the best practices of program implementation (e.g., routine monitoring and evaluation and participant feedback).

8.4 RESEARCH APPLICATIONS

The research undertaken in Rwanda, while limited in scope and to a singular case, does offer several opportunities for future application, following additional work.

8.4.1 Potential Case Considerations and Applications

If it is more broadly tested across a variety of cases in more comprehensive and externally valid ways, defection programming can have practical applications for conflict-resolution practitioners. To assess how programming initially might be implemented, issues concerning cost and case viability for application are worth reviewing.

8.4.1.1 Cost Implications

Defection and recruitment-prevention programming, as revealed in this study's findings, requires relatively limited direct new resources. The personnel needed to develop and implement programming – a key factor for implementation – is a core cost consideration. Training would require upfront but limited capital. However, as discussed in Chapter 3 and based on existing outreach to rebel groups in other operations that encourage defection, existing diplomatic and military personnel may comprise a possible pool from which to draw. Similarly, in addressing the recruitment-prevention aspect – in contexts that are similar to that of the FDLR in eastern DRC, where rebels recruit primarily from refugee populations – personnel costs may be borne by the hiring of additional security staff, teachers, and development project managers located at and near refugee camps. These costs may not be overly significant in comparison to other programming.

In addition to personnel costs for implementing programmatic areas and ensuring peaceful reintegration for combatants, other costs for defection programming may be related to communications-technology support, funding for IOs to provide more targeted assistance to defecting combatants in the field, enhanced donor contributions to regional developmental projects in conflict zones, and increased assistance to DDR and other related programs. There also may be costs associated with limited military engagement to provide security for those implementing the defection programming, the communities surrounding the rebel group, and the safe-haven areas used by combatants. These costs should be considered distinct from military operations that involve lethal activities and operations against a rebel group. Additional costs for recruitment prevention in at-risk areas, where refugees often are targeted at camps, may include increased security provisions (e.g., physical barriers and other requisite materiel), more formalized educational systems and related costs at camps, programming to encourage large-scale repatriation for refugees (when appropriate), and funding for on-site development programs to offer refugees alternatives to a life of fighting. Depending on the context, it is likely that much of this work

already would be occurring under separate budgets and would need to be aligned with or reoriented to the defection and recruitment-prevention objectives. These factors notwithstanding, programming for defection and recruitment prevention will increase costs of conflict-resolution efforts, although perhaps not as significantly as other undertakings. Nevertheless, it is a consideration for future application.

8.4.1.2 Conflict or Case Viability

In addition to cost, there are considerations for conflict types and cases in which these efforts might be viable. Defection programming and recruitment prevention are not applicable in all situations.

The first consideration for defection programming is an assessment of the general conflict types: interstate, intrastate, violent extremist or terrorist, and genocidal. Of these types, an interstate conflict is not likely to be an opportune environment for engaging in defection or recruitment-prevention programming— at least not if undertaken by an outside third-party actor seeking to encourage a swift resolution. However, seeking to weaken a state military adversary by encouraging defection and preventing new recruits is a potential course of action taken by one state against another.

Alternatively, and depending on conditions, intrastate conflicts or those in which non-state actors are engaged with state or other non-state actors (e.g., rebel conflicts, violent extremist conflicts, and even genocidal conflicts) might be more amenable cases for applying possible defection programming. To assess readiness for this type of programming, a few basic requirements and questions need to be reviewed. First, is there a way to identify the actors who will be targeted for structural reforms and those who will be targeted for defections so that intervention can be aimed toward common peace? Actors can intervene more easily to assist if the "state" can be relied on as a legitimate partner for ultimately resettling rebels, addressing grievances through reform, applying the appropriate political will toward developing good conditions under which to accept the defected rebels, and committing to lasting conflict-resolution efforts and peace.

Second, even if a state is willing to reform and redress grievances that led to conflict, it may not be conducive for offering a safe and secure environment to which rebels can return. It takes time for bureaucracies to make changes; for leaders to engender political will among constituents; and to establish and implement the types of policies required to manage, reform, reeducate, and reintegrate former combatants. Thus, it may not be possible in all cases to immediately repatriate defectors to their home

countries due to various factors (e.g., lack of political will, absence of support funding, inability to ensure reforms to redress grievance, and ongoing internal conflict).

Third, communities must be sensitized, committed to peace, and comfortable with the government program for managing returning rebels. It may be possible to have a "good" partner in a home state but not a "ready" one. In this case, seeking to weaken a rebel group through defection and recruitment planning need not be off the table—but modifications must be made, including the identification of alternate resettlement options for rebels, assurances of complete safety from the partner host countries, and resources allocated to their lifelong reintegration challenges in non-home states.

The fourth question to be asked in advance of launching a program on defection programming should address the identification of viable partners or implementing entities with the resources to undertake defection and recruitment-prevention programming. Skilled implementers with the resources to properly and safely manage the endeavors also are required. Political will to encourage defection may be present, but resources to manage rebels on their return in areas of DDR, training, and reintegration assistance may not be available. These are case-viability conditions that must be assessed in advance of program implementation.

Evaluating cases in which recruitment prevention could be viable also is most likely for non-state armed groups involved in intrastate, genocidal, and violent extremist conflicts. Identifying means of preventing access to recruitable populations could be implemented more easily if conditions mimic those of Rwandan refugees living in refugee camps in eastern DRC, which can be protected more practically. In cases in which recruitment is occurring online, from among larger populations across borders and embedded among secure, civilian communities, efforts may be more challenging—but nevertheless worth pursuing.

Questions concerning regional application for defection programming and recruitment prevention are also important to consider. Based on this study's analysis, there does not appear to be a regional limitation on the application of potential defection and recruitment-prevention programming. However, it remains important to consider the viability of location for defected ex-combatants to return. If conditions arise, for example, where would-be defectors cannot return to their home country (as noted herein),

reasonable accommodations must be identified in other locations that meet best practices for refugee

resettlement—and where defectors would be comfortable relocating.

The flowchart in Figure 29 evaluates potentially viable environments for defection-focused

initiatives.

Figure 29 **Flowchart for Implementing Defection Programming**

8.4.2 Potential Policy and Programmatic Applications

Several potential policy and programmatic applications emerge from this research, but they should

be predicated on a more comprehensive set of empirical findings that could address issues of external

validity (discussed previously). The main policy outcome anticipated is the incorporation of defection

programming and recruitment prevention as a core line of effort for conflict resolution as directed by

various IOs, governments, governmental agencies, and external NGOs.

Programmatic options in support of the defection and recruitment-prevention efforts could be

more diverse, spanning the life cycle of the combatants through defection, to DDR, and – ultimately – long-

standing reconciliation and good-governance programming for home countries accepting the defectors.

8.4.3 Potential Communities of Interest for the Research

The applications of this and future research may be relevant to several different communities,

agencies, and actors. Broadly speaking, those with an interest in conflict resolution, peace and stability

operations, and development comprise the main communities of interest. National, international, and

multinational conflict-resolution policy makers from across countries and organizations (e.g., the UN, the AU, and the United States; regional economic communities; and international NGOs and IOs including the ICRC and the World Bank) could find value in exploring this research relative to their conflict-resolution objectives. Agencies or departments within each entity may find value in these findings relative to more specific interest-related areas including international development, defense, security, and diplomacy. Finally, certain actors also may find the research of value—specifically, conflict-resolution practitioners, international mediators, policy makers, policy implementers, and researchers.

8.5 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The research pursued in this dissertation study provides a baseline for numerous additional research opportunities, as follows.

1. *Development of a Baseline for Joining and Defecting from Rebel-Group Activity*

This study developed a baseline of findings concerning reasons for joining and defecting from a rebel group. These findings, along with the guiding questions, can be used to develop more externally valid, comprehensive, population-level surveys for quantitative or mixed-methods research projects. Findings from additional work in other cases may contribute to a stronger theoretical basis for addressing human feasibility to weaken rebel groups. They also could further evaluate effective conflict-resolution programming for encouraging defections and preventing new recruitment into rebel groups.

2. *Development of a Baseline of Recommendations on How to Encourage Defection and Prevent Recruitment*

Programmatic recommendations from this study for encouraging more defections and preventing recruitment also constitute a new baseline of potential policy and programmatic initiatives that can be further tested. Recommendations from the Rwanda case study could be compared to input from additional research (in Rwanda and elsewhere) to evaluate for broader applicability. Cases may arise in which carefully controlled studies could apply the recommendations in real-life environments for further testing and evaluation.

3. *Development of a Baseline on a Lessons-Learned Framework for Other Conflict Types and Regions*

Expanding the baseline of research developed in this study could include the exploration of other conflict types, such as terrorist or extremist conflicts (e.g., Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS); genocidal conflicts (e.g., Sudan, the CAR, and South Sudan); and numerous options for additional rebel-based conflict cases (e.g., Columbia, Syria, and the Philippines—including further work in Rwanda and DRC). The formulation of a broader theory that is relevant across numerous locales, conflict types, and research methods is a useful exercise in determining the full viability of the methods applied and learned from Rwanda. Ultimately, these findings could contribute to policy recommendations on how to develop defection programs and to prevent additional recruitment in the effort to more effectively weaken rebel groups and resolve conflicts.

8.6 MOVING FORWARD

Defection and recruitment-prevention programming presents interesting and potentially new practical tools that conflict-resolution practitioners can apply to resolve conflicts, with several benefits, as follows:

1. Defection and recruitment-prevention programming may not require extensive direct financial resources. Certainly, these efforts would be less costly than a military intervention but perhaps costlier than a diplomatic one.

2. Because defection is not a kinetic military option – that is, one that occurs without the risk of lethal activity and associated repercussions – it may be considered a more humane, lower risk, and less costly approach to conflict resolution, in which fewer lives (both rebel and civilian) are lost.

3. There are widely applicable conditions (both regional and conflict type) under which the defection programming could take place.

4. When defectors are reintegrated well, under conditions in which they and the rest of the populace can reconcile and mutually benefit, defection programming may have the potential to contribute to a more lasting peace. When ex-combatants have not been well reintegrated, when people are not afforded equal opportunity, and when there remains animus among groups, the likelihood of former rebels being re-recruited for conflict remains. However, when they are well integrated,

when there is equal opportunity, and when reconciliation policies are working, the likelihood of their contributing to renewed conflict outbreaks is low.

5. Defection programming has few significant repercussions if it fails. For example, if radio programming or familial connections cannot encourage a combatant to defect, the alternative is simply the null hypothesis. Conversely, when military strikes fail, there typically are casualties or physical damage, as well as costly financial implications, that contribute to the costs of war.

Thus, defection programming provides an opportunity to apply a tool that has the capacity for high impact but low risk.

It is hoped that this research will be utilized as a baseline for contributing additional resources to evaluating a broader set of cases of defections resulting in a clear understanding of why people join and defect from rebel groups, what is most effective for encouraging defection and preventing recruitment, which policies must be in place for defection to be successful, and whether defection indeed can be a viable tool for conflict resolution in the future. As these findings suggest, there is a mix of issues that encourages defection: negative experiences in the forest that push individuals to consider alternate paths and positive information about development and opportunity that pulls rebels to defect and return. The ultimate determination of what works best may be reduced to factors relating to rank, gender, personal experiences, conflict type, and regional or cultural conditions. A broader study among more rebel groups and defectors from other cases, conflict types, and countries would contribute significantly to the field. It would articulate a concrete argument about what is most important for promoting voluntary defection, prevent new recruitment, and use these programs to quickly engage rebel groups at the negotiating table so that conflict can be more effectively resolved.

GLOSSARY

TERM	DEFINITION
Combatant	"All members of the armed forces or a party to the conflict are combatants, except medical and religious personnel" (International Committee of the Red Cross, n.d.). This includes support staff such as logisticians, planners, legal officers, and others who were not involved in combat but were members of an armed group.
Conflict	"An armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state." For intrastate conflicts, the location *over which conflict emerges is* a country, *but due to the nature of porous borders in many regions which witness conflict, the rebel group may operate either within or without the country of conflict*. "For an interstate conflict, it is two or more countries" (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2010, modified by the Author).
Conflict Resolution (or Conflict Cessation)	Conflict cessation is defined as when an officially sanctioned conflict negotiation, ceasefire, or peace agreement has taken place, a victor has succeeded, or the rate of killings related to conflict has decreased to less than 25 per year, following a conflict rate of more than 1,000 per year, due to causes of conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2010).
Defection	"The action or fact of voluntarily, and without coercion, deserting a non-state armed group (be it ideological, extremist, genocidal, or rebel) in favor of putting down arms for the purposes of ending one's personal fight with the opposing party(s) and pursuing peaceful coexistence" (Author).
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)	"Disarmament: This is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons carried by both combatants and often also some civilians. Disarmament also may include the development of responsible arms-management programs. Demobilization: This is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. There are two stages of demobilization. The first stage of demobilization includes the processing of individual combatants and placing them in temporary centers plus the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). The second stage encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. Reintegration: This is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and it often necessitates long-term external financial assistance" (United Nations 2005, 1–2).
Ex-Combatant	"An ex-combatant can be seen as an individual who has taken direct part in the hostilities on behalf of one of the warring parties. The individual must also either have been discharged from or have voluntarily left the military group he or she was serving in" (Nilsson 2005, 16).

Feasibility Theory (and Factors of Feasibility) — Feasibility is the theory that where armed conflict is materially feasible, it will occur (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006).

Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2007, 21) explained that "the feasibility hypothesis proposes that where rebellion is feasible it will occur: motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche." It advises that neither grievance nor greed is as important to conflict as is the feasibility of actors to directly undertake armed conflict.[3]

Fragile States — The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2008, 16) defined fragile states as those "unable to meet [their] population's expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process." The Department for International Development (2005,7) defined fragile states as "those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor." Stewart and Brown (2009, 3) defined fragile states as "failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive service entitlements or legitimacy." The Crisis States Research Center (2007, 1) defined fragile states as one "significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems and particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts." [4]

Gacaca — Gacaca, literally meaning, "justice on the grass" in Kinyarwanda, was a court system used in Rwanda following the genocide in 1994. It was based on a traditional system of community courts used for resolving lesser crimes and familial or property disputes (Corey and Joireman 2004). Following the genocide, to assist the formal courts in trying suspects of the genocide, communities elected citizen judges who were formally trained in judicial proceedings to hold trials on low-ranking genocide perpetrators (Daly 2002).

Génocidaire — Corey and Joireman (2004, 87) defined a *génocidaire* as "one who commits genocide." However, as Kang et al. (2016, 357) noted, "[i]t is not a legal term suggesting that a person was prosecuted for genocide-related crimes."

Genocide — Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations (1948) states: "In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to

---

[3]**Alternate Definitions:**
Feasibility also can be referred to as "third-party enablers" in discussions of conflict transformation. For example, the feasibility of conflict may rely on the third-party enabler that could be tangible assets of war (e.g., armaments, uniforms, and logistical tools) but also may be financial as in networks that provide funding to procure goods needed for war or armed rebellion. Finally – and most important for this study – feasibility also may be the implementing actors of armed rebellion, those populations sensitive to recruitment by spoilers seeking to engage in conflict (Author).

[4]**Alternate Definitions:**
Fragile states, as defined by the World Bank (2011a), are those that receive a score of 3.2 or less on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) on indicators reviewing four key areas: economic management, structural policy, policies for social inclusion/equity, and public-sector management and institutions. "Fragile Situations" have either (1) a harmonized average CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or (2) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years. This list includes only International Development Association–eligible countries and non-member or inactive territories or countries without CPIA data. It excludes International Bank for Reconstruction and Development–only countries for which the CPIA scores are not currently disclosed (World Bank 2014)

Brück, Naudé, and Verwimp (2013, 1) defined states as fragile when they are "the poorest, and lack authority, legitimacy, and capacity to promote their citizens' well-being."

The Center for Systemic Peace (2011, 21) definition of fragility: "decrease in state fragility as an increase in societal-system resiliency; larger values of fragility are associated with lower levels of systemic well-being."

destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

Greed Theory	Greed Theory argues that "predation and sadism" drive armed internal conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006, 6). Collier and Hoeffler (2004a, 588) concluded, "[w]e have interpreted this as being due to the opportunities such commodities provide for extortion, making rebellion feasible, and perhaps even attractive."[5]
Grievance Theory	Grievance theory argues that "objective social exclusion" is a motivation for rebellion (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006, 6).[6]
Grounded Theory	"Grounded theory refers to a set of systematic inductive methods for conducting qualitative research aimed toward theory development. The term *grounded theory* denotes dual referents: (a) a *method* consisting of flexible methodological strategies and (b) the *products* of this type of inquiry. Increasingly, researchers use the term to mean the methods of inquiry for collecting and, in particular, analyzing data. The methodological strategies of grounded theory are aimed to construct middle-level theories directly from data analysis. The inductive theoretical thrust of these methods is central to their logic. The resulting analyses build their power on strong empirical foundations. These analyses provide focused, abstract, conceptual theories that explain the studied empirical phenomena" (Charmaz 2004). Charmaz (2004) explained that grounded theory is both a research technique and a description of anticipated outcome.
Violent Extremist or Ideological conflict	United States Agency for International Development (2011, 2) stated that violent extremism (and thus violent extremist conflict) includes "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives."
Information Operations	Information Operations are "the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs [information-related capabilities] in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own" (US Department

---

[5]**Alternate Definitions:**
Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007, 1), stated that greed theory is about "elite competition over valuable natural resource rents." Further, they explained that "a proper greed-based theory of civil war must relate to the trade-off between production and predation in making a living, where we may view war as theft writ large. Violence is one means of appropriating the resources of others" (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007, 6).
[6]**Alternate Definitions:**
Gurr (1970, 24) explained grievance as being relative: "[t]he potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity."
Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007, 17) wrote about two other related concepts to grievance theory. First, "[p]olarisation occurs when two groups exhibit great inter-group heterogeneity combined with intra-group homogeneity. Economic polarisation (along with high vertical income inequality) can occur in societies that are culturally homogenous. Ethnic polarisation could, in principal, exist along with a degree of economic equality."
Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007, 18) also explained the concept of horizontal inequality as related to grievance theory: "The notion of horizontal inequalities between groups, classified by ethnicity, religion, linguistic differences, tribal affiliations etc., is thought to be an important cause of contemporary civil war and sectarian strife, but not routine violence. The idea of horizontal inequality may overlap with the notion of relative deprivation and polarization."

of Defense 2014, I-1). Military information operations are generally used "to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective" (US Department of Defense 2014, x). Information Operations are typically deployed by a state military during conflict, but they also may be deployed not during conflict, by nonmilitary state agencies and by non-state actors against states or other non-state actors.

Interstate Conflict Conflict (see previous definition) that takes place between two or more countries (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2010).

Intrastate Conflict Conflict (see above) that takes place between a state and non-state actor(s) (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2010).

Mediation Wallensteen and Svensson (2014, 316) explained "…mediation is an activity geared towards resolving an ongoing dispute; that it is action by an autonomous, outside party (a third party); that it uses persuasion rather than coercion; and that it aims to reach a solution acceptable to the (primary) parties. Thus, mediation aims at conflict resolution and primarily achieves this through negotiations, by resorting to reason and logic and, ultimately, by appealing to the common wishes to end violence and prevent its recurrence."

Millennium Development Goals (MDG) "The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight goals with measurable targets and clear deadlines for improving the lives of the world's poorest people. To meet these goals and eradicate poverty, leaders of 189 countries signed the historic millennium declaration at the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000" (Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund n.d.).

Official Development Assistance (ODA) The OECD-Development Cooperation Directorate defined ODA as "Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC [Development Co-Operation Directorate] List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted" (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2017).

Peace Agreement "A peace agreement is defined as an agreement concerned with the resolution of the incompatibility signed and/or publicly accepted by all, or the main, actors in a conflict. The agreement should address all, or the central, issues of contention" (Kreutz 2010, 245).

Peace Building The definition of peace building is from Call and Cousens (2008, 4), who defined it as "Actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics. Post-conflict peacebuilding is the subset of such actions undertaken after the termination of armed hostilities."[7]

---

[7]**Alternate Definition:**
Peace building is defined by the UN as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" (United Nations 2000b).

Positive and Negative Peace	Negative Peace: Those indicators associated with the absence of violence (Galtung 1964). Positive Peace: Those indicators associated with structural peace (ibid.). Galtung's 1964 peace and conflict transformation approach advises that for peace and stability to take hold, both negative and positive peace must be considered. This means that those indicators that are associated with the absence of violence, or negative peace, which are validated in studies by Cevik and Rahmati (2013) Collier (2006); Collier and Hoeffler (1999a, 2000, 2004a); Collier and Sambanis (2002); Collier et al. (2003); Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2006, 2008); and many others, must be addressed to ensure nonviolent stability. Furthermore, studies that focus on positive peace, using indicators that are most associated with cultures of peacefulness and structural stability by Global Peace Index, Institute for Economics and Peace, and the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index Indicators, must be addressed in post-conflict states to ensure that security, peace, and stability endure. Thus, target programs in post-conflict states should consider efforts that address both positive and negative dimensions of peace.
Post-Conflict State	States that experienced more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during conflict; are currently experiencing less than 25 battle-related deaths per year; have achieved conflict cessation (see previous definition); and are T-0 to T-10 years since the cessation of conflict activities (Author, modified from several sources).[8]
Rebel	[A rebel is] "…a member of rebel groups that oppose existing national governments militarily and have political goals.… [a rebel is] an individual, embedded in a collective group, with political goals such as taking over the central government or achieving political autonomy or territorial independence. He or she is the person who decided to take up arms to achieve that goal, in opposition to the status quo provided by the government" (Jo, Dvir, and Isidori 2016, 76).
Recruitment	"Recruitment within irregular armed groups is the process through which noncombatants abandon – at least partially, and for some time – their civilian life to pledge loyalty to social groupings whose direct or indirect aim is to carry out violent actions against their perceived enemies, whether governmental or not" (Guichaoua 2012, 276).

---

[8]**Alternate Definitions:**

A post-conflict state is a "conflict situation in which open warfare has come to an end. Such situations remain tense for years or decades and can easily relapse into large-scale violence." In post-conflict areas, there is an absence of war, but not essentially real peace. Lakhdar Brahimi stated that "the end of fighting does propose an opportunity to work towards lasting peace but that requires the establishment of sustainable institutions, capable of ensuring long-term security. Prolonged conflict can lead to terrible human loss and physical devastation; it can also lead to the breakdown of the systems and institutions that make a stable society work, and these are the very systems that need to be revived" (Gender-Based Violence, n.d.).

Junne and Verokren (2005, 1): A post-conflict situation is one that a "conflict situation in which open warfare has come to an end. Such situations remain tense for years or decades and can easily relapse into large-scale violence."

Brown, Langer, and Stewart (2011, 4) acknowledged the fluidity of internal state conflict and the difficulty of distinguishing a hard end to conflict and a start to peace. Instead, they defined the achievement of peace and cessation of conflict through a series of "peace milestones," which include the following: "Cessation of hostilities and violence; signing of political/peace agreements; demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration; refugee repatriation; establishing a functioning state; achieving reconciliation and societal integration; and economic recovery."

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2010) stated that post-conflict states are those, which according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program-Peace Research Institute Oslo, "experience fewer than 25 battle-related deaths per year, following over 1,000 battle-related deaths of conflict."

The Civil Society Organization for Development Effectiveness (2009–2012) defined post-conflict states as those that: "(a) suffered a severe and long-lasting conflict; (b) experience a short, but highly intensive conflict; (c) a newly sovereign state that has emerged through the violent break-up for a former sovereign state."

Resilience	"In the context of transformation, resilience is often discussed as stabilisation strategies after an undesirable regime or armed group" (Menkhaus 2013, 5).
Shelter	Aronson et al. (2015, 9) defined shelter as the "the structures that must be put into place to build, train, arm, command, and maintain" the rebels.
Spoiler (Conflict Spoiler, Spoiler of the Peace)	Newman and Richmond (2006, 1) defined conflict spoilers as "groups and tactics that actively seek to obstruct or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means and for a variety of motives."
State-Building	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008, 14) provided the following definition of state building: "[p]urposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups."
Sustainable Development Goals	"On September 25th, 2015, countries adopted a set of goals to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all as part of a new sustainable development agenda. Each goal has specific targets to be achieved over the next 15 years" (United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2017). "The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), otherwise known as the Global Goals, are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity. These 17 Goals build on the successes of the Millennium Development Goals, while including new areas such as climate change, economic inequality, innovation, sustainable consumption, peace and justice, among other priorities. The goals are interconnected – often the key to success on one will involve tackling issues more commonly associated with another" (United Nations Development Program 2017).
Terrorism	"The unlawful use or threat of violence in furtherance of political, religious, ideological or social goals that is intended to (a) evoke fear, intimidate or coerce a civilian population or any segment thereof; (b) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion" (US Federal Bureau of Investigation 2012, 3).
Third-Party Enabler	For rebellion, this includes financial and military factors (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006). According to Lopez (2012, 3): "There are three essential elements to enabling: (1) A third party provides resources, goods, services, or other practical support—directly or indirectly—to the perpetrator of ongoing atrocities; (2) This support is a critical ingredient that enables or sustains the commission of the atrocities, without which the atrocities would not have taken place to the same extent; and (3) The third party knew or should have known about the atrocities and about the ways in which its goods or support were likely to contribute to the commission of these crimes."
Victory	"A victory is when one side in an armed conflict is either defeated or eliminated, or otherwise succumbs through capitulation, surrender, or similar public announcement" (Kreutz 2010, 244).
Violent Extremists	"Individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals" (US White House 2011, 1).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Arusha Accords" (1993). Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame. Available at https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-accord-4-august-1993.

"Lusaka Agreement" (1999). *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.* July. Available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/22634.htm.

"Nairobi Agreement" (2007). *Joint Communiqué of the Government of the Republic of Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on a Common Approach to End the Threat Posed to Peace and Stability in Both Countries and the Great Lakes Region*. November 9. Available at www.peaceau.org/uploads/nairobi-agreement.pdf.

"Pretoria Agreement" (2002). *Peace Agreement between the Governments of Rwanda and the DRC on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the DRC and the Dismantling of the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces in DRC.* July 30. Available at http://peacemaker.un.org/drcrwanda-agreementwithdrawal2002.

Addison, T (ed.) (2003). *From Conflict to Recovery in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press/UNU/WIDER.

Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke (1996). "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management." *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.

African Development Bank (2011). "The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Some Lessons Learnt." Fragile States Unit (OFSU), September. Available at www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/2011%20Role%20of%20Disarmament-%20Reintegration%20Programs%20in%20Post-Conflict%20Reconstruction.pdf.

African Rights (2007). "A Welcome Expression of Intent: The Nairobi Communique and the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe." December. Available at www.africanrights.org.

Agence France-Presse (2015). "Only 10 Rwandans against Paul Kagame's Third Term, Says Lawmakers' Report." *The Nation*, August 11.

Amos, Deborah (2014). "Islamic State Defector: 'If You Turn Against ISIS, They Will Kill You.'" *All Things Considered*, National Public Radio, September 25.

Anand, Sudhir, and Amartya Sen (1994). "Sustainable Human Development: Concepts and Priorities." Occasional Papers, United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report Office, September 1. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294664.

Anand, Sudhir, and Amartya Sen (2000). "Human Development and Economic Sustainability." *World Development* 28 (12): 2029–49.

Annan, Jeannine, and Christopher Blattman (2006). "The Survey of War Affected Youth, Research & Programs for Youth in Armed Conflict in Uganda." *SWAY Research Brief 2: The Psychosocial Resiliency of Youth.* May. Available at http://chrisblattman.com/documents/policy/sway/SWAY.RB2.pdf.

Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (2015). "Definitions of Political Violence, Agents and Event Types." Available at www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Definitions-of-Political-Violence_2015.pdf.

Aronson, Jacob, Paul Huth, Mark Lichbach, and Kiyoung Chang (2015). "How Rebels Win (And Why They Lose)." University of Maryland, November. Available at http://unige.ch/sciences-societe/speri/files/9314/5294/8814/Paul_Huth_-_how_rebels_win_11_26_15.pdf.

Autesserre, Severine (2007). "DRCongo: Explaining Peace-Building Failures, 2003–2006." *Review of African Political Economy* 34 (113): 423–41.

Aydin, Aysegul (2012). *Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflict*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Baldauf, Scott (2009). "Rwanda Rebel Leaders: US, French, Spanish, and Congo Business Links." *Christian Science Monitor*, December.

Bandeira, Monica (2008). "Restoring Dignity: Current Psychosocial Interventions with Ex-Combatants in South Africa: A Review, Discussion and Policy Dialogue Project." Johannesburg: Trauma and Transition Program, The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Available at www.csvr.org.za/docs/correctional/restoringdignity.pdf.

Barker, Daniel (2008). "Towards a More Comprehensive DDR." *Journal of Politics & International Affairs,* Fall: 101-114.

Barklay, Chadwick D. (2007). "Maximizing the Psychological Battlespace: Effectively Planning and Integrating Operational-Level Psychological Operations (PSYOP) into Full-Spectrum Operations." Department of Joint Military Operations. New Port, RI: US Naval War College.

Bartoli, Andrea, and Peter T. Coleman (2003). "Dealing with Extremists." In *Beyond Intractability*, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, September. Boulder: University of Colorado.

Beehner, Lionel (2007). "The Effects of 'Youth Bulge' on Civil Conflicts." Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, April 27. Available at www.cfr.org/world/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts/p13093.

Belasco, Amy (2014). "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11." Congressional Research Service Report Prepared for the Members of Congress. December 8.

Boshoff, Henri, and Hans Hoebeke (2008). "DR Congo: Peace in the Kivus? An Analysis of the Nairobi and Goma Agreements." Institute for Security Studies, July. Available at www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=18866.

Boudreaux, Karol, and Jutta Tobias (2009). "The Role of Entrepreneurship in Conflict Reduction in the Post-Genocide Rwandan Coffee Industry: Quantitative Evidence from a Field Study." Working Paper No. 09-24. Mercatus Center at George Mason University, June. Available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/Post_Genocide_Rwandan_Coffee_Industry.pdf.

Brahm, Eric (2003). "Conflict Stages." In *Beyond Intractability*, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado.

———(2004). "Costs of Intractable Conflict." In *Beyond Intractability*, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado.

Branczik, Amelia (2004). "Humanitarian Aid and Development Assistance." In *Beyond Intractability*, eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado. Available at www.beyondintractability.org/essay/humanitarian-aid.

Brehm, Hollie Nyseth, Christopher Uggen, and Jean-Damascène Gasanabo (2014). "Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda's Gacaca Courts." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 30 (3): 333–52.

Briggs, Rachel, and Sebastien Feve (2014). "Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online." Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Available at www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Countering%20the%20Appeal%20of%20Extremism%20Online_1.pdf.

British Broadcasting Corporation (2004). "Timeline, 100 Days of Genocide." April 6. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3580247.stm.

Brown, Graham, Arnim Langer, and Frances Stewart (2011). "A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments." Centre for Research on Peace and Development Working Paper No. 1. September. Available at http://soc.kuleuven.be/web/files/12/80/wp01.pdf.

Brück, Tilman, Patricia Justino, Philip Verwimp, and Alexandra Avdeenko (2010). "Identifying Conflict and Violence in Micro-Level Surveys." Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 5067. July.

Brück, Tilman, Wim Naudé, and Philip Verwimp (2013). "Business under Fire: Entrepreneurship and Violent Conflict in Developing Countries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57 (001): 3–19.

Buhaug, Halvard, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Jan Ketil Rod (2008). "Disaggregating Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars: A Dyadic Test of Exclusion Theory." *International Organization* (Summer) 62:531–51.

Buhaug, Halvard, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2014). "Square Pegs in Round Holes: Inequalities, Grievances, and Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 58:418–31.

Burgess, Heidi, and Guy M. Burgess (eds.) (2003). "What Are Intractable Conflicts?" In *Beyond Intractability*. Conflict Information Consortium, Boulder: University of Colorado.

Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar (2000). "Aid, Policies, and Growth." *American Economic Review* 90 (4): 847–68.

———(2004). "Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3251. World Bank, March. Available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-3251.

Call, Charles T., and Elizabeth M. Cousens (2008). "Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies." *International Studies Perspectives* 9:1–21.

Carlyle, Thomas (1841). *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The Heroic in History*. London, UK: James Fraser.

Caryl, Christian (2015). "Africa's Singapore Dream: Why Rwanda's President Styles Himself as the Heir to Lee Kuan Yew." *Foreign Policy*, April 2.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis." *World Politics* 62 (1): 87–119.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug (2013). *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2011). "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison." *American Political Science Review* 105 (3): 478-495.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Nils-Christian Bormann (2015). "Triangulating Horizontal Inequality." *Journal of Peace Research* 52 (6): 806–21.

Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (2010). "An Expansive Approach to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration." Center for Civil Military Relations Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, US Naval Postgraduate School. Available at www.ccmr.org/flipbooks/3137_CCMR/files/assets/basic-html/page14.html.

Center for Systemic Peace (2011). *Global Report*. Available at www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf.

———(2016). "Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets 1800–2015." The Polity Project, May. Available at www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
Central Intelligence Agency (US) (2017). *The World Factbook 2017*.

Cevik, Sirhan, and Mohammad Rahmati (2013). "Breaking the Curse of Sisyphus: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Conflict Economic Transitions." IMF Working Paper, WP/13/2. Middle East and Central Asia Division, International Monetary Fund, January.

Charmaz, Kathy (2004). "Grounded Theory." In *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods,* eds. Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Futing Liao. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

Charron, Andrea, and Clara Portela (2015). "The UN, Regional Sanctions and Africa." *International Affairs* 91 (6): 1369–85.

Chen, Siyan, Norman V. Loayza, and Marta Reynal-Querol (2007). "The Aftermath of Civil War." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4190. April. Available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4190.

Civil Society Organization for Development Effectiveness (2009–2012). "Definition of Conflict," Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness. Available at http://cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/conflict_definition_final.pdf.

Coffey, Amanda, and Paul Atkinson (1996). *Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complementary Research Strategies*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

Coghlan, Benjamin, Richard J. Brennan, Pascal Ngoy, David Dofara, Brad Otto, Mark Clements, and Tony Stewart (2006). "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Nationwide Survey." *The Lancet* 367:44–51.

Colletta, Nat J., Marcus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer (1996). "The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa." Washington, DC: World Bank.

Collier, Paul (1994). "Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of the Transition from War to Peace." *Journal of International Development* 6 (3): 343–51.

———(1999). "Doing Well Out of War." Paper prepared for the Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. London, April 26–27.

———(2000a). "Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity (Special Issue)." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (6): 839–53.

———(2000b). "Doing Well Out of War." In *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, eds. Mats Berdal and David Malone. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

———(2004). "Development and Conflict." Oxford University: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics. October. Available at www.un.org/esa/documents/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf.

———(2006). "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy." Oxford University: Department of Economics. April. Available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/EconomicCausesofCivilConflict-ImplicationsforPolicy.pdf.

———(2007). "Post-Conflict Recovery: How Should Policies Be Distinctive?" Oxford University: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics. May. Available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/PostConflict-Recovery.pdf.

———(2009). *Wars, Guns and Votes*. New York: Harper Collins.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler (1999a). "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." World Bank. Available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2355.

———(1999b). "Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War." Working Paper, Report 28151. World Bank/Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University.

———(2000). "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." WPS 2000-18. World Bank, April 26. Available at www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/20-18text.pdf.

———(2002). "Aid, Policy, and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2902. World Bank, October. Available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2902.

———(2004a). "Greed and Grievance in Civil War.*" Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4): 563–95.

———(2004b). "Conflict." In *Global Crises: Global Solutions*, ed. B. Lomborg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———(2004c). "Military Expenditure in Post-Conflict Societies." CSAE WPS/2004-13. Oxford University: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics. April 8. Available at www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2004-13text.pdf.

Collier, Paul, and Nicholas Sambanis (eds.) (2002). "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (1): 3–12.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner (2006). "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War." CSAE Working Paper Series, No. 10. Oxford University: Centre for the Study of African Economies. August. Available at www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2006-10text.pdf.

———(2007). "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War." Oxford University: Centre for the Study of African Economies WPS/2006-10. Available at www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP2_MM_ZT.pdf.

———(2008). "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility of Civil War." Oxford University: Centre for the Study of African Economies.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom (2004). "On the Duration of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 41:253–73.

———(2006). "Post-Conflict Risks." In collaboration with the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations and the World Bank. Oxford University: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCONFLICT/Resources/PCP3797CollierHoefflerSoderbom.pdf.

Collier, Paul, V. L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.* A World Bank Policy Research Report. World Bank and Oxford University Press.

Collin, P. H. and A. C. Black (eds.) (2004). *Dictionary of Politics and Government.* Available athttps://libproxy.tulane.edu/login?url=http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/acbgovtpol/defection /0.

Conciliation Resources (2009). "Choosing to Engage: Armed Groups and Peace Processes." Policy Brief. *Accord* 16.

Copeland, Darryl, and Evan H. Potter (2008). "Public Diplomacy in Conflict Zones: Military Information Operations Meet Political Counter-Insurgency." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 3:277–97.

Corey, Allison, and Sandra F. Joireman (2004). "Retributive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda." *African Affairs* 103 (410): 73–89.

Council on Foreign Relations (2013). "The Global Regime for Armed Conflict." Global Governance Monitor, International Institutions and Global Governance. February. Available at www.cfr.org/global-governance/global-regime-armed-conflict/p24180.

Crisis States Research Centre (2007). "Crisis, Fragile and Failed States: Definitions used by the Crisis States Research Centre." London School of Economics. Available at www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/drc/FailedState.pdf.

Crocker, Chester (1995). "Lessons on Intervention." In *Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World: The Role of Intervention*, 77–88. Report of the Aspen Institute Conference, August 2–6.

———(2011). "Thoughts on the Conflict Management Field after 30 Years." *International Negotiation* 16:1–10.

Cutter Patel, Anna, Pablo De Greiff, and Lars Waldorf (eds.) (2009). *Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants.* New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, Social Science Research Council. Available at www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new_publication_3/%7B465ede38-0c0d-df11-9d32-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf.

Dabo, Awa, Jago Salmon, Moises Venancio, and Patrick Keuleers (2010). "Local Governance, Peace Building and State Building in Post-Conflict Settings." A UNDP Discussion Paper. United Nations Development Programme. Available at http://uncdf.org/gfld/docs/post-conflict.pdf.

Dagne, Ted (2011). "Rwanda: Background and Current Developments." Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R40115. *CRS Report for Members of Congress*. Available at www.crs.gov.

Daly, Erin (2002). "Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda." *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 34 (2): 355–96.

David, Mason T., Joseph P. Weingarten Jr., and Patrick J. Fett (1999). "Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 239–68.

De Veenhoop, Hans Romkena (2007). "Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Cases of the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU." Secretariat of the Multi-Country Demobilization Program, Conflict and Transition Consultancies. Washington, DC: World Bank. June. Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/668411468244798529/Opportunities-and-constraints-for-the-disarmament-and-repatriation-of-foreign-armed-groups-in-the-Democratic-Republic-of-Congo-the-case-of-the-FDLR-FNL-and-ADF-NALU.

Debelle, Raymond (2014). *FDLR: Past, Present, and Policies.* Prepared on behalf of the DRC Affinity Group. Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, Social Science Research Council. March. Available at www.ssrc.org/publications/view/fdlr-past-present-and-policies.

Debelle, Raymond, and Nicolas Florquin (2015). "Waning Cohesion: The Rise and Fall of the FDLR." In *Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World*, 186–215. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Department for International Development (2005). "Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states." London, UK. Available at https://www.jica.go.jp/cdstudy/library/pdf/20071101_11.pdf.

Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Department of Homeland Security, and US Coast Guard (2007). *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7. July. Available at www.jag.navy.mil/documents/NWP_1-14M_Commanders_Handbook.pdf.

Des Forges, Alison (1999). *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York, Washington, London, Brussels: Human Rights Watch.

Diamond, Larry (2005). "Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges." Prepared for the National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security, and America's Purpose. September 6–7, Washington, DC. Available at www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/papers/PromotingDemocracy0905.htm.

Downes, Alexander B. (2004). "The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars." *Security Studies* 13 (4): 230–79.

Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis (2006). *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Duffy Toft, Monica (2014). "Territory and War." *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (2): 185–98.

Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert (2006). "A Participatory Approach to DDR: Empowering Local Institutions and Abilities." *Conflict Trends* 3:39–43.

Elbadawi, Ibrahim A., Linda Kaltani, and Klaus Elbadawi (2007). "Post-Conflict Aid, Real Exchange Rate Adjustment, and Catch-Up Growth." World Bank. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCONFLICT/Resources/PCP3795ElbadawiKaltaniSchmidt.pdf.

Ellis, B. Heidi, & Abdi, Saida (2017). "Building community resilience to violent extremism through genuine partnerships." *American Psychologist* 72 (3):289 –300

Eriksson, Mikael, and Peter Wallensteen (2015). "Targeting Sanctions and Ending Armed Conflicts: First Steps Towards a New Research Agenda." *International Affairs* 91 (6): 1387–98.

Fearon, James D. (2007). "Economic Development, Insurgency and Civil War." In *Institutions and Economic Performance*, ed. Elhanan Helpman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin (2003). "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 75–90.

Fein, Helen (2007). *Human Rights and Wrongs: Slavery, Terror, Genocide.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Ferroggiaro, William (ed.) (2001). *The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction*. Washington, DC: The National Security Archive.

Fjelde, Hanne (2015). "Farming or Fighting? Agricultural Price Shocks and Civil War in Africa." *World Development* 67:525–34.

Florquin, Nancy, and Claudia Seymour (2016). "Down, but Not Out: The FDLR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Small Arms Survey Research Notes: Armed Actors* Number 56 (January).

Fortna, Virginia Page (2004). "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 269–92.

Freedom House (2016). *Freedom of the Press 2016*. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016.

———(2017a). "Rwanda." *Freedom of the Press 2016*. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/rwanda.

———(2017b). *Freedom in the World 2017, Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy*. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.

Front Patriotique Rwandais/Rwanda Patriotic Front (2008). "RPF Constitution." RPF–Inkotanyi, Kigali.

Fund for Peace (2016). *Fragile States Index 2016.* Available at http://fsi.fundforpeace.org.

g7+ Group of Fragile States, Pacific Island Countries and the Group of Portuguese-Speaking African Countries (PALOP) (2013). *The Dili Consensus*, Conference on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, Dili, Timor-Leste. February 26–28. Available at www.g7plus.org/sites/default/files/article-downloads/Dili-Consensus-English-Final.pdf.

Galtung, John (1964). "An Editorial." *Journal of Peace Research* 1 (1): 1–4.

———(1969). "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* (6) 3: 167–91.

Games, Dianna (2011). "Doing Business in Post-Conflict and Fragile States: Challenges and Risks." Development Planning Division, Working Paper Series No. 23. Development Bank of Southern Africa.

Gates, Scott (2002). "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (1): 111–30.

Gender-Based Violence (n.d.). "Defining Conflict/Post-Conflict." *GBV Guide*. Available at http://gbvguide.org/files/pdfs/pages/page-965.pdf.

Genocide Watch (n.d.). "Rwanda." Available at http://genocidewatch.net/category/updates/byregion/africa/centralafrica/rwanda/page/3.

Gent, Stephen E. (2008). "Relative Rebel Strength and Power Sharing in Intrastate Conflicts." *International Interactions* 37 (2): 215–28.

Gettleman, Jeffrey (2010). "Africa's Forever Wars: Why the Continent's Conflicts Never End." *Foreign Policy* March/April 178:73-75.

Gilligan, Michael J., and Ernest J. Sergenti (2008). "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3:89–122.

Gilligan, Michael, Eric Mvukiyehe, and Cyrus Samii (2010). "Reintegrating Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Burundi." Wartime and Post-Conflict Experiences in Burundi. Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, and Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, May 5. Available at www.columbia.edu/~enm2105/docs/burundi/gilligan_et_al_capers.pdf.

———(2012). "Reintegrating Rebels into Civilian Life: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Burundi." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 00 (0): 1–29.

Ginifer, Jeremy (2003). "Reintegration of Ex-Combatants." In *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*, Institute for Security Studies Monograph No. 80, eds. Sarah Meek, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer, and Patrick Coke. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies.

Gleichmann, Colin, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken, and Adrian Wilkinson (2004). *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*. German Technical Co-operation *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH*, Norwegian Defence International Centre, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre – Centre Pearson pour le maintien de la paix, Swedish National Defence College, Druckerei Hassmüller Graphische Betriebe GmbH & Co. KG. Available at www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/04-5358.pdf.

Goetz, J. P., and M. D. LeCompe (1981). "Ethnographic Research and the Problem of Data Reduction: What Do I Do with the Five Drawers and Fieldnotes." *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 12 (1): 51–70.

Goldstone, Jack (2001). "Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4:139–87.

Gourevitch, Philip (1995). "After the Genocide: When a People Murders up to a Million Fellow-Countrymen, What Does It Mean to Survive? Letter from Rwanda." *The New Yorker*, December 18.

Greig, Michael J., and Patrick M. Regan (2008). "When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars." *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (4): 759–81.

Grewal, Baljit Singh (2003). "John Galtung: Positive and Negative Peace." Auckland University of Technology: School of Social Science. Available at www.activeforpeace.org/no/fred/positive_negative_peace.pdf.

Grey, Jeff (2008). "Australia's Counterinsurgencies: A Brief History." *Australian Army Journal* 5 (2): 517–26.

Griffiths, Aaron, and Catherine Barnes (2008). "Incentives, Sanctions and Conditionality in Peacemaking." Conciliation Resources Policy Brief. *Accord* 19:9–13.

Grignon, Francois (2009). "Time for a New Approach to Disarm the FDLR." *The Africa Report*, August 7.

Guichaoua, Yvan (2012). "Rebel Recruitment," Chapter 12. In *The Elgar Handbook of Civil War and Fragile States*, eds. Graham K. Brown and Arnim Langer. Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Gurr, Ted Robert (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———(2000). "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane." *Foreign Affairs* 79 (3): 52–64.

———(2010). "How Africa's Internal Wars Ended: Lessons for Prevention?" Prevention and Mitigation of Genocide and Mass Atrocities: Focus on East and Central Africa, and the Islamic World. Genocide Prevention Advisory Network. Available at http://gpanet.org/content/how-africa%E2%80%99s-internal-wars-ended-lessons-prevention#_ftn2.

———(2011). "Why Men Rebel Redux: How Valid Are its Arguments 40 years On?" *e-International Relations*, November 17. Available at www.e-ir.info/2011/11/17/why-men-rebel-redux-how-valid-are-its-arguments-40-years-on.

Gurr, Ted Robert, and Will H. Moore (1997). "Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (4): 1079–103.

Gurses, Mehmet, Nicolas Rost, and Patrick McLeod (2008). "Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace." *International Interactions* 34 (2): 129–55.

Haar, Rohini Jonnalagadda, and Leonard S. Rubenstein (2012). "Health in Fragile and Post-Conflict States," Special Report 301. US Institute for Peace. January. Available at www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR_301.pdf.

Hacıoğlu, Ümit, Hasan Dinçer, and İsmail Erkan Çelik (2012). "Economic Approach to Conflict Issue: Investment in Post-Conflict Situation for International Business." *International Journal of Business Administration* 3 (5): 1–8.

Hammersley, Martyn, and Paul Atkinson (1995). *Ethnography: Principles in Practice*, second edition. London: Routledge.

Harff, Barbara (2003). "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 57–73.

———(2005). "Chapter 8. Assessing the Risks of Genocide and Politicide." In *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, eds. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr. University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Department of Government and Politics.

Hartzell, Caroline (2002). "Peace in Stages: The Role of an Implementation Regime in Nicaragua." In *Ending Civil Wars*, eds. S. Stedman, D. Rothchild, and E. Cousens. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hartzell, Caroline, and Matthew Hoddie (2003). "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post–Civil War Conflict Management." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2): 318–32.

Hegre, Håvard (2014). "Democracy and Armed Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (2): 159–72.

Heiberg, Marianne, Brendan O'Leary, and John Tirman (eds.) (2009). *Terror, Insurgency and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Hill, Richard, Gwendolyn Taylor, and Jonathan Temin (2008). "Would You Fight Again? Understanding Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration," Special Report 211. US Institute for Peace. September. Available at www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr211.pdf.

Hochschild, Adam (1999). *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Hoeffler, Anke (2012). "Growth, Aid and Policies in Countries Recovering from War." A thematic paper supporting the OECD DAC INCAF project "Global Factors Influencing the Risk of Conflict and Fragility." *Think Global, Act Global: Confronting Global Factors Influencing Conflict and Fragility*. October. Available at www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/WP1%20Growth%20Aid%20and%20Policies.pdf.

Hoeffler, Anke, Syeda Shahbano Ijaz, and Sarah von Billerbeck (2010). "Post-Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding." Background Paper, *World Development Report 2011*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Högbladh, Stina (2012). "Peace Agreements 1975–2011: Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset." In *States in Armed Conflict 2011*, eds. Thérèse Pettersson and Lotta Themnér, 39–56. Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Available at www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/61/c_61533-l_1-k_peace-agreements-1975-2011final.pdf.

Holmes, Richard, Hew Strachan, Chris Bellamy, and Hugh Bicheno (eds.) (2001). *The Oxford Companion to Military History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Horgan, John (2008). "Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis." In *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, 17-29. New York: Rutledge.

Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013). "United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Conflict Peace," Annual Meeting Paper. American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2300169.

Human Rights Watch (1994). "Human Rights in Africa and US Policy: A Special Report by Human Rights Watch/Africa for the White House Conference held June 26–27, 1994." *Human Rights Watch/Africa* 6 (6): 1–37. Available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/AFRICA947.pdf.

———(1997). "Democratic Republic of the Congo, What Kabila Is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo." *Human Rights Watch/Africa and Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme* 9 (5) A: 1–38. Available at www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/c/congo/congo97o97o.pdf.

Human Security Centre (2006). *Human Security Brief 2006*. Vancouver: Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia.

Humphreys, Macartan, and Ashutosh Varshney (2004). "Violent Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals: Diagnosis and Recommendations [First Draft]." Prepared for the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals Poverty Task Force Workshop, Bangkok, June. Available at www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HV.pdf.

Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein (2004). "What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June–August 2003," Interim Report. July. In partnership with the Post-Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment (PRIDE), with support of The Earth Institute, Columbia University, and the DDR Coordination Section, UNAMSIL, Freetown, Sierra Leone. Available at www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/Report1_BW.pdf.

———(2008). "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 436–55. Available at www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/who_fights.pdf.

Independent Evaluation Group (2014). *World Bank Group Activities in Situations of Conflict and Violence: An IEG Evaluation.* World Bank Group. Available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20762.

Inkster, Nigel (2015). "Introduction." In *Armed Conflict Survey 2015*, ed. Nigel Inkster, 5–10. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies Publications.

Institute for Economics and Peace (2011a). *Pillars of Peace: Understanding the Key Attitudes and Institutions that Underpin Peaceful Societies.* Available at http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Pillars-of-Peace-Report-IEP.pdf.

———(2011b). *Quantifying Peace and Its Benefits: Pillars of Peace*. Available at http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Pillars-of-Peace-Report-IEP.pdf.

———(2014). *Global Peace Index 2014: Measuring Peace and Assessing Country Risk*. Available at http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/04/2014-Global-Peace-Index-REPORT_0-1.pdf.

———(2015). *Global Peace Index 2015: Measuring Peace, Its Causes and Its Economic Value*. Available at http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Peace-Index-Report-2015_0.pdf.

———(2016). *Global Peace Index: Quantifying Peace and Its Benefits*.

International Committee of the Red Cross (n.d.). "Chapter 1, Rule 3." In *Customary IHL Database*. Available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule3.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2008). *The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T*. Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB452/docs/doc23.pdf.

International Crisis Group (2003). "Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration." *ICG Africa Report* No. 63. Nairobi/Brussels, May. Available at www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/13/icg_05232003.pdf.

International Development Association (2015). "Strengthening Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States." Progress Report, IDA17 Mid-Term Review, IDA Resource Mobilization Department, Development Finance. World Bank Group, November. Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/859221468197958545/pdf/100928-BR-IDA-SecM2015-0221-Box393245B-OUO-9.pdf.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015). *Armed Conflict Survey*. Available at www.iiss.org/en/Topics/armed-conflict-survey/armed-conflict-survey-2015-46e5.

International Labour Organization (2010). *Socioeconomic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants Guidelines.* ILO Programme for Crisis Response and Reconstruction. Available at www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_emp/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_141276.pdf.

Jacobs, Richard M. (n.d.) "Educational Research: Qualitative Research Methods." Philadelphia, PA: Villanova University.

Jo, Hyeran, Rotem Dvir, and Yvette Isidori (2016). "Who Is a Rebel? Typology and Rebel Groups in the Contemporary Middle East." *META (Middle East–Topics and Arguments)* 6:6–86.

Johansen, Morgan, and Mark Joslyn (2008). "Political Persuasion during Times of Crisis: The Effects of Education and News Media on Citizens' Factual Information about Iraq." *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* Autumn 85 (3): 591–608.

Johnston, Lisa G. (2013). "Module 4: Introduction to Respondent Driven Sampling." In *Introduction to HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infection Surveillance.* Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization/UNAIDS. Available at http://applications.emro.who.int/dsaf/EMRPUB_2013_EN_1539.pdf.

Johnston, Lisa G., and Keith Sabin (2010). "Sampling Hard-to-Reach Populations with Respondent-Driven Sampling." *Methodological Innovations Online* 5 (2): 38–48.

Junne, Gerd, and Willemijn Verkoren (eds.) (2005). *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Justino, Patricia (2009). *Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro Level Perspective on the Causes and Duration of Warfare.* Updated January 2009, MICROCON Research Working Paper No. 6. Brighton, England: MICROCON. Available at www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP6_PJ.pdf.

Justino, Patricia, and Philip Verwimp (2008). *Poverty Dynamics, Violent Conflict and Convergence in Rwanda.* MICROCON Research Working Paper No. 4. Brighton, England: MICROCON. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116610.

Kang, Ezer, Darcie A. P. Delzell, Christophe Mbonyingabo, and Sylvestre Ngendahayo (2016). "Exposure to the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Survivor Attitudes toward Génocidaires: A 20-Year Postscript." *Journal of Peace Psychology* 22 (4): 356–66.

Kang, Seonjou, and James Meernik (2004). "Determinants of Post-Conflict Economic Assistance." *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2): 149–66.

Kates, Robert, Thomas M. Parris, and Anthony A. Leiserowitz (2005). "What Is Sustainable Human Development? Goals, Indicators, Values, and Practice." *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* 47 (3): 8–21.

Kelly, Jocelyn (2010). "Rape in War–Motives of Militia in DRC." Special Report. US Institute for Peace. Available at www.usip.org/publications/rape-in-war-motives-of-militia-in-drc.

Kilroy, Walt (2011). "From Conflict to Ownership: Participatory Approaches to the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone." Paper presented at the European Conference on African Studies (ECAS4), Uppsala, Sweden. June 15. Nordik Afrika Institute. Available at www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/41-60/panel-53/Walt-Kilroy-Full-Paper.pdf.

Knight, Mark, and Alpaslan Özerdem (2004). "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants." *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (4): 499–516.

Kreutz, Joakim (2010). "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 243–50.

Kreutz, Joakim, Nicholas Marsh, and Manuela Torre (2011). "Regaining State Control: Arms and Violence in Post-Conflict Countries." In *Small Arms, Crime and Conflict: Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence*, eds. Owen Greene and Nicholas Marsh, 43–63. London and New York: Routledge.

Kroslak, Daniela (2008). *The French Betrayal of Rwanda.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Kumar, Krishna (1989). "Conducting Key Informant Interviews in Developing Countries." AID Program Design and Evaluation Methodology Report No. 13. US Agency for International Development, December. Available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaax226.pdf.

Kurtenbach, Sabine (2009). "Post-War and Post-Conflict Challenges for Development Cooperation." Policy Brief 5. Institute for Development and Peace. Available at http://inef.uni-due.de/cms/files/policybrief05_en.pdf.

Kurtenbach, Sabine, and Herbert Wulf (2012). "Violence and Security Concerns in Post-Conflict Situations." Research and Advisory Project, "Instruments and Procedures of German Development Cooperation in Post-Conflict Situations," Project Working Paper No. 3. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg Universitaet. Available at https://inef.uni-due.de/index.php?rex_media_type=ImgTypeName&rex_media_file=wp03_gesamt.pdf.

Leff, Jonah (2008). "The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: A Case for Sierra Leone." *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 8 (1): 9–38.

Lektzian, David, and Patrick M. Regan (2016). "Economic Sanctions, Military Interventions and Civil Conflict Outcomes." *Journal of Peace Research* 53 (4): 554–68.

Lemarchand, René (1998). "Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?" *African Studies Review* 41 (1): 3–16.

Leonhard, Manuela, and Dr. Herwig Hahn (2004). "Review and Analysis: Needs Assessment in Post-Conflict Situations." Prepared by the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ) on behalf of United Nations Development Program, World Bank, and German Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development. April. Available at www.undg.org/docs/9145/Review_Analysis_Needs_Assessments_in_Post-Conflict_Situations.pdf.

Lincoln, Y. S., and E. G. Guba (1985). *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Newbury Park, CA: SAGe Publications.

Longman, Timothy (2010). "Trying Times for Rwanda: Reevaluating *Gacaca* Courts in Post-Genocide Reconciliation." *Harvard International Review* (Summer): 48–52.

———(2011). "Limitations to Political Reform: The Undemocratic Nature of Transition in Rwanda." In *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence*, eds. Lars Waldorf and Scott Straus, 25–47. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Lopez, George A. (2012). "Dealing with 'Enablers' in Mass Atrocities: Towards a New Human Rights Concept." Paper presented at the 2012 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego April 1–4. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. Available at http://kroc.nd.edu/sites/default/files/ISA_enabler_paper_4.pdf.

Lopez, Humberto, Quentin Wodon, and Ian Bannon (2004). "Rwanda: The Impact of Conflict on Growth and Poverty." Social Development Notes, No. 18. World Bank. Available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11268.

Maclin, Beth J., Jocelyn T. D. Kelly, Rachel Perks, Patrick Vinck, and Phuong Pham (2017). "Moving to the Mines: Motivations of Men and Women for Migration to Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Sites in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Resources Policy* 51:115–22.

Marshall, Monty G. (2005). "Conflict Trends in Africa 1946–2004: A Macro-Comparative Perspective." Prepared for the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACCP). Department for International Development, Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of the United Kingdom. Available at www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/ConflictTrendsAfrica2006MGMarshall.pdf.

Marshall, Monty G., and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall (2015). *State Fragility Index and Matrix 2015*. Center for Systemic Peace. Available at www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFImatrix2015c.pdf.

Maxwell, Joseph A. (2005). *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*, second edition. Applied Social Research Methods Series, Volume 41. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Maynard, Jonathan Leonard (2015). "Preventing Mass Atrocities: Ideological Strategies and Interventions." *Politics and Governance* 3 (3): 67–84.

McGreal, Chris (2012). "Rwanda's Genocide and the Bloody Legacy of Anglo-American Guilt." *The Guardian*, December 12.

McKibben, Gareth (2011). "Bridging the Divide: Connecting Training to Jobs in Post-Conflict Settings." *NORRAG (Network for Policy Research, Review and Advice on Education and Training) NEWS* 46: 94–6. Available at www.norrag.org/fileadmin/Full%20Versions/NN46.pdf.

McMullin, Jaremy (2013). *Ex-Combatants and the Post-Conflict State: Challenges of Reintegration.* Rethinking Political Violence Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

McNulty, Mel (2000). "French Arms, War and Genocide in Rwanda." *Crime, Law & Social Change* 33:105–29.

Meijer, Cécelle, and Philip Verwimp (2005). "The Use and Perception of Weapons Before and After Conflict: Evidence from Rwanda." Working Paper No. 2. Small Arms Survey. Available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP2-Rwanda.pdf.

Melander, Erik (2016). "The UCDP Armed Conflict Definition." Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Available at www.undp.org/content/dam/norway/nro/images/img/sdg-16-oslo-2016/Erik%20Melander.pdf.

Melvern, Linda (2004). *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide*. New York: Verso Books.

Menkhaus, Ken (2013). "Making Sense of Resilience in Peace-Building Contexts: Approaches, Applications, Implications." *Geneva Peace-Building Platform*, Paper No. 6. Available at www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/PP%2006%20-%20Resilience%20to%20Transformation%20-%20Jan.%202013_2.pdf.

Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004). "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach." *Journal of Political Economy* 112:725–54.

Mill, John Stuart (1843). *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, in Two Volumes. London: John Parker, West Strand.

Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (n.d.). Available at www.mdgfund.org.

Miller, Barbara (2012). "Chapter 7: Real and Virtual Relationships in Qualitative Data Analysis." In *A Realist Approach for Qualitative Research*, ed. Joseph A. Maxwell. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Minorities at Risk Project (2004a). *Chronology for Tutsis in Rwanda*. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Available at www.refworld.org/docid/469f38d6c.html.

———(2004b). *Chronology for Hutus in Rwanda*. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Available at www.refworld.org/docid/469f38d51e.html.

———(2009). "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Available at www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar.

Monahan, John (2015). "The individual risk assessment of terrorism: Recent developments." *Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Number 57*. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2665815.

Mueller, Hannes (2014). "Foreign Intervention and the Economic Costs of Conflict: A Micro Perspective." Center for Economic and Policy Research's Policy Portal, *VOX*, February. Available at http://voxeu.org/article/foreign-intervention-and-economic-costs-conflict

Mueller, John (2003). "Policing the Remnants of War." *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (5): 507–18.

Muggah, R., and P. Batchelor (2002). "Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development: A Preliminary Study of the Socio-Economic Impacts and Development Linkages of Small Arms Proliferation, Availability and Use." New York: United Nations Development Program.

Muggah, Robert (2005). "No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-Conflict Contexts." *The Round Table* 94 (379): 239–52.

———(2006a). "Emerging from the Shadow of War: A Critical Perspective on DDR and Weapons Reduction in the Post-Conflict Period." *Contemporary Security Policy* 27 (1): 190–205.

———(2006b). "Reflections on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sudan." *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine* 33, April. Available at www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-33/reflections-on-disarmament-demobilisation-and-reintegration-in-sudan.

Muhanji, Stella, and Kalu Ojah (2014). "External Debt and Military Spending: The Case of Africa's Conflict Countries." Munich Personal Research Papers in Economics Archive (MPRA) Paper 56077. Munich, Germany: University Library of Munich. Available at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56077/1/MPRA_paper_56077.pdf.

Muller, Gale (2011). "Worldwide, Peace and High Wellbeing Generally Coexist: Countries with the Highest Wellbeing Tend to Be the Most Peaceful." *Gallup*, 13 May. Available at www.gallup.com/poll/147515/worldwide-peace-high-wellbeing-generally-coexist.aspx.

Murshed, S. M., and M. Z. Tadjoeddin (2007). "Reappraising the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict," MICROCON Research Working Paper 2. Brighton, England: MICROCON. Available at www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP2_MM_ZT.pdf.

Nathan, Laurie (1999). "When Push Comes to Shove: The Failure of International Mediation in African Civil Wars." *Track Two* 8 (2): 1–29.

Neudorfer, Natascha S., and Ulrike G. Theuerkauf (2014). "Buying War, Not Peace." *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (13): 1856–86.

Newman, Edward, and Oliver Richmond (eds.) (2006). *Challenges to Peace Building: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution.* New York: United Nations University Press.

Nilsson, Anders (2005). "Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict Societies." Department for Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations and Humanitarian Assistance & Conflict Management, Swedish International Development Association. May. Available at www.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18365_SIDA4715en_Ex_Combatants.pdf.

Nolan, Cathal J. (2002). *Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations.* Santa Barbara, CA: American Bibliographical Center-Clio Press (ABC-CLIO).

Norris, John, Casey Dunning, and Annie Malknecht (2015). "Fragile Progress: The Record of the Millennium Development Goals in States Affected by Conflict, Fragility, and Crisis." Center for American Progress and Save the Children. June. Available at www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2015/06/08/114296/fragile-progress.

Ogden, Russell. (2008). "Bias." In *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, ed. Lisa Given, 61–2. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Olson Lounsbery, Marie (2016). "Foreign Military Intervention, Power Dynamics, and Rebel Group Cohesion." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1 (2): 127–41.

Olson Lounsbery, Marie, and Alethia Cook (2011). "Rebellion, Mediation and Group Splintering: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Hypotheses." *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (1): 73–84.

Orero, Baldwin, Charlotte Heime Max, Suzanne Jarvis Cutler, and Sarah Mohaupt (2007). "Impact of Conflict: Livelihoods Table." In *The Impact of Conflict on the Intergenerational Transmission of Chronic Poverty: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography.* Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper 71, Annotated Bibliography 4. March. Available at www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/CPRC_Annotated_Bibliographies_No_4.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2008). "Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience." OECD/DAC Discussion Paper. Available at http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/41100930.pdf.

———(2014). *Fragile States 2014: Domestic Revenue Mobilisation.* OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility. Available at www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/FSR-2014.pdf.

———(2016). OECD Data–Aid Statistics, Development Finance. Available at www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data.

———(2017). "Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC): Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts." Development Co-Operation Directorate. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm#ODA.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (2011). *International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't We Do Better?* Conflict and Fragility. OECD Publishing. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264086128-en.

Orth, Richard (2005). "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective." In *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*, ed. Susan E. Cook, 227–68. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Ouellet, Julian (2004). "Procedural Components of Peace Agreements." In *Beyond Intractability*, eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict Information Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado.

Oxford English Dictionary (2017). Third Edition, December. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at www.oed.com/view/Entry/48770?redirectedFrom=defector.

Özerdem, Alpaslan (2012). "A Re-Conceptualisation of Ex-Combatant Reintegration: 'Social Reintegration' Approach." *Conflict, Security & Development* 12 (1): 51–73.

Panić, M. (2008). "Post-Conflict Countries: Aid Effectiveness and Permanent Peace." Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. Available at www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_bg_papers/bp_wess2008_panic.pdf.

Pape, Robert A. (2006). *Dying to Win. Why Suicide Terrorists Do It*. London: Gibson Square Books.

Paris, Roland (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (2013). "UN Force Intervention Brigade against the M23." Posted by Chief, Lessons Learned, PKSOI, November 20. Available at http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/LMS-AF_1307_UN_FIBde_M23.pdf.

Pettersson, Thérese, and Peter Wallensteen (2015). "Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014." *Journal of Peace Research* 52 (4): 536–50.

President of the United States of America (2006). "Executive Order 13413—Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Part VIII. *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Administration, October 31. Available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/13413.pdf.

Prevent Genocide International (2005). "News Monitor for April 1–15, 2005." *News Monitor*, April. Available at www.preventgenocide.org/news-monitor/2005apr1.htm.

Prunier, Gerard (2008). *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Public Broadcasting Service (1999). "The Triumph of Evil: How the West Ignored the Warnings of the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and Turned Its Back on the Victim." *Frontline*, Public Broadcasting Service. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil.

Ramsbotham, Olivier, Tom Woodhouse, Hugh Miall, and Christopher Mitchell (2016). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, fourth edition. Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Rapley, John (2007). *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Regan, Patrick M. (2002). "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (2): 336–59.

Regan, Patrick M., and Aysegul Aydin (2006). "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (5): 736–56.

Republic of Rwanda (1996). *ORGANIC LAW No. 08/96 of August 30, 1996, on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed since October 1, 1990*. Available at www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm.

———(1997). *Chapter 1.1. Report on the Practice of Rwanda, 1997*, referring to Statement by the Rwandan Minister of Defense, Kigali, August 18.

———(2001). *Law No 47/2001 On Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism*. Available at www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ac5c4302.pdf.

———(2006). Sénat. *Idéologie du génocide au Rwanda et stratégies de son eradication*, Kigali. Available at http://cec.rwanda.free.fr/documents/doc/Doc-Rwandais/ideologie-Senat-Rwanda.pdf.

———(2008). *Law No. 35/2008 of 2008 Determining the Organization and Functioning of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission.* August 2008. Available at www.refworld.org/docid/4a3f87922.html.

———(2012). *Vision 2020*, revised. Available at www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/Vision_2020_.pdf.

———(2016). "Functions of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC)." National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. Available at www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=83.

Reyntjens, Filip (2011). "Behind the Façade of Rwanda's Elections." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 12 (2): 64–9.

———(2013). *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———(2015). "Rwanda: Progress or Powder Keg?" *Journal of Democracy* 26 (3): 19–33.

Rother, Björn, Gaëlle Pierre, Davide Lombardo, Risto Herrala, Priscilla Toffano, Erik Roos, Greg Auclair, and Karina Manasseh (2016). "The Economic Impact of Conflicts and the Refugee Crisis in the Middle East and North Africa." Staff Discussion Note, SDN/16/08. International Monetary Fund, September. Available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1608.pdf.

Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission/Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (2015). "Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Revised Project Implementation Manual." Republic of Rwanda, January. Available at http://demobrwanda.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/demoba/Coo/Special_Documents/final_PIM_SEDRP.pdf.

Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (2016). *Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme Annual Report 2015.* Republic of Rwanda, April. Available at http://demobrwanda.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/demoba/documents/2006/newslatters/ANNUAL_REPORT_2015_FIN_20_avril_2016_FINAL_CORR_01.pdf.

SAGE Publications (2012). *A (Very) Brief Refresher on the Case Study Method.* Available at www.sagepub.com/upm-data/41407_1.pdf.

Samii, Cyrus (2009). "Who Wants to Forgive and Forget? Civilian Attitudes toward Post-Conflict Justice and Truth in Burundi." *Report of the Wartime and Post-Conflict Experiences Project.* New York: Columbia University, Department of Political Science.

———(2010). "Economic Deprivation and Revolt: Evidence from Burundi. Draft hypotheses and methodology." For presentation at Midwest Political Science Association 2010.

———(2012). "Do Quotas Exacerbate or Reduce Ethnic Conflict? Evidence from Burundi's Military." Presented at Columbia University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and University of California, San Diego.

Sellstrom, Tor, and Lennart Wohlgemuth (1994). "Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors. Study 1, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience." Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden; and sponsored by the governments of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany. Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, Commission of the European Union, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECDI-DAC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs

(UN/DHA), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), Doctors of the World, INTERACTION, Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, and VOICE. November.

Sen, Amartya (1993). "Capability and Well-Being." In *The Quality of Life*, eds. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, 30–53. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press and the United Nations University.

———(1999). *Development as Freedom.* Random House Publishers, LLC.

Shenton, Andrew K. (2004). "Strategies for Ensuring Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research Projects." *Education for Information* 22:63–75. Available at www.crec.co.uk/docs/Trustworthypaper.pdf.

Simmons, Odis (n.d.). "Grounded Theory Guidelines for IRB Reviewers at Fielding Graduate University." Ethical Review/IRB, Grounded Theory Online. Available at www.groundedtheoryonline.com/getting-started/ethical-review-irb.

Small Arms Survey (2003). *Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2003: Development Denied*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2003.html.

Smith, Dan (2011). *Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict*. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Available at http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2576/pdf/smith_handbook.pdf.

Solomon, Christiana, and Jeremy Ginifer (2008). "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sierra Leone: Case Study." Contribution to the Project on DDR and Human Security: Post-Conflict Security-Building in the Interests of the Poor. West Yorkshire, England: University of Bradford. July. Available at www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4024~v~Disarmament_Demobilisation_and_Reintegration_in_Sierra_Leone.pdf.

Spear, Joanna (2006). "From Political Economies of War to Political Economies of Peace: The Contribution of DDR after Wars of Predation." *Contemporary Security Policy* 27 (1): 168–89.

Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert (2008). "Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC." *Fatal Transactions*. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. Available at http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/20080311_Mapping_Conflict_Motives.pdf.

Staub, Ervin (1999). "The Origins and Prevention of Genocide, Mass Killing, and Other Collective Violence." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 5 (4): 303–36.

Stearns, Jason (2012). *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. New York: Public Affairs Books.

Stedman, Stephen John (2001). "Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers." International Peace Academy Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation. Available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ImplementingPeaceAgreementsinCivilWars_IPI2001.pdf.

Stedman, Stephen John, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (2002). *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Stern, Jessica (2003). *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. New York: Ecco Harper Collins.

Stern, Paul C., and Daniel Druckman (eds.) (2000). *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*. National Research Council. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Stewart, Frances (2008). *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Conflict in Multiethnic Societies*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stewart, Francis, and Graham Brown (2009). "Fragile States." Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Working Paper No. 51. Oxford: University of Oxford. Available at www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper51.pdf.

Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (2005). "SIDDR: Concept Paper for the Framework and Structure of Work." Government of Sweden. February. Available at www.government.se/content/1/c6/06/54/07/c71ba647.pdf.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2016). *SIPRI Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Available at www.sipriyearbook.org.

Sundaram, Anjan (2016). *Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship*. New York: Doubleday.

Symansky, Steve (2010). "Discussion Paper: Donor Funding and Public Finance Management Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Recommendations Derived from Personal Observations." Overseas Development Institute, Centre for Aid and Public Management, and the International Monetary Fund. Available at www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events-documents/4518.pdf.

The Hague (1899). "Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land." Article 3, July 29.

The New Deal (2011). Available at www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/new-deal/about-new-deal.

Torabi, Yama, and Lorenzo Delesgues (2008). "Afghanistan: Bringing Accountability Back in from Subjects of Aid to Citizens of the State." *Integrity Watch Afghanistan*, June. Available at www.iwaweb.org/_docs/reports/research/bringing_accountability_back_in.pdf.

Transparency International (2016). *Corruptions Perceptions Index 2016*. Available at www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.

Tribune News Service (1999). "Survivors Tell Horror of Uganda Slaughter." *Chicago Tribune*, March 3.

United Nations (1945). *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. United Nations Conference on International Organization, October. Available at www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html.

———(1948). "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," Resolution 260 (III) A. United National General Assembly. Available at www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html.

———(1987). *Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development* (Annex to UN A/42/427). Available at http://un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.

———(1989). *Convention on the Rights of the Child,* Document A/RES/44/25. UN General Assembly, December 12. Available at www.hakani.org/en/convention/Convention_Rights_Child.pdf.

———(1993). *Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action*. Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 25. Available at www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx.

———(1999a). *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines.* Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

———(1999b). *Our Common Future.* Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Transmitted to the General Assembly as an Annex to Document A/42/427–Development and International Co-operation: Environment.

———(2000a). *The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration:* Report of the Secretary General, Security Council, S/2000/101, February 11. Available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3768C42C154A073DC12574280044873C-sc_feb2000.pdf.

———(2000b). "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations." The Brahimi Report, 2000, A/55/305–S/2000/809, General Assembly, Security Council, August 21. Available at www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305.

———(2005). "Note by the Secretary General." *Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Agenda Item 123, Fifth Committee, Fifty-Ninth Session, A/C.5/59/31, May 24. Available at http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/254146/A_C.5_59_31-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y.

———(2006). *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards*. Interagency Working Group. August 1. Available at http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UN%20Guidelines/IDDRS.pdf.

———(2007). "Decision of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee." May. Available at www.un.org/en/peace-building/pbso/pbun.shtml.

———(2009). "Report of the Secretary-General on Peace-Building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict." A/63/881–S/2009/304, General Assembly, Security Council, June 21. Available at www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/88.1.

———(2010). "Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Practices in Peace Operations: A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping," Report commissioned by United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section January 18. Available atwww.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf.

———(2012a). "Background Note: The Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda." Outreach Programme on the Rwandan Genocide and the United Nations, Department of Public Information, March. Available at www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/bgjustice.pdf.

———(2012b). "UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, Peace and Security Thematic Think Piece." Available at www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/groupb_pbso_peacesecurity.pdf.

———(2014a). "Background Information on Preventing Genocide." Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide at the United Nations, Department of Public Information. Available at www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgpreventgenocide.shtml.

———(2014b). "The Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda." Background Note. Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide at the United Nations, Department of Public Information. March. Available at www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20Justice%202014.pdf.

———(2015a). "Letter Dated 16 October 2015 from the Group of Experts Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015) Addressed to the President of the Security Council." S/2015/797, United Nations Security Council. October 16. Available at www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/797.

———(2015b). *Millennium Development Goals Report 2015*. Available at www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf.

———(2016a). "Mandate," United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO). United Nations Peacekeeping. Available at https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/mandate.

———(2016b). "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." S/2016/1130, United Nations Security Council. December 29. Available at https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1646447.pdf.

———(2017). "Sustainable Development Goals." Available at www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (n.d.). *Rwanda, Background*. Available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm.

United Nations Children's Fund (2004). "Ten Years after Genocide, Rwandan Children Suffer Lasting Impact." Press Release. Geneva/New York: UNICEF Press Center. April. Available at www.unicef.org/media/media_20325.html.

United Nations Development Group and World Bank (2007). *Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning Using Post-Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks*. September. Available at https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Joint%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Integrated%20Recovery%20Planning.pdf.

United Nations Development Program (1997). *Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document*. UNDP Governance Policy Paper. Available at http://pogar.org/publications/other/undp/governance/undppolicydoc97-e.pdf.

———(1997). *Human Development Report 1996*. United Nations Development Program. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/257/hdr_1996_en_complete_nostats.pdf.

———(2005). "Crisis Prevention and Recovery Program Overview." Available at www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/overview.html.

———(2011a). "Chapter 5: Official Development Assistance." In *Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty.* Available at www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Inclusive%20development/Towards%20Human%20Resilience/Towards_SustainingMDGProgress_Ch5.pdf.

———(2011b). *Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All*. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2011.

———(2015a). "What Is Human Development?" Human Development Report Office. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/what-human-development.

———(2015b). *Human Development Index*. Human Development Report Office. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi.

———(2017). "Sustainable Development Goals." Available at www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html.

United Nations General Assembly–Security Council (2016). "Children and Armed Conflict." Report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly, Seventieth Session, Agenda Item 68, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children. A/70/836-S/2016/360. April 20. Available at www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2016/360&referer=/english/&Lang=E.

United Nations News Centre (2008). "Women Vital to Peace in Post-Conflict Zones, Security Council Hears." October 28. Available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28758#.WWgp6YjyvIU.

United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (2007). "Overview: DDR Processes in Africa." Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo. June 12–14. Available at www.un.org/africa/osaa/speeches/overview.pdf.

United Nations Peace Building Commission (2005). Available at www.un.org/en/peacebuilding.

United Nations Security Council (2000). *Resolution 1325*, S/RES/1325. Available at www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325(2000).

———(2017). *Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List*. Available at https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=+FDLR&per-page=2500&sections=s&sections=s&sort=id&includes=FDLR&excludes=&committee=&nationality=&reference_from=&reference_to.

United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (2015). "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015: 70/1. Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development," Seventieth Session Agenda Items 15 and 116, A/RES/70/1. October 21. Available at www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E.

———(2016). "Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals." Report of the Secretary-General, E/2016/75. June. Available at www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/2016/75&Lang=E.

United Nations Women (2000). "Women and Armed Conflict." Fact Sheet No 5, based on "Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action: Report of the Secretary-General" (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2). UN Department of Public Education. May. Available at www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/session/presskit/fs5.htm.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2010). "UCDP Definitions." Sweden: Uppsala University. Available at www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions.

US Agency for International Development (2009a). "Summary of Factors Affecting Violent Extremism." Adapted from *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming.* October. Available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAA929.pdf.

———(2009b). "A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries." Office of Economic Growth, Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade, USAID. January. Available at www.usaid.gov.

———(2011). "The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Policies into Practice." *USAID Policy*, September. Available at www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf.

US Department of Defense (2012). *Joint Publication 3-13.4 Military Deception*. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January. Available at http://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/1C3-JP_3-13-4_MILDEC.pdf.

———(2014). *Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations*. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November. Available at http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf.

US Federal Bureau of Investigation (2012). *Federal Bureau of Investigation CounterTerrorism Analytical Lexicon*. Directorate of Intelligence, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation and US Department of Justice (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY).

US State Department (2004). "Terrorist Exclusion List." Office of the Coordinator for CounterTerrorism, December. Available at www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm.

US White House (2011). *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. President of the United States of America, Barack Obama. August. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf (web archive): https://web.archive.org/web/20111111164048/www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf.

Uvin, Peter (1999). "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence." *Comparative Politics* 31 (3): 253–71.

———(2007). "Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why They Joined, Why They Left, How They Fared." Working Paper No. 3. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. October. Available at www.mdrp.org/pdfs/mdrp_working_paper3.pdf.

———(2010). "Structural Causes, Development Co-Operation and Conflict Prevention in Burundi and Rwanda." *Conflict, Security & Development 10* (1): 161–79.

Van Walraven, Klaas, and Jurjen van der Vlugt (1996). *Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of International Organizations*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael." February. Available at www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/19960000_cru_paper.pdf.

Veal, Karina (2008). "Once Were Warriors: Reintegrating Ex-Combatants." Supplement 13 to UNESCO-UNEVOC Bulletin. April, No. 14. Available at www.unevoc.net/fileadmin/user_upload/pubs/bulletin/Forum13_e.pdf.

Verwimp, Philip (2003). "The Political Economy of Coffee, Dictatorship, and Genocide." *European Journal of Political Economy* 19 (2): 161–81.

Vinck, Patrick, Phuong Pham, Suliman Bando, and Rachel Shigekane (2008). *Living with Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.* Human Rights Center, University of California Berkeley, Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University, and the International Center for Transitional Justice. Available at www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DRC-Attitudes-Justice-2008-English.pdf.

Walden University (n.d.). "Grounded Theory Research." Center for Research Quality. Available at http://researchcenter.Walden.edu/Documents/Grounded_Full_Captions.pdf.

Wallensteen, Peter (2000). "A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited." Uppsala Peace Research Papers No. 1. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Available at www.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/a_18601-f_UPRP_No_1.pdf.

Wallensteen, Peter, and Isak Svensson (2014). "Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts." *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (2): 315–27.

Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg (2001). "Armed Conflict 1989–2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 38 (5): 629–44.

Walter, Barbara F. (2010). "Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace." Background Paper for *The World Development Report 2011*. Washington, DC: World Bank, September. Available at http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/pdf/wdr%20background%20paper_walter_0.pdf.

———(2011). "Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace." Background Paper for *The World Development Report 2011.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

———(2013) "The Four Things We Know About How Civil Wars End (and What This Tells Us About Syria)." *Political Violence at a Glance, Expert Analysis on Violence and its Alternatives*, October. Available at www.politicalviolenceataglance.org/2013/10/18/the-four-things-we-know-about-how-civil-wars-end-and-what-this-tells-us-about-syria.

Weimann, Gabriel (2014). *New Terrorism and New Media*. Research Series, Vol. 2, Commons Lab of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Available at www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/STIP_140501_new_terrorism_F.pdf.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2003). "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." The Center for Global Development and Stanford University. November. Available at www-personal.umich.edu/~satran/PoliSci%2006/Wk%206-2%20Terrorism%20background%20insurgency%20Weinstein.pdf.

———(2005). "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 598–624.

Weinstein, Jeremy, and Macartan Humphreys (2005). "Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration." Center for Global Development, Working Paper Number 69, September 22. Available at www.cgdev.org/publication/disentangling-determinants-successful-demobilization-and-reintegration-working-paper-69.

Weiss, Robert S. (1994). *Learning from Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview Studies.* New York: The Free Press.

Westendorf, Jasmine-Kim (2015). *Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity after Civil War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Whelton, Clark (2007). "A Demographic Theory of War: Population, Power, and the 'Slightly Weird' Ideas of Gunnar Heinsohn." *The Weekly Standard*, October 5. Available at www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/185jeplm.asp.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Kathleen J. Young, David M. Quinn, and Victor Asal (2005). *Mediating International Crises*. New York: Routledge.

Willems, Rens, and Mathijs van Leeuwen (2015). "Reconciling Reintegration: The Complexity of Economic and Social Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Burundi." *Disasters* 39 (2): 316–39.

Willems, Rens, Willemijn Verkoren, Maria Derks, Jesper Kleingeld, Georg Frerks, and Hans Rouw (2009). "Security Promotion in Fragile States: Can Local Meet National? Exploring the Connections between Community Security and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration." Working Group Community Security and Community-Based DDR in Fragile States, No. 00030. Peace Security and Development Network, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. August. Available at www.williamtsuma.com/sites/default/files/clingendaelsecuritypromotionfragilestates.pdf.

World Bank (2004). "Rwanda: The Impact of Conflict on Growth and Poverty." Social Development Notes 29353, *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, No. 18. June. Available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11268/293530RW0confl10CPR0no101801P ublic1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

———(2005). "Conflict Analysis Framework." Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Team, Social Development Department, Draft, April 11. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214574-1112883508044/20657757/CAFApril2005.pdf.

———(2007). "Impact of Conflict." Resources. February. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ImpactofConflict.pdf.

———(2009). *Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project*, P112712, Rwanda, Projects and Operations. Available at http://projects.worldbank.org/P112712/second-emergency-demobilization-reintegration-project?lang=en.

———(2010). *Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements*. MDRP Secretariat. Available at http://tdrp.net/mdrp/PDFs/MDRP_Final_Report.pdf.

———(2011a). *Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2011*. September 25 Available at www.worldbank.org/ida/papers/CPIAcriteria2011final.pdf.

———(2011b). *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*. Washington, DC. Available at https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf.

———(2013/2014). "Empowering Vulnerable Groups." *Empowerment Newsletter,* December/January.

———(2013a). "Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations." Issue Brief. Updated September. Available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20042303~menuPK:34480~page PK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html.

———(2013b). "Fragility, Conflict and Violence, Strategies, Projects." Last Updated November 27. Available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,menuPK:511 784~pagePK:64171540~piPK:64171528~theSitePK:511778,00.html.

———(2013c). "Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY13." Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1269623894864/FCSHarmonizedListFY13.pdf.

———(2014). "Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY14." Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1269623894864/HarmonizedlistoffragilestatesFY14.pdf.

———(2016a). "Development for Peace: The World Bank Group's Work to Tackle Fragility, Conflict and Violence." Fragility, Conflict and Violence Department, November. Available at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/597521479145510349/11-11-2016-17-57-24-WBGFCVBrochure.pdf.

———(2016b). "Overview. Fragility, Conflict and Violence." September. Available at www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview.

———(2017a). "Rwanda: Country Overview." March. Available at www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview.

———(2017b). *World Bank Open Data*. Available at www.data.worldbank.org.

———(2017c). "Ease of Doing Business in Rwanda." Doing Business, Measuring Business Regulations. Available at www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/Rwanda.

World Bank and United Nations Development Program (2005). "Rebuilding Post-Conflict Societies: Lessons from a Decade of Global Experience." Workshop Report, September 21–25. Available at www.effectivestates.org/Papers/Rebuilding%20Post-Conflict%20Societies.pdf.

World Health Organization (2012). "Definition of an Older or Elderly Person: Proposed Working Definition of an Older Person in Africa for the MDS Project." *Health Statistics and Information Systems.* Available at www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/ageingdefnolder/en.

Wrong, Michela (2002). *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo.* New York: Harper Perennial.

Yanagizawa-Drott, David (2012). "Propaganda and Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

———(2014). "Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129 (4): 1947–94.

Yin, Robert K. (2009). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods.* Volume 5 of Applied Social Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Zartman, I. William (1989). *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa.* Updated edition. New York: Oxford University Press.

———(2001). "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments." *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1 (1): 8–18.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: GUIDING INTERVIEW TOPICS FOR EX-COMBATANTS[9]

Basic Biographical and Background Questions
1. Biographical Information: Age, Family, Hometown, etc.
2. Professional Information: Job prior to conflict and post conflict, Income levels, Job security, etc.
3. Personal Information: Family, Location, Size, Responsibilities, Education, etc.
4. Experience During Conflict and Transition to DRC: Role during conflict, Transit process and decision to go to DRC, Age at time of move, etc.
5. Current Snapshot: Employment, Income, Housing, Family, etc.
About Past Rebel Activity
1. Recruitment into Rebel Group: Voluntary or involuntary, Reasoning, Age, Finances, Familial Pressure, Opportunity, Politics, and Personal Beliefs, etc.
2. Rebel Group Structure: Organization, Advancement, Membership, Establishment, Hierarchy, Departments, Size, Rule of Law or Code of Ethics, etc.
3. Rebel Group Objective: Goals, Means to achieve, etc.
4. Rebel Group Sustainment: Funding, Salary, Housing, Food, etc.
5. Rebel Group Leadership: Who, Respected, Strong Command and control, Ideology, Weapons, Strategy, etc.
6. Rebel Group Benefits: Pay, Camaraderie, Future payouts promised, Family protection, Housing, Membership, etc.
7. Rebel Group Role: Role, Position, Training, Advancement, Peers, etc.
8. Alternate Options: Employment, Education, Security outside of the rebel group
About Defection from Rebel Activity
1. Responsibilities and Role Changes within Group: Time with group, Position, Leadership, Reporting, Responsibilities, Decision-making, Organization, Work-life balance, Family, Security, Job training, Mentorship, etc.
2. Experience of a "Normal Day": Good/Bad days
3. Relationships within Group: Colleagues, Camaraderie, Trust, Nepotism, Corruption, etc.
4. Benefits and Compensation: Housing, Education, Training, Salary, Weapons, Clothes, Money, etc.
5. Lifestyle: Work satisfaction, Breaks and vacations, etc.
6. Defection Reasoning: Situational Factors, Decision-making process, Reasons for leaving, etc.
7. Defection Process: Planning, Information, Requirements, Assistance, Communications, Experience, etc.
8. Defection Concerns: Capture, Pressure, Other groups, International actors, Justice, Persecution, Revenge, etc.
Push/pull factors from the rebel activity
1. Pull Factors:
a. Social: Community, Happiness, Opportunity, Family Security, Camaraderie, Meaning, Identity, etc.
b. Economic: Salary, Education, Professional Training, etc.
c. Security: Safety, Absence of Fear, etc.
d. Political: Ideological shift, Belief system, Regional issues, Governance, etc.
e. Freedoms and Choice: Democracy, Personal Autonomy, Decisions about life, etc.
What were the main things pushing you?
1. Push Factors:

---

[9]For more information on specific questions used to guide topical discussions, please contact Author directly.

    a. Social: Group support, Trust, Resources, Treatment, Collegial, Pressures, Future opportunity, Growth, Respect, Fairness, Cohesion, Rules, Professional, etc.

    b. Political: Goals, Justified, Importance of cause, Change of beliefs, Organizational objective, Achievement, etc.

    c. Leadership: Challenges, Welcome, Able, Respectful, Management, Fairness, Corruption, Nepotism, Law-abiding, etc.

    d. Recruitment and Sustainability: Funding, Personnel, etc.

    e. Age: Fatigue, etc.

    f. External Organizations: Pressure, Outreach, Information, Communications, Family, Church, Assistance, etc.

    g. Programs: Beneficial, Counter-effective, etc.

    h. Military Pressure: Strength, Access, Capture, Battlefield, Access to safe haven, etc.

    i. Freedoms, Democracy, Choice: Absence or Presence, etc.

    j. Other: Trauma, Loss, other, etc.

Why Rwanda

    1. Decision-making on Rwanda: Why, Alternate Country options, Contacts, Fear, Considerations, Assistance, Associates, Country knowledge, Assurances, Justice, etc.

    2. Post-return Experience: Prosecution, Harassment, Safety, Governance, Community, Training, Opportunities, Support, Acceptance, Help, Feel accepted, Identity, etc.

    3. Those who stayed behind: Communication, Reasoning, Assistance to those still in the forest, etc.

About Recruitment and Reintegration

    1. Recruitment: About, Future recruitment, Vulnerabilities among former combatants, Decision-making factors, Spoilers or leaders, Benefits analysis, etc.

    2. About DDR: Process, Success or challenges, Best or worst aspects, Helpful, Expectations, Support, Training, Reintegration, Ideology, etc.

Recommendations and Best Practices

    1. Recommendations: Prevent future recruitment

    2. Recommendations: Encourage more defections

    3. Recommendations: Support more defectors

APPENDIX II: DESCRIPTIVE DATA ON MAIN UNIT OF ANALYSIS: EX-COMBATANTS

Following is a brief presentation of the descriptive data on the 41 ex-combatants interviewed for the study.

Among the 41 ex-combatants interviewed for this study, five, or approximately 12%, were female (Table 21). This is 50 times higher than the 2010 total of women demobilized in Rwanda (i.e., 0.22%) and almost three and a half times more than the regional average number of female combatants demobilized from the World Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), in which only 3.5% of combatants reintegrated from the seven countries (i.e., Angola, Burundi, CAR, DRC, ROC (Brazzaville), Rwanda, and Uganda) were women.[10]

Table 21 **Gender of Subject Interviewed**

Gender	Number Interviewed
Male	36
Female	5

Of the 41 interviewed, 13 were officers (e.g., major, colonel, or general); 15 were non-commissioned officers (NCOs) (e.g., sergeant major, corporal, or master sergeant); 11 served as enlisted combat soldiers; and one was no longer a combatant in DRC but rather a propagandist for the group outside of DRC in ROC (Table 22). In addition, one female interviewed served as a "prayer girl" for her unit. Prayer girls were women and young girls brought in to pray for the safety and success of the FDLR. They reported to the unit priest, who reported to the head of each command group.

Table 22 **Rank of Subject at Time of Defection**

Rank	Number Interviewed

---

[10]The RDRC was unable to provide the author with figures on Rwandan female ex-combatants who had voluntarily defected and returned to Rwanda. The only data the RDRC was able to provide were on those who had gone through the RDRC program from its inception, annualized by gender. These data included former combatants from DRC but also former RPA, ex-FAR, and current Rwandan army personnel who had been demobilized through the RDRC, combined. Thus, the author presents data from the World Bank's regional MDRP program (i.e., the lead funder of the RDRC) and the 2010 RDRC data, available (incidentally) as comparative sources that focused exclusively on ex-combatants, categorized by gender.

Officer	13
NCO	15
Enlisted	11
Prayer Girl	1
N/A	1

Most of those interviewed, almost 75%, traveled to DRC in 1994 following the victory of General

Paul Kagame and the RPA. Those who fled were members of the Habyarimana regime's military, the ex-

FAR, public administrators and high officials of the Habyarimana regime, Interahamwe or

Impuzamugambi fighters or the *génocidaires*, and private citizens. Those who arrived in later years mostly

were tricked into joining or abducted and brought to DRC. (Table 23)

Table 23 **Year That Subject Fled to DRC**

Year Traveled to DRC	Number Interviewed Who Cited That Year
1994	30
1997	2
1998	4
1999	1
2000	1
2012	1
N/A	2

Slightly less than half of those interviewed were originally members of the ex-FAR, the

Habyarimana regime's state military. They fled to DRC en masse. Others were either students in higher

education or vocational schools or children fleeing with their parents. (Table 24)

Table 24 **Occupation Prior to Fleeing to DRC**

Occupation Prior to DRC	Number Interviewed Who Cited Occupation
Ex-FAR	16
Student	15
Child	7
N/A	3

Finally, almost 60% of those interviewed had been fighting with the FDLR since its founding in 2000 (and with its predecessor, PALiR/ALiR). Another 17% fought with the FDLR for more than a decade. Of those interviewed, 77% had lived in the bush without income, safe habitat, access to regular basic foodstuffs and clean water, and services for family and children – for more than 10 years of their lives (Table 25).

Table 25 **Number of Years with the FDLR**

Number of Years with the FDLR	Number Interviewed Who Cited That Many Years
20 or more years	12
15–19 years	13
10–14 years	7
5–9 years	3
0–4 years	1
N/A	5

APPENDIX III: KEY DEFECTION REASONS CLASSIFIED BY FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORIES

(Listed from most- to least-frequently cited)

Rebel-Force Causes (57)
Experienced Disillusionment, Lowered Morale: 22
Rebel-Group Mission Failure: 14
Decreased Force Strength/ Weakness of Rebel Group: 8
Poor and Corrupt Leadership: 7
Absence of Force Cohesion: 6

Trauma and Negative Lifestyle Causes (39)
Experienced Harsh Life in Forest with No Future Prospects: 20
Insecurity and Fighting in DRC, Unwanted by Congolese: 8
Witnessed Traumatic Event, Friends and Family Dying: 8
Absence of Freedom: 3

Communications and Information Operations (27)
Learned of Good and Improved Life Opportunities in Rwandan: 23
Miss Rwanda (Home): 4

Individual or Personal Causes (26)
Changed Beliefs or Ideology: 10
Battle Fatigue: 6
Abused or Not Cared for by Group and Leadership: 6
Seeking Better Life for Oneself: 1
Guilt over Actions Committed in Rebel Group: 1
Seeking Gender Equality: 1
Searching for Personal Freedom: 1

Family-Related Causes (18)
Pressure from Spouse or Family to Stop Fighting: 7
Seeking Better Medical Care, Educational Opportunities, and Food for Children and Family: 4
Miss Family and Friends in Rwanda: 4
Seeking Better Overall Life and Opportunity for Children and Family: 3

Influence of Defection Causes (13)
Defection of Friends: 8
Defection of Leaders: 5

APPENDIX IV: KEY DEFECTION REASONS CLASSIFIED BY SHD USING UNDP (1997) FIVE CORE CATEGORIES

(Listed from most- to least-frequently cited)

Cooperation: **With a sense of belonging important for personal fulfillment, well-being, and purpose and meaning, human development is concerned with the ways in which people work together and interact. (55)**
Mission Failure: 14
Defection of Friends: 8
Decreased Force Strength/Weakness of Rebel Group: 8
Abused or Not Cared for by Group and Leadership: 6
Absence of Force Cohesion (Infighting): 6
Defection of Leaders: 5
Missing Rwanda (Home): 4
Lonely, Missing Family and Friends in Rwanda: 4

Empowerment: **The expansion of men's and women's capabilities and choices increases their ability to exercise those choices free of hunger, want, and deprivation. It also increases their opportunity to participate in or endorse decision making affecting their lives. (43)**
Experienced Disillusioned, Lowered Morale: 22
Pressure from Spouse or Family to Stop Fighting: 7
Battle Fatigue: 6
Seeking a Better Overall Life and Opportunity for Children and Family: 3
Absence of Freedom: 3
Seeking a Better Life for Oneself: 1
Searching for Personal Freedom: 1

SHD Category Overlap: **Fitting into multiple categories and representing SHD broadly. (43)**
Learned of Good and Improved Life Opportunities in Rwanda: 23
Experienced a Harsh Life in the Forest with No Future Prospects: 20

Security: **Particularly the security of livelihood. People need to be free from threats, such as disease or repression, and from sudden harmful disruptions in their lives. (23)**
Insecurity and Fighting in DRC, Unwanted by Congolese: 8
Witnessed Traumatic Event, Family and Friends Dying: 8
Poor and Corrupt Leadership: 7

Equity: **The expansion of capabilities and opportunities means more than income – it also means equity, such as an educational system to which everyone should have access. (11)**
Changed Beliefs or Ideology: 10
Searching for Gender Equality: 1

Sustainability: **The needs of this generation must be met without compromising the rights of future generations to be free of poverty and deprivation and to exercise their basic capabilities. (5)**
Seeking Better Medical Care, Educational Opportunities, and Food for Family and Children: 4
Guilt over Actions as Rebel Combatant: 1

APPENDIX V: KEY DEFECTION REASONS CLASSIFIED BY POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PEACE

(Listed from most- to least-frequently cited)

Structural or Positive Peace-Related (102)
Learned of Good and Improved Life Opportunities in Rwanda: 23
Experienced Disillusionment, Lowered Morale: 22
Changed Beliefs or Ideology: 10
Pressure from Spouse or Family to Stop Fighting: 7
Poor and Corrupt Leadership: 7
Battle Fatigue: 6
Absence of Force Cohesion: 6
Seeking Better Medical Care, Educational Opportunities, and Food for Children and Family: 4
Lonely, Missing Family and Friends in Rwanda: 4
Missing Rwanda (Home): 4
Seeking Better Overall Life and Opportunity for Family and Children: 3
Absence of Freedom: 3
Seeking Better Life for Oneself: 1
Seeking Gender Equality: 1
Searching for Personal Freedom: 1

Direct or Negative Peace-Related (43)
Experienced Harsh Life in Forest with No Future Prospects: 20
Insecurity and Fighting in DRC, Unwanted by Congolese: 8
Witnessed Traumatic Event, Friends and Family Dying: 8
Abused or Not Cared for by Group and Leadership: 6
Guilt over Actions and Behaviors as Rebel Combatant: 1

Not Aligned (35)
Mission Failure: 14
Decreased Force Strength/Weakness of Rebel Group: 8
Defection of Friends: 8
Defection of Leaders: 5

APPENDIX VI: CHECK ON EX-COMBATANTS' RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCED DEFECTION PROGRAMMING AND REASONS CITED

The Author performed a modified and abridged analysis on the recommendations cited by ex-combatants for increasing defection against their own personal reasons cited for defection. This was to check on observational error – or consistency of response – as a way to evaluate whether there were any inadvertent errors in the responses given by the ex-combatants that would result in a threat of a systematic error. In this instance, in which the Author is not performing a quantitative analysis, it would be unusual to review formally for an observational error. However, an informal check on whether ex-combatants were consistent in their own perspective and reasoning illuminates the validity of their responses—although still only internally.

Reasons Cited for Defection
Rebel-Force–Related Reasons
Trauma and Harsh Lifestyle–Related Reasons
Rwanda Communications and Information Operations–Related Reasons
Individual or Personal Reasons
Family-Related Reasons
Defection-Influenced Reasons

Recommendations for Defection	Reasons Cited for Defection as "Checked" with Recommendations
Enhance IOs	Can be used to address: - Trauma and Harsh Lifestyle – especially security-related concerns
Communications-Technology Support	Can be used to address: - Rwanda-related Communications and Information Operations – especially by helping to connect combatants with information - Family-related reasons – by helping connect combatants with family by phone, skype, or mail
Information Operations Campaigns	Can be used to address: - Rwanda-related Communications and Information Operations – in direct campaigns to offer information about Rwanda, counter the rebel ideology, and more
Targeting Defectors Senior and Lower Ranks	Can be used to address: - Defection-influenced reasons – especially if targeting can focus on particular leaders or units that impact the broader morale of the group
Offering Incentives	Can be used to address: - Trauma and Harsh Lifestyle–related reasons – for example, by offering vocational or other lifestyle support for defecting - Individual or Personal reasons – by offering means to improve one's own opportunities and options in life
Strong Domestic Return Policies	Can be used to address:

	- Trauma and Harsh Lifestyle–related reasons for defecting – for example, by offering opportunities to live without fear and with personal freedoms
Counter Ideology Programming	Can be used to address: - Rwanda-related Communications and Information Operations – by launching operations that expose combatants to the lies of the rebel leadership
Support for Safe Egress	Can be used to address: - Trauma and a Harsh Lifestyle – especially by assisting potential defectors with the security situation in the rebel-held areas so they can safely find a way out
Good Governance and Effective Leadership	Can be used to address: - Family-related reasons – especially by encouraging those who are still in Rwanda to share with their relatives who are fighting about the positive experiences they have in Rwanda to encourage family to return
Spousal and Familial Engagement	Can be used to address: - Family-related reasons – by enhancing communications and knowledge of family in Rwanda with combatants fighting in DRC
Application of Military Pressure	Can be used to address: - Force-related issues – although not ideal, tactical efforts to limit safe haven and land, to push rebel forces farther from towns and arable areas, and to limit access to food, clothing, and shelter may ultimately pressure some combatants to defect by influencing force-related issues in the field

BIOGRAPHY

M. Karna L. Cohen works in fragile and conflict-prone states focused on issues of conflict early warning and resolution, security sector reform, and private sector development. She has lived and/or worked in Africa, Europe, Central America, the Middle East, North America, and South Asia. M.K.L. Cohen holds Bachelors of Arts degrees in Anthropology, History, and Pre-Medical Studies; a Masters of Arts degree in International Development and Technology Transfer; and presents this thesis in support of her Doctor of Philosophy degree in International Development.