

Church vs. State in the Morisco and Co-Patronage Debates

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
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
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*This thesis is dedicated*

*first, to my defense committee*

*as without their unfailing support this would not have been possible*

*second, to my parents and little sister*

*who I hope to one day thank at greater length in a dissertation*

*third, to my grandparents:*

*Gerald Malinasky*

*who grumbled at not being mentioned in my Senior thesis*

*and who instilled in me his love of history*

*Wilma Malinasky*

*who has patiently endured the comedic antics of her husband and grandson*

*Sonia Laird*

*for her selfless devotion and love every day*

*and in memory of Robert Laird, Sr.*

*who fought bravely in a war, so that I may be free to write about them*

Introduction

*Levanta noble España  
 Tu coronada frente  
 Y alégrate de verte renacida (...)  
 Deja el ropaje Mauro  
 Y el cautivo quebranto  
 Pues ya eres señora triunfante<sup>1</sup>*

Saint James, known in Spanish as Santiago, was regarded by medieval and early modern Iberian chroniclers as the first evangelizer of the peninsula. Following his martyrdom in 44 AD at the hands of Herod Agrippa, his followers allegedly brought his remains back to Galicia, where they would be miraculously found eight centuries later.<sup>2</sup> According to medieval chroniclers, including Archbishop of Toledo Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, Santiago had heroically returned to Spain in the ninth century in order to aid the Christian kingdoms in their wars against the Moors. He first made a dramatic entrance at the (probably fictitious) Battle of Clavijo in 844, charging into battle against the Moors on a white horse, brandishing a sword.<sup>3</sup> Santiago became known in Spain as Santiago Matamoros, or Saint James the Moor-slayer, and was adopted as a patron saint by various

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<sup>1</sup> “Elogio de Gonzalo de Argote y Molina a la historia, y a las antigüedades de España,” Ambrosio de Morales, *Las antigüedades de las ciudades de España* (Alcalá de Henares: Iuan Iñigues de Lequerica, 1575) in Antonio Feros, “Rhetorics of the Expulsion” in *The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain: A Mediterranean Diaspora*, Ed. Mercedes García Arenal and Gerard Wiegers (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p. 67. “Raise noble Spain / Your crown-encircled brow / and rejoice at your rebirth (...) / Cast off your Moorish garb / and captive’s sorrow / for you have triumphed at last.” Trans. Antonio Feros.

<sup>2</sup> Erin Rowe, *Saint and Nation: Santiago, Teresa of Avila, and Plural Identities in Early Modern Spain* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Spanish kings.<sup>4</sup> The Moorslayer was credited as being a frequent battlefield ally to Christian armies throughout the nearly eight centuries of sporadic territorial conflicts in Iberia (called the *Reconquista*, c. 722-1492), which eventually resulted in the elimination of all Muslim polities from the peninsula.<sup>5</sup> The surrender of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada on January 2, 1492 brought an end to Santiago's monumental task.

The nominally united kingdoms of Spain entered the sixteenth century full of potential: "For a few fabulous decades Spain was to be the greatest power on earth. During those decades it would be all but the master of Europe; it would colonize vast new overseas territories; it would devise a governmental system to administer the largest, and most widely dispersed, empire the world had yet seen."<sup>6</sup> Spain, however, would leave the sixteenth century with much of that potential already long spent during the war-torn reigns of Emperor Charles V (r. 1516-1556) and his son King Philip II (r. 1556-1598). By the 1590s, the Castilian economy was cracking under the strain of taxation gathered to fund various imperial adventures and the royal treasury was mired in debt, resulting in currency devaluations and a string of bankruptcies.<sup>7</sup> These massive military expenditures, however, had accomplished very little. The Invincible Armada's failure to so much as reach the heretic shores of England in 1588, as well as the consistent inability to escape the military quagmire of the Netherlands with any semblance of victory eroded Spanish confidence. These defeats and economic crises indicated that something was deeply wrong with the Spanish state to many intellectuals, known as the *arbitristas*, who

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<sup>4</sup> Grace Magnier, *Pedro de Valencia and the Catholic Apologists of the Expulsion of the Moriscos: Visions of Christianity and Kingship* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 95-96. Santiago's patronage was not universal, for example, Aragon venerated St. George, while Navarre had Saint Fermin. He was, however, by far the most prevalent Iberian patron.

<sup>5</sup> Helen Rawlings, *Church, Religion and Society in Early Modern Spain* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 1.

<sup>6</sup> J. H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469-1716* (London: Penguin, 2002), p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 285.

published numerous treatises on their solutions for the manifold ills of their *patria* during the seventeenth century. In the words of Erin Rowe, “The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries marked a period of profound shift in the Spanish *Zeitgeist* – the fiscal burdens of and moral complications of empire, along with the changing political situation in Europe, created a sense of unstable identity and general crisis among contemporary Castilians.”<sup>8</sup>

This essay will explore two debates that came to a head early in the seventeenth century. These debates provide insight into how the powers-that-be in Spain reacted to this identity crisis. José Antonio Maravall saw religious and political authority during the Baroque epoch to have been carefully linked, in an attempt to reinforce the power and ensure the survival of both traditional institutions.<sup>9</sup> Yet these debates reveal deep tensions between the objectives of the throne and the altar, as well as anxieties over religious orthodoxy, racial purity, and a perceived feminization of Spain. The first of these debates, on the “Morisco problem,” concerned the decision of whether or not the baptized descendants of the Moors should be expelled from Iberia, on the grounds that they had not become true Catholics and thus remained a corrosive influence on society. The *Reconquista* ended Muslim political power in Iberia, but left hundreds of thousands of Muslims (called *mudéjares*) under the vassalage of the Catholic Kings. The forced baptisms of 1502 in Castile, which now included Granada, as well as conversions at sword-point during the revolt of the Germanías (1519-1523) in Valencia converted these

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<sup>8</sup> Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> José Antonio Maravall, *Culture of the Baroque: Analysis of a Historical Structure*, trans. Terry Cochran (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 12-13.

mudéjares into Moriscos.<sup>10</sup> These nominal New Christians came to be vilified as scapegoats for Spain's problems, and were accused and persecuted by the Inquisition for having remained followers of Islam in their hearts. After decades of deliberations on this "Morisco problem" King Philip III decreed in 1609 that all remaining Moriscos would be expelled from Spain for the good of the realm.

The second debate, the co-patronage controversy, revolved around the belief held by numerous members of the government and clergy that Spain would be better represented by two patron saints rather than by only one. Santiago had come under fire for the failures of the Spanish Monarchy to continue its meteoric rise. Although the Moorlayer was never rejected as patron, the newly canonized Saint Teresa of Ávila was strongly considered, at the urging of Philip IV and his favorite the Count-Duke of Olivares, for the role of co-patron at Santiago's side, as a symbol of purity, reform, and the struggle against Protestant heresy. The co-patronage debate, which perhaps had more celestial implications compared to the concrete matter of the expulsion of the Moriscos, was nonetheless still fervently debated at the highest levels of the Church and the government, and thus is also significant to us as it sheds light on the complex self-perception of early modern Spaniards in a time of crisis and change.<sup>11</sup> As Peter Burke argues, "Saints are well worth the attention of historians because they are cultural indicators. Like other heroes, they reflect the values of the culture that sees them in a

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<sup>10</sup> L.P. Harvey, *Muslims in Spain 1500-1614* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). The validity of these forced conversions in Valencia was upheld by Charles V in 1525; the theologians argued that although such violent conversions were not an appropriate method of evangelization, it was better for the souls of the converted that the conversions be accepted by the Church despite their circumstances.

<sup>11</sup> To borrow the phrase from John Lynch, *The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change 1598-1700* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 1992).

heroic light.”<sup>12</sup> The arguments for the expulsion of the Moriscos as well as from those favoring the co-patronage of Teresa represent attempts to make Spain more securely orthodox in response to perceived external and internal threats posed by heretics and infidels. They were justified on solid pragmatic but much shakier theological grounds. In both cases, we can clearly see that the monarchy and secular authorities were willing and able to overlook the opposition of Church authorities even within these two discourses intrinsically tied to matters of faith, demonstrating a weakness of the Spanish Catholic Church when its goals came into conflict with those of the state.

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<sup>12</sup> Peter Burke, “How to Become a Counter-Reformation Saint,” in *The Counter-Reformation*, ed. David M. Luebke (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 130.



*The Morisco Problem*

Américo Castro hypothesized that the roots of twentieth-century Spanish identity had been formed during the medieval *convivencia* (or “living-togetherness”) in Iberia of Christians, Jews, and Muslims living and working side by side.<sup>13</sup> But despite the renewed interest in Spain’s intriguing heterodox heritage evident in modern scholarship, to the thinkers of early modern Spain the Moriscos were a concern, a problem, a threat to the safety of Spain in both secular and spiritual terms due to their rebellious acts of disloyalty to the crown and the perception that at best only a few of the new converts held sincere Christian beliefs.

Spanish Mudéjars and later Moriscos were uneasy subjects of the empire—understandably so, given their forced conversion and second-rate status— and engaged in several uprisings in the century after the fall of Granada. The first in 1499 started as an urban riot in Granada, which was soon repressed, but spread into the Alpujarras mountains, where Mudéjar rebels were able to hold out until 1501. Despite promises of

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<sup>13</sup> Américo Castro, *The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their History*, trans. Willard F. King and Selma Margaretten (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94, 584.

freedom of worship in Granada agreed upon at the surrender of the city, many of Ferdinand and Isabella's new subjects did not trust their new lieges to keep their word, as Islamic expression had already begun to be repressed.<sup>14</sup> This fear became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the First Alpujarras Revolt was directly followed by a convert-or-leave decree in Castile in 1502.

The Muslims of Valencia suffered a similar fate, in this instance from the lower reaches of society rather than the top. The *Germanía* revolt began in 1520 as a protest by commoners and urban artisans in Valencia against the abuses of the nobles, but it quickly spiraled out of control into violence. Most of Valencia's substantial rural Moorish population sided with their feudal lords, and the *Germanía* rebels came to espouse anti-Muslim hatred.<sup>15</sup> After some initial victories by the citizen militias of the *germanías* (brotherhoods) the Christians began to take the issue of conversion into their own hands, forcibly baptizing captured Moors under threat of execution. "These 'conversions' were driven by a curious combination of ethnic revenge, religious fervor, and class hatred. On one hand the rebels hoped to please God and ensure success for the rebellion by baptizing infidels," and on the other hand they believed that the baptisms would weaken the bargaining position of the landowners, who had shown a preference for employing Moors on their estates, since the Moors were willing to pay higher rents and it was believed that they were also more productive.<sup>16</sup> Charles V, who had previously promised not to engage in forced conversions and in any case did not really want to give any credit to the rebels who had attacked the Valencian aristocracy--who themselves demanded that the

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<sup>14</sup> Henry Charles Lea, *The Moriscos in Spain: Their Conversion and Expulsion* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), pp. 38-39.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>16</sup> Matthew Carr, *Blood and Faith: The Purging of Muslim Spain* (New York: The New Press, 2009), p. 84.

conversions should be annulled--suffered a crisis of conscience concerning the legitimacy of the conversions. Nevertheless, Charles V could not readily deny new believers (regardless of the circumstances of their baptism, they had ultimately made the decision to convert), so justified by reports from the Valencian inquisitor Juan de Churruca and permission from Pope Clement VII, he went ahead and ruled that any Moors who did not truly want to convert could leave.<sup>17</sup> Although not as strongly worded, this 1525 decree was a forced conversion with the same effect as those before it.

The most serious Morisco rebellion again centered on the Alpujarras mountains in Granada, with fighting between rebels, local Christians, and the crown occurring between 1568-1570. The conversions in Valencia had finally brought the former Moors under the purview of the Inquisition, but the first four decades after the conversion became a sort of grace period during which the inquisitors largely left the Moriscos to their own devices, for two reasons. First, the new converts had to be given some time to get acquainted with the tenets of their new faith. Just because a Morisco does not yet know the *Pater Noster* does not make him automatically a crypto-Muslim. Jean Pierre Dedieu's study of Christianization in New Castile revealed that many of those investigated by the Inquisition, and particularly the illiterate, were ignorant of prayers and doctrine during this period.<sup>18</sup> Second, the Moriscos paid what amounted to protection money to the crown and to local nobles in exchange for only being subjected to minimal inquisitorial supervision.<sup>19</sup> This allowed the Moriscos of Granada and Valencia to maintain many aspects of their traditional cultural expression until 1567, when Philip II issued an edict

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 86-87.

<sup>18</sup> Jean Pierre Dedieu, "Christianization in New Castile," trans. Susan Isabel Stein, in *Culture and Control in Counter-Reformation Spain*, ed. Anne J. Cruz and Mary Elizabeth Perry (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 15.

<sup>19</sup> Rawlings, *Church, Religion, and Society*, pp. 18.

banning the use of Arabic or traditional Moorish garb. Once this edict began to be enforced, it sparked uprisings throughout the original Nasrid kingdom which would require multiple years of bloody campaigning by royal troops to suppress.<sup>20</sup> Eighty thousand Moriscos were captured over the course of the campaign. Since allowing the Granadans to remain in their ancestral lands had proven to be a risky proposition these captured Moriscos were instead resettled throughout Castile, with the belief that if sufficiently scattered they would be able to assimilate better into Christian society.<sup>21</sup> This extreme measure was, at best, to prove only marginally successful.

While there was potential for Morisco subjects to rebel, optimistic churchmen saw the baptism and incorporation into the Church of a vast number of infidels as an opportunity to evangelize and save souls, like the missionaries in the New World. Christianization was, of course, one of the best ways to instill loyalty to the crown as well. The first Archbishop of Granada, Hernando de Talavera (1493-1507) started out with an effective evangelization effort based around meeting the Moriscos halfway; for example, he urged his priests to learn Arabic and to permit traditional music during religious ceremonies. Talavera's tolerance seems to have brought converts and the archbishop himself took a Morisco priest as his personal confessor. Yet, his friendliness towards the Moors and tolerance of their culture raised (unsubstantiated) doubts about his own heritage and orthodoxy, which resulted in a change of management for the Granada evangelization efforts. The Archbishop of Toledo, Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, took over in 1499 and replaced the promised tolerance with persecution of Muslim religion and culture, which angered the residents of Granada and contributed to the start of the

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<sup>20</sup> Harvey, *Muslims in Spain*, p. 217.

<sup>21</sup> Rawlings, *Church, Religion, and Society*, pp. 19.

first revolt in the Alpujarras.<sup>22</sup> Although not every evangelizer had the iron-fisted approach of Archbishop Cisneros, it had been made clear through the removal of Hernando de Talavera that future efforts by priests in Granada to Christianize the populace would not engage directly with Morisco culture.

Decades later, Juan de Ribera, the Archbishop of Valencia from 1568-1611, began his tenure as a genuine believer that the Moriscos could become good Catholics.<sup>23</sup> To serve the large rural population of Valencia more effectively, he expanded the diocese in 1573 by establishing new parishes in areas of dense Morisco settlement in the countryside, utilizing both local Church revenues and his own substantial fortune.<sup>24</sup> Ribera also sought to reform the Church in Valencia in accordance with the Council of Trent by improving the moral and intellectual qualities of parish priests and by exhorting “the people of Valencia to conduct their lives according to the sacramental rhythms of Catholicism.”<sup>25</sup> Despite Ribera’s herculean efforts, however, he became disillusioned by the perceived failure to make any substantial gains. By 1582, although he publicly continued to support efforts to evangelize, he had begun to favor expulsion as the best option for his Morisco flock.<sup>26</sup> He would later emerge at the forefront of the expulsion debate.

Despite the efforts of Christian bishops and priests, and the sincere faith of an unknowable number of Moriscos, public sentiment never shifted away from the belief that all or nearly all Moriscos remained secretly Muslim, commonly exemplified by the

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>23</sup> Benjamin Ehlers, *Between Christians and Moriscos*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>24</sup> Rawlings, *Church, Religion, and Society*, p. 21.

<sup>25</sup> Ehlers, *Between Christians and Moriscos*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

proverb “once a Moor, always a Moor.”<sup>27</sup> This monolithic suspicion was not helped by the existence of the Islamic doctrine of *taqiyya*, which allowed Muslims to take the precaution of appearing publicly to be Christian while remaining secretly Muslim without risking damnation.<sup>28</sup> In cases of legitimate faith on the part of a Morisco, however, James B. Tueller suggests that he or she would likely effectively disappear (both to contemporaries and within the historical record) due to integration into the Catholic community and thus would have been protected from expulsion through anonymity.<sup>29</sup> The success stories of evangelization thus had the potential to go unnoticed, as those successes resulted in Moriscos who were able to pass for Old Christians. Assimilation was very possible, as newly converted Moriscos and Old Christians in many ways looked and behaved similarly. Even contemporaries, such as the chronicler Pedro de Valencia, noted that in pure physical appearance and in many aspects of culture the Moriscos were hardly distinguishable from other Iberians.<sup>30</sup> Although Arab and Berber blood had certainly been introduced into the Iberian gene pool through the conquest and later immigration, this had nonetheless been heavily diluted in eight centuries of intermarrying with the indigenous population.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, someone who continued to exhibit aspects of Morisco culture such as dress, diet, or language would not be taken for a Spanish Catholic (regardless of their personal beliefs) and would fuel concern among their neighbors of subversion. There evidently remained many individuals who could be identified as Moriscos and thus could have been seen as potential infidels. As time

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<sup>27</sup> Antonio Feros, “Rhetorics of Expulsion,” p. 63.

<sup>28</sup> Rawlings, *Church, Religion, and Society*, pp. 16.

<sup>29</sup> James B. Tueller, *Good and Faithful Christians: Moriscos and Catholicism in Early Modern Spain* (New Orleans: University Press of the South, 2002), p. 200.

<sup>30</sup> Feros, “Rhetorics of the Expulsion,” p. 64.

<sup>31</sup> Magnier, *Pedro de Valencia*, p. 35.

progressed, the idea that a more drastic solution was necessary became more and more popular among all sectors of the population.

### *The Expulsion Debate*

The first discussions of a final solution to the Morisco problem occurred during the reign of Philip II, although the Prudent King never saw fit to act upon the proposals made by his advisors. A full expulsion of the Morisco population was first discussed at the end of the Second Alpujarras Revolt in 1570, but Philip II opted for the policy of mass resettlement instead.<sup>34</sup> In 1582 came the first official recommendation of expulsion to the monarch from a *junta* composed of several of the king's most trusted advisors: the Duke of Alba, the Count of Chinchón, Juan de Idiáquez (the king's secretary) and the royal confessor, Diego de Chaves. All but the confessor recommended that, for the safety of the realm, expulsion was necessary.<sup>35</sup> Yet, Philip II never acted upon the recommendation. Pascual Boronat y Barrachina attributed this to his characteristic prudence. Such a drastic measure simply was not feasible at the moment, given his many

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<sup>34</sup> Már Jónsson, "The Expulsion the of the Moriscos from Spain in 1609-1614: The Destruction of an Islamic Periphery," in *Journal of Global History*, v. 2 (2007), p. 199.

<sup>35</sup> Feros, "Rhetorics of the Expulsion," p. 70.

ventures, despite his own desire to see the Moriscos expelled, a desire echoed by many of his councilors including Juan de Ribera<sup>36</sup>

Given the number of Moriscos who would have to be transported, there was concern about how feasible such a mass expulsion would be, although it had multiple precedents. One of those precedents was the result of the Alhambra Decree, made on March 31, 1492 only three months after the Sultan Boabdil had vacated the beautiful namesake palace. The decree ordered all Jews in Spain to be either baptized or to leave within four months. Over the preceding centuries, many Jews had already converted under various levels of coercion (becoming conversos) but there remained about eighty thousand in 1492, just over half of whom chose to be baptized while the other half fled, many eventually into Ottoman territory.<sup>37</sup> The forced conversions of Muslims in 1502 and 1525, as well as the internal diaspora of Granadan Moriscos in 1571, had represented substantial undertakings by the crown to move so many people. Still, these were not nearly on the same scale as the expulsion that would occur between 1609-1614. Also, this new expulsion would necessarily involve only those who had in earlier years chosen to stay or their descendants, and who thus could not be expected to uproot their lives willingly. It is possible that the expulsion was delayed for several years to ensure that adequate military and naval resources could be put in place to prevent violence and make the forced emigration proceed smoothly. Expulsion was a drastic measure, but one that would ensure that the perceived taint of Islam would cease to exist in Iberia. Yet many other options, both more and less extreme, were also discussed.

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<sup>36</sup> Pascual Boronat y Barrachina, *Los Moriscos españoles y su expulsión*, Tomo 1 (Valencia: Francisco Vives y Mora, 1901), pp. 300-301.

<sup>37</sup> Rawlings, *Church, Religion, and Society*, pp. 11-13. 80-90% of those who left in 1492 may have returned over the next few years. She is using figures from Henry Kamen, "The Expulsion: Purpose and Consequences" in *Spain and the Jews*, ed. Elie Kedourie (London: 1992), p. 85.



Since it was considered by churchmen and courtiers to be too spiritually perilous and militarily risky to permit the Moriscos to continue their alleged crypto-Muslim practices, many solutions were presented to the “Morisco problem.” Proposals that children could be taken away and raised in Christian households or that marriages with Old Christians could bring Moriscos into the Church gained little traction due to the logistical difficulty in finding foster parents and potential spouses willing to take on the task of conversion.<sup>38</sup> And in the case of marriage, it was only seen as viable for Old Christian men and Moriscas, not the other way around, as Morisco men would likely impose their Islamic practices on Christian wives. The far more brutal suggestion to send the Moriscos out to sea and then drown them by scuttling the boats likewise, thankfully, was only briefly considered and dismissed in 1587.<sup>39</sup> Martin de Salvatierra, Bishop of Segorbe, stood by the idea of expulsion but suggested instead that the Moriscos might be transported to Newfoundland, perhaps castrated, and left there to die.<sup>40</sup> Even enslavement of the Moriscos was proposed (potentially to work as galley slaves, which were always in short supply), an idea which the Duke of Lerma briefly favored, possibly motivated by avarice more than any other cause.<sup>41</sup> But no alternative solution had the same following as expulsion, which dominated these discussions.

There were several arguments presented during the final decade before the expulsion for why it was necessary, based on theological, economic, and military grounds. The Archbishop of Valencia, Juan de Ribera, was the most influential

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<sup>38</sup> Lea, *The Moriscos in Spain*, p. 294.

<sup>39</sup> Harvey, *Muslims in Spain*, p. 295.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 296. Friar Jaime Bleda was also an excited proponent of mass murder. Lea, *The Moriscos in Spain*, p. 297.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 301. Harvey is only one of many historians whose educated opinion of the Duke of Lerma is highly negative in that Lerma was motivated primarily by selfish causes. See also Alfredo Alvar Ezquerro, *El duque de Lerma: corrupción y desmoralización en la España del siglo XVII* (Madrid: Esfera de los Libros, 2010).

ecclesiastical voice in favor of the expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain. Ribera had been in favor of expulsion for decades, although he had to wait until the death of Philip II in 1598 before Spain would have a king (and first minister) who might be more open to the idea. He would prove instrumental in convincing Philip III of the merits of expulsion. Ribera sent the king an unsolicited memorandum in December of 1601, after which the monarch requested that he expound on his ideas further in a longer work.<sup>42</sup> The archbishop eagerly acted upon the king's request and responded early the following year. This second memorandum's arguments included both military and economic concerns,<sup>43</sup> but focused on the spiritual argument that the Moriscos as a group were guilty of mass apostasy, the dangers of which for the spiritual welfare of the realm sufficiently justified such an extreme and indiscriminate castigation.

According to Ribera, the years of living under Catholic kings and alongside Old Christians had done little to change the lives of the Moriscos. "No reciben sacramento alguno... no confiessan, no comulgan, no reciben la Extrema Unción, no comen puerco, ni beben vino."<sup>44</sup> The sacraments are a vital part of Catholic life, from birth to death. Without them, it is difficult for someone to claim to be part of that faith. And of course, for a Morisco to avoid pork and wine, two staples of the Spanish diet which are forbidden (*haram*) in Islam, would have been quite suspicious. The Moriscos had all been baptized, and thus because they continued to reject the Word of God by not participating in Church life they could be considered apostates, which justified their expulsion or even execution,

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<sup>42</sup> Carr, *Blood and Faith*, p. 221.

<sup>43</sup> The text of this memorandum was printed in *Memorable expulsion y iustissimo destierro de los moriscos de España*, Ed. Marco de Guadalajara y Xavierr (Pamplona: Nicolas de Assiayn, 1613). Ribera's military and economic arguments can be found on f. 83v and f. 84r, respectively.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 85r. "They don't receive any sacraments... they don't confess, don't take communion, don't receive Extreme Unction, they don't eat pork or drink wine."

according to Ribera. Although he admits that under usual circumstances heresy and apostasy should be investigated and punished by the Inquisition, this case was grave enough that the powers of the Church were not sufficient, and that Philip III had the divine obligation to step in and protect Spain from her destruction.<sup>45</sup>

The Archbishop of Valencia also made sure to address several arguments opposing to expulsion in his memorandum to the monarch. First, he countered the idea that Moriscos were like new plants, who only needed tender care and instruction to become good Christians, by instead claiming that they were more like gnarled old trees, filled with treason and heresy. The Inquisition had found, according to Ribera, that when left to their own devices even Moriscos who had been well instructed in doctrine would seemingly forget everything within a few years, as they did not actually want to be taught how to be faithful Christians.<sup>46</sup> Along similar lines, he responded to the claim that since the Church had baptized the Moriscos, it was now obliged to do what was necessary to nurture them as Christian (and certainly not to expel them) by arguing that because they have been baptized, the fact that they are still not Christians makes them apostates and thus the Church has no further responsibility for their well-being.<sup>47</sup> Finally, Ribera addressed the concern among clergy who opposed the expulsion that it would gravely endanger the souls of the Moriscos, both those who were in their hearts Christians and those who were not yet converted. “No es necesaria consecuencia del destierro, irse a tierras de Moros, pues hay otras Provincias de Christianos donde pueden ir, y si ellos lo son, haran lo que hazen otros Christianos... Y si no lo hazen, sera, no por ser desterrados,

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., f. 85v-86r.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., f. 88r, 89r.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., f. 91r.

sino por ser Moros.”<sup>48</sup> Those who were Christians would remain as such, and those who were Muslims also would continue to be infidels whether they were in Spain or Africa, so there was no cause for concern regarding the souls of the expelled Moriscos. Ribera’s arguments and counter-arguments would certainly not prove satisfactory to everyone (especially the other Valencian bishops), but his memorandum did have the desired effect. Philip III and Lerma at the very least had now determined to explore the issue further and had begun to assemble their justification for the eventual expulsion seven years later.

Ribera’s only rival in dedication to effecting a solution to the Morisco problem was the Dominican friar and Inquisition official Jaime Bleda. Like Ribera, Bleda had spent years in Valencia and was similarly convinced that the Moriscos were not and could not become faithful Christians. It is clear, however, that Bleda hated the Moriscos to an extent that even Ribera did not match. In turn the friar attributed the same enmity that he felt to the Moriscos themselves. In his ponderous tome, *Coronica de los moros de España*, Bleda characterized the actions of those people he still believed to truly be Moors: “Conspiraban siempre estos enemigos malvados rabiosos contra la persona y Corona Real, y contra la Religión Christiana en toda sus juntas y conversaciones. De continuo traçaban nuestros daños, y destrucción.”<sup>49</sup> To Bleda the Moriscos at all times and in all places threatened both the monarchy as traitors and the Christian faith as infidels, and thus deserved expulsion, at the very least. He was an extreme case,

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., f. 92r. “It is not a necessary consequence of banishment, going to Moorish lands, since there are other provinces of Christians where they can go, and if they are (Christians) they will do as other Christians do... and if they do not, it would not be because they are banished, but rather because they are Moors.”

<sup>49</sup> Jaime Bleda, *Coronica de los moros de España* (Valencia: Felipe Mey, 1618), p. 897. “These wicked, rabid enemies always conspired against the Crown and the person of the king, and against the Christian religion in all of their gatherings and conversations. Continuously they plotted our injury and destruction.”

especially among churchmen, but yet the differences between his arguments for expulsion and Ribera's arguments can be seen as a matter of magnitude or exaggeration rather than fundamental content.

Ribera and Bleda were convinced that there resided within Spain a dangerous body of crypto-Muslim apostates, which put both faithful Christians and the destiny of the empire at risk. The presence of infidels in Spain challenged ideas of divine providence. Spain's success in the *Reconquista* and discovery of the New World had given Spaniards a firm sense that they were God's new chosen people, preeminent above all Christian nations and champion of the Catholic faith against heretics, infidels, and pagans.<sup>50</sup> But Spain's various difficulties in recent years challenged that identity. In Ribera's first memorandum to Philip III, he explained that (as he had told the previous king) just as the Armada against England failed, so too would any other grand imperial enterprise, until his dominions had been purified.<sup>51</sup> "Mientras no tenía remedio en estas heregias de España... no se debia ocupar en remediar los Reynos agenos."<sup>52</sup> He did not doubt the divine mission, but did not believe that Spain could reach its full potential until it was undeniably united in the one true faith. Arguments for expulsion thus took on a millenarian aspect, as Catholic apologists for the expulsion believed or at least asserted that once Spain was purged of the infidel Moriscos it would enter a Golden Age, perhaps even heralding the End Times of the book of Revelation.<sup>53</sup> The expected spiritual reward of expulsion was beyond tantalizing, but there remained more secular concerns as well that also drove the cause of expulsion forward.

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<sup>50</sup> Magnier, *Pedro de Valencia*, p. 51.

<sup>51</sup> Lea, *The Moriscos in Spain*, p. 307.

<sup>52</sup> Guadalajara, *Memorable expulsion*, f. 80v. "So long as there is no remedy for the heresies in Spain... Spain should not be occupied with remedying those of foreign kingdoms."

<sup>53</sup> Magnier, *Pedro de Valencia*, p. 64.

Around 1580, Castile entered into an economic depression that would last far into the seventeenth century. The economic difficulties, compounded by a devastating plague between 1596-1602, led to famine and a drop in population in several regions.<sup>54</sup> This crisis was sufficiently clear to contemporaries, but its causes were vigorously debated by the *arbitristas*. The Moriscos did not escape blame, despite the abundance of factors leading to this crisis. Gold was undoubtedly disappearing from Spain faster than it entered, but the Moriscos were frequently seen wearing gold ornaments and were believed to be hoarding their wealth, much of which had been earned through trade and small enterprise.<sup>55</sup> Ribera referred to the Moriscos having become “the sponge of all the wealth in Spain” as he sought to counter arguments that the expulsion would cause further economic distress.<sup>56</sup> Those who had the most to lose were the nobles and ecclesiastics of Aragon and Valencia, who derived much of their revenues from the work of Morisco vassals, and many of these powerful figures fought against expulsion.<sup>57</sup> Although most of the nobility in Spain supported the expulsion, the few that actually had large numbers of Morisco subjects were the most likely to voice opposition. This undoubtedly contributed to Ribera’s failure to garner much support among his own bishops in Valencia, as will be discussed later.

The most pervasive fear surrounding the Moriscos was that they would support foreign invaders. Although the Holy League’s victory at the Battle of Lepanto had staved off Ottoman ambitions in the western Mediterranean for the foreseeable future, Saadian

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<sup>54</sup> Angel García Sanz, “Economic Crisis and the Policy of ‘Reform,’” in *The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. I.A.A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 28.

<sup>55</sup> Lea, *The Moriscos in Spain*, p. 210.

<sup>56</sup> Ehlers, *Between Christians and Moriscos*, p. 130.

<sup>57</sup> Lea, *The Moriscos in Spain*, p. 299.

Morocco and the Barbary corsairs remained sources of anxiety. Philip III, Lerma, and the Duke of Medina Sidonia believed that the Moriscos had been providing corsairs with information and support.<sup>58</sup> The Duke of Lerma warned the Council of State of the potential for a Moroccan invasion of the south of Spain, potentially with Dutch assistance.<sup>59</sup> In 1608 it seemed that this catastrophe might come to pass, when it was discovered that fifty Valencian Moriscos had gone to Muley Zeydan, the Sultan of Morocco, and promised that they would support him if he decided to invade.<sup>60</sup> This revelation spurred the debate into its final stages. Spain was at peace with the English, and moving towards a peace treaty with the Dutch, and thus by 1609 would be better situated to move forward with the expulsion. But just because something is possible does not necessarily make it right. And in this case, by “right” we refer only to clerical sanction based on theological reasoning, which was not forthcoming.

Lerma, King Philip III, and other nobles<sup>61</sup> in the Council of State desired expulsion by 1608 and could justify it on grounds of state security, but were hesitant to move forward without clear ecclesiastical endorsement. Unfortunately for these secular authorities, the argument on theological grounds that all Moriscos were apostates and

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<sup>58</sup> Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, “The Expulsion of the Moriscos in the Context of Philip III’s Foreign Policy” in *The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain*, p. 44.

<sup>59</sup> Alfredo Alvar Ezquerro, *El Duque de Lerma: corrupción, y desmoralización en la España del siglo XVII* (Madrid: La Esfera de Los Libros, 2010), p. 303.

<sup>60</sup> Harvey, *Muslims in Spain*, pp. 305-306.

<sup>61</sup> Although Philip III’s Council of State generally supported the expulsion and ultimately voted in favor of it, the council was far from unanimous on the matter of expulsion, and meetings often became heated when the “Morisco Problem” was discussed. Trevor J. Dadson in a recent work claims that several nobles in the council expressed serious concerns about the project, both before and during its execution between 1609-1614. They fought for exceptions to be made, especially for the Old Moriscos who had lived for centuries as Christians, as well as children, the elderly, and in general those who to them clearly could be counted among the faithful. Juan Hurtado de Mendoza, Duke of the Infantado and thus liege to many Moriscos consistently opposed expulsion, while the Duke of Albuquerque, the Constable of Castile, (Juan Fernández de Velasco) and the Knight Commander of León (Juan de Idiáquez) among others voiced dissent to what Dadson characterizes as project driven principally by Lerma and his creature, the Count of Salazar. See Trevor J. Dadson, *Tolerance and Coexistence in Early Modern Spain: Old Christians and Moriscos in the Campo de Calatrava* (Woodbridge: Tamesis, 2014), pp. 110, 136-146.

thus put Spain into spiritual peril had substantial flaws. While Christians were united in intolerance of crypto-Muslims, this did not mean that the Church could abandon its duties to integrate the baptized Moriscos into the Church, or failing that to castigate them on an individual basis under the precepts of canon law.<sup>62</sup> Martín González de Cellorigo, an Inquisition lawyer, added to this main argument that it was not entirely the fault of the Moriscos that they had not become good Christians; part of that blame should fall on the prelates who had so far failed to convert their flocks.<sup>63</sup> He evidently rejected Ribera's position that the Moriscos had already received sufficient instruction in the faith. Given the pessimism towards evangelization held even by the archbishop it was not much of a leap of logic for Cellorigo to say that some clergy at least had not done their duty in shepherding the Morisco flock. Until more was done on the part of the Church, Cellorigo saw it as unjust to denounce all Moriscos as apostates; many churchmen on the ground agreed with him, in large part because of successes of evangelization that they had experienced.

The Church in Spain was deeply divided on this issue, but, with the exception of Archbishop Ribera, the bishops from regions with large Morisco populations overwhelmingly rejected expulsion. The highest-ranking voice of opposition to expulsion was Cardinal Fernando Niño de Guevara, Archbishop of Seville from 1601-1609 and former Inquisitor General, who could not accept that baptized Christians would be sent to North Africa, where they would almost certainly become renegades and thus forfeit salvation.<sup>64</sup> Several Valencian bishops also refused to approve of the drastic measure of

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<sup>62</sup> Rafael Benítez Sánchez-Blanco, "The Religious Debate in Spain," in *The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain*, p. 111.

<sup>63</sup> Magnier, *Pedro de Valencia*, p. 11.

<sup>64</sup> Benítez Sánchez-Blanco, "The Religious Debate in Spain," p. 116.



expulsion, and believed that the Moriscos should be given still more time to join the faithful. In 1607 and 1608, Philip III called two Valencian *juntas* into session to discuss the morality of expulsion. These deliberations, led by Ribera and including the local bishops, both ended in the same manner, with Ribera's plans for expulsion failing to gain significant support among the other bishops or lower clergy. The archbishop's chief opponent during these *juntas* was the Franciscan Antonio Sobrino, who had himself found success with more benevolent forms of evangelization in Valencia.<sup>65</sup> Sobrino wrote a letter to the king right before the expulsion in Valencia was about to be carried out in which he once again asserted that efforts to convert the Moriscos must be allowed to continue, as he believed that even the presently unconverted could still be brought into the Catholic faith. Sobrino characterized the moment as an opportunity for Philip II to exhibit divine piety and forgiveness in place of an act of vengeance that would lead only to misery and ruin.<sup>66</sup> The Franciscan, who could not support any theological justification for the expulsion, correctly characterized the fundamental rationale as *razón de estado* (reason of the state).<sup>67</sup> That is, the king had a right to rid Spain of a material threat, but this conflicted with his duties as a Catholic, and in any case Sobrino discounted that threat as only temporary pending the successful evangelization of the Moriscos. In addition, Sobrino remarked that the expulsion would result in a desolation of his kingdom and economic hardship for the nobles and ecclesiastics who depended on rents from hard-

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<sup>65</sup> Carr, *Blood and Faith*, p. 227.

<sup>66</sup> Sobrino to Philip III, September 1609, in Mercedes Garcia-Arenal, *Los Moriscos* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1996), p. 247-248.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247.

working Moriscos.<sup>68</sup> Philip II may have had the right but, to Sobrino, he lacked any solid cause to expel the Moriscos.

Like Sobrino, the bishops of Orihuela, Tortosa, and Segorbe (Feliciano de Figueroa had replaced the sadistic Martín de Salvatierra in that post) also supported the continuance of the Christianization program.<sup>69</sup> It was clear to these bishops and friars that Moriscos could become faithful Christians if properly engaged by evangelists. For example, Ignacio de Las Casas, before his death in 1608, was living proof of the success of Christianization, and considered by Tueller to have been an inspiration in particular to Figueroa and Sobrino.<sup>70</sup> Ignacio de Las Casas was born to Morisco parents, joined the Jesuit order, and had a successful evangelical career preaching to other Moriscos in Arabic, which of course would have made Archbishop Cisneros roll over in his grave. Pedro de Castro took over the archdiocese of Seville upon the death of Guevara just as the expulsion project reached Seville, and he too petitioned the king to call it off in January, 1610. He emphasized that he presided over few Moriscos, and that these posed no threat. Many of the Moriscos and Moriscas had married Old Christians, and had children and grandchildren who were good Catholics. Castro did not even present the situation as being a work in progress; instead, he based his dissent on concern for the welfare of the Christians under his protection who are about to be punished severely for a crime of which they were not guilty. “Temo si trae peligro en las consciencias de algunos de ellos... Yo como padre lo siento y me duelo y querria socorrer al peligro de las

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Rawlings, *Church, Religion, and Society*, p. 23.

<sup>70</sup> Tueller, *Good and Faithful Christians*, p. 131.

consciencias.”<sup>71</sup> Yet the king remained unmoved by these impassioned pleas for clemency, as he evidently believed that continuing to harbor the Moriscos was too dangerous for Spain, even if that meant the unjust punishment of the few among them who might be true Christians.

Even among the priests closest to the king, his royal confessors, almost all rejected the proposed expulsion. Philip II’s confessor Diego de Chaves had stood in opposition back in 1582 when Ribera first revealed his intention to see the Moriscos removed from Spain. The Dominican friars Gaspar de Córdoba and Jerónimo Javierre likewise urged Philip III not to expel the Moriscos. Not until Javierre’s death in 1608 would a royal confessor, Luis de Aliaga, approve of the king’s plan. This confessor had been recommended by Lerma, as Aliaga had previously served the Duke himself in that capacity.<sup>72</sup> It was nothing new for Lerma to place one of his own men close to the king, and in this case Lerma’s machinations may have allowed Philip III to go through with the expulsion with a clearer conscience.<sup>73</sup>

So despite substantial opposition the expulsion project continued unabated. Jaime Bleda, in addition to being perhaps the most zealous author of anti-Morisco texts, also sought out papal approval for the project. The Dominican journeyed to Rome on at least

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<sup>71</sup> “Carta de don Pedro Vaca de Castro, Arzobispo de Sevilla, al Rey Felipe III,” January 1610, in Antonio Domínguez Ortiz and Bernard Vincent, *Historia de los Moriscos: vida y tragedia de una minoría* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1979), p. 281. “I fear that it brings danger to some of their consciences... It pains me as a father and I want to help them to avoid that danger to their consciences.”

<sup>72</sup> Benítez Sánchez-Blanco, “The Religious Debate in Spain,” p. 131. Martha K. Hoffman, *Raised to Rule: Educating Royalty at the Court of the Spanish Habsburgs, 1601-1634* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2011), p. 88.

<sup>73</sup> Luis de Aliaga, in turn, later used his influence with the king to help his younger brother, Isodoro de Aliaga, to become Archbishop of Valencia after the death of Juan de Ribera in 1611. This would represent yet another case of the crown ignoring the desires of the Valencian bishops, who wanted Cardinal Gaspar de Borja (who was a son of the Duke of Gandia and thus seen as a native Valencian, unlike Ribera or Isodoro de Aliaga) to take the post, as they believed him best suited to deal with the archdiocese’s difficulties brought on by the depopulation of Morisco settlements and the ensuing loss of Church revenues. See Emilio Callado Estela, *Iglesia, poder y sociedad en el siglo XVII: El arzobispo de Valencia fray Isodoro Aliaga* (Valencia: Biblioteca Valenciana, 2001), pp. 30-31.

two occasions, and proved persistent enough that the Pope ultimately saw fit to ban him from the city in order to gain some respite from Bleda's diatribes.<sup>74</sup> Paul V did not offer the blessing sought by Bleda, Ribera, and the monarch. The Roman theologians rejected the case on the legal grounds that it was improper to label the Moriscos as a race to be, without exception, apostates.<sup>75</sup> This, as we have demonstrated, reflected the arguments of many among the Valencian clergy, who knew from their own evangelical experiences that it was possible for Moriscos to become good and faithful Christians. Nonetheless, the expulsion decree would still ultimately include language to the effect that despite efforts to convert the Moriscos, they remained heretics, apostates, and traitors.<sup>76</sup> The views of the Valencian bishops (with the exception of Ribera) as well as the Holy Father himself apparently did not matter to Philip III, his advisors, or the Cortes.

The most important religious figure in Spain did not participate actively in the debate, but his views must have carried substantial weight for the king and his favorite, the Duke of Lerma. Bernardo de Sandoval y Rojas held two of the three posts considered to be the three pillars of the monarchy.<sup>77</sup> Sandoval y Rojas was named Archbishop of Toledo, and also received a cardinal's hat in 1599. Then, after refusing the proffered appointment several years earlier, he was also made Inquisitor General in 1608.<sup>78</sup> At least until 1608 he refused as member of the Council of State to approve expulsion, but he did not condemn the idea either. Instead he hoped that the king would make his own decision

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<sup>74</sup> Tueller, *Good and Faithful Christians*, p. 117.

<sup>75</sup> Stefania Pastore, "Roma and the Expulsion" in *The Expulsion of the Moriscos*, p. 147.

<sup>76</sup> Harvey, *Muslims in Spain*, p. 310

<sup>77</sup> Alvar Ezquerro, *El Duque de Lerma*, p. 133. The third pillar was the President of Castile. All three of the existing officeholders had coincidentally died in the first two years of Philip III's reign. Lerma was known for nepotism but it is uncertain how much this influenced the Duke's decision to propose his great-uncle to be both Archbishop of Toledo and Inquisitor General, as the two did not always see eye to eye.

<sup>78</sup> Rawlings, *Church, Religion, and Society*, p. 160.

in consultation with God.<sup>79</sup> But at the final Council of State vote on April 4, 1609, the Archbishop of Toledo voiced his support for the expulsion.<sup>80</sup> The king at least could rely on two of his archbishops to back the expulsion, even if he had less support from the lower prelates.

Thus, with the approval of a majority of the Council of State, the Archbishop of Valencia, and Castile's primate the Archbishop of Toledo, Philip III issued on April 4, 1609 his decree on expulsion to take effect on September 22 of that year. The decree stated that despite extensive and diligent efforts to instruct the Moriscos in the holy faith and previous offerings of Edicts of Grace, "se ha visto que ninguno se (h)aya convertido, antes ha crecido su obstinacion." After having discussed the matter with many learned and holy men, "para aplacar a nuestro Señor que tan ofendido esta desta gente: assigurandome que podia sin ninguno escrupulo castigarlos en las vidas y haziendas, porque la continuacion de sus delitos los tenia convencidos de hereges apostatas, y proditores de lesa Magestad divina y humana."<sup>81</sup> The decree condemns the Moriscos as a group of being both heretics and traitors, thus applying both secular and spiritual condemnations, very similar to Ribera's language in his 1602 memorandum. In Lea's judgment, the monarch had treated the issue "exclusively as an affair of state and, except a vague allusion to the service of God, only secular reasons were advanced in its

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<sup>79</sup> Lea, *The Moriscos in Spain*, p. 313.

<sup>80</sup> Magnier, *Pedro de Valencia*, p. 2.

<sup>81</sup> Philip III, "Bando de expulsion de los Moriscos de Valencia" April 4, 1609, in Garcia-Arenal, *Los Moriscos*, pp. 251-252. The entire decree can be found on pp. 252-255. My translation: "it has been seen that none of them have converted, rather their obstinacy has increased," and "in order to placate our Lord who is so offended by these people, I have been assured (by his learned advisors) that without any scruples I could punish them by taking their lives and property, because the continuation of their offenses has convinced them (the advisors) that they (the Moriscos) are apostate heretics, and traitors to both human and divine Majesty."

justification.”<sup>82</sup> While it is true that Philip III had little to say personally on theological grounds, the declaration of mass apostasy (even if impossible to substantiate under canon law) was not a secular justification. It was certainly a theological claim, but a weak one, because it had not been accepted by Rome or many of Spain’s own clergy. The pragmatism of the state—or perhaps the king’s sense of his own divine guidance—had won out over the sacred mission of the Church.

To those with any familiarity with the course of Spanish history after 1609 it need not be said that the expulsion of the Moriscos did not indeed fix Spain’s problems. Although Spain’s coerced unity as a Catholic kingdom may well have prevented the kinds of bloody sectarian strife experienced elsewhere in early modern Europe during the next few decades (most notably in the Thirty Years’ War of 1618-1648), Spain’s economy and reputation did not appear to be on the road to recovery, and the search for solutions continued. With the vestiges of the Moorish past finally banished, ironically the next scapegoat came in the form of the Moorslayer, Santiago. William Christian claimed that, at the local level of his research at least, patron saints were often replaced in times of stress in order to find a new, more helpful heavenly advocate.<sup>83</sup> Would Santiago suffer the same fate, or be considered sufficient to continue in the role of being the sole patron of Spain?

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<sup>82</sup> Lea, *The Moriscos of Spain*, p. 309.

<sup>83</sup> William Christian, *Local Religion in Sixteenth-Century Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 60.

*Teresa as Patroness?*

Teresa of Ávila (1515-1582) entered the local Carmelite convent as a young woman in order to escape the temptations of frivolity and flirtation.<sup>84</sup> She would become over the course of her life one of the most respected people in Spain, counting even King Philip II among her distinguished patrons. She founded the humble Order of Discalced Carmelites in response to the laxity and elitism she found within her own order. The Descalzas expanded quickly beyond her first convent, founded in 1562, to include thirty-two communities in Iberia before the end of her life.<sup>85</sup> At the same time she became renowned as a spiritual reformer, noted for her intense devotion and mysticism. “In her

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<sup>84</sup> Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, p. 49.

<sup>85</sup> Rawlings, *Church, Religion, and Society*, p. 36.

commitment to radical reform through prayer and her conscious desire to counteract heresy, Teresa personified the intense devotional and contemplative spirit of Spanish Catholicism in the Counter-Reformation era.”<sup>86</sup>

With the enthusiastic support of her Discalced Carmelites, she was beatified in 1614, only a few decades after her death.<sup>87</sup> In the years between her death and her formal installation as a heavenly intercessor, she had just missed the debate on the expulsion of the Moriscos. Santiago’s final act of the *Reconquista* was soon followed by the first attempt to have Teresa join him as co-patron of Spain. The *procurador general* of the Discalced Carmelites, Friar Luis de San Jerónimo, petitioned the Cortes on October 24, 1617 to elevate Teresa to patron sainthood. The Cortes immediately voted to approve the Carmelite petition, a decision which seems clearly to have pleased the king. Philip III sent letters to every city in his realm informing them of Teresa’s elevation to co-patronage and detailing plans for an eight-day celebration starting on her feast day. The king shared his father’s affection for Teresa and her followers.<sup>88</sup> The defenders of Santiago’s right to sole patronage, the so-called *Santiaguistas*, quickly mobilized. The archbishops of Seville and Santiago ardently refused to permit celebrations of Teresa’s co-patronage in their cities. Pedro de Castro, Archbishop of Seville (1610-1623), quickly became one of Santiago’s most fervent supporters, and his arguments led Philip III to reconsider his position. The king met with the President of Castile, the papal nuncio, and several of the major prelates of Spain, and was ultimately convinced by Pedro de Castro

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>87</sup> Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, p. 55.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p. 56.



along with the archbishops of Santiago and Toledo to call off the celebrations and the declaration of Teresa's co-patronage until papal approval was given.<sup>89</sup>

The strongest argument against Teresa at this point hinged on her celestial status. She had been beatified, but not canonized, which the *santiaguista* prelates convinced Philip III disqualified her from patron sainthood.<sup>90</sup> In any case, Teresa did not have to wait long for full sainthood, even though Philip III would not live to see it. Spaniards deeply desired local saints who could be counted on to intercede on behalf of their countrymen in order to shorten stays in Purgatory.<sup>91</sup> Teresa, of course, would have been seen as particularly potent in this regard, as she was widely credited with Philip II's rapid release from purgatory only eight days after his death, even before the nun had been beatified.<sup>92</sup> Spanish influence at the Roman court had proved to be a crucial factor in the election of Gregory XV in 1621, and the new pope rewarded his sponsors during his brief term by canonizing four Spanish saints: Ignatius of Loyola, Francis Xavier, Isidore the Laborer, and Teresa of Ávila.<sup>93</sup> Teresa and Ignatius of Loyola, as founders of religious orders, were able to rely on their followers as a powerful lobby within the papal court.<sup>94</sup> The mystic's elevation was also supported by the major prelates of Spain, including the Archbishop of Santiago de Compostela.<sup>95</sup> Although several of these prelates had and would continue to oppose her co-patronage, they could not deny her worthiness

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Thomas Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome 1500-1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 165.

<sup>92</sup> Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, p. 82.

<sup>93</sup> Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome*, p. 106.

<sup>94</sup> Burke, "How to Become a Counter-Reformation Saint," pp. 138-140. Burke found that 12 out of the 55 canonizations between 1588-1767 were earned by the founders of religious orders. Philip Neri, another new saint in 1622, founded the Congregation of the Oratory.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 182.

to be canonized. The patronage controversy was, after all, a debate on the merits of two nearly perfect individuals.

As a patron, Teresa had advantages over Santiago in her modernity and indisputable *españolidad* (Spanish-ness). Santiago's cult, despite a brief upswing in popularity around the fall of Granada, had suffered since. In no small part his diminished popularity reflected the economic woes of the nation and Santiago's seeming inability to come to Spain's aid; "Some began to wonder if the apostle was failing in his duty as Spain's patron."<sup>96</sup> In addition, the historicity of Santiago's evangelizing mission to Spain was questioned in Rome, to the point that it was left out of his entry on the official church calendar.<sup>97</sup> *Teresianos* "viewed the Moorslayer as an increasingly obsolete cultural symbol and instead advocated in favor of Teresa as a warrior against heresy and a promoter of internal reform."<sup>98</sup> Teresa, perhaps, could get Spain back on track. She had the distinct advantage that she had been born, lived, and died in Spain, and had performed miracles which had been witnessed by living people. Her novelty, or modernity, also made her better suited to understanding the problems facing her beloved *patria*, or so her supporters reasoned.<sup>99</sup> The Dominican preacher, Domingo Cano, went so far as to create a sort of prophetic genealogy for Teresa, suggesting that in spirit she and Spain had always been one.<sup>100</sup> In the Cortes of Castile, the vote in 1626 for her co-patronage passed unanimously.<sup>101</sup> In addition to her appeal to the nation, she was equally important to the Habsburg dynasty, and thus linked the two together. She was credited with Philip II's

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<sup>96</sup> Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, p. 44.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

rapid escape from purgatory and was believed to have interceded so that Philip III would sire male heirs, (including, of course, Philip IV). And when the young Philip IV fell gravely ill (and was without an heir) in 1627, he made a seemingly miraculous recovery with her aid.<sup>102</sup>

Teresa had powerful supporters in the Spanish court and governing institutions. Philip IV himself saw Teresa as worthy of co-patronage owing in no small part to her service to his dynasty both before and after her death, and in particular through her service to his own grandfather, Philip II. Philip IV's favorite and chief minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares, likewise, was deeply committed to her cause. He claimed that he had been devoted to her since he was a boy, and attributed her with having saved the life of his mother when he was young. The royal favorite even came into possession of Teresa's heart, a relic which he clearly cherished.<sup>104</sup> Olivares also had political cause to advocate the co-patronage of a unifying figure. He saw his proposed Union of Arms (which aimed to create a reserve army drawn proportionately from the resources of all of Spain's disparate kingdoms) as a prelude to a "union of hearts," which could be assisted Teresa as a patron of all of Spain.<sup>105</sup> Although she was not a warrior like Santiago Matamoros, Teresa was still seen as a figure who could aid the combat forces of Spain. After the Portuguese-Spanish victory against the Dutch at Bahia in Brazil in 1625, for example, admiral Fadrique de Toledo named Teresa as the protector of his armada.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 82. This occurred right after he received the papal brief from Urban VIII officially elevating Teresa to patron sainthood, as will be discussed later in the present work.

<sup>104</sup> Erin Rowe, "St. Teresa and Olivares: Patron Sainthood, Royal Favorites, and the Politics of Plurality in Seventeenth-Century Spain" in *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 37: 3 (Fall, 2006), p. 724.

<sup>105</sup> J.H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p.243. Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, p. 81.

<sup>106</sup> Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, p. 116. For the military exploits of St. Mary, an equally non-violent female saint, see Amy G. Remensnyder, *La Conquistadora: The Virgin Mary at War and Peace in the Old and New Worlds* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

It is fair to say that virtually all secular authorities within Spain advocated co-patronage. The crucial difference, as Rowe explains, between the *Teresianos* and *Santiaguistas* lay in the question of who truly had the authority to declare a national patron. While the *Teresianos* held that patronage was a national issue, and therefore the decision of the civic authorities was sufficient, the *Santiaguistas* resisted what they saw as a violation of ecclesiastical authority (particularly that of the Cathedral chapters), believing that a new patron could not be named without the consent of the Church.<sup>107</sup>

*The Santiaguista Defense*

*A Santiago Teresa agradecida  
Refiere luz y vida  
Mas decir no se debe  
Jamás que bebe luz: luz que se bebe  
(Con Góngora te pago)  
A San-Trago se debe, y no á San-Tiago<sup>108</sup>*

The first line of this poem reflects a key argument of the *Santiaguistas*. Teresa, while certainly an admirable figure, could only have existed thanks to Santiago's efforts. He had been active in Spain for sixteen centuries and to the *Santiaguistas* continued to

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., p. 167-168.

<sup>108</sup> Francisco de Quevedo, *Su espada por Santiago* in *Obras de Don Francisco de Quevedo Villegas: colección completa*, Tomo 2, ed. Don Aureliano Fernández-Guerra y Orbe (Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, 1859), p. 453.

actively serve the nation. The Compostelan priest Alonso Rodríguez de León wrote a letter to the king arguing that it would be ‘absurd’ to interrupt the sole patronage of a sacred personage so interwoven into the history of Iberia.<sup>109</sup> Francisco de Quevedo felt much the same way, asserting that Santiago’s patronage of Spain did not start just at the Battle of Clavijo (as some *Teresianos* had argued) but that he had been patron by divine right presumably ever since the apostle’s death. Neither the king nor the kingdom had the right to choose a new patron, as the ‘nation’ itself knew well who their patron was and would remain.<sup>110</sup> Other arguments were founded on more strongly political grounds. Rodríguez de León, as well as Pedro de Losada y Quiroga of the cathedral chapter of Jaén, included rhetoric in their rejections of co-patronage that amounted to an attack on royal favoritism. To these *Santiaguistas*, states were best governed by a single leader, the king, and thus to include a second but equally powerful voice was to create a ‘two-headed monster’ that would be detrimental to good governance.<sup>111</sup> Finally, *Santiaguistas* questions as to Teresa’s universal appeal or relevance within Spain. At best, she could be considered a Castilian patroness. Even Santiago had not risen to prominence in Aragon or Navarre, and Teresa’s following there was even less substantial.<sup>112</sup>

The Carmelite saint was strongly connected to Avila, in central Castile, and various other cities within Castile supported her co-patronage, but many other regions and cities did not feel the same connection to her cult.<sup>113</sup> Many of the wealthiest cathedral chapters opposed co-patronage: Toledo, Burgos, Seville and of course Santiago

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<sup>109</sup> Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, p. 75.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93. The Sevillian Alonso de Serna argued for Santiago along similar lines.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

itself.<sup>114</sup> These chapters and others supported and funded those who defended Santiago's cause. One of their most vehement arguments against the nun, outside of the kind of pragmatic or political attacks seen above, amounted to declaring Teresa essentially ineligible for the duty of patron on grounds of her gender.

Many of those who rejected Teresa's co-patronage did so on these grounds, claiming that a female saint would be too weak to properly defend the nation. Pedro de Castro had made it clear in the first stage of the debate that he did not consider female saints to be of the same quality as male ones.<sup>115</sup> He had passed away before 1627, but the idea continued to be prevalent in *Santiaguista* arguments. Indeed, fears that Spain was becoming too effeminate and weak had become popularized following the catastrophe of the Armada in 1588, decades before the debate on co-patronage began.<sup>116</sup> While Quevedo praised the boldness and bravery of his fellow Knights of Santiago, he criticized the weakness of Teresa's Discalced Carmelites, who were commonly depicted with spinning-wheels rather than swords.<sup>117</sup> Teresa's gender did not cause the same apprehension for everyone, however, as her defenders proved. The royal preacher Hortensio Félix Paravicino evoked the myth of Rodrigo and Florinda, "whose sinfulness had led to the loss of Spain to Arab invasion... Paravicino claimed that it was fitting for Spain to be restored by a woman and a man, which was clearly the role God intended for dual patronage."<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, despite her passionate relationship with the Lord, Teresa

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p. 146.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 59, n. 42.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>117</sup> Castro, *The Spaniards*, p. 461.

<sup>118</sup> Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, p. 67. For more on the myths surrounding femininity and the 'fall of Spain', see Patricia E. Grieve, *The Eve of Spain: Myths of Origins in the History of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Conflict* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). Some of Paravicino's sermons, although not those on the co-patronage issue, can be found in Hortensio Paravicino, *Sermones cortesanos*, ed. Francis Cerdan (Madrid: Editorial Castalia, 1994).

remained a virgin; that status deflected some of the perceived weaknesses of her sex. A virginal nun could be seen as having overcome the rampant sexuality supposedly inherent to her gender, and thus, in a way, could be considered more ‘manly.’<sup>119</sup> There existed plentiful examples in scripture of women exhibiting masculine traits, and the *Teresianos* were willing to depict Teresa like these strong females of antiquity.<sup>120</sup> They followed the arguments of the Jesuit Francisco de Ribera, an early biographer of Teresa, that souls could be gendered differently than the bodies they inhabited. The gender of the soul related only to how well it resisted being conquered by one’s passions, which Teresa had certainly accomplished.<sup>121</sup> Manly woman or not, Teresa did not have to be considered superior to Santiago, just to be worthy of standing at his side, like Minerva next to Mars, a vision forwarded by the preacher Diego del Escorial.<sup>122</sup>

The church was not united either for or against Teresa’s co-patronage, but the opposition within the clergy remained far too strong for Philip IV to ever make the claim that the Spanish church was behind him. This did not stop him from calling the Castilian Cortes to a vote on the matter in 1626, which passed unanimously.<sup>123</sup> Philip IV sent a brief to Urban VIII in 1627 requesting that he ratify Teresa’s election as co-patron, which the Pope initially favored.<sup>124</sup> Yet, two years later Urban decided to nullify the earlier brief, in part because Philip IV had held to his belief that the monarch could declare a patron saint without ecclesiastical support, and because the Bishop of Rome had grown

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<sup>119</sup> Magdalena S. Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun: Women and Power at the Court of Philip III of Spain* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 142.

<sup>120</sup> Rowe, *Saint and Nation*, p. 112.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 197. The 1616 vote (before Teresa had been canonized) was also unanimous in the Cortes.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

concerned over Spanish ambitions in Italy.<sup>125</sup> Just as Teresa had nearly become co-patron based largely on secular political authority, she was ultimately rejected by the Papacy on political grounds, hidden behind a theological justification. Pope Urban VIII, who was pro-French unlike his predecessor Gregory XV and thus sought to weaken Spain, understood as well as the Habsburg kings how the force of a pragmatic ruling could be augmented by a bit of religious law. He responded to the Spanish infringement on papal authority by declaring not only that Teresa would not be acknowledged as a patron of Spain, but also that only through the papacy and the Congregation of Sacred Rights could a national patron saint be chosen.<sup>126</sup> Teresa was demoted to being only a local saint, albeit a local saint venerated in many localities.

### Conclusion

Seventeenth-century Spaniards experienced an identity crisis in response to a material crisis, the former of which presented itself in many forms including the debates on the expulsion of the Moriscos and of St. Teresa's co-patronage. Spaniards saw their nation on the decline, and many believed that removing the infidel Moriscos from Spain's territory would allow the nation to strengthen and fulfill its mission as the chief defender of Catholicism. Teresa, hero of the Counter-Reformation, was favored by Philip IV's court in large part because she had lived recently enough to have combated Protestant heresy, which if allowed into Iberia could only mean its ruin. Philip III and the Duke of

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., pp. 203, 206. These ambitions would result in the War of the Mantuan Succession (1628-1631).

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p. 206.



Lerma had a few allies in the Church such as Archbishop Ribera, but in his decision to finally expel the Moriscos in 1609 the king relied principally on the support of secular authority. Likewise, when Philip IV and the Count-Duke of Olivares put Teresa forward for co-patronage they did so with the full backing of the Cortes, but on this issue the Church was sharply divided. Neither plan ultimately received papal approval, in no small part because of the lobbying at the papal court by churchmen who opposed the position of the monarchy. On the expulsion the monarchy was able to ignore the lack of ecclesiastical support, since Philip III had both an army and practical justification for removing the Moriscos. Philip IV attempted a similar measure— albeit on a higher and more abstract plane— in 1627 and within Spain he was successful. On the divisive and deeply religious issue of patronage he did not ignore Rome's later rejection, but was willing to proceed over the objections of many of his own clergy. Church and State, rather than appearing as allies in these debates instead found themselves entirely at odds, and it is clear to us which of the two proved more influential in seventeenth-century Spain. Both Philip II and Philip IV listened to opponents within the Church and without, but were not swayed by their arguments. The Spanish Church, despite its wealth and power, retained only a power of suggestion in the Habsburg court, which could be ignored by the king when he saw fit for the good of the realm.

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### Biographical Sketch

Bryan Laird was born in Pequannock, New Jersey on February 5, 1992 to Robert and Janice Laird. Despite his father’s sincere hope that he would one day pitch for the New York Yankees, within the next decade or so it became abundantly clear that this would not come to pass. Both Bryan and his little sister Colleen were scholars at heart. Bryan has only attended three schools during his twenty years of education, during which he has learned about many topics, including finger painting, calculus, and more recently early modern Spanish history. Immanuel Lutheran and Crystal Lake Central High had

prepared him sufficiently to be accepted by Tulane University, where in 2014 he graduated *magna cum laude* with a BA in History and Classical Studies, with minors in Spanish, Philosophy, and Medieval and Early Modern Studies. For reasons unbeknownst to him, Tulane's esteemed history department then decided to keep Bryan around a bit longer. In May of 2016 he will receive an MA in History with a concentration in Modern Europe, and at some time in the proceeding years he intends to earn a PhD in the same subject. Finally, he sincerely thanks anyone who digs through the Jones Hall archives or Howard Tilton website to read this in the future.