NATIONAL CONFIDENCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN: INSURGENCY VS. COUNTERINSURGENCY

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE PAYSON CENTER ON THE 24th DAY OF NOVEMBER 2014 FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF TULANE UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY

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For the builders of Afghanistan

Executive Summary

The initial hypothesis of this dissertation was that Afghan insurgents' attacks on Afghan civilians have lowered popular confidence in the Afghan government and its institutions. The goal of the insurgents has been to convince Afghans that their local, provincial, and national governments and security forces cannot protect them. Insurgents harm and kill civilians as part of their strategy of intimidation. Conversely, counterinsurgents try to convince the Afghan people that their government is responsive, that the economy is promising, that the rule of law is strong, and that Armed Forces of Afghanistan are viable. For the counterinsurgency to have been successful, the level of national confidence would need to have been high.

National confidence is intangible, often fleeting, and sometimes difficult to gauge. There are standard measurements of human development, such as economic growth; longevity; access to medicine and health clinics, levels of literacy, potable water, security, and others. However, measuring confidence presents unique challenges for the researcher.

The Taliban were, by far, the most powerful and largest of the insurgent groups, but there were others. The strategy of the insurgents to break confidence in the Afghan local, provincial and national governments was based on three basic principles: crippling the economy, terrorizing their domestic enemies; and destroying the will of foreign states to continue their support for Kabul. All these tactics were predicated on violence.

In this dissertation, quantitative methods associated the impact of violent incidents, which were the independent variables, to various indicators of national morale, which are the dependent variables.

The results confirmed some elements of the hypothesis and disproved others. Several components of national confidence declined from 2008 and 2010, but only marginally. For the scales that were measured, there was a decline of national confidence in four scales, but an increase in one scale. There were decreases in the confidence of economic prosperity in villages and neighborhoods where citizens live, and a decline in the confidence of citizens in national and provincial governments. In security, there was a very slight decline. However, there was an increase in the confidence of citizens in institutions, organizations, and officials.

The findings suggest that the overarching counterinsurgency strategy of building national confidence through sustained human development was successful in the years analyzed in this dissertation. Despite a spike in insurgent attacks during 2009, national confidence in 2010 was not significantly eroded.

The author of this dissertation is a military analyst for the Department of Defense. All material in this work – its observations, conclusions, recommendations, and opinions – are those of the author and his alone. No element of this dissertation, officially or unofficially, reflects the policy of the Department of Defense or any element or agency of the United States government.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If this dissertation has any value, much of it rests on the guidance and instruction I received from my dissertation committee, soldiers in the U.S Army, and colleagues in the intelligence community. I am indebted to those who supported my participation in the Director of National Intelligence's Exceptional Analyst Program, the funding of which allowed me to conduct field research in Afghanistan. Even more am I indebted to the Coalition Forces who kept me safe in that beleaguered country when I briefly studied at the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy.

Dr. Keith Shawe, chief researcher in the Asia Foundation's Kabul office, generously supplied me with the survey data from 13,500 respondents, which I needed to measure shifts in national confidence. I thank him for his help and salute his bravery and efforts to pursue knowledge in one of the most dangerous cities in the world.

Dr. Milton Goldsamt gave me support, guidance, and instruction. I will always be grateful for his competence and patience. Living so far from New Orleans, I cannot imagine how I could have structured, let alone completed, statistical elements of my dissertation without his instruction. His teaching was indispensable, and I thank him. Finally, I need to acknowledge the bravery of the builders of Afghanistan who have toiled so long and hard to sustain human development in that country.

INTRODUCTION

"It is clear that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means." Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard's 1976 translation[1]

As this dissertation comes to closure, the Afghan people, government, public administration and security apparatus are preparing for a new and untested era in their country's history. According to plan, most Western, namely American, military and paramilitary personnel will be withdrawn in 2015 after a 14-year presence, during which they have attempted to lay the bedrock for sustained human development; a strong, accountable, and democratically elected governance; transparent and professional public administration; and effective armed forces and other security, and police and paramilitary personnel. These characteristics, according to U.S. doctrine, are preconditions for forging and maintaining high levels of national confidence and an enduring security.

Developmental and counterinsurgency strategies intersect and reinforce each other in Afghanistan. Housing is created, soldiers are trained, and children are educated to improve the lives of Afghans and to build a nation-wide confidence in the government. This dissertation will attempt to measure the success of these and other confidence-building efforts through a pre-post test based on nationwide surveys, as the dependent variable, and numbers of civilian fatalities, as the independent variable. Many strategists have opined on the proper way to fight a counterinsurgency. Their advice and

[1] Military Quotes Homepage, "Clausewitz Quotes/Quotations," http://www.military-quotes.com/Clausewitz.htm, accessed April 8, 2014.

observations will be discussed here. But, few strategists have offered a comprehensive model to test and measure the effectiveness of a counterinsurgency. And this dissertation attempts to do just that. The dissertation will create a definition of national confidence, based on existing U.S. military doctrine, and then determine the extent to which that confidence declined after a year of unprecedented insurgent lethal attacks in Afghanistan.

In this sense, Afghanistan serves as a laboratory to test the effectiveness of Western counterinsurgency doctrine, as well as local, regional, and national platforms for sustained international development in Afghanistan. Will the national confidence of Afghanistan hold in Afghanistan in 2015? As of fall 2014, many observers of the Afghan scene, some of whom are quoted in this dissertation, are pessimistic.[2]

America's other notable counterinsurgency of the 21st century, the one in Iraq, did not build lasting national confidence. The Baghdad regime is crumbling, soldiers have discarded their uniforms, local political leaders have switched allegiances, and insurgents have enriched themselves with booty, much of which is American-made military hardware. The dynamic, well-organized and, to some extent, unprecedented Jihadist army, the Islamic State, is marching towards Baghdad and is poised to lay siege soon. And at the very center of this test lies the will of the Afghan people, which will remain, in

[2]For example, the author of Little America, Rajiv Chandrasekaran's wrote in 2012, "For all the lofty pronouncements about waging a new kind of war, our nation was unable to adapt .... Our government was incapable of meeting the challenge. Source: Scott Stephenson, "Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan." *Military Review*, 2014, HighBeam Research, (May 30, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-367545462.html

the words of the Prussian military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz, the war's "center of gravity."[3]

This dissertation will offer several hypotheses to examine the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan. Its literature review will scan the important insurgency and counterinsurgency texts, particularly as they developed during the 20th and 21st centuries; and it will explore theories of economic development, with a focus on post-World War II literature. Some of this literature converge in the study of contemporary Afghanistan. For example, publications associated with colleges and universities, particularly the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and Army War College, have analyzed, often in detail, counterinsurgency and developmental efforts there. If there is a central text for this dissertation, it is the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. The literature review section also will highlight several of the difficulties in writing a dissertation on this theme and verifying the data, particularly when it is collected in a war zone.

Because insurgency is a type of war, general theories of war, particularly those of the classical writers, will be traced. The successes and failures of some of the insurgencies and counterinsurgencies will be analyzed, as well as the lessons that were drawn from their failures or triumphs. The standard template of insurgencies, which is used by the U.S. military and intelligence community, will be the subject of a chapter.

[3] Dale Eikmeier, "Center of Gravity Analysis." *Military Review*, 2004, HighBeam Research, (September 4, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-121416825.html

An overview of the study design and the secondary analysis will examine the Asia Foundation surveys, from which the independent variable analysis is taken. The four indicators are national morale; economic prosperity; confidence in institutions, organizations, and officials; and security. The response and non-response survey items are measured through the overall analyses of variance in several, successive stages to see if the pre- and post-test cohorts were similar.

An entire chapter is reserved for the economic and political development of Afghanistan. It will cover the periods of the British-Russian rivalry, the era of autonomy and economic growth, the Soviet intervention, the anti-Soviet insurgency, the Taliban and the post-Taliban periods. The conduct of counterinsurgency will be discussed. Issues that have bedeviled the researcher hoping to measure counterinsurgency tactics and strategies will be debated. Finally, a pre-post test of indicators of national confidence will measure the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency in one year.

CHAPTER ONE: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND LITERATURE REVIEW

"Only the dead have seen the end of war." Plato

Statement of the Problem

The goal of the Afghan insurgents is and has been to crush civilian confidence in the government and institutions of Afghanistan and to reassert their monopoly of power over the entire country. As will be discussed in chapter five and propounded by Mao Tse-tung,[1] insurgents use violence to counter the superior firepower, organization, and general military capabilities of government forces. In insurgencies, violence is directed against an enemy's political will, rather than towards the exhaustion of the state's conventional military power.

In contrast, the basic strategy of the Karzai government and its NATO allies has been to build national confidence by promoting sustained development. This strategy is driven by the need to create stakeholders in Afghanistan's future. In sum, just as the Coalition partners try to build Afghan confidence in the government's institutions through sustained human development, the insurgents try to destroy national confidence by attacking people and destroying property.

[1] Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies – Insurgency According to Mao," E-History Achieve, Ohio State University, Accessed September 11, 2014, http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/essays/insurgency/0002.cfm

Null and Research Hypotheses

The three sets of hypotheses associated with measuring indicators' shifts in National Confidence are listed in table 1.

Hypotheses and Null Hypotheses	
Null Hypothesis 1	H0.1-There was no decline in levels of national confidence in the economy from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
Research Hypothesis 1	H1.1-There was a decline in levels of national confidence in the economy from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
Null Hypothesis 2	H0.2- There was no decline in levels of national confidence in public administration from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
Research Hypothesis 2	H1.2-There was a decline in levels of national confidence in public from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
Null Hypothesis 3	H0.3- There was no decline in in levels of national confidence in security from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
Research Hypothesis 3	H1.3- There was a decline in level of national confidence in security from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.

Table 1 - Hypotheses and Null Hypotheses

Literature Review

There is a vast repository of literature dealing with human development, general military issues, morale and national confidence, the Taliban, insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and other topics relating to Afghanistan and to this dissertation. Historians, political scientists, anthropologists, economists, and geographers have written extensively on different aspects of Afghanistan.

General Research on Developmental Issues That Have Implications for Afghanistan

There is much regional literature about Eurasia, to include academic treatments, such as peer-reviewed papers, dissertations, theses, conference findings, and

conversations relating to development issues in Afghanistan. There are broad and basic texts that give the reader the fundamentals of military and developmental issues facing Afghanistan today.[2] Dobbins also authored the RAND's "History of Nation Building," which provides historical, case analyses. RAND also produced studies of previous U.S. occupations.[3] Another RAND-produced book, in which Dobbins was heavily, engaged is "America's Role in Nation Building: From Iraq to Germany."[4] A dominant theme in these texts is efforts to strengthen security and by building national confidence.

There are many academic studies, which were written independent of military and U.S. government developmental doctrine or funding. The strategist Mark Moyer has written on counterinsurgency and development and opined that, while sustained economic growth is important to long-term stability, security is the more-important factor.[5] Anthony James Joes' "Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency University Press of Kentucky, 2004); Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Robert B. Asprey, "War in the

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[2] For example, James Dobbins' RAND Corporation's publication, "The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building" is a basic and valuable tool for this dissertation. It offers a framework to analyze and judge developmental efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere. James Dobbins, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), xxiii.

[3] James Dobbins, *Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Experience*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003).

[4] James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Iraq to Germany*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003).

[5] Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 213-258.

Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, 2 vols." (New York: Doubleday, 1975).[6] Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: War and Warlords in Afghanistan, published in 2009, was very timely for material in this dissertation. [7] Giustozzi's "Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field" and Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, "The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan," had developmental-related information, as it concerns defeating the Taliban.[8]

Articles in important academic journals include Manus Midlarsky's "Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence" and Charles Boix, "Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in the Contemporary World."[9]

Non-governmental treatments with a focus on Afghanistan include Paul Fishstein, "Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan? Examining the Relationship between Aid

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[6] Anthony James Joes' "Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency y,' (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 2004); Timothy J. Lomperis, "People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Robert B. Asprey, "War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1975).

[7] Antonio Giustozzi, "Empires of Mud: War and Warlords in Afghanistan," (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

[8] Antonio Giustozzi, ed., "Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field," (New York: Columbia University," (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

[9] Manus I. Midlarsky, "Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence," The American Political Science Review, vol. 82, no. 2 (June 1988), 491-509; Charles Boix, "Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in the Contemporary World," World Politics, vol. 60, no. 3 (April 2008), 390-437.

and Security in Balkh Province,"[10] and Andrew Wilder's "Money Can't Buy American Love," and "Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan," December 2009.[11]

The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have produced literature on general developmental issues, as well as on specific Afghan developmental programs.[12]

The World Bank's "Indicators" is an annually produced compilation of data and analysis by economists. Economic growth, health care, the environment, trade, education, and infrastructure are measured.[13] The World Bank has produced studies analyzing human development and capacity building in Afghanistan.[14] The U.N. Human Development Index (HDI) measures life expectancy, health, education, adult literacy,

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[10] Paul Fishstein, "Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Balkh Province," *Feinstein International Center*, November 2010.

[11] Andrew Wilder "Money Can't Buy America Love," Foreign Policy, December 1, 2009 and "Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan," *Middle East Institute*, December 2009.

[12] Developmental bodies, such as the Afghan government, the World Bank, the IMF, ADB, as well as private donors, have produced case studies on lending programs. In addition, they often offer recommendations on patterns of development. For example, the "Country Programme Action Plan of 2006," signed between the government of Afghanistan and the United Nations (UN), gave developmental guidance that continues. This and similar documents some of the successful and failed stratagems.

[13] "Afghanistan: Projects, Data, and Research, 2006," *The World Bank Group*, (2006). http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/countries/southasiaext/afghanistanextn

[14] The World Bank has given billions of dollars in credits to Afghanistan since 2002 to support development and reconstruction projects. These programs include power, water, public works, public resources, and construction projects. Source: "Afghanistan: Status of Projects, 2006," *The World Bank Group*, (2006). http://www.worldbank.org.af/wbsite/external/countries/southasiaext/afghanistanextn.

income distribution, and disposable income, among other variables.[15 and 16] Some of the economic theory and data that guided developmental projects in this dissertation come from the IMF.[17]

One of the most objective and comprehensive sources is the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which is charged with helping to "improve the performance and ensure the accountability of federal spending."[18] Other primary sources come from the U.S. Army's public affairs officers, who promote the U.S. agenda in the Afghan counterinsurgency. These sources are identified as being connected to or supportive of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts.

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[15] The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. Source: GINI index, *The World Bank*, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI

[16] Other economic texts offer more expansive indicators of human progress including "school enrollment, years of schooling, daily caloric supply, access to safe water, radios, and daily newspapers." Source: Mahbubul Haq, *Reflections on Human Development*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4.

[17] The IMF provides country-specific information on poverty-reduction programs in Afghanistan. Memoranda, letters of intent, reviews, policy statements, and surveys detail the economic development and strategy for Afghanistan from 2001-2010. The IMF partnered with other international aid organizations, as well as military and para-military organizations, which will be discussed in greater detail. Source: "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative - Decision Point Document and Debt Sustainability Analysis, Country Report No. 07/253," *International Monetary Fund*, (Washington, DC: July 26, 2006).

[18] This is particularly important in Afghanistan, which had weak indigenous controls on waste, mismanagement, and corruption. The GAO wrote over 100 reports on different topics involving the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and many of these studies, as well as those of the IMF and World Bank, served as the main metric to determine the success or failure of U.S. developmental policies. The GAO notes, "We provide Congress with timely information that is objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, non-ideological, fair, and balanced. Our work is done at the request of Congressional committees or subcommittees or is mandated by public laws or committee reports. We also undertake research under the authority of the Comptroller General" Source: Homepage, *Government Accountability Office*, (Washington DC: 2013). http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html

There is a repository of graduate-level scholarship on Afghanistan, of differing levels of quality. One source, "The Afghanistan Analyst: An Online Resource for Researching Afghanistan,"[19]has more than 325 wide-ranging Ph.D. and masters theses. Topics include many fields of scholarship: administration, anthropology, education, economics, politics, international relations, and sociology, and science.[20] Many are helpful to understand linkages between development, stability, counterinsurgency and national confidence.[21] There have been many studies from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks that focus directly on the linkages between development, confidence, and insurgency in Afghanistan.[22]

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[19] The Afghanistan Analyst: An Online Resource for Researching Afghanistan," http://afghanistan-analyst.org/dissertations.aspx

[20] Approximately 5-10% of the papers were in languages other than English, generally German or French.

[21] Examples of dissertations and masters theses used in this study are as follows: Mohammad Ashraf's 1995 master's thesis at Central Missouri State University, "The Effects of the Russian Invasion on the Agriculture of Afghanistan: A Retrospect and Prospects;" Michael Batson's 2003 master's thesis at Victoria University of Wellington, "Borderless States and Transnational Forces: The Emergence of the Taliban and the Regional Consequences of State Failure in Afghanistan, 1978-2002"; Joseph Collins' 1984 Columbia dissertation, "Afghanistan: A Case Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy"; Sarah Dimick's 2005 master's thesis at Carleton University, "Democracy and Reconstruction in Afghanistan"; Zabioullah Eltezam's 1967 Wayne State University's Ph.D. thesis, "Problems of Economic Development and Resource Allocation in Afghanistan"; Larry Goodson's 1990 Ph. D. thesis at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "Refugee-based Insurgency: The Afghan Case"; Marcy Marceau's 1988 Georgetown University's thesis, "Soviet Experience with Muslim Guerrilla Groups and Applications for Afghanistan"; Mohammed Dau Miraki Ph.D's dissertation at the University of Illinois at Chicago, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan, 1919-2000."

[22] Some of the studies are very broad and touch only briefly on Afghanistan. Some of these are produced by contractors to federal agencies with equities in Afghanistan. Sources of these studies include those produced by the RAND Corporation and Senlis. Other sources come from journalists of varying levels of professionalism.

One of the most highly regarded sources for economic data and for projecting economic trends and state stability for 6-18 months is the Economist Magazine's Intelligence Units' (IU) Annual Reports and Country Studies.[23]

Think tanks

Transparency International (TI) - Corruption Index. The TI index measures data that relate to the misuse of public funds for personal enrichment, bribery, kickbacks, and embezzlement in public office.[24] In the 2007 index, which is the year before the first of this dissertation's two surveys were taken, Afghanistan placed at 172 of 179 countries; the United States stood at 20.

Heritage Foundation – The Heritage Foundation analyzes, among other issues, the economic freedom in countries. Heritage analysts argue that economic freedom is often correlated with stability and national confidence.[25] On a scale of 1 to 100, the editors rate countries according to the extent they pursue economic freedom.[26]

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[23] The IUs give clear and precise economic data such as gross national product (GDP) growth, trade balances, reserve, inflation levels, principle exports, main destination of exports, and much other economic data.

[24] "The Methodology of the TI Corruption Index, 2007," *Transparency International*, (2007). http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi

[25] The Foundation writes, "The highest form of economic freedom provides an absolute right of property ownership, fully realized freedoms of movement for labor, capital, and goods, and an absolute absence of coercion or constraint of economic liberty beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself." Source: Index of Economic Freedom, *Heritage Foundation*, (Washington DC). http://www.heritage.org/research.

[26] The 10 categories in which countries are judged are: "business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, freedom from government, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom." Source: Index of Economic Freedom, *Heritage Foundation*, www.heritage.org/research/features/index

Freedom House -To measure the level of political freedom in Afghanistan and to compare that level to those in other developing countries, the methodology and data from Freedom House will be used in this dissertation. Freedom House assigns ratings, on a scale of one-to-seven, in two categories: political rights and civil liberties.[27] The political rights category is subdivided into three categories: electoral process; political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government.[28]

There are other think tanks, such as the International Institute of Strategic Studies, which focuses on military affairs,[29] and Human Rights Watch, which produces work with a humanitarian orientation.[30] The Council on Foreign Relations produced a work about the post-war difficulties,[31] and the United Nations has produced many studies.[32] The

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[27] Civil liberties are divided into "freedom of expression and belief; associational and organizational rights; rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights." Source: Freedom House, 2007 Edition, Methodology. http://www.freedomhouse.org

[28] The final rating in each category determines whether a country is, according to Freedom House's matrix, free, partly free, or not free. Freedom House determined that Afghanistan was "not free" in 2013. The Swiss Institute of Technology in Zurich built matrixes to measure social integration and globalization, which will be used in this dissertation. Source: Freedom House, Methodology, 2014. http://www.freedomhouse.org

[29] John Montgomery and Dennis Rondenelli, *Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Experience*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[30] "We Want to Live as Humans: Repression of Women and Girls in Western Afghanistan," *Human Rights Watch Report*, (London: December 2002). http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/afghnwmn1202/

[31] "Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?" *Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society*, (New York: June 2003). http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistan-we-losing-peace/p6055

[32] Kofi Annan, "The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security by Kofi Annan to the General Assembly of the United Nations," *United Nations*, (Washington, DC: December 3, 2003).

Fund for Peace has produced several studies referenced in this dissertation. Among the more useful background studies is the Center for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS) "In the Balance: Measuring Afghanistan's Reconstruction,"[33] which offers a list of media sources, polling sources, and analysis that relate directly to the subject of this dissertation.

Other Sources

There are also other indexes relating to economic and political stability. However, some do not analyze Afghanistan. For example, the Eurasia Group and Citigroup have developed a Global Political Risk Index (GPRI) designed to gauge stability in 24 emerging market countries, but Afghanistan was not among them.[34] Afghanistan was also not listed in the Economist Magazine's IU Quality of Life Index, which measures the material well-being; calculated by GDP per person.[35] However, the IU's country reports, on Afghanistan, were very useful and were used extensively in this dissertation.

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[33] Fredrick Barton, "In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, (CSIS Press, 2014). http://csis.org/event/balance-measuring-progress-afghanistan

[34] Eurasia Group, Homepage. http://www.eurasiagroup.net

[35] The index measured the health, calculated by life expectancy; political stability, using a metric created by the Economist Magazine; family life, calculated by the divorce rate; community life, which they calculate by using church attendance; climate and geography, using latitude; job security, using the unemployment rate; political freedom, using the metrics of Freedom House; and gender equality, ratio of male-to-female earnings The Economist Magazine, "The Economist Intelligence Unit's Quality of Life Index, 2005."

Doctrinal Studies

Military-related think tanks provide many studies on all aspects of warfare. Each military service has its center or centers of scholarship, which is often affiliated and collocated with the service college. [36]

There are also many studies that involve counterinsurgency implications of military occupation.[37] There is a large pool of literature, particularly monographs, from the Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, and the National War College that provide expert, soldier-scholar analysis of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare. Some of this literature relates directly to Afghanistan, other elements do so only peripherally.

National security and international relations scholars have written on the counterinsurgency. Scholars and journalists from around the world have written academic and editorial studies of the situation in Afghanistan. [38] Peter Hopkirk has written many books on Central Asia, particularly about the colonial struggle for empire there.[39]

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[36] Because the Afghan insurgency is land warfare, much of the literature, such as masters' theses and academic treatments, come from the Army Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, or the National War College. However, the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School have produced many authoritative works.

[37] An example cited comes from an officer at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, who wrote a monograph in 1975 entitled "US Doctrine and Belligerent Occupation." It analyzed the legal, military, and social requirements of occupying a hostile country.

[38] Some authors have been imbedded and have witnessed the insurgency first hand. Some scholars have both topical and specific expertise on Afghanistan. For example, Oliver Roy is an expert on political Islam and is also the author of a book about Afghanistan. Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan London*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[39] Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*, (New York: Kodansha, 1990).

There are many sources that are considered classic. A recent milestone in counterinsurgency literature is the U.S. Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, which offers official guidance on how to combat insurgencies. It is the most-important doctrinal manuscript in this dissertation because it has driven counterinsurgency strategy and efforts since 2007.[40] This field manual is a central text for the Afghan counterinsurgency, or any other.

The theorists Sir Robert Thompson and Edward Lansdale are particularly important to this dissertation because they emphasized developmental, confidence building, and other non-combat techniques to defeat insurgents.[41] These are the "Golden Age" theorists, and they will be discussed in chapter five.

Stabilization Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: The Fusion in Afghanistan

Many of the doctrinal elements that guided soldiers and Marines in Afghanistan from 2008-2010 were drawn from combat experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, following

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[40] *The U.S. Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5,* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).

[41] In Malaysia, Thompson stressed political reform and economic development to create a large pool of stakeholders. Lansdale, an American business executive, looked to non-military solutions to defeat insurgents in South East Asia. Source: Jeet Heer, "Counterpunch Revisionists Argue That Counterinsurgency Won the Battle against Guerrillas in Vietnam, but Lost The Larger War. Can It Do Better In Iraq?" *The Boston Globe*, (January 4, 2004).

the September 11, 2001 attack.[42] The Field Manual and its recent successor, Field Manual 3.24.2, are central texts that guide operations and confidence-building measures in counterinsurgency. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide is the Field Manual's civilian counterpart, with an emphasis on U.S. government equities in counterinsurgencies.[43]

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 defined responsibilities and areas of interest for U.S. national-level agencies involved in reconstruction and development projects.[44] DoD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations," issued in November 2005, raised stability operations to a level comparable to combat operations in the DoD.[45] This was a

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[42] Dan W. Davenport, "Congressional Testimony, "Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations," (Washington, DC: February 26, 2008). "The development process is collaborative and follows the natural maturation of new ideas or concepts. It starts with the development of white papers and pamphlets to generate robust discussion and leads to the ultimate issuance of new doctrinal documents… These efforts in doctrine development are continually informed by lessons learned and best practices from the current theaters of war and ongoing operations and exercises. Current publications dealing with civilian-military cooperation and the interagency community across the spectrum of conflict, including Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations, include: Joint Publication 3--08 Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations."

[43] William Rosenau, "Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan," *Harvard International Review,* (2009). http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Harvard-International-Review/200271859.html

[44] It recognized the importance of stabilizing and reconstructing failed or failing countries and guiding them toward democratic, market-oriented reforms. Richard H. Smyth, "Some Thoughts about Stability Operations," *PKSOI Bulletin, Volume 1, Issue 2,* (Carlisle: February 2009). http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/journal/pubsreview.cfm?ID=2

[45] This was a directive not a change in doctrine. It mandated a change in DoD policy not a shift in the way a war should be fought.

significant shift in the Pentagon's thinking. It moved away from funding large wars at the expense of small wars and post-conflict stability operations.[46]

The U.S. Army promulgated the Stability Operations Field Manual 3-07 in October 2008, which was derived from lessons in Afghanistan and Iraq.[47] Like the 3-24 counterinsurgency Field Manual, the Stability Operations Field Manual emphasized the use of "soft power," to include developing economic, communications, medical, educational, and legal sectors.[48] This doctrine charged the military with five tasks: establish civil security; establish civil control; restore essential services; support governance; and support economic and infrastructure development.[49]

Another doctrinal text used in U.S. developmental efforts in Afghanistan is "The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Playbook- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,"[50] which was written under the auspices of the Center for Army Lessons

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[46] The DoD ensured that funding for stability operations would increase and that greater long-term resources for training, confidence-building measures, interagency coordination, and budgeting for international developmental operations would increase, too. It also mandated that the DoD and the military services coordinate with the State Department and Agency for International Development (AID). Carl Baker and Brad Glosserman, "US Military: From Kinetic to Comprehensive," *Asia Times Online in English*, (November 13, 2008). http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JK13Df03.html·

[47] David Morgan, "Army Issues New Manual for Nation Building," *Reuters*, (October 6, 2008).

[48] Stabilization efforts support flagging, post-conflict governments and give them the resources and time to begin sustained human development. In the case of Afghanistan, this required unprecedented coordination of all instruments of national power. Janine Davidson, "The New Army Stability Operations Manual: Fact, Fiction, and Perspective on FM 3-07" *Small War Journal*, (October 20, 2008). http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/10/the-new-army-stability-operations

[49] U.S. Army, "Stability Operations, 3-07," (HQ Department of Army, October 2008). http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf

[50] The Playbook was intended to be a living document.

Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS. [51] As the title suggests, this text focused on Army developmental operations involved in PRTs. The PRT Playbook offers a step-by-step planning guide for PRTs deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.[52]

The U.S. Army published the "Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System," to guide commanders on the most effective way to spend developmental funding.[53] Specific instruction on how to operate in the field came from the "Counterinsurgency Leaders Course- Afghanistan Student Handbook, CLC-A XIII," which was finalized and distributed in July 2007.

Table 2 shows the more important documents that are relevant to the military elements of this dissertation.

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[51] Much PRT-related guidance is found on the website of the U.S. Army Combined Army Center, "Center for Army Lessons Learned," located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp

[52] It offers 29 principles and sub-principles on how PRTs should operate in a counterinsurgency and applies to U.S. Army small-scale developmental policies, as well. Source: "PRT Playbook- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures No.07-34, Handbook," (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army lessons Learned (CALL). http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/07-34/07-34.pdf

[53] Andrew Wilder, "Losing Hearts and Minds," *International Herald Tribune*, (September 17, 2009).

US Military- Related Document	Application to Afghan Counterinsurgency
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual- 3.24. This was updated in 2009 to 3-24.2.	Revised and updated counterinsurgency doctrine. Stressed preponderance of non-kinetic, developmental activities. Killing was de-emphasized. Required an understanding of and respect for local culture
The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide	Published in January 2009, reflected Washington's commitment to a "whole of government" approach to counterinsurgency that includes major roles for departments and agencies beyond the Pentagon
Stability Operations Field Manual 3-07	"Recognized that the nature of conflict is more complex than the pure science of defeating enemy militaries"[54]
The U.S. Army PRT Playbook- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures	Examined successes and failures of PRTs. Provided case studies. Gave details of how U.S. Army personnel should approach problems when engaging in village-level developmental programs
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44	Defined responsibilities and areas of interest of U.S. national-level agencies involved in reconstruction and development programs
DoD Directive 3000.05 "Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations,"	Elevated the importance of stability operations to level comparable with combat operations. Stressed "whole of government" approach
"Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System"	Gave guidelines for spending aid in the Afghan counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency Leaders Course- Afghanistan Student Handbook CLC-A XIII	Taught lessons/doctrine to Coalition forces in Afghanistan

Table 2 U.S. Army Doctrinal Literature

There are other authoritative and influential counterinsurgency sources. The United States Joint Forces Command, (USJFCOM); Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) produced a series of research papers that examined the successes and failures of the local development projects to guide decision makers.[55] High-ranking individuals and scholars who are involved or who have been involved in Afghanistan's counterinsurgency

[54] Janine Davidson, "The New Army Stability Operations Manual: Fact, Fiction, and Perspective on FM 3-0."

[55] "Provincial Reconstruction Teams," *JWFC Pre-doctrinal Research White Paper, No. 07-01*, (November 11, 2007). http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/provrecon_whitepaper.pdf

regularly comment on both the kinetic and non-kinetic elements of war.[56]General military officers publish their views on counterinsurgencies.[57] Some of these views became formalized in documents such as 3-24 and 3-07, and many were included in this dissertation.

Primary Sources for Metrics

The primary sources in this dissertation for measuring national confidence were the Asia Foundation's Afghanistan surveys and UNAMA's data on violent attacks during 2009. Information on attacks was gathered by UNAMA's human rights officers, who used a broad range of techniques to gather information. This information was cross-checked and analyzed.[58]

General Literature on Political Violence

Information on political violence used in this dissertation comes from academia, international organizations, lending regimes, non-governmental and governmental sources, military sources, independent scholars, intelligence agencies, as well as

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[56] Observers of Afghanistan's reconstruction and development drew individual lessons, much of which stem from the culture and missions of their home agencies. They are also based on their set of personal experiences and organizational culture. For example, Andrew Natsios, former director of USAID, offered principles focused on non-kinetic efforts. Source: Andrew Natsios, "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development," *Parameters*, (Autumn, 2005).

[57] Walter Pincus, "General's Paper Sheds Light on Counterinsurgency," *Washington Post*, (April 7, 2009), 21.

[58] If it was judged credible, it was entered into the U.N. database. However, the United Nations did not break down responsibility for particular incidents, other than attributing them to "pro-government forces" or "anti-government elements." UNAMA did not claim that the statistics presented were complete; but that they were as accurate as possible, given the conditions in which data are collected. This was the methodology and data collection process that were used in 2008 and 2010.

insurgents themselves. The vast corpus of literature has different foci, to include economic, military, political scientific, anthropological, legal, religious, and ethical lenses.

Confidence and National Morale

In addition to the Asia Foundation's Afghanistan surveys, there are works on general Afghan morale and the confidence Afghans place in their government and institutions. There include, "Afghanistan: Where Things Stand (ABC News/BBC/ARD) Public Opinion Survey" of the International Republican Institute. One of many data sources is the Brookings Institute, and many polls are listed in PollingReport.com.[59] There are other surveys on the status of women, [60]the impact of violence on civilians, by the ICRC); the perceptions of the Afghan people, by CARE, morale in Coalition Forces,[61]battlefield surveys,[62]troop morale,[63] U.S. public opinion,[64] and human rights, by the Center or Economic and Social Rights.

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[59] PollingReport.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm

[60] Trust Law, http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/womens-rights/dangerpoll/

[61] "US Army Morale Down in Afghanistan: Study," *The Nation*, (Pakistan: November 14, 2009). http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/14-Nov-2009/Afghan-violence-takes-toll-on-US-troop-morale-survey

[62] "New Battlefield Surveys Troop Morale Down Amid Afghan Violence," *The Washington Times*, (2009). http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/14/troop-morale-down-amid-afghan-violence/

[63] "US Army: Troop Morale Falls in Afghanistan Military also Points to Shortage of Mental Health Workers to Aid Soldier, *MSNBC*, November 11, 2009. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33908828/ns/us_news-military/t/us-army-troop-morale-falls-afghanistan/

[64] "Terrorism Survey III." *Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy Magazine*, (2007), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/pdf/terrorism_index_survey.pdf

General studies on national-level conflict, economic development, and national confidence include: Jeremy M. Weinstein's "Inside Rebellion,"[65] Michell Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," in Handbook of Defense Economics,[66] H. R. McMaster's article "On War: Lessons to be Learned"[67]and Axel Hadenius and Fredrick Uggla's "Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: What Can States and Donors Do."[68]

Challenges in the Literature

This dissertation benefitted from the strengths of resting on a multi-year, large-scale survey program of the same target population in each year (the citizens of Afghanistan). This allowed each annual survey's instrument, sampling design, and data collection procedures to be fine-tuned from year to year, improve precision and statistical power of measuring topics that mattered to the funding source and principal investigators.

The current dissertation also had access to written materials, in particular, the annual report volume, which that contained in-depth discussions of findings and graphic displays of multi-year data patterns and therefore could inform the current writer about trends in data and contextual issues possibly affecting survey respondent views, in addition to containing technical appendices containing methodology descriptions and

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[65] Jeremy M.Weinstein, "Inside Rebellion," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[66] T. Sandler and K. Hartley eds: "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, (2007) pp. 649-709.

[67] H.R. McMaster, "On War: Lessons to be Learned," *Survival*, Volume 50, Issue 1, (February 2008.)

[68] Axel Hadenius and Fredrick Uggla, "Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: What Can States and Donors Do?" *World Development*, Vol. 24, No. 10, 1621-1639, (1996).

complete survey instruments, and individual-respondent level annual survey data sets that already were weighted to produce nationally representative data.

These annual surveys also were designed in accordance with professional standards; using well-accepted methods, such as the Kish grid method for making within-household respondent selections; interviewer training approaches; and large-scale stratified random sampling to reduce sampling error.

There are at least 12 significant challenges associated with understanding Afghanistan's development and counterinsurgency. First, there is a battle over normative terminology. There is some confusion in terminology surrounding human development, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and other issues involved in this dissertation. The adage "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" expresses some of the confusion and passions attendant to discussions of political violence. For this reason, terms that invite conjecture and debate are defined in this dissertation, when possible. Authoritative definitions of military terms come from the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. This dissertation uses the term "insurgent" to specify individuals and groups perpetrating violence against those associated with the Afghan government and its institutions.

A second challenge is the erratic historical focus on Afghanistan's wars, particularly in academic literature. During the last 50 years, there were periods of social calm without any pronounced insurgency or terrorism. Most of the literature that was written about Afghanistan reflected a period of gradually rising living standards and

optimism across a broad spectrum of development indicators. There was not sizable insurgency or a terror campaign of any significance before 1979. Nonetheless, this has little impact on this dissertation because most the research centers on the post-1996 period.

A third challenge to those conducting research on Afghanistan is the relatively low level of importance in which Afghanistan was held in held international relations scholarship. Many scholars did not focus their intellectual energies on Afghanistan. The Cold War rivalry had some implications for the Soviet Union's southern border. But, until 1979, Europe, East Asia, and Southeast Asia were considerably higher in importance than was Afghanistan.

For example, much more was written on developmental patterns and on insurgency and counterinsurgency in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s and on Latin American then was written on Central Asia. Insurgents, such as Fidel Castro and Che Guevarra, developed a folklore surrounding their lives and stratagems.[69] But there were no famous or chic "peoples wars" in Afghanistan, until the Soviets invaded. In addition, there were relatively few known strategic resources in Afghanistan, and the amount of U.S. investment there was very low. This has no impact on the data in this dissertation.

[69] Clive Foss, "Cuba's African Adventures: In 1959 Fidel Castro Came to Power in Cuba after a Masterly Campaign of Guerrilla Warfare. Drawing on This Success, Castro and His Followers, Including Che Guevara, Sought to Spread Their Revolution, as Clive Foss Explains," *History Today*, 2010. HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-221196357.html

A fourth challenge for the developmental researcher is the bland economic performance of Afghanistan. It was not likely that Afghanistan would be held as a developmental model by any economist. In the 1950s and 1960s, the world marveled at the economic miracles of Germany and Japan. Later, there would be Asian tigers and dragons; economic failures and defaults in South America; but Afghanistan's performance would be unspectacular. Nonetheless, the post-Taliban insurgency and economic development has been studied in detail and included in this dissertation.

A fifth challenge is the inconsistency of the accuracy of Afghan financial data.[70]The level of transparency was often low and corruption was high by western standards. Data involving funding, restructuring, or privatizing projects is sometimes difficult to obtain.[71]

Six, there is an intellectual divide between the academic disciplines of economics and military science. Developmental economists are generally not trained in counterinsurgency, and few military officers have a professional-level understanding of international or developmental economics.[72] There is the perennial uncertainty of

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[70] Donald R. Snodgrass, "Afghanistan's Economic Prospects and Challenges Draft, *Management Systems International, USAID/EGAT's Business Growth Initiative Project,"* (October 10, 2009). http://egateg.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Afghanistan%20Final.pdf

[71] Donald R. Snodgrass, "Afghanistan's Economic Prospects and Challenges Draft," *Management Systems +International.*

[72] Developmental economics emerged as a distinct field in economic research after World War II. The economist, Paul Krugman, notes that development economics drew from other academic disciplines, particularly anthropology, sociology, and political science. Source: Vernon Ruttan, "The New Growth Theory and Development Economics: A Survey," *Journal of Development Economics*, (December 1, 1998).

measuring war. Many metrics in counterinsurgency have proven faulty and, sometimes, fraudulent.[73]

The seventh and eighth challenges involve data collection. The challenges and limitations in data collection include the strong sensitivities about women involved in polling. There were cultural traditions that required polling males and females separately. This was acknowledged by researchers at the Asia Foundation, which employed women pollsters when possible. Further, some districts were inaccessible to survey researchers, particularly in 2009.[74] However, researchers of the Asia Foundation, adjusted for this in their survey results.

When collecting the data, it was necessary to ensure that the respondents understood all questions. Surveyors at the Asia Foundation estimated that 62.3% understood all and 27.8% understood most of the questions. Less than 2% had difficulty understanding the questions, as shown in table 3.

[73] For example, Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is also skeptical of many standard metrics of security forces, particularly those that focus on the number of those trained and equipped. Cordesman, Anthony. He stresses the importance of counting the number of people who are actually fielded. This number should be contrasted to the requirements stated by the Coalition authorities. "The Uncertain "Metrics" of Afghanistan (and Iraq)," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, (May 18, 2007). www.csis.org/burke

[74] Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People.*

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Understood all of the questions	8131	62.3	62.3	62.3
	Understood most	3631	27.8	27.8	90.1
	Understood with some help	1105	8.5	8.5	98.5
	Had difficulty understanding	194	1.5	1.5	100.0
	Total	13060	100.0	100.0	

Table 3: Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

As far as the independent variable, attacks on civilians, there were difficulties in verifying some violent incidents during 2009, the topic year. There are many incidents in which investigators could not determine the combatant status of victims of violence. These victims may have been affiliated with the insurgents, affiliated with the government forces or unaffiliated.[75] Nonetheless, UNAMA had high and often-tested standards and procedures in investigating and vetting. Although, the techniques for investigating attacks on civilians have evolved over many year in conflicts in which the United Nations was involved.

A ninth challenge comes from measurement issues involving conducting secondary data analyses. While all the questions in the dissertation had direct relevance

[75] UNAMA, *Afghanistan Annual Report 2011*.

to measuring national confidence, few of the questions directly asked respondents if their level of confidence in the economy, public administration, or security apparatus was affected exclusively by insurgent attacks on civilians.

The tenth challenge is a perennial difficulty, often impossibility, of isolating a single cause to explain national-level attitudes. In the case of this dissertation, the goal was to determine if and to what extent insurgent attacks against civilians lowered national confidence. It is not possible in this, or any, dissertation to isolate any *single* variable that increases or lowers national confidence. Rather, national confidence in the government usually increases or decreases as a result of a cluster of variables. These include increased or decreased levels of violence, improved or collapsing harvests, improved or degraded transportation systems, levels of corruption in different levels of government, and myriad other factors. Further, there is often a time lag between the incident of violence and the gathering of interview data.[76]

While it is not possible to isolate a single variable, it is possible to associate attacks on civilians with national confidence. The dissertation does not attempt to determine the exact level of causation between the violence and the level of national confidence.[77] It measures, instead, association.

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[76] Jason Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon, "How to Measure the War," *Policy Review, No. 157,* (October-November 2009). http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-210848003/how-to-measure-the-war

[77] War operators, planners, and historian have conducted post-conflict surveys in major wars, as well as battles, to determine the causes of failures and successes.

An eleventh challenge is inherent in a secondary-data analysis. The writer had to work around the choice of individual survey item content, which directly affected the sensitivity of measurement, particularly of certain topics. Thus, none of the survey items directly refer to the Taliban.

Further, some survey questions had categories that, perhaps, would have been more focused or different had they been posed by this writer. For example, the number of people living in a household starts with the number "2"; those living alone might have had different views that could not have been captured by the study. In addition, the subsets of questions dealing with a common topic (in the 2008 and 2010 surveys) varied from 8 to 9 to 16, the latter a fairly large number, and representing relatively more precision or reliability of measurement than other subsets.

Most frustrating for this writer, the 2008 survey contained a number of survey items dealing with national morale but none of those items, which formed a fairly reliable scale in the 2008 survey, were included in the 2010 survey. Unfortunately, a relevant scale could not be built from individual survey items in these two years because they were either too few and/or in a categorical rating scale rather than in a Likert rating scale format.

A twelfth challenge was that the each year's pool of sampled households was independently sampled from any other year's pool. The two surveys' data sets used for dissertation analyses did not contain a household- or person-level identifier to allow longitudinal analyses of views from the same households or family members, which would have reduced the presence of cohort differences between the two survey years.

Cohort differences" did exist in the pool of data used for analysis purposes. Differences in background characteristics, such as region, geographic subdivision or educational level, were found in two sets of analyses.[78]

Given that these likely respondent biases were associated with certain background characteristics, such as educational level or geographic subdivision, it is possible that results indicating the magnitude of shifts in certain scales, which were reflected in the fairly low effect size levels, were not as accurate in testing the research hypotheses and their results not as generalizable as those for other scales. Perhaps for Scale 2B, valid differences in shifts were obscured by these biases, since that result was not found to be statistically significant.[79]

Summary

Literature connected to this dissertation is drawn from disparate sources. Most of the literature on the independent variables, which are statistics on violent attacks, comes from UNAMA sources. Literature on the dependent variables, which are the components of national confidence, comes largely from the Asia Foundation's study of Afghan

[78] That is, between-years differences in characteristics in: (1) the two nationally representative samples of 2008 and 2010 Afghan citizens taking part in the surveys (see Chapter one and tables 27 and 28), and (2) respondent-non-respondent differences in those providing complete data for each of the five scale scores compared with those that did not do so.

[79] On a technical plane, other studies and surveys have used sampling weights that were adjusted for non-response. In this study, with two independent populations, and differential response rates for each of five scales per survey, it seemed best to not have multiple adjusted sampling weights since such weights might alter the results on that basis alone, and be hard to easily use.

society and many other sources. There is other literature that explains the nature of the Talibans' philosophy, military goals, and political aims. Analysis of this qualitative information helps to put the Taliban's violence in context and explain the purpose and target selection of the Taliban's attacks.

There are challenges and limitations surrounding the data and methodology used in this dissertation. Participants in some districts in which interviews were conducted in 2008 were not available in 2010. In addition, the level of violence is only one factor in determining the level of national confidence. This dissertation seeks to measure the extent to which changes in the level of national confidence is associated with, not caused by, insurgent attacks. Finally, economists and political scientists have competing methodologies to measure human development.

CHAPTER TWO: INSURGENCIES AND NATIONAL CONFIDENCE

Introduction

Chapter two will discuss general and insurgent warfare and will analyze the importance of national confidence in military conflicts. It will explain why both insurgents and counterinsurgents target national confidence; why insurgents try to destroy the national confidence in the government; and why counterinsurgents try to build confidence in all levels of government and their institutions. This chapter will discuss concepts of leading political scientists, present a national confidence index, and explain how it relates to insurgency and sustained human development in Afghanistan and elsewhere. It will trace some of the measures undertaken to promote confidence in Afghan institutions.[1] The last part of the chapter will explain the survey design.

The term "human development" is not part of a standard military lexicon, but is it fundamental to any contemporary counterinsurgency mission. It was popularized in the early 1980s by U.N. economists to refer to broad-based developmental efforts that include, but go well beyond, economic growth.[2] Human development expands the range of choices Afghans make in their lives. It involves public administration, medicine, education, communications, governance, living conditions, security and environmental

[1] John M. Spiszer, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Lessons Learned by a Brigade Combat Team," *Military Review, Vol. 91, No. 1,* (January/February 2011).

[2] Richard Brinkman, "Implementing a Human Development Strategy," *Journal of Economic Issues*, 1996, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-18263803.html

concerns.[3] According to the United Nations, when economic growth is broadly based, other sectors of human development often grow, as well. If the economic growth is too concentrated, broad-based human development is not likely to improve, despite rapid GDP growth. The core of sustained human development is expanding the range of life's choices. Noble laureate economist Amartya Sen defined poverty in terms of "capability deprivation and lack of access to fundamental freedoms."[4]

Human development and state stability, both of which will be defined and examined in detail in subsequent chapters, are interlocking and mutually reinforcing. They are tightly linked because state stability is usually a pre-condition for broad-based economic growth.[5] Individuals and firms are reluctant to invest their labor or capital in unstable states. Capital investments are made on the basis of anticipated costs and benefits and generally flow in the direction of safety and away from the dangers caused by war.[6]

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[3] Polly Vizard, *Poverty and Human Rights, Sen's Capability Perspective' Explored*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 260.

[4] Patrick Kilby, "Is Empowerment Possible under a New Public Management Environment? Some Lesson from India," *International Public Management Journal*, (January 2004).

[5] According to U.S. Army doctrine, governments are charged with protecting their nation's people, property, and institutions and with ensuring the stability necessary to promote sustained development. Governments with the ability to protect citizens and promote sustained human development often garner public confidence. High levels of public confidence in the government make it more difficult it is for an insurgency to succeed. Conversely, a general lack of confidence in government gives opportunities to insurgents.

[6] Some scholars, such as Robert Ted Gurr, note that higher levels of educated are correlated positively with the magnitude of violence. However, Jonathan Lemco responds that this is contracted by other studies that positively correlate national educational levels with both state stability and the sustained economic growth. Source: Jonathan Lemco, *Political Stability in Federal Governments*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 128.

Part One: War, Insurgency, and History

War has been a constant and dominant theme of recorded history. Heraclitus said, "War is the father of us all," and Plato opined that "peace is a punctuation to war."[7] Hobbes, a student of Thucydides, held a tragic view of war's inevitability.[8] This was a prism shared by leading medieval philosopher statesman, Niccolo Machiavelli.[9] The Prussian military philosopher, Carl Von Clausewitz, explicated that "war is the continuation of politics by other (he meant non-diplomatic) means."[10]

These philosophers and their contemporaries in the realist school share, what the historian Victor Davis Hanson calls, a tragic view of international relations.[11] Dr. Hanson opines that wars are caused by one of, or a multiple of, three factors: perceived self-interest, pride, and fear. Through this prism, the outbreak, conduct, and resolution of war reflect the universal failings, aspirations, passions, and aggression in mankind.

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[7] "War," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, (First published February 12, 2002; substantive revision August 23, 2008). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/

[8] "Hobbes's Moral and Political Philosophy,*" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, First published on February 12, 2002; substantive revision August 23, 2008). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral

[9] Niccolo Machiavelli, trans. Leslie J. Walker, *The Discourses*, (London: Routledge, 1975).

[10] "War," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

[11] This tragic view of life is a philosophical outlook shared many modern and contemporary intellectuals, such as the economist Friedrich Hayek, as he discussed economic disparity in The Road to Serfdom, as well as contemporary thinkers and artists such as David Mamet.

In opposition to the realist school, there is, what Dr. Hanson calls, the therapeutic view of international relations, which is often called idealism.[12] Its exponents attribute the outbreak of war to malignancies in political systems. For example, communism places the onus of war on capitalism, imperialism, and other material conditions. By bettering material conditions, eliminating predatory governments, and collectively enforcing international law, war, in this view, can be effectively eliminated. In the 20th century, there was a surge of pacifism, particularly between the world wars.

Johann Galtung, who was a founder of the Peace Studies branch of international relations, coined the term 'structural violence,' to refer to a twilight state between peace and war.[13] He described structural violence as "quiet process, working slowly in the way misery in general, and hunger in particular, erode and finally kill human beings."[14] Galtung uses the term 'structural violence' to describe the conditions and institutions by which one group suppresses another in a single state. [15] In his view, there is neither full war nor real peace in societies that are fundamentally unjust.[16]

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[12] Victor Davis Hanson, "Frank Gaffney, Victor Davis Hanson and the Rise of the Rise of the Therapeutic Mindset," *Secure Freedom Radio*, (September 10, 2011). http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-0qTEc4V4YY

[13] Marc Pilisuk and Jennifer Tennant, "The hidden structure of violence, (Responding to Violence)," ReVision, 1997, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-20171089.html

[14] Geoff Harris, *Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countries*, (Routledge: London, 1999), 29.

[76] Geoff Harris, *Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countries*, 29.

[16] Nathan Gunk, "Building on what's Already There," *International Journal, Vol. 67, No. 2*, (Spring, 2012).

Peace building is a relatively new concept, which rose to prominence with the publication of the former U.N. Secretary-General's report "An Agenda for Peace."[17] In this report, Boutros Ghali describes peace building as, "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."[18]

Whatever its causes, war has always existed on the human landscape. A standard definition of war is a "state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations or a period of such armed conflict."[19] The wars of antiquity were often long and bestial, slaughtering civilians and laying waste to entire civilizations.[20] Centuries later, Huns, Mongols, and Turkish armies ravished vast tracts of Europe and Asia. By the mid-17th century, central Europe collapsed under the strain of the Wars of Religion. In the 19th century, American apostles of total war, generals Sheridan and Sherman, destroyed anything of use to enemy populations.[21]

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[17] Boutros Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, (New York: United Nations, 1992).

[18] Geoff Harris, *Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countries*, 32.

[19] Merriam-Webster Dictionary, from the internet. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/war

[20] This was made in reference to the wars between Athens and Sparta but could apply to many of the nation-wide wars of antiquity. Source: Lewis Bernstein, "The Peloponnesian War," *Military Review*, (November/December, 2005).

[21] In 1949 LTC Paul F. Smith wrote that total war operates in four distinct fields: "military warfare or the application of the concerted power of land, sea, and air forces; economic war-fare or the interference with access to markets, capital, sources of material and labor power; political warfare or the framing of national policy designed to facilitate military operations and propaganda; and psychological warfare or the direct use of suggestion." Source: Lt. Col. Paul F. Smith, "Limitations on the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare," *Department of Operations & Training Command and General Staff College*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: June 1949), 14.
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There is a vast spectrum of war's lethality. Within this gamut of hostile conflict, lie punitive expeditions, such as the attacks against the North African pirates in the 19th century and Mexican bandits along the California and Mexican borders in the early 20th century, at the low end of a spectrum.[22] Towards the violent end of war's spectrum, are the European and Asian wars of the 1930s and 1940s. These were the "total wars."[23]

Small wars generally do not require mass mobilizations, and their commanders do not attempt to devastate enemy societies. Instead, tactics in smaller wars often intend to erode the morale of the opposing forces and reduce confidence of the enemy's military leadership. Insurgencies, or guerilla wars, use this tactic.[24] This insurgency was nested within a larger continental war, and there would be other examples that are presented in this dissertation.

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[22] Smith E. Cline, *Inevitable Partnership, Understanding Mexico-U.S. Relations*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 239.

[23] David Kopf and Eric Markusen, *The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing - Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 38.

[24] In the Napoleonic wars, the world "guerilla" warfare was coined to refer to the Spanish harassment tactics against the occupying French. Wellington successfully used the insurgency to force Napoleon to redeploy 100,000 French soldiers from the main theater of war. Source: David French, *The British Way in Warfare: 1688-2000* (London: Unwin-Hyman, 1990), 111. In 1810, the French deployed 350,000 troops to Spain but could only use 90,000 of them to invade Portugal. The rest had to be used for Counterinsurgency and to guard lines of communications. By 1810, Wellington's force comprised 50,000 troops. Another related source was Robert Cassidy, "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture," *Military Review*, (May/June 2005).

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency - Definitions

The war in Afghanistan is a type of small war; it is an insurgency. U.S. doctrine defines insurgency as, **"**an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict**.**"[25] This conforms to an academic definition offered by Professor John Mackinlay, King's College, University of London. An insurgency is a "movement, which, in addition to committing acts of terrorism, also had a political strategy to subvert the population to such an extent that it attracted a reciprocating political response from the government, amounted to something more than terrorism."[26]

Revolutions and insurgencies have some common elements, but there are profound differences. The French military theoretician, David Galula, whose counterinsurgency philosophies will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five, underscored that revolutions and insurgencies share the common goal of replacing the existing system of government.[27] But insurgencies are plodding and long and do not have the spontaneous nature of a revolution.[28] Sometimes the word "insurgency" is blended or

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[25] *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* 2007.

[26] Robert L. Green, "Considerations for Irregular Security Forces in Counterinsurgency," U.S. *Army, Command and General Staff College*, (Fort Leavenworth: January 2011), 2 and 3.

[27] Galula notes that an insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order (China, 1927-49; Greece, 1945-50; Indochina, 1945-54; Malaya, 1948-60; Algeria, 1954-62). Source: Donald W. Hamilton, *The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia*, (Westport: Praeger, 1998), 15.

[28] Donald W. Hamilton, *The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia*, 15.

confused with related terms, such as subversion, civil war, or revolution.[29] Often, it is used synonymously with guerrilla war.[30] Like counterinsurgency, insurgency is "complex, messy, and ambiguous social phenomenon."[31]

There are many other definitions of insurgency, but most conventional ones have at least four elements. These are the elements used in this dissertation to frame analysis of insurgencies:

- It is an organized movement with leadership, command, and control. A food riot or mob attack is not an insurgency.
- It intends to destroy the current government and replace it with a new and usually fundamentally different type of government. Insurgents are not reformers who intend to modify existing political conditions, such the civil rights marchers in the United States during the 1960s.
- It is a protracted struggle. There are few week- or month-long insurgencies. It is not a revolution.
- Tactics are directed at weakening the government's control and legitimacy. For this reason, propaganda is used extensively.

In table 4, the defining characteristics of insurgency are listed for illustration. The first example is the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets in the early 1980s. The Afghan insurgency against the Soviets, as well as the current insurgency, had all four elements.

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[29] In World War Two, partisan war in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and France was referred to sometimes as insurgency. Much of the literature in English uses the term partisan warfare. An example is Anthony James Joes, *Guerilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook,* (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1996), 65.

[30] Donald W. Hamilton, *The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia*, 14.

[31] Milan Vego, "Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice," (Newport: United States Naval War College, 2007).

Both Afghan insurgencies were well organized, armed, and had chains of command. Both intended to replace the government in Kabul with a radically different one. Both were long ordeals, taking many years. Propaganda was heavily, and often effectively, used in both insurgencies.

	Definitional Traits	**Afghan Insurgency Against the Soviets**	**Afghan Insurgency Against the Coalition**
1	It is an organized movement with leadership, command, and control.	It was a multi-national, pan-Afghan war, with multiple chains of command among different, sometimes rivaling, warlords and clan leaders.	The Taliban and other insurgents have recognized chains of command.
2	It intends to destroy the current government and replace it with a new and usually fundamentally different type of government.	From the outset, clans, war lords and external patrons determined to rid Afghanistan of all Soviet troops, Soviet institutions, and Soviet-supported Afghan institutions.	Despite current on-going negotiations, the demands of the insurgents center on replacing the existing government.
3	It is a protracted struggle.	The war began in December 1980. The last Soviet troops left in 1989.	It began in 2002 and continues.
4	Tactics are directed at weakening the government's control and legitimacy. For this reason, propaganda is used extensively	Afghan insurgents used information operations to undermine the authority of the government and the Soviet forces.	Tactics are directed at delegitimizing government and weakening international support for Coalition efforts.

Table 4. Defining Characteristics of an Insurgency in Afghanistan

There are different types of insurgencies.[32] Some insurgencies are heavily supported by outside agencies, such as foreign governments or ethnic kinsmen, while

[32] Kilcullen and his co-author Sebastian Gorka fit the 1979-1989 and 2001-2011 wars in Afghanistan into the category of international regime change. These initially temporary efforts to force regime change grew into long-term and resource-draining wars.

others receive little outside support. Prominent 20th century examples of insurgencies include partisan warfare in Europe, during World War Two. The British and the United States provided aid to resistance fighters in France and other German-occupied countries.[33]

Some insurgencies are largely autonomous; they are self-sustaining and are not reliant of external sources of support. The Chinese Insurgency (1920-1949) is an example of a largely self-sufficient insurgency.[34] Both insurgencies in Afghanistan, the anti-Soviet and anti-Coalition insurgencies, received substantial outside support.[35]

Insurgencies, Peoples Wars, and Morale

Insurgencies, of different types and levels of intensity, have existed since recorded history. But in the last 50 years, there has been a proliferation of literature about, what Timothy Lomperies referred to as, the era of Peoples Wars. This was the 30-year post-World War II period of insurgencies in still-colonized or newly independent states. Most of these insurgencies were led by communists or nationalists who partnered with communists.[36]

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[33] Sebastian L. Gorka and David Kilcullen, "An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understanding the Difference between COIN and Counterinsurgency," *Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 60, 1st Quarter,* (National Defense University, 2011). http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_14-18_Gorka-Kilcullen.pdf

[34] Timothy J. Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 11.

[35] Sebastian Gorka and David Kilcullen, "An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understanding the Difference between COIN and Counterinsurgency," 14-18.

[36] Timothy J. Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam,* 11.

According to Lomperies, there were eight communist insurgencies in the 30-year, post-war period.[37] Five of these insurgencies were successful, and three were not. Mao's triumph was followed by the victory of Ho Chi Minh over the French in Vietnam (1946-54).[38] Communist insurgents lost in Greece (1941-49); the communist Huks[39] lost in the Philippines (1946-56); and in Malaya (1948-60). Communists then won in South Vietnam[40] and Cambodia.[41]

All insurgencies develop with a small nucleus of like-minded militants, and successful insurgent groups expand their ranks as they gain the broader confidence of their countrymen. Many insurgencies never garner the support to expand beyond a small band of cadre, but many do. Some insurgent forces with small numbers have defeated enemies were more troops.[42] According to Charles Pfaff, from 1800 to 1998, smaller insurgent groups facing adversaries were victorious 30% of the time.[43] From 1950 to

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[37] After the 30-year post-World War II period, there continued to be communist insurgencies in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Africa.

[38] Timothy J. Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam*, 11.

[39] H. W. Brands, *Bound to Empire The United States and the Philippines*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 242.

[40] General Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

[41] Timothy J. Lomperis, "From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam," 11.

[42] Charles Pfaff, "Aligning Mean and Ends: Toward a New Way of War," *Military Review, Volume: 91, Issue: 5*, (September-October 2011), 78.

[43] Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security, 26, no.1,* (Summer 2001), 96-97.

1998, the side that had inferior military capabilities in the insurgencies won the majority-55-out-of-90 of the conflicts surveyed.[44]

Successes and failures in insurgencies have been attributed to many factors. Some insurgencies are poorly planned from the beginning and never develop a basis of support, as was the case of Che Guevara's ill-conceived insurgency in Bolivia.[45] In insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, garnering the confidence of the population is often essential for success.[46] Carl Von Clausewitz referred to the support of the people, or nation, as a vital element, or "center of gravity," in an insurgency.[47] This would be echoed in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. "In the end, victory comes, in large measure, by convincing the populace that their life will be better under the (host-nation) government than under an insurgent regime."[48]

Studies of war, including insurgencies, have revealed the centrality of non-material qualities, such as determination and confidence in leadership, for achieving

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[44] Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," 97.

[45] Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr, *Ernesto (Che) Guevara and Guerrilla Warfare*, (Wilmington: Latin American Silhouettes, 1997).

[46] Carl von Clausewitz coined the term "center of gravity" to mean the basic sources from which an army draws its strength.

[47] These sources can be material, such as weapons, supplies, and terrain, and they can be non-material, such as leadership, training, and morale. As retired Lieutenant General David Barno said, "The core principle animating the new strategy (the U.S. COIN in Afghanistan) was our identification of the Afghan people as the center of gravity for COIN. Source: David Barno, "Fighting the Other war: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005," *Military Review*, (September 1, 2007), and U.S. *Army Field Manual (FM)* 3-24/MCWP No. 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2006), 160.

[48] *U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24/MCWP No. 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency*, 139.

victory on the battlefield. Xenophon, of classical Greece, stated that victory in war belonged that was "stronger in soul." Napoleon wrote that "moral considerations" were key determinates in the success or failure of combat operations. In the 20th century, Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery stated that "the morale of the soldier is the greatest single factor in war."[49] This applies to Afghanistan. The competent and charismatic leadership of Mullah Omar proved crucial in revitalizing the Taliban, after they were routed from Afghanistan in 2001.

The General Template of Insurgency and the Taliban

Analysis of 20th century insurgencies indicate that there are prerequisites for a successful insurgency. First, the population must be vulnerable to the intimidation by the insurgents. If the insurgents effectively intimidate villages, as did the Viet Cong in Vietnam, the will of the villagers to retaliate or resist can be worn. Second, there needs to be competent insurgent leadership that can tap into this resentment and harness it to the insurgents' cause. A third prerequisite is lack of government control over substantial portions of the country. The greater control the government has, the less the chance of insurgent triumph. These are the three preconditions for a successful insurgency, which generally develop according to a well-established pattern.

The manual 3-24 defined five general strategies of insurgencies, all of which have application to Afghanistan. They are as follows: conspiratorial; protracted popular war; traditional; military-focus; and urban warfare. Many insurgencies, including those in

[49] Kelly Farley and Jennifer Veitch, "Measuring Morale, Cohesion and Confidence in Leadership: What Are the Implications for Leaders?" *Canadian Journal of Police and Security Services*, (December 2003).

Afghanistan, have elements of each of the five strategies. The strategies may run concurrently or sequentially. They can shift in emphasis and in terms of resource allocation. Finally, they can be blended.[50] Afghans have used elements of all these strategies, which will be discussed in chapter four. The strategies are as follows:

A conspiratorial strategy relies on clandestine activity directed by a relative handful of leaders. "The organization will usually be small, secretive, disciplined, and tightly controlled by leadership."[51] They conduct few killings until they develop a base of operations. They often have charismatic leadership, as is the case with Mullah Omar and was the case with Osama bin Laden.

The military-focus strategy, unlike the conspiratorial strategy, is focused "almost completely" on violence.[52] Its advocates see relentless violence as a means to degrade the morale of the host nation and to rally nationals to their cause. According to 3-24, the military-focus strategy does not have a strong historical record of success, except for the Cuban revolution. But elements of this strategy have been well-used Taliban tactics, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

An urban strategy focuses on using terror in cities. Cities are target-rich environments for terrorists because leading governmental, political, and economic leaders often live in cities. Insurgents try to infiltrate political and military organizations, often

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[50] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, 3-86.

[51] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, 3-86.

[52] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, 3-86.

through small, compartmentalized cells.[53] In Afghan cities there are symbols of foreign occupation and upscale hotels, which cater to non-Afghans.

Protracted popular war is associated with Mao and relies on simultaneously building support among the populace and undermining the legitimacy of the government. The Taliban's insurgency was based on the underlying strategy of building popular support and eroding support for the government in Kabul and the provinces.

A traditional strategy focuses on harnessing tribal and identity politics.[54] At the heart of this strategy is portraying the government as racially, ethnically, religiously, or culturally inauthentic. This is a dominant theme in the Taliban's information operations.

The chart in table 5 displays elements that the Taliban's two insurgencies, in terms of the 3-24 model.

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[53] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, 3-86.

[54] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, 3-86.

	Conspiratorial	Military Focus	Urban	Protracted Popular	Traditional
Defining traits	A small nucleus of leaders and, usually, a charismatic leader	Focuses almost exclusively on violence	Terror in the cities	Build popular support and undermine confidence of government	Portray government as outside the racial, ethnic, or religious nation
The Taliban's First Ascent 1994-1996	Mullah Omar founded the Taliban in terms of his view of Islam. Built a tight nucleus of cadre to direct operations.	The Taliban did not rely exclusively on violence but increasingly used it in the second insurgency.	The Taliban did not focus on the cities in the original insurgency.	This was the dominant strategy.	The Taliban successfully used this to gain credibility and prestige.
Post-2001 Taliban through 2009	Mullah Omar's charisma and competence continued to be heavily influential in Taliban's regrouping and revitalization.	As the Taliban's appeal declined after 2001, they turned increasingly to violence. Their strategy was never based exclusively on violence.	The Taliban attacked leaders in the cities and provinces.	This was the dominant strategy.	Information operations focus on the government's connection to foreign donors.

Table 5: The Five Insurgency Strategies and Their Application to Afghanistan

A Chronological Approach

Table 5 showed the *types* of insurgencies. But, it is also helpful to explain insurgencies in terms of *chronological* or developmental stages. Insurgencies evolve from a small nucleus and develop into a recognized and persistent threat to the government. The general pattern of insurgencies applies to Afghanistan. Most insurgencies, including the current one in Afghanistan, follow a general chronological template. Mao, long considered the most-successful practitioner of modern insurgency,

developed his model in the 1930s.[55] The U.S. government produced a template that is very similar to Mao's.[56] The template has three phases:

In the first phase, leadership emerges. Secret cells are created, supplies are gathered, propaganda is generated, but direct conflict is generally avoided. This is a building phase, which often focuses on developing, not destroying, infrastructure.[57]Mao also articulated a set of principles to avoid alienating potential comrades. Killings are highly selective and occur rarely.

In their first surge to power, in the mid-1990s, the Taliban won the confidence of local Afghans.[58] In this first phase of the Afghan insurgency, as in the second, Arabs came *en mass* to swell the Taliban's ranks.[59] The foreign fighters in Afghanistan were drawn from many states including Chechnya, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan, and particularly the Arab Middle East. By the time the Taliban consolidated power, Arab Jihadis were noticeable in key cities.[60] Arabs, particularly those

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[55] Timothy J. Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule, Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam*, 294.

[56] Some of the terminology is different. The development of the current insurgency in Afghanistan loosely follows the CIA's three-phase. It does not exactly fit the model, and no single model would be appropriate for all evolutionary aspects of every insurgency.

[57] For example, the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt won the confidence of many Egyptians by presenting itself as an alternative to a failed public administration.

[58] They came to regional attention when they interceded to protect a young woman who was sexually violated. They built legitimacy among clerics, who in turn, legitimized the Taliban. Clerics praised the Taliban in their sermons. Support of clerics to justify violence is essential. Source: Ken Tovo, "From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operation," *Special Warfare*, (2007).

[59] David B. Edwards, *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 149, 266, and 269.

[60] The Taliban displayed military acumen and uncanny intelligence capabilities, which continued during the span covered in this dissertation. They cultivated a vast network of informants and sympathizers and bought off enemies with foreign-supplied money. They also learned from mistakes and innovated.

affiliated with al Qaeda, brought enthusiasm, financing, and technical expertise. But there is no evidence that any major Taliban victory was determined exclusively by the Arabs.

In the second phase of an insurgency, the insurgents take military action to dislodge the government. This can include attacks, assassinations, sabotage, or subversive activities. The government refers to this as the "organizational phase," in which the group builds its infrastructure, draws recruits and trains cadre, and acquires supplies.[61] The Taliban pursued this from 1994-1996, when they fought rival groups of different ethnicities, sometimes in pitched battle.[62] They also settled scores with rivaling ethnicities and clans.

The third and final phase of insurgent warfare is conventional warfare. In the last phase of the war in Vietnam, it was armor, artillery, and massive infantry power that conquered Saigon.[63] If the transition is properly timed, the government has been weakened sufficiently to succumb to assault by an onslaught of insurgent forces.[64]Many

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Source: Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 221.

[61] William Rosenau, "Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan)." *Harvard International Review*, (2009), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-200271859.html

[62] The Taliban had been in this stage since about 2005, when they attacked targets of opportunity, as well as those whom they considered puppets or apostates. They currently do not have the current military capabilities to launch conventional warfare against the Coalition. That will occur, if it occurs at all, in phase three.

[63] Some scholars underscore that elements of Mao's model do not precisely fit the Taliban conquest because there was far weaker command and control among the Pashtuns. Dr. Lester Grau writes, "The Taliban was and is a loose coalition of Pushtun (sic) gangs of thugs who show respect to Mullah Omar, but he is certainly not directing all the Taliban activities." Source: Dr. Lester Grau, in email correspondence with Mark Silinsky, April 1, 2013.

[64] Ken Tovo, "From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations."

insurgencies never reach this stage. The Taliban reached this point during their final drive to Kabul in 1996. They have not reached this state as of fall 2014.

	One-Pre-insurgency Phase	Two- Guerilla Warfare Phase	Three- Mobile Warfare
Defining Elements	Developing secret cells, gathering supplies, building base of operations, expanding credibility, disseminating propaganda	Initiate attacks against enemy targets, recruit and train cadre, and eliminate opposition forces. Use terror, if necessary, to subdue hostile elements in society	War of movement, infantry, supported by artillery and armor, engage government forces in pitched battle
Application to Afghanistan	The Taliban were engaged in this stage in the very early 1990s when Mullah Omar was consolidating power. When the Taliban were forced from Afghanistan in 2001, they returned to this phase in the borderlands by consolidating their power and regrouping.	As of 2014, the Taliban are in this stage. They target pro-government forces and terrorize those they suspect of working against their cause.	The Taliban reached this stage in mid-1990s prior to their ascension to power in 1996.

Table 6: Three Phases of Warfare and the Taliban

Afghan Insurgents

There were, and continue to be, several Jihadi groups of Afghans that are trying to replace the current government in Afghanistan. Some the insurgents were well trained, well armed, highly motivated, and experienced, having fought in other areas of the international jihad, including Iraq and Chechnya. [65] There were three groups that were particularly active during the period covered in this dissertation. Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin, led their own insurgent band and operated often autonomously, but

[65] Jihad means struggle and sometimes refers to an internal, ethical struggle to be a better Moslem. But Jihad is largely used in the Koran and by Jihadists today to mean a defensive war to protect the interests of Muslims or an aggressive war to expand the frontiers of Islamic influence. Muslims are commanded to struggle in war against non-Muslims.

also in conjunction with other militant groups, including the Taliban.[66] Its areas of influence extended from North and South Waziristan to Parachinar, Kurram agencies, which are all in Pakistan. From these bases, the Haqqanis attacked border areas of Paktika, Khowst, and Paktia provinces.[67] The Haqqanis also had a strong bin Laden connection.[68]

Figure 1. Regional Map of Afghanistan

Another group, Hezb-i-Islami, was led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, two-time former prime minster of Afghanistan, veteran politician, and long-term antagonist of the Karzai

[66] The tribally diverse network was comprised of Chechens, Kashmiris, Pakistanis and Uzbecks, many of whom lived in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Source: "Return of the Taliban- Jalaluddin Haqqani," *Frontline website*. www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban

[67] Carlotta Gall, "Oldline Taliban Commander is Face of Rising Afghan Threat," *New York Times*, (June 17, 2008).

[68] Steven Coll, "Return of the Taliban- Jalaluddin Haqqani," *Frontline website*. www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban

government.[69] A trained engineer, Hekmatyar, with his group, fought against the Soviets. They continued as a threat throughout the period covered in this dissertation.

Table 7 lists the basic goals, ethnicities, level of capabilities, and area of operations of the three major insurgent groups in Afghanistan during the timeframe of this dissertation.

	Taliban	**Haqqani Network**	**Hizb Al Islami-Glubuddin**
Goals	Create Sharia State	Create Sharia State	Create Sharia State
Ethnicity	Largely Pashtun	Multi-ethnic: Kashmiris, Uzbecks, Chechens, Pashtu	Many regional ethnicities including
Level of Capabilities	Strongest of all groups. Growing strength in Pakistan and border areas of Afghanistan.	Moderate levels of strength in east.	Currently, the weakest of the three groups.
Areas of Operations	The south and east	The east	East and northeast

Table 7: The Three Major Insurgent Groups in Afghanistan

War's Termination- Reconstruction Beginning

Post-war reconstruction agendas follow a general pattern. When there are post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts, they are usually broken down into four phases. First, there must be an end to the fighting. Sometimes this occurs immediately,

[69] Afghanistan Online at http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/today/ghekmatyar.html

such as the German and Japanese unconditional surrenders in 1945.[70] In other wars, particularly insurgencies, the cessation of hostilities is a gradual process and sometimes entails negotiations and arbitration.

The second phase is disarming the former enemy and providing emergency services to non-combatants. In the third phase, the government and public administrators try to bring living standards to pre-conflict levels and lay the fundamentals of sustained human development. The final phase is creating a significantly more prosperous society.[71] In all four phases, confidence plays vital roles, and all four phases apply to Afghanistan.

[70] "The End of the War in the Pacific Surrender Documents in Facsimile," *The National Achieves*, (1945), 4.

[71] Geoff Harris, *Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countries*, (London: Routledge, 1999), 44.

Part Two: National Confidence and War

The grand strategy and evolution of counterinsurgency will be discussed in great detail in chapter five. But it is important to introduce basic concepts of insurgency and national confidence, which are reoccurring themes in this dissertation.

Confidence on the Home Front

Both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces vie for national confidence. Game theorist and Nobel Laureate Roger Myerson underscored that populations have confidence in the government, as long as they judge that the government has a monopoly on power and national-level political decision making.[72] Insurgents try to capture this national confidence by proving that they can outmatch the capabilities of the government. When they inflict battlefield successes on government troops or gain operational control of territory, insurgents succeed in two ways.

Defeats of government forces boost the image of the insurgents. They project images of insurgents' confidence, competence, and daring. At the same time, insurgent victories lower the image of the government's competence and reduce the confidence many nationals have in the military. Conversely, government battlefield victories over

[72] A government is legitimate when everyone believes that everyone else in the nation will obey this government ... people everywhere will ultimately accept the rule of a faction that is able to win decisive battles, kill its enemies, and protect its friends, even if the faction lacks any other culturally accepted symbols of legitimacy." Source: Roger Myerson, "Foundations of the State," *University of Chicago, Paper, 11,* (November 2008), 11.

insurgents boost credibility and prestige among soldiers, while demonstrating the fecklessness of the insurgents.[73]

National confidence is critical during war. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine stresses the need to win the confidence of society.[74] In war, confidence in government leaders can hold or heighten morale, through leadership skills and prestige.[75] According to U.S. military doctrine, when leaders are seen as weak, particularly during times of crisis, their ability to govern tends to decrease.[76] How national confidence is measured is the subject of the next part of this chapter.

Attacking Confidence in War – A Historical Perspective

Twentieth century wars offer many illustrations of military commanders targeting the national confidence of their enemies. In February, 1916, the Germans attacked Verdun to create a vast killing field in which French soldiers would be slaughtered in greater numbers than the French could kill Germans.[77] If successful, this would collapse

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[73] Lane V. Packwood, "Popular Support as the Objective in Counterinsurgency: What Are We Really After?" *Military Review*, (May-June 2009).

[74] *U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24/MCWP No. 3-33.5*, 108.

[75] Examples include Winston Churchill's harnessing Britain's confidence during the Battle of Britain and President Roosevelt's rallying the United States after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the invasion of Normandy. One generation later, President Kennedy inspired national confidence during the Missile Crisis.

[76] U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24/MCWP No. 3-33.5, 108. Another example is the presidency of Jimmy Carter, during which Iranian revolutionaries kidnapped U.S. diplomatic personnel. President Carter delivered a nationally televised talk of a debilitating "crisis of confidence." This would be known as the "malaise speech. Source: Richard Gamble, "How Right Was Reagan? The 40th President Gave America Hope-But That's Not Enough," *The American Conservative*, (May 4, 2009).

[77] Michael S. Neiberg, *Warfare & Society in Europe: 1898 to the Present*, (New York: Praeger Press, 2004), 43.

the confidence the British and French held in their military and political leaders.[78]

In the Second World War, German and British bombers attacked each other's cities to break the national will, as well as their enemy's military and productive capabilities.[79] The British Bomber Command coined the gerund "dehousing,"[80] as a term to mean shattering the will of German citizenry and paralyzing the war effort through city bombing.[81] German workers without homes; with scant food, provisions, health care; and without prospects of better living conditions would likely lose morale and the will to endure the hardships of war.[82] Against Japan, the U.S. Army Air Corps incinerated cities in 1000-bomber raids, the most famous of which were the firebombing raids of Tokyo. The atomic attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki shattered the will of the emperor and of elements of Japan's military to continue the war.[83]

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[78] In the event, the strategy failed, but "during its ten months, over 700,000 French and German lives were lost - one tenth of all those killed in 1914-18 - and almost three-quarters of available French fighting men passed through the "mill", or "cauldron", or "mincing- machine" (as it was variously called) of Verdun." Source: Review of Euan Cameron, "Books: Hell's Citadel; The Road To Verdun," Ian Ousby Jonathan Cape, "Euan Cameron Revisits the Horrors of Verdun, Where 700,000 Soldiers Died," *The Independent*, (London, England), 2002, HighBeam Research, (February 16, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-1650464.html

[79] Michael S. Neiberg, *Warfare & Society in Europe: 1898 to the Present*, 208 and 117.

[80] Daniel J. Simonsen. "Night Fighters: Luftwaffe and RAF Air Combat over Europe 1939-1945, (Book review)," *Air Power History*, 2011, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-276891420.html

[81] Michael S. Neiberg, *Warfare & Society in Europe: 1898 to the Present*, 401.

[82] D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins 1917-1960, Volume One*, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1961).

[83] Scott A. Willey, "Hiroshima: The World's Bomb. (Book review)," *Air Power History*, 2008, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-191999646.html

In large-scale or near-total wars, many elements of violence and destruction combine the shatter the national will and aggregate military capabilities of a belligerent. In their post-war surveys, it was not possible for Allied statisticians to isolate a single type or act of violence that would explain a shift in national confidence. For example, the defeat of Germany was attributed to many factors on several fronts to include the incineration of cities, annihilation of entire armies, denial of basic foods and services, and the military's inability to move, shoot, or communicate outside of Berlin in the last days of the war. But Allied forces tried to measure the extent to which each service and strategy contributed to victory. Unsurprisingly, naval forces would accent the effects of blockades; air forces on strategic and tactical bombing; and armies on the importance of taking and holding German territory.

In sum, since antiquity, countries have sought to destroy the national confidence, as well as the military capabilities, of their enemies. Leaders of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies use military, paramilitary, political, economic, and psychological tactics to do so.

Part Three: Insurgencies and the Index of National Confidence

This dissertation provides a model that will measure the extent to which insurgent attacks have lowered national confidence in the government and its institutions in Afghanistan in a specific time period. The defining characteristics of national confidence are distilled from the general literature, much of which was discussed in the chapter on literature review, which was chapter one. The four blocks are national morale; economic prosperity; institutions, organizations, and officials; and security. These are detailed below:

Indicator One: National Morale

The overarching faith in the direction of the country and its leaders can be called national morale.[84] As with the term "insurgency," the word "morale" has been defined in many ways. Morale can refer to a general feeling in a social organization, a political association, a military unit, or in myriad other social associations. The American Heritage Dictionary defines it as, "The state of the spirits of a person or group as exhibited by confidence, cheerfulness, discipline, and willingness to perform assigned tasks."[85]

The U.S. Army, defines morale as "the mental, emotional, and spiritual state of the individual. It is how he feels-happy, hopeful, confident, appreciated, worthless, sad,

[84] "Good morale is shown by the stamina with which people stand up under punishment and by the energy with which they strive to realize their ideals. Poor morale is evidenced by those who 'can't take it," and who become easily discouraged and disillusioned." Source: Goodwin Watson, *Civilian Morale of The Society For The Psychological Study of Social Issues*, (Boston: Hitchcock, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942).

[85] American Heritage Dictionary, http://ahdictionary.com/

unrecognized, or depressed."[86] All three definitions share two elements; they underscore that morale is difficult to define and refer to a general feeling or spirit.

National Morale in the 20th Century and the Watson Model

An important contribution to the study of national morale came in September 1941, at a conference the "Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues," held in Evanston, IL. The conference was entitled "Civilian Morale," and a book on the proceedings was edited by Goodwin Watson and was published the following year. The principles were examined in the context of Germany's and Japan's conquests of that era. However, five principles – an unambiguous positive goal, togetherness, national involvement, individual contributions, and a sense of advance – have timeless application and relate to the Afghan insurgency.

According to Watson, the first essential for good morale is successfully articulating an *unambiguous positive goal* for the nation. Effectively polarizing causes as good versus evil can hold morale, though sometimes only temporarily.[87] In the Second World War, a common goal for the Allies was the defeat of fascism, and in the Cold War the goal was rolling back and containing communism. But national confidence in goals can wane. This was the case of U.S. efforts to shore-up the anti-communist regime in

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[86] M. J. Kelly Farley and Jennifer A. Veitch, "Measuring Morale, Cohesion and Confidence in Leadership: What Are the Implications for Leaders? "*Canadian Journal of Police and Security Services*, (December, 2003).

[87] Goodwin Watson, *Civilian Morale of The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues*.

Vietnam.[88] After the attacks of September 2001, President Bush rallied the country in the War on Terrorism.[89] Presidents Bush and Obama argued the centrality of Afghanistan in the war.[90]

A second fundamental in national morale is *togetherness*. Morale is stronger in those persons who feel themselves a part of a larger group, sharing a common goal. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor shattered the still-prevailing, non-interventionist sentiment in the United States. Hitler's declaration of war further erased the broad-based and widely held isolationism almost overnight. When al Qaeda attacked the United States, there was a strong, if temporary, sense of togetherness and national violation. These were vital factors in forging a shared national purpose and laying the foundation for national morale.[91] Afghanistan, though ethnically divided into many clans, can unite to fight a common enemy.

The third factor in morale is *national involvement*. In the Second World War, the home front tied vast strands of the American national fabric from all economic and social strata, races, ages, and both sexes.[92] In post-Taliban Afghanistan, non-Pashtun

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[88] It became progressively less clear to Americans that the regime in North Vietnam was significantly more onerous or unjust than the regime in Saigon. The purpose of the war blurred and national confidence waned. Source: Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1979), 229.

[89] Thomas Mockaitis, *Grand Strategy in the War against Terrorism*, (New York: Frank Cass, 2003), 88.

[90] Graciana del Castillo, "Peace through Reconstruction: An Effective Strategy for Afghanistan," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, (Spring 2010).

[91] Goodwin Watson, *Civilian Morale of The Society For The Psychological Study Of Social Issues.*

clans were given greater access and involvement in national-level politics and administration.

A fourth factor is conviction in *individual contributions*. While the third factor focused on the inclusion of communities into the larger national effort, this fourth factor underscores the individual contribution to the war effort: the serviceman, the factory worker, the administrator, and others. The Afghan counterinsurgency stressed local development and individual contributions.

Fifth, there needs to be a sense of *advance*.[93] Morale is usually stronger when a nation feels that it is moving towards victory. Often national leaders publicize high-profile successful attacks.[94] Bin Laden's death was trumpeted as proof that the War on Terrorism was concluded on victorious terms.[95]

Analysis of these elements of morale, as measured in 2008, will be discussed in chapter six. In table 8, three historical examples of the successful use of national morale are examined in the context of Watson's principles in historical terms.

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[92] Women were accorded greater employment opportunities and political responsibilities. Minority groups entered the industrial workforce as never before. Source: Goodwin Watson, *Civilian Morale of The Society For The Psychological Study of Social Issues*.

[93] Goodwin Watson, *Civilian Morale of The Society For The Psychological Study of Social Issues*.

[94] Some examples include the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo and Stalin's parading German prisoners captured at Stalingrad as visible proof that the tide of that war had changed. Source: "Doolittle Raiders Celebrate 64th Anniversary, (Brief article)," *Air Power History*, 2006, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-146959209.html

[95] Michael Neiberg, *Warfare and Society in Europe: 1898 to the Present*, 138.

	Watson's Principles	British Morale in World War Two	Union Morale in the Civil War	Communist Morale in Vietnam
1	**Positive goal**	National survival; existence of democracy in Europe	Save the Union, the "last best hope for mankind."	Unify nation into single state under communist leadership. Expel non-Vietnamese
2	**Togetherness**	Social cohesiveness fostered; The British nation in its finest hour	A nation united to quell a rebellion	A single nation fighting Americans and its collaborator
3	**Danger in which group members feel themselves involved.**	German invasion and enslavement; end of empire	The survival of the nation at stake	Fear of U.S. bombing and threatened destruction of infrastructure
4	**Conviction that individuals can affect positive change**	Each person can contribute towards protecting Britain and defeating Germany and being a part of Britain's finest hour	Each person is part of the nation	Each person can help defeat the U.S. and regime in Saigon
5	**Sense of advance**	Dunkirk turned into a victory; bombing German cities[96] and dams boosted British morale; North African victories became "beginning of the end"	Antietam allowed for Emancipation Proclamation; collapse of Savannah and Atlanta helped Lincoln's re-election.	Witnessed television footage of popular demonstrations in the United States against the war in Indo-China.

Table 8: The Watson Principles Applied to Success in National Confidence – A Historical Perspective

In sum, national morale is a spiritual and broad-based sense of pessimism or optimism. To sustain positive morale there needs to be one or a multiple of five factors. Leaders need to articulate and to continue to make credible an unambiguous positive goal; they must foster a sense of national togetherness; they must ensure that collective and individual senses of national involvement and contribution. There must

[96] "Another Taboo Broken; A German Review of History. (In Germany Another Taboo About The War Is Broken) (More Is Being Spoken And Written About The German Suffering During World War II*)," The Economis*t (US), 2002, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-94544622.html

also be a sense of advance. How these principles apply to insurgency and counterinsurgency will be discussed later.

Indicator Two: Economic Prosperity and National Confidence

The first category of national confidence is morale, and the second is economic prosperity. U.S. Army doctrine underscores the importance of economic initiatives in quelling an insurgency.[97] National stability is often contingent on sustained and broadly distributed economic growth.[98] Modernization theory underscores the importance of economic growth in state formation.[99] Political scientists Kenneth Bollen and Robert Jackson argue that economic development is a dominant explanatory variable for promoting democratic rule.[100] This is loosely defined as a form of government built on free, fair, and contested elections; multiparty governments; a liberal interpretation of human rights; and property rights.[101]

The political scientist Amitai Etzioni asserts that rule of law based on democratic rule is stronger than non-consensual rule of law. He opined that the values embraced

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[97] Seth Bodnar and Jeremy Gwinn, "Monetary Ammunition in a Counterinsurgency," *Parameters, Vol. 40, No.* 3, (US Army War College, 2010). http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2010autumn/Bodnar_Gwinn.pdf

[98] Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work – Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 84.

[99] Jeremy Tejirian, "Cities in the Developing World: Issues, Theory, and Policy, (Review)," *Journal of International Affairs*, 1998, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-54117779.html

[100] Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work – Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, 84.

[101] Randall Peerenboom, *Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France, and the U.S. Contributors*, (New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2004), 4.

through a democratic process are generally more enduring than values in nonconsensual societies.[102]

These theories were distilled and embedded in U.S. counterintelligence doctrine. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, 3-24, stresses the primary objective in defeating insurgents is to build effective governance. This requires a government considered legitimate by most citizens.[103]

The political scientist Samuel Huntington noted that sustained economic growth promotes modernization, a term he used to encompass industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization, and more complex and diversified occupational structures.[104] The social psychologist Abraham Maslow noted the connection of material development to psychological development.[105] His Hierarchy of Needs model became foundational in the field of psychology and has broad application to national confidence building measures.[106] This model has been particularly useful in post-conflict stability operations, in which there are many displaced and destitute persons.

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[102] Amitai Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society*, (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 220.

[103] James Cricks, "Useful Enemies: When Waging Wars Is More Important Than Winning Them," *Military Review*, 2014, HighBeam Research, (May 29, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-367545470.html

[104] Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik, *Modernization, Democracy, and Islam*, (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 144.

[105] John L. Allen, "Best Education Policy Is Respecting Teachers," *National Catholic Reporter*, (1998), HighBeam Research, (March 1, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-20449163.html

[106] Patrick Gambrel, “Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs: Does It Apply in a Collectivist Culture,” *Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship*, (April 2003), 2-4.

For many decades, U.S. strategists advocated broad-based and sustained economic development as a tool to forge stability.[107] Many of these theories, some of which will be raised in chapter three, were challenged after the defeats in Vietnam and the mixed development and military records in Latin America. But, advocacy for robust national building programs was resurgent after the attacks in September 2001. The U.S. National Security Strategy and several important doctrinal works, namely the Stability Field Manual 3-01 and the manual 3-24, require developmental efforts to ensure long-term stability.[108]

Some political scientists and economists argue that social inequality is an engine of political instability. They believe that inequality builds a class consciousness, which leads to collective action. [109] Others, such as Clark Kerr, disagree and argue that economic growth creates a relatively homogeneous middle class, which, in turn, leads to stability.[110] Gerhard Lenski contends that creating surpluses alleviates scarcity, creating stakeholders in the economy. [111]

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[107] Significant developmental assistance was administered to lesser-developed allies during the Cold War in an attempt to offset Soviet destabilization efforts, particularly in post-war Europe. The influential economist Walt Rostow argued, in the 1960s, that economic seed money would prompt poorer countries to accelerate the speed and scope of development. Source: Lloyd G. Reynolds, "Economic Growth in the Third World, an Introduction," *Business Economics*, 1989, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-7018990.html

[108] Thomas Blau and Daryl Liskey, "Analytics and Action in Afghanistan," *Prism 1. No. 4,* (September 2010), 49.

[109] Jonathan Lemco, *Political Stability in Federal Governments,* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 125.

[110] Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison, and Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

[111] Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1966).

According to these theorists, development in Afghanistan and elsewhere is centered on expanding choices individuals can make in their daily lives. Expanding an individual's range of choices increases the level of trust between those who govern and those who are governed. It promotes civil society, which is the area of political decision making between the government and the individual.

Nations with high per capita GDPs are, by and large, more stable than poor ones, which was why building sustained economic development in Afghanistan became a central goal early in the counterinsurgency. Most unstable countries are very poor, and most stable countries are relatively wealthy.[112] The 10 most-stable and 10 least-stable countries of 2008 are shown in table 9.[113] The Jane's Country Risk Ratings for 2008,[114] the year of the first survey of this dissertation's dependent variables, demonstrate the correlation between national income and national stability.[115]

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[112] This is not to suggest that a wealthy country cannot be unstable, that a poor country cannot be stable, or that a wealthy country cannot be destabilized. However, there is a proven trend for wealthy countries to be more stable than poor countries, and it is reasonable to conclude that a wealthier Afghanistan, with broadly distributed wealth, will probably be a more stable Afghanistan.

[113] M. Chalmers, "Supporting Security in Fragile States," *World Bank*, (Paper presented at the LICUS Learning Seminar, (Washington, DC: September 2005), 7.

[114] The figures for 2008 were very similar to those in earlier years. There has long been a positive correlation between levels of sustained economic growth and stability.

[115] The publication explains, "The risk ratings assess the stability environment by rating 24 factors, and sub-factors that precisely evaluate the factor ratings. The 24 factors are classified in five category groupings: political; social; economic; external; and military and security. The numerical ratings of each factor grouping produces an overall stability rating, which is further refined for accuracy with the factors being weighted according to the importance to a particular country's stability."

Ranking	10 Most Stable Countries	10 Most Unstable Countries
1	Vatican City	Gaza and the West Bank
2	Sweden	Somalia
3	Luxembourg	**Afghanistan**
4	Monaco	Sudan
5	Gibraltar	Ivory Coast
6	Lichtenstein	Haiti
7	San Marino	Zimbabwe
8	United Kingdom	Chad
9	The Netherlands	Democratic Republic of the Congo
10	Ireland	Central African Republic

Table 9: The 10 Most-Unstable and the Ten Most-Stable Countries in the World as of March 1, 2008[116]

Insurgencies attempt to exploit a lack of employment/job opportunities to gain active and passive support from a disgruntled populace.[117]

Jeffery Sachs, of Harvard's Kennedy School, in 2001, underscored that poor economic performance can collapse other sectors of human development.[118] In some cases this leads to state failure.[119] Some examples are listed in table 10. According to the Watson Institute's Global Security Matrix, at Brown University, failed states threaten the

[116] Country Risk Index, *Janes*, (2008). http://jmsa.janes.com.

[117] The manual 3-24 places the major categories of economic activity include the following: "fossil fuels, mining, and related refining infrastructure; generation and transmission of power and energy; transportation and movement networks; stock and commodities exchange, and the banking industry; manufacturing and warehousing; building trades and services; agriculture, food processing, fisheries, and stockyard processing; labor relations; education and training. Source: *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, (Headquarters Department Of The Army, December 2006), 5-14. Http://Www.Fas.Org/Irp/Doddir/Army/Fm3-24.Pdf

[118] John Arielle and Virgil Storr," Can the West Help the Rest? A Review Essay of Sachs' the End of Poverty and Easterly's the White Man's Burden," *Journal of Private Enterprise*, 2009, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1921045021.html

[119] Jeffery Sachs, "The Strategic Significance of Global Inequality," *Washington Quarterly*, (Summer, 2001).

security of the international system because the consequences of political, economic, and social instability in failed states have a spill-over effects on neighboring states.[120] Among those effects are vast problems with refugees, public health, and sanitation.[121]

Failed states share some common characteristics. These include highly skewed income distributions, including instances of absolute poverty and vast wealth; high levels of structural unemployment; weak and decaying physical infrastructure; and low levels of human capital.[122]

	The 10 Most-Failed States of 2008	The 10 Least-Failed States of 2008
1	Somalia	Norway
2	Sudan	Finland
3	Zimbabwe	Sweden
4	Chad	Ireland
5	Iraq	New Zealand
6	Congo (D.R)	Denmark
7	**Afghanistan**	Australia
8	Cote d-Ivoire	Austria
9	Pakistan	Canada
10	Central African Republic	Netherlands

Table 10: The Failed States Index 2008- Fund for Peace[123]

When stability dissolves almost entirely, as was the case in Afghanistan from approximately the mid-1980s through 1996, a 'war economy' develops.[124] Contracts

[120] Watson Institute of Global Security, http://watson.brown.edu.

[121] Brent Scowcroft and Samuel Berger, "In the Wake of War: Getting Serious about Nation-Building," *The National Interest,* 2005, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-137874469.html

[122] Michael Howard, *Public Sector Economics for Developing Countries,* (Barbados: University Press of the West Indies, 2001), 7.

[123] "Failed States Index, 2008, *Fund for Peace,* Accessed January 25, 2014. http://www.ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2008-sortable

[124] Dr. Conrad Schetter, of the University of Bonn, uses the term 'bazaar economy' to refer to the Afghan economy that emerged when the state structures and state order disappeared in the Soviet and early post-Soviet period. Source: Christine Nölle-Karimi and Conrad Schetter, *The 'Bazaar Economy' of*

could not be enforced and state-mandated regulation was meaningless because of the inability to penalize those who violated regulations.

According to Schetter, in the absence of any state enforcement mechanism, the capitalistic free-market economy regulates all economic activities. During the Afghan civil war, this 'bazaar economy' went beyond the national borders and became a regional market an informal transnational network.[125] This will be discussed in some detail in chapter three.

***Indicator Three: Public Administration: Institutions, Organizations, and Officials**:*

The first two indicators of national confidence were morale and economic prosperity. The third is public administration and its institutions, organizations, and officials. Public administration is a broad category of public institutions that provide essential services for Afghans. If civil servants are involved in decision making and service providing, it can loosely be called public administration. The quality of the civil service is a central measure of sustained development.[126]

Afghanistan. A Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan – A Country a without State? (Schriftenreihe der Mediothek für Afghanistan Frankfurt, 2002), 109-127.

[125] Christine Nölle-Karimi Conrad Schetter, "The 'Bazaar Economy' of Afghanistan. A Comprehensive Approach in, Afghanistan – A Country a without State?" 109-127.

[126] Mahbubul Haq, *Reflections on Human Development,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Political scientists and philosophers have long stressed the importance of effective administering public needs. They also underscored the dynamic and vital interplay between administration and public confidence within the civic community.[127]

Michael Walzer highlighted the necessity of solid public administration to create and maintain public virtue.[128] Aristotle used the word "friendship" to describe the bonds of civic trust that develop when a government and its administrative organs function harmoniously with the citizenry.[129] The manual 3-24 underscores the importance of civil society.[130] In an insurgency, these organizations are important because their representatives interact with the populace and the military units.[131]

A civil service is different from civil society. Civil society is the space of decision making between the government and individuals, in which political decisions

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[127] Nicolo Machiavelli stressed the importance of "civic virtue," which is the integrity of the citizens and administrative leaders in civil and religious affairs and associations. Source: Diana Schaub, "Machiavelli's Realism." *The National Interest*, 1998, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-21223157.html

[128] Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work – Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, 84.

[129] Michael Walzer in Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work – Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, 89.

[130] It refers to non-military organizations such as "church groups, fraternal, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, political parties, and community watch groups. Source: *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33*, 3-86.

[131] Further, "organizations generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistic support. Source: "Tactics in Counterinsurgency," *FM 3-24.2*, (Headquarters Department of The Army, April 2009), 1-13. www.us.army.mil.

are made.[132] A civil service is often referred to as public administration, as noted above, or as bureaucracy.[133] It is an administrative policy making group.

Developing a pool of capable, honest, and enthusiastic bureaucrats is essential for increasing human development.[134] The role of the civil service extends beyond dispensing public goods and services; it also helps to build the rule of law in Afghanistan.

Enforcing Contracts and Agreements

Enforcing contracts is vital to modernization and stability. The Western principle of contract law developed in medieval Europe.[135] It was anchored in values from ancient Greece and Rome, as well as certain religious values.[136] Among other duties, public administrators protect property rights and ensure contracts.[137] Douglass

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[132] Alan Wolfe, "Is Civil Society Obsolete? Revisiting Predictions of the Decline of Civil Society in 'Whose Keeper?" *Brookings Review*, 1997, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-20178899.html

[133] "…specialization of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority." *Merriam-Webster*, accessed February 20, 2014. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bureaucracy

[134] The ability of civil servants to meet the immediate needs of the citizenry, particularly the basic needs, such as distributing food, shelter, and emergency supplies, significantly builds the credibility of the state. Conversely, failure to meet these needs undercuts the national confidence in the state. Source: Richard Batley, "Civil Service Reform and Structural Adjustment. (Review)," *Journal of Development Studies*, 1998, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-54258655.html

[135] Laina Farhat-Holzman, "Modernization or Westernization: The Muslim World vs. the Rest," *Comparative Civilizations Review*, (Fall 2012).

[136] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).

[137] Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, "Unbundling Institutions," *Journal of Political Economy, 2005, vol 113, no 51*), 949.

North distinguished between a "contract theory" of the state and a "predatory theory" of the state, which has particular relevance for the developing world.[138]

Adam Smith, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* wrote that national stability is dependent on a liberal economy and the ability to enforce contracts.[139] The 19th century liberal thinkers did not advocate for a strong government's hand in the economy. They did, however, insist on its judicial and military responsibilities to provide internal stability and security against external enemies.[140]

The contract theory of the state requires officials to provide the legal framework to facilitate economic transactions and sustained human development.[141] Property rights institutions are rules and regulations that protect citizens against the power of government and elites.[142] They ensure that the state cannot confiscate property without compensation. Property rights have long-term effects on economic growth, investment, and financial development.[143] Many social scientists see economic, legal and political intuitions in a

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[138] Ronaldo Fiani, "An Evaluation of the Role of the State and Property Rights in Douglass North's Analysis," *Journal of Economic Issues*, 2004, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-126420159.html

[139] Dipak K. Gupta, *Economics of Political Violence: The Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 4.

[140] Dipak K. Gupta, *Economics of Political Violence*: *The Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth*, 180.

[141] Douglass North, *Structure and Change in Economic History*, 20-27.

[142] Dipak K. Gupta, "Economics of Political Violence: The Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth," 155.

[143] N. Rosenberg and L.E. Birdzell, "How the West Grew Rich: The Economic Transformation of the Industrial World," (Unpublished, October 1999), 1. http://chrispapageorgiou.com/papers/statute1.pdf

county as the primary determinant of economic performance.[144] Without these institutions, the economy could not deliver sustained, broad-sector growth. Securing property rights is necessary to promote sustained economic development.[145] Without property rights, criminality would hamper investment and entrepreneurial activity.[146] Property rights are seen by the Heritage Foundation as a defining characteristic of economic freedom.[147] They are placed in the category of "rule of law," which also includes "Freedom from Corruption." [148 and 149]

To protect these property rights, there needs to be some form of public administration. There is a spectrum of professionalism in public administration.[150] In

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[144] Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, "Unbundling Institutions," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2005, *vol 113, no 51*, (2005), 950.

[145] H. De Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*, (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

[146] William Byrd and Stéphane Guimbert, "Public Finance, Security, and Development, A Framework and an Application to Afghanistan," *The World Bank, South Asia Region, Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development Department*, (January 2009), 7. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/4004/WPS4806.txt?sequence

[147] The Heritage Foundation defines economic freedom as, "Economic freedom is the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own labor and property. In an economically free society, individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please. In economically free societies, governments allow labor, capital and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself. Source: "Index of Economic Freedom," *Heritage Foundation*, accessed January 27, 2014. http://www.heritage.org/index/about

[148] The property rights are rated annual on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 being "Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently and quickly. The justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. There is no corruption or expropriation." Source: "Index of Economic Freedom," *Heritage Foundation*, accessed January 27, 2014. http://www.heritage.org/index/about

[149] Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, "Unbundling Institutions," 953.

[150] Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, *Public Administration in the Global Village*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 18.

many wealthy western regimes there are professional civil servants. Most developing countries have lower levels of professionalism in their civil service.[151] They are very loosely tied to the government and often work on a contractual basis.[152] They have in-demand skills, such as proficiency in English; technical skills, particularly information systems; and accounting skills.[153] This has been particularly important in Afghanistan during the period covered in this dissertation.

The competence with which public projects are developed and implemented by the civil service has a great impact human development. Talented and creative indigenous administrators can innovate, substitute, investigate, and coordinate to remove obstacles in their development projects. Their insights into social norms, linguistic nuances, and tribal hierarchies often cannot be replicated among western developmental specialists. H.H. Werlin asserts that the good governance is more important than natural resources in the economic development of poor countries.[154]

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[151] In developing countries, there is often a pool of administrators, of varying sizes and levels of competence, who are sometimes referred to as the "second civil service." Source: "Effective Public Administration Vital For Afghans: WB," *Pajhwok Afghan News* (Kabul, Afghanistan), 2008, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-180291360.html

[152] Kristin Helgason and Vilhelm Klareskov, "When the Halo Wears Off," *The Public Manager*, 2006, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-998404411.html

[153] "Effective Public Administration Vital To Deliver Services to Afghan Citizens, Says World Bank Report," *US Fed News Service*, (June 10, 2008).

[154] H.H. Werlin, "Poor Nations, Rich Nations: A Theory of Governance," *Public Administration Review*, *63(3)*, (2003).

Elements of Building Confidence in Public Administration

Many practices, policies, and factors determine the success or failure of public administration. Max Weber advocated a professional civil service, as a prerequisite for economic prosperity. A respected and uncorrupted civil service, Weber argued, reduces levels of uncertainty in civic transactions and increases the level of predictability.[155] There are three specific elements of governance that will determine the credibility of the civil service in Afghanistan and elsewhere.[156] They are particularly important in developing countries with low levels of stability. They are accountability, predictability, and transparency.

Accountability is a precondition for broad-based confidence.[157] Accountability refers to the conviction that civil servants are held responsible for their performance. In high-functioning and professional civil services, industrious and capable employees are rewarded while the incompetent will, ideally, be trained, demoted, or cashiered.[158] When it is effective, accountability rewards competent and honest work and discourages lethargy, incompetence, and dishonesty.[159]

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[155] Dipak K. Gupta, *The Economics of Political Violence: The Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth,* 80.

[156] Kuotsai Liou, "Applying Good Governance Concept to Promote Local Economic Development: Contribution and Challenge," *International Journal of Economic Development*, (January 1, 2007).

[157] Kuotsai Liou, "Applying Good Governance Concept to Promote Local Economic Development: Contribution and Challenge."

[158] "Reasons to be Venal: Can Governments Reduce Corruption by Paying More to Public Servants?" *The Economist (US*), 1997, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-19675970.html

[159]Abdo I. Baaklini and Helen Desfosses, *Designs for Democratic Stability: Studies in Viable Constitutionalism*, (M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 73.

Predictability, like accountability, is necessary for national confidence in public administration.[160] There needs to be confidence in administrators' ability and intention to perform and complete projects according to agreed-upon schedules. Public servants need to ensure that their decisions and plans have long-term credibility and that administrative and legal agreements remain valid in the future.

Transparency is the third requirement for confidence in public administration.[161] Transparency means making decisions through a process that can be recorded and verified. Transparency, like accountability, reduces corruption and builds confidence in public administrators.[162] Transparency is usually a precondition for effective accountability.[163]

Indicator Four: Security

The security sector refers to the military and paramilitary instruments that have a legitimate monopoly on the use of force to create a secure environment throughout country.[164] Many philosophers, Thomas Hobbes was one, stressed that a strong nation-

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[160] B. Guy Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 268.

[161] B. Guy Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, 360.

[162] Francis Adams, "States of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development, (Book Reviews)," *Journal of Development Studies*, 2008, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-90994425.html

[163] "The TI Global Corruption Barometer 2004 is a worldwide public opinion survey conducted for TI by Gallup International with 52,682 respondents. The Global Corruption Barometer is a set of five questions included in the Voice of the People survey 2004, conducted in more than 60 countries by Gallup International members or partners. The TI Global Corruption Barometer is meant to be conducted annually.

[164] "The main security institutions in Afghanistan include: National Security Council and National Security Advisor, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, and the Auditor General's Office; (ii) security services: Afghan National Army (ANA), National Border Guards, Counter-Narcotics forces,

state guarantees peace and that the absence of national-level authority invites a state of disorder, chaos, and war.[165] In many ways, security is pure public good, "meaning that everyone in the locality (in the case of internal security) or in the country (in the case of external security, i.e. defense) benefits from a situation with a general level of security."[166]

The World Bank defines security as, "an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment that is not detrimental to their health and well-being."[167]

U.S. counterinsurgency determined that a government that guarantees security for the population is more likely to have national legitimacy.[168]This is because stakeholders in any economy are rational actors and base their decisions of benefit/cost calculations about the future. Pessimism or uncertainty discourages investment, while optimism

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National Directorate of Security (responsible for intelligence), Customs." Source: William Byrd and Stéphane Guimbert, "Public Finance, Security, and Development, A Framework and an Application to Afghanistan," *The World Bank, South Asia Region, Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development Department*, (January 2009), 28.

[165] Mark Duffield in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 69-89.

[166] William Byrd and Stéphane Guimbert, "Public Finance, Security, and Development, A Framework and an Application to Afghanistan," *The World Bank, South Asia Region, Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development Department*, (January 2009), 17.

[167] "Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice," *Organization of Economic Development and Cooperation*, (Paris: OECD, 2005), 20-21.

[168] John Lynn, "Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Military Review, Vol. 85, No. 4,* (July 2005).

encourages investment, as well as the expansion of stakeholders[169] The World Bank underscores that weak security discourages investment.[170] The manual 3-24 states that "Security is the key facilitating mechanism for most societal and government functions. Although U.S. and multinational forces can provide direct assistance to establish and maintain security, this situation is at best a provisional solution. Ultimately, the host nation must secure its own people."[171]

A strong security apparatus—robust military capabilities, effective paramilitary forces, strong civil-military relations—shores-up the government. Faith in the government gives the citizenry incentive to invest in the county's future. This, in turn, helps to develop the economy. Poor security weakens public administration in several ways. Inadequate security makes it difficult to collect tax revenues and to sustain state assets. It also erodes confidence in public administration. Finally, crime can flourish in the absence of broad-based security.[172]

Maslow's Hierarchy and Its Application to Confidence and Development

Abraham Maslow was a social psychologist whose studies on human needs had broad and enduring implications for many academic disciplines, including sociology,

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[169] Insurgencies and civil wars often generate high casualties among civilians. Source: William Byrd and Stéphane Guimbert, "Public Finance, Security, and Development, A Framework and an Application to Afghanistan," The World Bank, South Asia Region, Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development Department, (January 2009), 5. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/4004/WPS4806.txt?sequence

[170] William Byrd and Stéphane Guimbert, "Public Finance, Security, and Development, A Framework and an Application to Afghanistan," 8.

[171] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, 3-10.

[172] William Byrd and Stéphane Guimbert, "Public Finance, Security, and Development, A Framework and an Application to Afghanistan," 7.

economics, and military science.[173] Maslow developed the pyramid, which he referred to as a hierarchy of universal human motives and needs. It is shown in figure 2. At the base of the pyramid rest the fundamental needs of all persons and societies, to include the physiological needs of food, shelter, and medical care. [174] Filling these needs is a key goal of U.S. counterinsurgency. At the peak are psychological and spiritual states of fulfilled, which Maslow calls "self-actualization.[175]



Figure 2. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

[173] "All About People; The Fourth in Our Series Of Briefs Describes The Search For A Managerial Utopia: The Perfectly Motivated Organization. (Management Brief; Includes Related Article On Reorganizing The Organization)," Source: *The Economist (US*), 1989, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-7826989.html

[174] See "Using Values Modes" at Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality, 3rd edn 1987*, (Addison Wesley, originally published 1954 Longman). http://www.campaignstrategy.org/and http://www.cultdyn.co.uk.

[175] "Maslow's Pyramid Gets A Much Needed Renovation," *States News Service*, (2010), HighBeam Research, (March 1, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-234982583.html

Elements of Maslow's hierarchy have direct application to the Afghan counterinsurgency, particularly on the two bottom levels, physiological and safety; and to esteem, as it loosely applies to counterinsurgency, which will be discussed in chapter five. In table 11 Maslow's pyramid outlined in terms of its application to the counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan. In the far-right column, "Number of Questions in Indicators Used in Pre-Post ANOVA," the *approximate* number of survey questions used in the 2008-2010 ANOVA are listed.[176]

[176] The purpose of this column is to demonstrate the relevance of Maslow's pyramid to the counterinsurgency, in general, and the survey design upon which the ANOVA is based. In the column, this author estimated the approximate number of questions from the data set used in the pre-post ANOVA that are relevant to the testing national confidence.

Maslow's Levels	Selected Character-istics Defined by Maslow	Broad Application to 3-24 and Counterinsurgency Goals in Afghanistan[177]	Number of Questions in Indicators Used in Pre-Post ANOVA
Self-actualization	Morality and creativity	No clear and direct application	NA
Esteem	Confidence, respect	Mobilize and develop local economic activity; identify and recruit local leaders and organizations representatives; develop local and regional national policies. Mobilize and develop local economic activity; identify and recruit local leaders and organizations representatives; develop local and regional national policies.	Indicator 1 – one Indicator 2- three Indicator 3 - 14 Indicator 4- -four
Love/ belonging	Friendship, family	No clear and direct application.	NA
Safety	Security, employment, health	Establish and expand secure areas; Protect key infrastructure; Secure borders; Economic Development. Establish training centers; secure safety continuously; counter crime; isolate insurgency	Indicator 1 –four Indicator 2- four Indicator 3- 14 Indicator 4 -seven
Physiological	Food, water, shelter	Focus on population its needs and security; Provide essential services.	Indicator 1 – five Indicator 2- 10 Indicator 3 - seven Indicator 4 - four

Table 11. Maslow's Pyramid and Its Broad Application to Development and Counterinsurgency and Survey Design

[177] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, 3-86.

Part Four: Measuring National Confidence in Afghanistan in 2008 and 2010

The first three parts of this chapter dealt with insurgency and counterinsurgency; national confidence and war; and levels of national confidence. The remainder of this chapter presents the secondary data analysis methodology used in this dissertation.

Null and Research Hypotheses

As mentioned earlier in the chapter one, three major hypotheses were tested, each referring to a specific elements of national confidence. The null and research hypotheses formats of each indicator were the following:

- H0.1- There was no decline in levels of national confidence in the economy.
  H1.1-There was a decline in levels of national confidence in the economy from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.

- H0.2-There was no decline in levels of national confidence in public administration from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
  H1.2- There was a decline in levels of national confidence in public administration from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.

- H0.3-There was no decline in in levels of national confidence in security from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
  H1.3- There was a decline in level of national confidence in security from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.

To test these hypotheses, the following study design was used:

Overview of Study Design/ Secondary Data Analysis

Two well-regarded annual surveys of Afghan residents, conducted by the Asia Foundation, were chosen for dependent variables. These Asian Foundation surveys were selected because they contained items directly related to national confidence. They were also selected because the Asia Foundation had a strong reputation for accuracy, objectivity, and experience. The quality control was considered high, which helps to ensure validity. Finally, all questions helped to measure perceptions of sustained human development in Afghanistan.

The 2008 and 2010 surveys were 'mature' - the survey data collection cycle had begun in 2005 – and had proven themselves methodologically sound. Further, the Asia Foundation furnished individual-respondent data allowing secondary data analyses to be refined and measured for this dissertation.[178] Finally, there were no other similar data sources of this, or even, lower caliber.

The study design reanalyzed the Asia Foundation's survey data to measure national confidence. Questions from both 2008 and 2010 were selected for their suitability for measuring confidence. The design was a pre-post design, using several indicators and scales, formed by creating linear composites of survey items measuring certain topics. The responses of citizens answering all questions forming a scale.

The study design used survey questions that appeared in both the Asia

[178] To this end, the Asia Foundation's Director of Research and Surveys at the time, Dr. Keith Shawe, based in Kabul, provided full data sets as e-mail attachments, as well as technical notes and other documentation.

Foundation's 2008 and 2010 surveys. These questions helped measure morale and the level of confidence in the economy, public administration, and security. The scales used in the dissertation had been included both 2008, the "pre" measurement level, and the 2010 "post" measurement levels and represented dependent variables. Insurgent attacks against civilians in 2009 were the study's independent variable.

The basic analytic approach was to determine if there were significant shifts, increases or decreases, from 2008 to 2010, and to infer if shifts were associated with violent insurgent attacks. The study design tried to determine if shifts were significantly associated with one or more explanatory variables posed in this dissertation.[179]

Sampling Design and Weighting Approach

Both the 2008 and the 2010 surveys were designed to include 50% female and 50% male respondents. Both surveys were independently drawn, as a nationally representative survey of the citizens in that year. The number of interviews in each province varied. The survey's universe was divided into eight geographic regions, incorporating all 34 provinces. Samples of the target population were then sampled through a proportionally stratified random approach, stratified by provinces, cities, and districts.[180]

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[179] A fuller description of these statisicals techniques can be could in Michael Sullivan' Statistics Informated Decision Using Data, Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2007.

[180] There is no official census of Afghanistan. The Central Statistics Office (CSO) of the Afghan government has attempted to provide updates since 2003, but their base is influenced by figures from the 1979 census. The CSO has received support from the UN, the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, and the World Food Programme to issue updates. ACSOR completed a review of 2010-2011 updates from the CSO and reported that these were acceptable as replacements for the 2006 estimates.

The margin of sampling error was calculated at a cumulative level of +/-4.1 percent at a 95% confidence interval. In addition, there are relatively low levels of other types of estimated error: The stochastic error was +/-2.4 percent, while the systemic error was +/-1.7 %.[181]

Study Participants and Their Characteristics

The average age of the respondents surveyed in the two years increased by less than one year between 2008 and 2010. In 2008, the average age was 34.64, and in 2010 the average 35.21 years old. The average size of households increased only slightly from 2008 compared with 2010. Household size averaged 9.1 members in 2008 and 9.5 members in 2010.

The series of tables that follow provide an overview of major characteristics for each year. In addition, analyses presented later in this study will identify other differences between the two years of respondents, this may have contributed to differences in scale scores for those two years.

[181] Ruth Rennie, Afghanistan in 2011- A Survey of the Afghan People, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2012).

Region	Rural 5175 %	Urban 1417 %	All 6593 %
Central/Kabul	14	54	23
Eastern	13	2	11
South Central	11	4	10
South East	16	10	15
North West	15	13	14
Western	15	9	14
South Western	12	8	11
Central/Hazarjat	4	0	4

Table 12: Region 2008

Region	Rural 5076 %	Urban 1390 %	All 6467 %
Central/Kabul	14	54	23
Eastern	13	2	11
South Central	12	3	10
South East	16	10	15
North West	15	12	14
Western	15	9	14
South Western	12	8	11
Central/Hazarjat	4	1	4

Table 13: Region 2010

Gender	Rural 5175 %	Urban 1417 %	All 6593 %
Male	51	50	51
Female	49	50	49

Table 14: Gender 2008

Gender	Rural 5175 %	Urban 1417 %	All 6593 %
Male	57	43	51
Female	50	50	49

Table 15: Gender 2010

Employment Status	Rural 5175 %	Urban 1417 %	All 6593 %
Working	40	36	39
Retired	1		1
Housewife	42	2	41
Student	7		8
Unemployed	9		10

Table 16: Employment Status 2008

Employment Status	Rural 5076 %	Urban 1390 %	All 6467 %
Working	46	35	44
Retired	1	2	1
Housewife	39	43	39
Student	6	10	7
Unemployed	9	10	9

Table 17: Employment Status 2010

Age	Rural 5175 %	Urban 1417 %	All 6593 %
18-24	26	25	26
25-34	28	29	28
35-44	22	23	22
45-54	15	14	15
55-64	6	7	6
65+	2	3	2

Table 18: Age Distribution 2008

Age	Rural 5076 %	Urban 1390 %	All 6467 %
18-24	25	29	26
25-34	28	27	27
35-44	23	21	23
45-54	14	14	14
55-64[182]	NA	NA	NA
65+	10	10	10

Table 19: Age Distribution 2010

[182] The 55-64 cohort was not listed in the survey volume, with no explanation for that exclusion.

Average Household Income (in Afghanis)	**Rural 5175 %**	**Urban 1417 %**	**All 6593 %**
Less than 2,000 Afs	13	8	12
2,001-3,000 Afs	24	23	24
3,001-5,000 Afs	24	26	24
5,001- 10,000 Afs	33	25	23
10,001-15,000 Afs	8	8	8
15,001-20,000 Afs	4	5	4
20,001-25,000 Afs	1	1	1
25,001-40,000 Afs	0	1	1
More than 40,001 Afs	0	1	0

Table 20: Average Household Income 2008

Average Household Income (in Afghans)	**Rural 5076 %**	**Urban 1390 %**	**All 6467 %**
Less than 2,000 Afs	15	7	13
2,001-3,000 Afs	21	14	20
3,001-5,000 Afs	21	17	20
5,001- 10,000 Afs	25	35	27
10,001-15,000 Afs	10	13	10
15,001-20.,000 Afs	4	7	4
20,001-25,000 Afs	1	3	2
25,001-40,000 Afs	1	2	1
More than 40,000 Afs	2	2	2

Table 21: Average Household Income 2010

Main Occupation	Rural 2141 %	Urban 540 %	All 2682 %
Farmer (own land/ tenant farmer)	35	9	30
Farm laborer (others' land)	15	3	12
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker	6	13	8
Informal sales/business	11	19	13
Skilled worker/artisan	12	12	12
Government Office – Clerical worker	2	6	3
Government Office Executive/Manager	1	3	1
Private Office-Clerical worker	1	2	1
Private Office-Executive/Manager	0	2	1
Self-employed professional	5	13	7
Small business owner	4	4	4
School Teacher	6	11	7
University Teacher	0	0	0
Military/Police	2	3	2
Other	0	0	0

Table 22: Main Occupation 2008

Main Occupation	Rural 2141 %	Urban 540 %	All 2682 %
Farmer (own land/ tenant farmer)	39	9	34
Farm laborer (others' land)	14	4	13
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker	6	8	6
Informal sales/business	9	16	10
Skilled worker/artisan	9	17	10
Government Office – Clerical worker	2	6	3
Government Office Executive/Manager	1	3	1
Private Office-Clerical worker	*	1	1
Private Office-Executive/Manager	*	1	*
Self-employed professional	8	14	9
Small business owner	5	6	5
School Teacher	5	9	5
University Teacher	*	*	*
Military/Police	1	3	1
Other	1	3	2

Table 23: Main Occupation 2010

Highest Level of Schooling	Rural 5175 %	Urban 1417 %	All 6593 %
Never went to school	59	39	55
Primary School, incomplete	13	13	13
Primary School, Complete	6	7	6
Secondary education, incomplete	6	8	6
Secondary education, complete	4	6	5
High School	10	21	12
University education or above	1	6	2

Table 24: Highest Level of Schooling 2008

Highest Level of Schooling	Rural 5076 %	Urban 1390 %	All 6467 %
Never went to school	61	42	57
Primary School, incomplete	9	8	9
Primary School, Complete	6	4	6
Secondary education, incomplete	5	6	3
Secondary education, complete	4	5	4
High School	13	26	16
University education or above	2	8	3

Table 25: Highest Level of Schooling 2010

Data Collection and Quality Control

The fieldwork was subcontracted to the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ASCOR), Kabul. Interviews were conducted in person, and a random, representative multi-stage, stratified- sample was drawn of approximately 6467 Afghan adult citizens in urban and rural environments in all Afghan provinces.[183 and 184]

Door-to-door interviews were conducted with residents from the sampled households, using an approach designed by Leslie Kish, a prominent University of Michigan statistician, which allowed interviewers to select randomly a single informant

[183] Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2010- A Survey of the Afghan People*, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2011).

[184] The surveys are divided into eight geographic regions, and the sample was distributed proportional to geographic and residential characteristics. The margin of sampling error was calculated at a cumulative level of +/-4.1% at a 95% confidence interval. In addition, there are relatively low levels of other types of estimated error: The stochastic error is +/-2.4 % while the systemic error is +/-1.7 %. Source: Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2011- A Survey of the Afghan People*, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2012).

in each household, based on its household size. Interviews were scheduled on various days of the week and times, to balance various potential biases in data collection.

Interviewers were locally based personnel, versed in languages likely to be used by household residents. These interviewers also received guidelines on how to administer survey question formats. Groups of interviewers were supervised and asked to work at a certain pace, to meet the levels of interviewing needed to accomplish the full data collection needed. A large group of interviewers was assigned to conduct interviews for each survey, supervised by a sizable number of supervisors. Each interviewer in the 2008 survey interviewed between 5-30 respondents, and those in the 2010 survey interviewed between 1-32 respondents.

Sampling Techniques

There were five basic steps in drawing the samples comprising the survey populations for both years. First, the sample was stratified by urban and rural population figures. The second step was distributing the sample across available districts in each province to maintain elements of random selection of sampling points and proportionality. Once the districts were identified, areas called "nahias" were selected by simple random sampling, which was the third step. Within the nahias, the interviewers were assigned starting points. The 2008 survey used recognized locations, such as "mosques, schools, bazaars, etc." for starting points.[185] The locations were then verified by supervisors. This was referred to as "the random walk" method. The 2010 survey

[185] Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 134.

used the same methodology.[186]

The fourth step was to select the households. In the 2008 survey, after the locations were determined, the interviewer stopped at the first street on the right-hand side of his route. He then contacted the fourth household from his starting point. If the household was an apartment, the interviewers would select each fifth apartment.[187]

The fifth stage was to gain information about the members of the selected households. After selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid within the household. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after three call-backs, the interviewer moved to the next household.

Interviewers attempted to make two call-backs before replacing the household. In the 2008 survey, 96.8% of the respondents were completed on the first attempt.[188] These call-backs were made at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period, in order to provide a broader schedule in which to engage the respondent. The high rate of success of response was partly attributable to the high rate of unemployment.[189]

Quality-control measures were used extensively in both years' surveys to maximize five major components: validity, reliability, timeliness, precision, and integrity.

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[186] In the 2010 the interviewer stopped at the first street on the right; from there he contacted the seconded household on the right. In apartment buildings, the fifth apartment was selected. Source: Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 176.

[187] Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 134.

[188] Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 134.

In 2008, the interviews were monitored directly in 4.4% of the sample. Another 15.1% of the completed were back-checked by a supervisor in the office. In 2010, 6.4% of the interviews were monitored directly by a supervisor, and another 23.9% of the interviews were directly reviewed by a supervisor. Verification tactics included direct observation during the interview; a return visit to the residence where an interview took place by the supervisor; a return visit to the interview location by a central office field manager; and back-check by an external validator. [190]

Weighting and Oversampling

As the tables presented later in this study show, 6593 residents, 50.8% of them male, were included in the 2008 survey and 6497 residents, 56.1% of them male, in the 2010 survey. Each set of respondents then had their data weighted, using a weighting factor formed from urban-rural and provincial data, to make its characteristics and responses nationally representative of that year's population. The data set also was weighted to adjust for oversampling in some provinces. Oversampling methods were implemented to ensure that sufficient-sized subgroups were part of the respondents included in the survey, and therefore to help develop a national distribution of the population, based on population statistics available.[191]

There were impediments to each year's survey data collection, particularly in 2010. These included weak security afforded interviewers; transportation limitations in

[190] Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People*, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2010), 136.

[191] Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 136.

reaching households; and local customs involving interviewing, which affected the use of female interviewers and reduced the willingness of females to be interviewed.[192]

Variables Used

Some, but not all, of the information gathered in each of the two surveys were used to measure national confidence in this dissertation. Some of the questions in the surveys were asked in only one year, and could not be used for comparison purposes. Some questions were asked in a single-item and were not appropriate for a multiple-items format. Other information did not relate directly to national confidence, though helped to explain elements of Afghan cultures. But this dissertation used demographic and background characteristics that were useful in associating shifts in national confidence from year to year.

Independent Variable

Data on the level of fatalities in the country were obtained from a range of sources by United Nations Assistance Mission– Afghanistan (UNAMA), with staff in regional and provincial offices throughout Afghanistan. UNAMA investigates all sources for credibility. Its officers crosschecked reports against testimony of victims, victim's relatives, witnesses, health personnel and other sources. UNAMA did not distinguish between the insurgent groups, such as Taliban, Haqqani Network, Pakistani Taliban, or

[192] A fuller description of the two surveys' sampling design, data collection approaches found to be feasible, and quality control procedures used (which included re-contacts by different interviewers to verify that interviews were conducted and reliably so) can be found in the Asia Foundation's volume of findings for each year.

others. Neither did they distinguish between pro-government forces.[193] The specific procedure for investigating, verifying, and recording attacks on civilians, including fatalities, is described here.

ISAF investigated all charges of civilian casualties. When a civilian attack was reported, an ISAF Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Incident Procedure investigated the claim.[194] This is particularly urgent when there was a concern that the casualties were caused by ISAF. All casualties, regardless of the perpetrator, were considered to be a CIVCAS "event."

The Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell (CCTC) investigated the cause, perpetrator, and results of attacks on civilians and records results in the CCTC tracker.[195] Investigators wrote a First Impression Report, generally within four hours of when the attack was reported. A Second Impression Report was required within 24 hours of submission of the First Impression Report. This was followed by an Investigation Recommendation Report, which was a more thorough report, written after more facts have been gathered and statements have been verified. Within nine days of the incident notification, an Assessment Report was submitted to headquarters ISAF, which included analysis of the attack and post-incident response and effectiveness. It also tried to draw

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[193] "Afghanistan: Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Army Conflict*," United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),* (Kabul: 2009).

[194] Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Standard Operating Procedure, *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF*), (February 23, 2011); as referred to in J. Bohannon, *Science 331*, (2011).

[195] Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Standard Operating Procedure, *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF*).

lessons learned. Finally, there were the Legal Advisor's recommendations**.** All incidents used in this dissertation followed this CIVCAS methodology.[196]

The Dependent Variables

National Confidence was measured in this study by creating four indicators and five scales measuring those indicators. Scale scores were used to provide greater precision, which gives greater statistical power to detect program effects.[197]

Each scale was formed as a linear composite, averaging citizens' responses to multiple survey questions with common response formats. One index, national morale, was measured but was included only in the 2008 survey.[198] The other three indicators and their component scales were measured using survey questions included in both the 2008 and 2010 surveys. These indicators and scales were the following:

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[196] J. Bohannon, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Standard Operating Procedure," *Science 331, 1256,* (23 February, 2011).

[197] Source: The National Center on Educational Evaluation and Regional Assistance, the article "Technical Methods Report: Using State Tests in Education Experiments: A discussion of the Issues" (NCEE 2009-013, November 2009) http://www.unt.edu/rss/class/Jon/Benchmarks/CompositeScores_JDS_Feb2012.pdf and http://www.uic.edu/classes/socw/socw560/SCALING/sld012.htm

[198] It should, therefore, should be considered more of a descriptive indicator since shifts from year to year cannot be measured on those topics.

Indicator	Scale	Title
Indicator 1		National Morale/Direction of the Country
Indicator 2		Economic Confidence (measured by using two scales)
	Scale 2A	Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in Citizens Household
	Scale 2B	Economic Prosperity: Measuring Conditions in Villages/Neighborhoods Where Citizens Live
Indicator 3		Confidence in Public Administration
	Scale 3A	Confidence of Citizens in Institutions, Organizations, and Officials
	Scale 3B:	Confidence of Citizens in National and Provincial Governments
Indicator 4		Confidence in Security
	Scale 4:	Level of local and national sense of security

Table 26: Indicators and Scales Used in this Dissertation

The Four Indicators

All indicators were based on scales, which were created by averaging respondents' answers on questions inquiring about the same topic and in the same rating scale format. The SPSS Reliability procedure was used to check the level of homogeneity or similarity among survey questions considered for a given scale. Results of that analysis, including Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha internal consistency reliability levels, appear in chapter six.[199] One set of questions, indicator 2B, that initially was thought to represent a scale, or homogeneous measure, did not survive the reliability analyses, and was discarded.[200] Only respondents who answered all questions forming a given scale were included in this dissertation's data analysis.

[199] The Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha measures a survey's internal consistency. It assesses the reliability of a rating summarizing a group of test or survey answers which measure some underlying factor (e.g., some attribute of the test-taker)." Source: Definition of Cronbach's Alpha, About.com Economics, accessed on July 5, 2014, http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/cronbachalpha.htm

[200] Nonetheless, the initial numbering given the scales and indicators in this study was retained for convenience

Indicator 1: National Morale (nine survey items)

Indicator 1 measures the general morale in Afghanistan in 2008, based on survey questions included in that year's survey. This indicator or scale could not be created from survey questions included in the 2010 survey because the 2008 questions used to create the scale were not asked in 2010. The 2008 questions asked the respondent to anticipate the quality of nine elements of human development as they would likely exist in the following year, 2009. The wording was "What is your expectation for _____ in your area a year from now? (Response format--- much better, somewhat better, somewhat worse, or much worse)."

Survey Topics in 2008 that formed this indicator were**:**

Q17a Availability of clean drinking water

Q17b Availability of water for irrigation

Q17c Availability of jobs

Q17d Supply of electricity

Q17e Security situation

Q17f Availability of clinics and hospitals

Q17g Availability of medicine

Q17h Availability of education for children

Q17i Freedom of movement--the ability to move safely in your area or district

Indicator 2A. Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in Citizens' Households (eight survey items):

Indicator 2A attempted to measure the economic status of households in 2008 and 2010. Indicator 2A compares the current economic status of respondents to the way they remembered their status in 2006. This question, therefore, compared the status of 2008 to that of 2006, and 2010 to 2009.

The 2008 questions were worded as: Compared to two years ago, would you say that the situation for your household has [response format] with respect to the following? (Response format--- gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse). The 2010 Question wording was: Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has (response format) with respect to the following? (Response format- gotten better, the same, or worse)

Survey Topics in 2008 were:

Q41a Financial well-being of your household

Q41b Employment opportunities

Q41c Availability of products in the market

Q41d Quality of your food diet

Q41e Physical condition of your house/dwelling

Q41f Health well-being of your family members

Q41g Electricity supply

Q41h Access to schools

In the 2010 survey these topics were numbered Q14a-Q14h.

Indicator 2B. Economic Prosperity: Measuring Conditions in Villages/Neighborhoods Where Citizens Live (nine survey items):

Indicator 2B attempted to measure the respondents' current view of his/her village or neighborhood economic status of households in 2008 and 2010. The questions in both 2008 and 2010 were worded the same, "I would like to ask you about today's conditions in the village/neighborhood where you live. Would you rate the _____ as [Response format] in your area? (Response format--- very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad)."

Topics in 2008 and 2010 were:

Q16a Availability of clean drinking water

Q16b Availability of water for irrigation

Q16c Availability of jobs

Q16d Supply of electricity

Q16e Security situation

Q16f Availability of clinics and hospitals

Q16g Availability of medicine

Q16h Availability of education for children

Q16I Freedom of movement—the ability to move safely in your area or district

In the 2010 survey these topics were numbered Q10a-Q10i.

Indicator 3A. Confidence of Citizens in Institutions, Organizations, and Officials (16 survey items):

Question 3A focuses on national confidence in different elements of public

administration. The question for 2008 is worded, "I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions and organizations in our country. Please tell me how much confidence you have in each of the [following] institutions and organizations and officials to perform their jobs _____ (Response format--- A great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all)." The question for 2010 was worded, "Do you have a (Response format--- a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all) in. . ."

Topics covered:

Q52a Afghan National Army[201]

Q52b Afghan National Police

Q52c Political parties

Q52d The Government justice system

Q52e Government ministries

Q52f Independent Election Commission

Q52g Public administration

Q52h Municipalities

Q52i Local militias

Q52j Community development councils

Q52k Provincial councils

Q52l Community shuras/jirgas

Q52m National NGOs

[201] Results of the ANA will be discussed in indicator four, security.

Q52n International NGOs

Q52o Electronic media, such as radio, TV

Q52p Newspapers, print media

In the 2010 survey these topics were numbered Q34a-Q34k, and Q34m-Q34p.

Indicator 3B. Confidence of Citizens in National and Provincial Governments (nine survey items):

Question 3B also focused on provincial and national public administration. Question wording in both 2008 and 2010 was: [First question in set] Thinking of _____, how do you feel about the way it is carrying out its responsibilities? [All other questions in set] And speaking of particular aspects of its work, do you think the National Government is doing [response format] in the following fields? _____ [Last question in set] Turning to your Provincial Government, do you think that overall it is doing [response format] (Response format--- a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job)

Topics covered:

Q62 The National Government

Q63a Education

Q63b Healthcare system

Q63c Creating job opportunities

Q63d Maintaining relations with neighboring countries

Q63e Reviving/Developing the economy

Q63f Fighting corruption

Q63g Security

Q64a Provincial government

In the 2010 survey these topics were numbered Q37a, Q37ba-Q37bg, and Q38a.[202]

Indicator 4. Security (Do citizens feel secure in various ways?) (nine survey items)

The fourth indicator measured perceptions of security. It was worded in both the 2008 and 2010 surveys, as "I'm going to read some statements to you about ANA (in four questions, ANP in five questions). Please tell me if you agree with each…ANA is _____ (Response format--- strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, strongly disagree)."

Topics covered:

Q53a Honest and fair with the Afghan people

Q53b Unprofessional and poorly trained

Q53c _____ needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself

Q53d Helps improve the security

Q54a Honest and fair with the Afghan people

Q54b Unprofessional and poorly trained

Q54c _____ needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself

[202] For purpose of measurement, public administration was divided into two elements. Both question sets 3A and 3B had questions involving local, provincial, and national public administration. Question set 3A had greater diversity including public administration questions involving fighting corruption; ensuring free, fair, and contested elections; and international relations. Question set 3B was focused on the performance of national and provincial governments. The questions sets will be measured separately and, in the results chapter, their aggregate scores will be averaged for a single result in public administration.

Q54d _____ helps improve the security

Q54e Efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that they can be brought to justice.

In the 2010 survey these topics were numbered Q35a-Q35d, and Q36a-Q36e.

Table 27 shows the missing data in the survey collection in both 2008 and 2010. Only those question sets in which *all the questions* were answered were used for analysis in this dissertation.

Of the five question sets for both years, the question sets with the most missing data were scale 3A with 36.1% in 2008, and scale 3A with 20.4% in 2010. The scales with the least missing data were scale 2B at 3.6% in 2008 and scale 2A at 6.2% in 2010. The average extent of scales that had missing questions was 14.5% in 2008 and 9.6% in 2010. The differences in response rates from year to year for each of the scales are listed in table 27:

	Number in 2008 Survey	**Number in 2010 Survey**	**% Valid Responses in 2008**	**% Valid Responses in 2010**	**Difference in Response Rates**
Scale 2A	6090	6159	92.4%	93.8%	-1.4%
Scale 2B	6327	5964	96.4%	90.8%	5.1%
Scale 3A	4212	5228	63.9%	79.6%	-15.7%
Scale 3B	5712	5808	86.6%	88.4%	-1.8%
Scale 4	5906	6079	89.6%	92.6%	-3.0%

Table 27: Differences in Survey Response Rates by Scale and Year of Interview

The scale with the greatest percentage of missing data was 3A for 2008. This is because 16 questions formed this scale, all of which needed to be answered for a

respondent to be included in analyses. Table 27 provides an overview of these scales and their component survey questions from each year.

INDIC -ATOR #	NAME OF SCALE	COEFF-ICIENT ALPHA VALUE	NO. OF SURVEY ITEMS IN SCALE	NO. OF SCALE PTS. IN SURVEY ITEMS	NO. OF VALID CASES **	SURVEY ITEMS ON WHICH SCALE IS BASED	
						2008	2010
1	National Confidence & Direction of Country	.926	9	4	5561	Q17A-Q17I	NOT MEASURED IN 2010
2A	Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in Citizens' Households	.741	8	3	6090	Q41A-Q41H	Q14A-Q14H *
2B	Economic Prosperity: Measuring Conditions in Villages & Neighbor-hoods	.735	9	4	6327	Q16A-Q16I	Q10A-Q10I
3A	Confidence of Citizens in Institutions, Organizations & Officials	.879	16	4	4212	Q52A-Q52P	Q34A-Q34P *
3B	Confidence of Citizens in National & Provincial Governments	.804	9	4	5712	Q62, Q63A-Q63G, Q64A	Q37A, Q37BA-Q37BG, Q38A
4	Security of Citizens	.700	9	4	5906	Q53A-Q53D, Q54A-Q54E	Q35A-Q35D, Q36A-Q36E

Table 28. 2008 and 2010 Survey Items Forming National Confidence Indicators [203]

[203] In the graph, the symbol "*" indicates a slight difference in question wording compared with corresponding 2008 survey questions. See "Indicators of National Confidence" document for wording comparisons. ** "Valid cases" = survey respondents answering each question forming a given scale.

Total Number of Scales with Complete Data from Participants in Each Survey Year

This dissertation measured the responses of both surveys, 2008 and 2010, as long as *each* of the survey items comprising the five scales used in the study were answered. It was essential to determine whether or not the scales used in this study were representative of *all* citizens that took part in both survey years.

A cross-tabulation of the results and chi-square analysis showed similar patterns for both years. However, not all respondents answered all questions. In the 2008 survey, 3499 respondents, or more than half, 53.1%, of all survey participants, provided responses for all of the survey items, which comprised all five of the scales used as dependent variables. In the 2010 survey, more respondents answered all the questions than in 2008; 4318 respondents, or 66.8%, provided complete data.

However, the percentage of respondents who answered all questions on either four or five scales is much higher, at 83.1% for 2008 survey participants and 89.8% for 2010 survey participants. Further, results show that 94.7% of 2008 survey participants provided complete responses for three-five scales and 96.7% of 2010 survey participants did so that year.

Variables on Which Respondents Were Similar From Year to Year

A stepwise discriminant function analysis (DFA) approach was used with the variables to understand the similarities and differences between the 2008 and 2010 surveys.[204] This was done to determine is differences in ANOVA results between 2008

[204] Discriminant function analysis performs a multivariate test of differences between groups.

and 2010 may have resulted, in part, from differences from respondents answering all the questions.

The DFA approach took into account correlations between pairs of these variables. The stepwise approach allowed for discovering the subset of all variables that most contributed to identifying differences between the two years of data. Some of the variables were nominal and were converted to dummy variable (0,1) or (absence, presence) format before being used. Those already in continuous or ordinal format were used in that format.

The statistical criteria for variables being entered into the discriminant function equation were the following: At each step, the variable that maximized the Mahalanobis distance between the two closest groups was entered, until the F level was considered insufficient for further computation. The maximum significance of the F to enter statistic was .05, while the minimum significance of the F to remove statistic was .10.

Characteristics of Survey Respondents

Tables 29-38 highlight differences between demographic and geographic variables. Geographic Subdivisions are shown in table 29. The survey was conducted in all eight regions, as shown below. These geographic regions, identified by the Asia Foundation in conducting their surveys, correspond to UNAMA's eight regions used to identify areas of insurgent and pro-government attacks. The most frequently surveyed region was Central/Kabul, at 20.7%, the least-frequently surveyed area was Central/Hazarjat at 6.8%.

Region		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
Central/Kabul	Count	1239	1462	2701
	% within Year of Interview	18.8%	22.6%	20.7%
Eastern	Count	640	627	1267
	% within Year of Interview	9.7%	9.7%	9.7%
South East	Count	705	692	1397
	% within Year of Interview	10.7%	10.7%	10.7%
South Western	Count	692	718	1410
	% within Year of Interview	10.5%	11.1%	10.8%
Western	Count	752	873	1625
	% within Year of Interview	11.4%	13.5%	12.4%
North East	Count	943	944	1887
	% within Year of Interview	14.3%	14.6%	14.4%
Central/Hazarjat	Count	659	226	885
	% within Year of Interview	10.0%	3.5%	6.8%
North West	Count	963	925	1888
	% within Year of Interview	14.6%	14.3%	14.5%
Total	Count	6593	6467	13060
	% within Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 29. Region by Year of Interview

In 2008 and 2010, the vast majority of Afghans lived in villages, as shown in table 30.[205]

Geographic Subdivisions		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
Villages	Count	5176	5077	10253
	% within Year of Interview	78.5%	78.5%	78.5%
Towns	Count	280	304	584
	% within Year of Interview	4.2%	4.7%	4.5%
City	Count	388	353	741
	% within Year of Interview	5.9%	5.5%	5.7%
Metro (Kabul)	Count	749	733	1482
	% within Year of Interview	11.4%	11.3%	11.3%
Total	Count	6593	6467	13060
	% within Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 30. Geographic Subdivisions by Year of Interview

[205] Neither the 2008 nor the 2010 survey defines precisely how village or town or city is defined.

The ratios of male-to-female respondents are listed in table 31. The gap expanded from 1.4% in 2008 to 11.2% in 2010.

Gender		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
Male	Count	3343	3597	6940
	% within Year of Interview	50.7%	55.6%	53.1%
Female	Count	3250	2870	6120
	% within Year of Interview	49.3%	44.4%	46.9%
Total	Count	6593	6467	13060
	% Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 31. Gender and Year of Interview

The age group cohort is listed in table 32.

Age Groupings		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
18-24	Count	1695	1684	3379
	% within Year of Interview	25.7%	26.0%	25.9%
25-34	Count	1875	1772	3647
	% within Year of Interview	28.4%	27.4%	27.9%
35-44	Count	1477	1468	2945
	% within Year of Interview	22.4%	22.7%	22.5%
45-82	Count	1546	1543	3089
	% within Year of Interview	23.4%	23.9%	23.7%
Total	Count	6593	6467	13060
	% within Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 32: Age Groupings by Year of Interview

The status of the respondents were divided into five categories: working, retired, housewife, student, and unemployed, as shown in table 33.

Employment Status		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
Working	Count	2593	2830	5423
	% within Year of Interview	39.4%	43.8%	41.6%
Retired	Count	89	53	142
	% within Year of Interview	1.4%	0.8%	1.1%
Housewife	Count	2734	2552	5286
	% within Year of Interview	41.5%	39.5%	40.5%
Student	Count	498	444	942
	% within Year of Interview	7.6%	6.9%	7.2%
Unemployed	Count	669	588	1257
	% within Year of Interview	10.2%	9.1%	9.6%
Total	Count	6583	6467	13050
	% within Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 33. Are You Now Working, A Housewife (Ask Only Women), Retired, a Student, or Looking for Work by Year of Interview

The ethnic balance of the survey is shown in table 34 and conforms closely to the national balance, as reported in 2013.[206] The largest ethnic group, by far, is the Pashtun group. The Taliban are heavily, though not exclusively, Pashtun. Areas of the highest insurgent violence in 2009 were those of the highest concentrations of Pashtuns.

[206] The CIA Factbook of 2014 gives the following representations of ethnic cohorts: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, Afghanistan, Accessed April 8, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

Ethnicity		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
Pashtun	Count	2765	2717	5482
	% within Year of Interview	41.9%	42.0%	42.0%
Tajik	Count	2190	2015	4205
	% within Year of Interview	33.2%	31.1%	32.2%
Uzbek	Count	647	559	1206
	% within Year of Interview	9.8%	8.6%	9.2%
Hazara	Count	645	679	1324
	% within Year of Interview	9.8%	10.5%	10.1%
Turkmen	Count	106	148	254
	% within Year of Interview	1.6%	2.3%	1.9%
Baloch	Count	40	61	101
	% within Year of Interview	0.6%	0.9%	0.8%
Kirghiz	Count	4	4	8
	% within Year of Interview	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Nuristani	Count	41	45	86
	% within Year of Interview	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%
Aimak	Count	43	124	167
	% within Year of Interview	0.7%	1.9%	1.3%
Arab	Count	69	99	168
	% within Year of Interview	1.0%	1.5%	1.3%
Sadat	Count	43	18	61
	% within Year of Interview	0.7%	0.3%	0.5%
Total	Count	6593	6469	13062
	% within Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 34. Ethnicity by Year of Interview

Afghanistan has very low levels of education, and this was reflected in the surveys, shown in table 35. The majority of the respondents never went to school, at

55.9%. Only 13.9% of those surveyed attended high school, and less than 3% attended university.[207]

Educational Level		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
Never went to school	Count	3619	3677	7296
	% within Year of Interview	54.9%	56.9%	55.9%
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	Count	878	567	1445
	% within Year of Interview	13.3%	8.8%	11.1%
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	Count	398	362	760
	% within Year of Interview	6.0%	5.6%	5.8%
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	Count	425	355	780
	% within Year of Interview	6.5%	5.5%	6.0%
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	Count	309	260	569
	% within Year of Interview	4.7%	4.0%	4.4%
High School (classes 10 to 12)	Count	795	1021	1816
	% within Year of Interview	12.1%	15.8%	13.9%
University education or above	Count	163	220	383
	% within Year of Interview	2.5%	3.4%	2.9%
Total	Count	6587	6462	13049
	% Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 35. What Is The Highest Level of School You Completed? Year of Interview

[207] The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Afghanistan, October 2010.

In surveying the household status, table 36, the largest differences between the years was in the "well-off" category.

Household Status		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
The household is well-off	Count	20	543	563
	% within Year of Interview	0.3%	8.4%	4.3%
The household is enjoying a fair well-being	Count	1214	964	2178
	% within Year of Interview	18.4%	14.9%	16.7%
Bears indications of moderate existence	Count	1736	1358	3094
	% within Year of Interview	26.3%	21.0%	23.7%
The household is in bad condition/in need of repair	Count	1777	1694	3471
	% within Year of Interview	26.9%	26.2%	26.6%
The household is living with difficulty	Count	1317	1332	2649
	% within Year of Interview	20.0%	20.6%	20.3%
The household bears all signs of poverty	Count	530	577	1107
	% within Year of Interview	8.0%	8.9%	8.5%
Total	Count	6594	6468	13062
	% within Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 36. Code household status. Impressions of Dwelling of the Household, The Environment, The Appearance of Its Members

Afghans are among the poorest people in the world.[208] The poorest Afghans surveyed, at 12.3% in 2008 and 13.2%, earned less than $40.00 per month, at the 2009 exchange rate. The highest earners, 3% in 2008 and 2.1% in 2010, earned more than $800.00 each month.

[208] In 2009 the currency exchange was 50 Afghanis to 1 dollar. Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Afghanistan, October 2010. June 10, 2010.

Income in Afghanis		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
Less than 2,000	Count	786	848	1634
	% within Year of Interview	12.3%	13.2%	12.7%
2,001 - 3,000	Count	1585	1272	2857
	% within Year of Interview	24.8%	19.8%	22.3%
3,001 - 5,000	Count	1581	1305	2886
	% within Year of Interview	24.7%	20.3%	22.5%
5,001- 10,000	Count	1508	1742	3250
	% within Year of Interview	23.6%	27.1%	25.4%
10,001 - 15,000	Count	528	664	1192
	% within Year of Interview	8.3%	10.3%	9.3%
15,001 - 20,000	Count	270	288	558
	% within Year of Interview	4.2%	4.5%	4.4%
20,001 - 25,000	Count	80	109	189
	% within Year of Interview	1.3%	1.7%	1.5%
25,001 - 40,000	Count	38	61	99
	% within Year of Interview	0.6%	0.9%	0.8%
More than 40,000	Count	17	134	151
	% within Year of Interview	0.3%	2.1%	1.2%
Total	Count	6393	6423	12816
	% within Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 37. Average Monthly Family Total Income by Year of Interview

Of those surveyed, 77.4 % were married and 19.8% were single. People in Afghanistan, particularly females, tend to marry very young, by western standards.

Marital Status		Year of Interview		Total
		2008	2010	
Single	Count	1341	1248	2589
	% within Year of Interview	20.4%	19.3%	19.8%
Married	Count	5052	5058	10110
	% within Year of Interview	76.7%	78.2%	77.5%
Widower/ Widow	Count	193	161	354
	% within Year of Interview	2.9%	2.5%	2.7%
Total	Count	6586	6467	13053
	% within Year of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 38. Are You Married or Single? By Year of Interview

Methodology

The questions used to measure national confidence in the 2008 and 2010 were nationally representative samples of Afghan citizens.[209] These questions were placed into different broad categories of national confidence to create scales. These scales either had eight, nine or 16 survey items.

These questions were used to determine if there was a national-level shift in confidence between 2008 and 2010 and to determine if there was a shift among specific groups, listed below as categorical and ordinal/discrete variables.[210] For example, did national confidence change among men more than it changed among women? Were employed Afghans more likely to shift their attitudes than unemployed Afghans or students or housewives? Did ethnicity or clan affiliation or region or age or education or

[209] The 2008 and 2010 samples were independently drawn, and nationally weighted by urban/rural and province factors.

[210] Scale 1, which was National Confidence, was presented only 2008 because it was not measured in 2010. In 2008 the average individual score computed by the current researcher across nine 2008 survey items, Q17a-Q17i.

wealth affect perceptions of national confidence? The variables used to explore national confidence are listed below:

Categorical Variables *(and order of response options)*

- Gender (male or female)
- Current status (working, retired, housewife, student, unemployed or other)
- Marital status (single, married or widow)
- Ethnic group to which respondent belongs (11 groups)
- Region (eight regions)
- Geographic subdivisions (villages, towns, city, or Metro/Kabul)

Ordinal/Continuous Variables (*and order of response options*)

- Age on last birthday (in single years)
- Highest level of school completed (never went to school, two levels of primary school, two levels of secondary school, high school, university education or above)
- Number of people living at address
- Average family total monthly income (nine categorical ranges of currency)
- Living standard of household[211]

This dissertation examines the differences between these variables in the 2008 and 2010 surveys.

[211] Six categories reversed to be low to high order although they were initially recorded in high to low order; codes assigned by interviewer on the basis of "impressions from the dwelling of the household, the environment, and the appearance of household members."

Examining the Response and Non-Response Survey Items

As mentioned above, a stepwise discriminant function approach determined which of a series of explanatory variables most differentiated those responding versus not responding on each of the five dependent variables, or scale scores, used in this study.[212]

"Response" was defined as a survey participant's providing valid answers to ***all*** survey items forming a given scale. "Non-response" was defined as anything less than the ***all*** of survey items forming a scale.[213] The explanatory variables and their categories that have distinguished respondents from non-respondents in the 2008 and the 2010 surveys.[214]

Explanatory variables and their categories that distinguished respondents from non-respondents on either three, four, or five scales *for either year* are included in the table, since those represent the most salient variables.[215] If a factor or category was included for one year, then its corresponding number of scales distinguishing the two groups for the other year also was included for comparison purposes.[216]

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[212] At each step, the variable that maximized the Mahalanobis distance between the two closest groups and was found to be significant at the $p<.05$ level was entered.

[213] In other words, from zero to one less than the full amount. All survey participants in both survey years were classified on each scale as to whether they had answered all questions of the scale, or fewer than all the questions.

[214] These two survey years of results were presented separately, since it was thought that different factors might distinguish each year's respondents from its non-respondents. They are presented next to each other for comparison purposes.

[215] Using lower cutoffs of one or two was thought to include more isolated and thus less generalizable factors.

[216] A count of zero meant that on none of the five scales did that factor differentiate respondents from non-respondents; they were comparable.

The findings presented in Table 39 indicated that scale respondents differed significantly differ from non-respondents on certain explanatory variables. As listed in the table, these factors were: region, four categories; geographic subdivisions, three categories; gender, average family income; highest level of schooling; and ethnic group membership, two categories.

In other categories there were few differences between respondents. These had none or 1-2 scales on which these two groups differed. For example, four other regional categories and nine other ethnic groups were not found to have significantly different proportions of respondents and non-respondents. These inspire confidence that the scale results gathered from respondents can be reasonably generalized to non-respondents.[217]

		Number of Scales on which Respondents were Distinguished from Non-Respondents	
Explanatory Variable	**Category**	**2008**	**2010**
Region	South East	5	1
	North East	4	3
	Central/Hazarjat	3	4
	Western	0	5
Geographic Subdivisions	Villages	5	3
	Towns	3	1
	City	1	3
Gender	Male	4	0
Average Family Income	*	3	2
Highest level of schooling	*	3	2
Ethnic Group	Hazara	3	3
	Arab	2	3

Table 39: Factors Most Distinguishing Respondents from Non-Respondents on Five Scales[218]

[217] Other factors had relatively low numbers of scales on which these groups differed (or did not enter the stepwise discriminant analyses at all), and therefore were not included in this table of highlights: Current status, marital status, age on last birthday, number of people living at address, and living standard of household.

[218] The symbol * indicates a continuous or ordinal variable that did not have categories included in the analysis.

Statistical Analyses Used for Detecting Differences between Years

The pre-post, one-way ANOVA in this dissertation tried to ensure that the characteristics of participants in both surveys were similar. It tried to ensure differences in average scale scores, associated with differential characteristics, also termed 'cohort effects' would not limit the internal validity of the study.

Overall Analyses of Variance

National confidence was examined in several, successive stages. ANOVA was first conducted, using SPSS software, for each of the five scale scores, as a dependent variable. The year of interview was the independent variable. If a scale score was found to be statistically significant at the $p = .05$ level, in would be analyzed at the next stage, to learn what explanatory variables were significantly associated with it. If the mean difference between the two groups of results, 2008 vs. 2010, was non-significant, no further analyses of data for that scale score was conducted.

If the one-way ANOVA result was statistically significant, factorial ANOVA tests of statistical significance were conducted, using the general linear model approach in a full factorial design. Six sets of analyses with selected potentially explanatory variables were conducted, resulting in results containing main effects, and two- or three-way interactions of explanatory variables combined with year of interview.[219]

[219] For this study, any significant interactions of two- or three-way interactions with year of interview were of interest, in addition to examining the magnitude of association or spread of between-group means.

Another level of examination also was conducted as follow-up tests after finding significant interaction effects, and those were pairwise comparisons.[220] Meaningful interactions results and/or the magnitude of difference in between-group means was presented graphically.

Explanatory Variables

Nine demographic and geographic factors, grouped into six sets, were used to assess the shift in national confidence from 2008 to 2010. These variables were gathered by extensively reviewing the likely variables available in the Asia Foundation surveys. Variable were examined in the context of the following questions: Were certain variables useful? Were given variables collected in the same way in both surveys? Did they overlap or correlate extensively with other variables?[221] Nine factors emerged, grouped into six sets.

Two of the factors are geographic, one divides Afghanistan into eight regions and another places respondents into either villages, towns, cities or in the Kabul metro area. Other factors included: gender, age, employment status, ethnicity, educational level, people living at a residence and living standards. The factors used in the ANOVA to as assess whether the characteristics of scale respondents and non-respondents significantly differ are listed in figure 40.

[220] The follow-up tested used the Sidak approach which is relatively conservative in minimizing the Type I error of incorrectly rejecting null hypotheses.

[221] For this latter purpose, a hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted, indicating that certain variables did not highly belong with other variables and/or they were essentially too correlated with other variables

These factors give a broad indication of Afghan society. They also help gauge the popular opinions of demographic cohort of counterinsurgency and developmental efforts. For example, these factor sets can isolate opinions of certain geographic elements, such as middle-aged, town-dwellers near Kandahar; or educational-social cohorts, such as university-educated, upper-income retirees.

Set Factor	Factor/Response Categories	Subdivisions
1	Region	Eight Regions
2	Geographic Subdivisions Gender Age on last birthday	Villages, towns, city, or metro/Kabul Male or female Four categories based on data patterns: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-82
3	Employment Stats	Working, retired, housewife, student, unemployed
4	Ethnic group to which respondent belongs	11 groups
5	Highest level of school completed	Never went to school, two levels of primary school, two levels of secondary school, high school, university education or above
6	Living standard of household	Six codes assigned by interviewer on the basis of "impressions from the dwelling of the household, the environment, and the appearance of household members Number of people living at address (grouped into four categories based on data patterns: 2-5, 6-7, 8-10, 11-39)[222]

Table 40: Sets of Factors Used in ANOVA

[222] Not used above--National Confidence (average individual score computed across nine 2008 survey items, Q17a-Q17i; these items not included in the 2010 survey). Further, 2008 and 2010 data were nationally weighted based on a combination of urban/rural and province location.

Summary

Part Four discussed how national confidence was systematically measured in this dissertation, and between-groups differences were tested for statistical significance. It also discusses the procedure for measuring civilian fatalities that occurred in 2009, which is the independent variable.

The manual 3-24 offers five indicators of "legitimacy" to analyze the level of stability in a country. These indicators are: "A high level of popular participation in or support for the political process; a low level of corruption; a culturally acceptable level or rate of political, economic, and social development; a high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions."[223] Elements of these indicators, except for regime acceptance by major social institutions,[224] were used to measure confidence in this dissertation. They were formulated into questions to measure national confidence.

In successive surveys, the Asia Foundation tried to measure various elements of national confidence because trust is the bedrock of human development.[225] Four sets of national confidence indicators, discussed earlier in this chapter, are shown below. Indicator one is national morale; indicator two is confidence in the economy, measuring situations in citizen's households; indicator three is confidence in public administration, including institutions, organizations, and officials; and indicator four is confidence in

[223] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*.

[224] Regime acceptance by major social institutions is not measured in this dissertation because the survey, the source of the dependent variables, asked individuals for their opinions. The survey does not measure the confidence held by organizations or institutions.

[225] This survey was made possible through support provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (Award No. 306-A-00-03-00504-00).

security. As was discussed in the literature review, the survey questions of the dependent variables were conducted in 2008 and 2010. [226]

Human development and counterinsurgency are mutually reinforcing. The reason that human development and counterinsurgency are often so linked, as is certainly the case in Afghanistan, is because domestic peace is usually a pre-condition for sustained human development. People will often not invest their labor or capital in unstable areas. Unless there are anticipated returns on investment, capital generally prefers to flow in the direction of safety, because capital investments are made on the basis of costs and benefits. Corruption corrodes faith in many governmental institutions; discourages investment; and weakens the rule of law.[227]

The government is charged with creating and maintaining conditions that will promote sustained development. The extent to which it can do this, is often the extent to which the government will be seen as legitimate. The higher the level of national confidence in the government, the more difficult it is for an insurgency to succeed. Elements of national confidence will be measured in a pre-post test.

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[226] These were conducted by the Asia Foundation, and the survey first was conducted in 2004. Source: Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 1.

[227] Dennis Steele, "The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Counterinsurgency," *Army Magazine, Vol 57, No 7*, (July 2007), 43-66.

CHAPTER THREE: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

"Nation-building is not for the fainthearted. It will often fail, or at least fall far short of aspirations. And sometimes failure is painful enough that perhaps it would have been better not to have made the attempt. But compared with the alternative of letting countries wallow in anarchy, violence and misery, it's our only choice." Michael O'Hanlon, 2006[1]

Introduction

Chapter two discussed general concepts of conflict and offered a model of national confidence. It presented the set of questions and the methodology used to measure the change in the levels of national confidence. Chapter three will analyze human development in Afghanistan. It will discuss confidence-building efforts to spur broad-based, multi-sector economic development. In addition, it will trace key issues in Afghanistan's development, such as public administration, education, health, communications, and security.

According to the ADB, in 2009 Afghanistan was the poorest country in Asia. In terms of human development, the UNDP Human Poverty Index ranked Afghanistan last among 135 countries, on the basis of short average lifespans, widespread insecurity, a weak rule of law, inadequate healthcare and education, poor public services, limited employment opportunities, and widespread poverty among a large segment of the population. Two-thirds of Afghans lived below or just above the country's official

[1] Michael O'Hanlon, "Nation Building: Not for the Fainthearted; as East Timor and Afghanistan Show, Fixing Failed Nations Is a Slog under the Best of Circumstances," *Newsweek*, (June 12, 2006).

poverty line indicator of $1.25 per day.[2] As of 2013, Afghanistan's living standards were still among the lowest in the world.[3]

Afghanistan had many elements of state failure throughout the period covered in this dissertation,[4] according to the criteria used in the Failed State Index (FSI), which was produced by Foreign Policy Magazine and the Fund for Peace think tank. [5] Failed states have several defining characteristics, to include the inability to: control the physical territory of the state; provide basic social services, such as electricity, potable water, emergency services, police services; collect adequate tax revenue or combat corruption; sustain adequate levels of economic growth, employment, job creation; mitigate the effects of social and sexual discrimination and group-based inequality; and prevent the erosion of the environment.[6] However, after the Taliban were expelled in winter 2001, sustained development began to take root, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

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[2] "Afghanistan: Fact Sheet," *Asian Development Bank*, (April 2009). http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact-Sheets/AFG.pdf.

[3] "The Government of Afghanistan needed to overcome a number of challenges, including low revenue collection, anemic job creation, high levels of corruption, weak government capacity, and poor public infrastructure. Afghanistan's growth rate slowed markedly in 2013." Source: The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed: May 5, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

[4] James H. Mittelman, "Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity," *Stanford Security Studies*, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010), 206.

[5] "The Failed States Index 2007," *Foreign Policy Magazine*, (July/August 2007). http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story

[6] "The Failed States Index 2007," *Foreign Policy Magazine.*

PART ONE: AFGHANISTAN'S DEVELOPMENTAL BACKGROUND

Afghanistan's Poverty and Governance

There are many reasons why Afghanistan was and continues to be among the poorest countries in the world. Monarchs, tribal strongmen, and autocrats did not pursue the western-oriented modernization developmental schemes that the more economically successful Asian states, particularly Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, pursued. [7] Modernization, as articulated by Samuel Huntington and, earlier, by the German sociologist Max Weber, in the 19th century, underscored the set of values, which Weber termed the Protestant work ethic.[8]

Relative to many other countries, Afghanistan was economically stagnant until the 20th century. Among the more important reasons that help explain the dire poverty are isolation, failed developmental schemes, and war.

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[7] Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building in the Kennedy Era,* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 36.

[8] Some economists cited this ethic, as well as what became known as the neo-Confusion work ethic, as partial explanation for the economic success of Northern Europe, Japan, and the United States. It is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyze in detail post-colonial theory, anti-Orientalism, and critical theory. Edward Said has characterized the Western image of the Third World as based on a "positional superiority." Western scholars emphatically characterized their society as uniquely advanced "in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. In academia, neo-Marxists and post-colonial theorists became very critical of many western values. Source: Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era*, 16.

Figure 3. Map of Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been among the more isolated countries in the world.[9] It is located where the Iranian Plateau, the Central Asian steppes, and the northwestern corner of the Himalayan range intersect.[10] The metaphor "mud curtain" refers to a metaphysical barrier that exists around the country. The country's history reflects its isolation. Britain was the leading Western force in Afghanistan for most of the 19th century. The British arrived, in a sizable force, in 1809, with the East India Company; suffered a devastating

[9] The issue of isolation is discussed in Rastislav Vrbensky, "Tajikistan-Afghanistan Poverty Reduction Initiative," *United Nations Development Program, Version 3*.3, (February 9, 2011). http://www.undp.tj/site/images/Docs/Tajikistan_Afghanistan_Poverty_Reduction_Initiative_Project_Document.pdf

[10] Richard Newell in Ali Anuazzizi and Myron Weiner, *The State Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 107.

military defeat in 1842; and fought the Afghans again in 1878.[11] There were social repercussions from the contact with Europeans.[12] Many conservative Afghans became alarmed at what they saw as increased immodesty and immorality.[13]

Britain kept Afghanistan as a buffer state during the Anglo-Russian rivalry known as the "Great Game,"[14] which divided much of Central Asia.[15] Britain and Russia competed against each other to expand their empires, as the Persian Empire waned.[16] This Anglo-British Central Asian tension led to the formation of many of the Central Asian states that exists today.[17]

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[11] Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and State Formation on a Colonial Frontier,* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011), xvi.

[12] Those critical point out that Afghan grain merchants were enriched but many Afghans so their standard of living decline. Inflation, in particular, harmed the poor and mullahs, who normally received a salary. Source: Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 120.

[13] Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History,* 120.

[14] Robert Nichais, "The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan," *The Middle East Journal*, (October 1, 2004).

[15] Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *Small Players of the Great Game: The Impact of Anglo-Russian and Abdali-Khozeimeh Rivalries on the Creation of Afghanistan and Settlement of Eastern Iranian Borderlands*, (New York: Routledge/Curzon; 2004), i.

[16]Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *Small Players of the Great Game: The Impact of Anglo-Russian and Abdali-Khozeimeh Rivalries on the Creation of Afghanistan and Settlement of Eastern Iranian Borderlands,* 209.

[17] Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, "Small Players of the Great Game: The Impact of Anglo-Russian and Abdali-Khozeimeh Rivalries on the Creation of Afghanistan and Settlement of Eastern Iranian Borderlands," P1.

Towards the late 19th century, Afghan King Abdur Rahman centralized national power and reigned-in the authority of local mullahs and tribal chiefs. He also centralized the Army and decommissioned many regional militias.[18]

Britain's world power waned by the turn of the 20th century, and Russia's Tsar, Nicholas II, was overthrown in November 1917. The newly created Soviet Union turned inward, and Britain lost interest in Afghanistan. British diplomats seriously considered partitioning Afghanistan among the neighboring states of Pakistan and Iran. This did not occur, but the result was general neglect.[19]

Afghanistan entered the post-WWII era impoverished and isolated.[20] International investment had been very low, and the economy was poorly diversified. By the 1950s, Britain was pessimistic about Afghanistan's ability to control its borders and become economically self-sufficient. With the advent of the Cold War, Afghanistan's strategic location gave it a new significance and, as a consequence, the United States and the Soviet Union became active in developing its economic infrastructure. "Total aid was

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[18] His son, Habibullah, who succeeded him in 1901, accelerated the modernization by upgrading the health care system, communication, and education. A reaction to this modernization was increased nationalism and anti-British sentiment. Habibullah was assassinated in 1919. Source: "Afghanistan The Journey to Economic Development Volume I: The Main Report, Report No 1777a-AF," *World* Bank, (Washington, DC: March 1978), P30. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/

[19] "Newly Released Files Show Britain Once Favored Carving up Afghanistan," *AP Worldstream*, (January 2, 2007).

[20] As an example, Afghanistan had only six miles of railroads in 1933. Source: Stefanie Nijseen, "Special Report on Economic Development in Afghanistan."

high in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s making Afghanistan one of the highest recipients of assistance on a per capita basis," as will be discussed.[21]

As the United States and the Soviet Union competed against each other for influence in Afghanistan, the influx of economic aid gave the country the moniker, the "Economic Korea."[22] Afghanistan turned to the Soviet Union for military and economic aid and bartered agricultural products and textiles for a variety of industrial and military goods.[23] The expansion of the government and economy in the 1960s began to produce a larger class of educated people.[24]

Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan, generally referred to as Daoud, who served from 1953 to 1963 and later in the mid-to-late 1970s, was not ideologically wedded to any theory of development.[25] He was a reformer who successfully courted Washington and Moscow to integrate Afghanistan into regional economies.[26]

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[21] It then fell to much lower levels during the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. By the early 2000s, it increased dramatically – again becoming one of the top recipients of aid according to the CIA World Factbook. Source: Maxwell Fry, *The Afghan Economy*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).

[22] Stefanie Nijseen,"Special Report on Economic Development in Afghanistan," *Civil-Military Fusion Center*.

[23] The Soviet traded petroleum products, rolled ferrous metals, and building materials in exchange for Afghan cotton, wool and finished and unfinished leather goods. Source: Mohammed Daud Miraki, Doctoral Dissertation, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan, 1919-2000," (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2000), 40.

[24] Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 168.

[25] Hafizulla Emadi, *State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan,* (Boulder: Praeger, 1990), 36.

[26] U.S. Department of State, *Afghanistan Country Page*, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/

Daoud tried to end Afghanistan's isolation by courting international financing for developmental schemes, as well as for modernizing the military.[27] The Soviets discovered and exploited petroleum and natural gas deposits.[28] They also built roads, electric power stations and power lines, irrigation canals, factories, housing, grain elevators, bakeries, wells, automotive repair plants, airports, technical colleges, and much more.[29] They trained tens of thousands of Afghan specialists; provided hundreds of thousands of tons of basic humanitarian assistance; and distributed food, seed, and fertilizer. Development was almost entirely dependent on foreign aid.[30]

Foreign aid slowed in the 1970s, partly because of the declining geostrategic importance of Afghanistan to the West and to the Soviet Union.[31] Détente, which was the thawing of Cold War tensions, began with visits of President Richard Nixon to the Soviet Union in 1971 and continued through a succession of treaties and protocols during the

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[27] M.A. Ahmad, "The Survival of Afghanistan 1747-1979, Lahore, Pakistan: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1990, 268; and Mohammed Daud Miraki, Ph.D Dissertation, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000," 197.

[28] This include petroleum exploration and aerial survey; "the Naghlu hydroelectric project; Pul-I-Khumri hydroelectric project; Darunta irrigation project; Salang pass road; Bagram airfield; Jungalak automotive workshop, Kabul airfield; Qizil Qala port; arms and military equipment;; Kushka-ZHerat-Kandahar road and Shindand airfield." Source; Mohammed Daud Miraki, Ph.D Dissertation, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000," 207.

[29] Mohammed Daud Miraki, Ph.D Dissertation, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000, 203.

[30] Paul Robinson, "Russia Lessons: We Aren't The First To Try Nation-Building in Afghanistan," *The American Conservative, Vol. 8. No. 11,* (August 2009).

[31] "In search of detente, once again; Russian-American relations. (The state of Russian-American relations)," *The Economist (US*), 2009, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-202806718.html

decade.[32] During this period, Afghanistan was content to keep neutral.[33] The monarchy was overthrown in 1973, and Afghanistan was declared a republic. This government, in turn, was overthrown in a military coup in April 1978.[34] A treaty between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was signed in December 1978,[35] which brought more Soviet aid and advisors to Kabul.[36]

On December 25, 1979, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan to shore–up a flagging regime in Kabul and took control of Kabul.[37] Kremlin leaders calculated that a quick infusion of military strength would ballast the flagging Soviet-friendly regime.[38] Babrak Karmal, leader of a moderate faction of the government, became president.

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[32] "The advances of detente continued through the 1970s. In August 1975, the US, USSR, and 33 other nations signed the Helsinki Accords, a non-binding agreement aimed at enhancing relations between communist nations and the West. There were also several Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) held during the 1970s, resulting in two weapons-reduction agreements: SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979)." Source: "Detent," *Alpha History*, Accessed May 5, 2014. http://alphahistory.com/coldwar/detente/#sthash.qNfJZ8ty.dpuf

[33] "Annual Policy Assessment," *United States Department of State*, (March 9, 1976).

[34] Hafizullah Emadi, *State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan*, 123.

[35] Late in 1978, Islamic traditionalists and ethnic leaders began an armed revolt, and by the summer of 1979 they controlled much of Afghanistan's rural areas. In September, Taraki was deposed and later killed. He was replaced by his deputy, Hafizullah Amin, but Amin also failed to suppress the rebellion, and the government's position weakened. Source: "Afghanistan and the United Nations," *United Nations*, accessed on February 2014, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml

[36]"Afghanistan Case Study, Annex" *Interagency Review of U.S. Government Civilian Humanitarian & Transition Programs*, (U.S. Department of State, April 24, 2000).

[37] "Milestones: 1977–1980 -The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978–1980," Office of the Historian, Department of State, Accessed May 5, 2014. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan

[38] "Milestones: 1977–1980 - The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978–1980."

Karmal adopted more open policies towards religion and ethnicity. A rebellion ensued, which developed into a civil war.[39] There were many reasons for this. One reason was that the development strategies advocated by the less-traditional Afghan statesmen state antagonized conservative religious leaders, liberals, and nationalist forces in the country.[40]

Economic Development Programs

Development must be redefined as an attack on the chief evils of the world today: malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums, unemployment and inequality. Measured in terms of aggregate growth rates, development has been a great success. But measured in terms of jobs, justice and the elimination of poverty, it has been a failure or only a partial success. Paul P. Streeten, Former Director, World Development Institute[41]

Afghanistan's poverty can be attributed, in part, to failed developmental schemes, which grew in the 1950s.[42] In the early post-World War II-period, development was concentrated heavily on rapid, aggregate economic growth.[43] In 1955, the Soviets signed a barter protocol with Afghanistan, by which the Soviets exported petroleum products,

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[39] "Afghanistan and the United Nations," *United Nations*, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml, accessed on February 2014.

[40] Jeffery J. Roberts, *The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan*, (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 215.

[41] Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, *Economic Development*, (New York: Addison-Wesley, 2003) 35.

[42] The plans by both the Soviet Union and the United States reflected the post- World War II dominant theories of development. W.W. Rostow labels the four basic strands of theory as, "the linear-stages of-growth model; theories and patterns of structural change; the international-dependence revolution; and the neoclassical, free-market counterrevolution." Source: Walt W. Rostow, "The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto," (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 1, 3, 4, and 12.

[43] Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, "Economic Development, 35.

metals, and building materials for Afghan cotton, wool and hides.[44] In response, the United States increased aid to Afghanistan from $1 million for each year, from 1950 to 1954,to $10 million per year from 1954 to 1957. [45]

The United States responded to Soviet aid with developmental projects, the most famous of which became the USAID's massive irrigation project in Lashkar Gah in Helmand. Local Afghans called the area that housed U.S. expatriates "Little America." The project ran from 1950 to 1970, cost over $21 million, but failed to boost substantially agriculture in the area.[46]

State-driven enterprises were a dominant theme of the 1960s in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the developing world.[47] The Afghanistan government established three, five-year plans that spanned the 1960s: 1957-1961, 1962-1967, 1968-1972.[48] During the 1950s and 1960s, Afghanistan received one of the highest levels of aid on a per capita basis of any country in the world. Foreign aid, largely from the Soviet Union and the

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[44] Mohammed Daud Miraki, Ph.D Dissertation, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000," 205.

[45] Mohammed Daud Miraki, Ph.D Dissertation, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000," 207.

[46] Temi Anderson, "Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan," *Army Lawyer*, 2013, HighBeam Research, (May 29, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-3191215611.html

[47] Robert S. Ford, Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, *Afghanistan Country Study, Chapter 3 – The Economy*, (Washington, DC: The American University, 1986), 147.

[48] Helena Von Seth, "Review of Afghanistan's Fiscal Management, "*Asian Development Bank*, (February 2003).

United States, in the forms of commodity assistance, project aid, and technical assistance totaled nearly $1.2 billion during the first three plans, extending from 1956 to 1972.[49]

The first and second five-year plans, focused on developing industry and infrastructure, rather than expanding agriculture.[50] There was little funding for commercial fertilizers or agricultural technology and capital.[51] The Soviets would later determine that this was a mistake. This diversion of agricultural-oriented capital to industry constricted funding for producing fertilizers and reduced to boost the level of agricultural technology. In the second plan, the Afghan government tried to improve agriculture by expanding irrigation and road construction.[52]

Some of the financing came through barter. For example, in 1963 the Soviets and the Afghans signed an exchange of Afghan wool, cotton, and fruits for Soviet cars, oil, cameras, and watches.[53] Foreign assistance provided 89% of the first "Five-Year Development Plan expenditures; 76% of the second; and 72% of the third."[54]

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[49] Robert S. Ford, Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, *Afghanistan Country Study*, (The American University, 1986).

[50] "Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East," *Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East*, (Bangkok: 1967).

[51] Wesley Oliphant, "Understanding Afghanistan's Recent Economic Development: A Comparative Analysis with Pakistan," Paper Delivered at the University of California, Irvine, date of conference was not listed. http://www.iga.ucdavis.edu/understanding-afghanistans-recent-economic-development

[52] Maxwell Fry, *The Afghan Economy*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).

[53] A. Ahmad, "The Survival of Afghanistan 1747-1979," (Lahore, Pakistan: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1990), 268. Another source was Mohammed Daud Miraki, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000, 201.

[54] Robert Ford, "The Economy, Chapter 3A," *Afghanistan Country Study*.

Afghanistan's economic planning was intended to produce a guided economy based on state control. State-owned industries increased from 23% in 1961, to 42% in 1971. By the end of the decade, the government controlled "most of the mining, butcher, and mill industry, printing houses, and production of cement and power."[55]

Soviet Aid

The Soviets granted $100 million to finance all the projects in the first five-year plan.[56]The second five-year plan, financed by a $200 million credit by the Soviets,[57] focused on the basic sectors of the economy, particularly agricultural and mining. [58] The Soviet assistance in the agricultural sector focused on large-scale irrigation and land-reclamation projects for the production of cash crops, such as cotton, olives, oranges, and lemons.[59]

By the end of the 1960s, nearly three-quarters of the total capital investment in large-scale industry was vested in government-owned factories.[60] The more important sectors of the economy - slaughtering, grain milling, cement production, and mineral extraction - were all under the control of the government. Only toward the end of the

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[55] Helena Von Seth, "Review of Afghanistan's Fiscal Management," *Asian Development Bank (ADB)* (February 2003), 7.

[56] Mohammed Daud Miraki, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000," 203.

[57] Mohammed Daud Miraki, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000," 204.

[58] Mohammed Daud Miraki, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000," 203.

[59] Andrei Dorre and Tobias Kraudzun, "Persistence and change in Soviet and Russian relations with Afghanistan," *Central Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4*, (December 2012), 433. http://www.academia.edu/2558411/Persistence_and_change_in_Soviet_and_Russian_relations_with_Afghanistan

[60] Robert Ford, *Afghanistan- The Economy, Countries of the World, Chapter 3A.* "

third five-year development plan, 1968-1972, did the priorities shift to aid the small farmers.

Afghanistan's economic performance of the 1960s was characterized in terms of disillusionment and pessimism by a 1971 World Bank Report.[61] The World Bank and other lending institutions determined that most developmental programs in the 1960s failed, not because Afghanistan did not receive large amounts of foreign aid, but because large-scale, state planning was inappropriate to the circumstance of that country. Afghanistan did not have the capacity to absorb and exploit the level of technology required to sustain many of the large programs. Louis Dupree observed that government intervention in the agricultural market, market wheat production and distribution, distorted the prices, and hurt farmers.[62]

In the third five-year plan (1967-1972), spending on agricultural development and irrigation increased from about $56.5 million to $124 million. Some of this was used to boost the output of fertilizers and to diversify and improve the quality of seed.[63] By the end of the 1960s, there was little or no increase of land under cultivation.[64] "Despite the

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[61] They concluded that "such pessimism is justified as even in areas where development activities were undertaken, with heavy inputs of capital investment and foreign advice, returns have been dismally low. Source: "Afghanistan: The Journey to Economic Development Volume I: The Main Report, Report No 1777a-AF," *World Bank*, (March 1978), 356. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/08/18/000178830_98101912301637/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf

[62] Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 634.

[63] In addition, The Afghan government in 1967 provided 1.2 million pounds of improved wheat seeds and 15,000 tons of chemical (commercial) fertilizers that were sufficient for 138,000 acres of land. Source: Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, *Afghanistan Country Study*.

[64] "In order to increase wheat production, the government abandoned the previously compulsory cultivations of cotton and sugar beets that were required for textile and sugar factories." Source:

construction of dams and irrigation schemes in the Helmand Valley since the 1950s, less than 5% of the country was irrigated in 2001."[65] Further, there was a reduction in cotton production from 1963-1966, as lands under cotton cultivation decreased from 74,000 hectares to 48,000 hectares.[66] There was significant landlessness in many parts of Afghanistan.[67]

Government policies throughout the decade hindered private development. The pre-1970s' policy of high tariffs did not expand local industry, as was intended.[68] The banking system was weak and was not trusted. As a result, individuals with entrepreneurial and financial skills preferred to work in the parallel market or to barter. The influx of foreign aid created economic distortions and led to inflation,[69] which, in turn, led to a hoarding of agricultural commodities and to the purchase of real estate as a hedge against inflation.[70]

Mohammed Daud Miraki, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000 1919-2000, Ph.D Dissertation," 226.

[65] Abdul Rahman Ghafoori, Ghulam Rabani Haqiqatpal and Nasharullah Bakhtani, "Present State of Food and Agricultural Statistics in Afghanistan" (country paper presentation, Asia and Pacific Commission on Agricultural Statistics, Siem Reap, Cambodia, 26-30 April 2010).

[66] Mohammed Daud Miraki, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000, Ph.D Dissertation," 224.

[67] "An earlier official survey (1967-68) documented landlessness as not less than 20.6 % (Paktiya Province) and up to 81.4% (Nimroz Province)." Source: Liz Alden Wily, "Looking for Peace on the Pastures, Rural Land Relations in Conflict: A Way Forward," (Kabul: AREU, 2004), 90.

[68] Mohammed Daud Miraki, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000, Ph.D Dissertation," 224.

[69] Richard S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 72.

[70] Mohammed Daud Miraki, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000," 228.

However, Afghanistan's economy began to improve in the 1970s, as developmental strategies became tailored to the village level, rather than the national level. Most of the economy remained split between subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. About 65% of the GDP was based on agriculture. Most Afghans' income came from labor, such as working their small farms and creating textiles. Leading merchandise exports in 1975 were dry fruits and nuts, fresh fruits, cotton, carpets and rugs, and natural gas.[71]

Soviet agricultural aid primarily targeted wheat development for self-sufficiency and export. [72 and 73] The Soviets also tried to diversify agricultural exports. The traditional export crops were dried and fresh fruits, vegetables, and industrial crops such as oil crops, cotton, and sugar beet.[74]

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[71] "Afghanistan: The Journey to Economic Development, Volume I: The Main Report, Report No 1777a-AF*," World Bank*, (March 1978), 3. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/08/18/000178830_98101912301637/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf

[72] While wheat accounted for over two-thirds of cultivated area, it largely was largely a subsistence crop.

[73] "Country Partnership Strategy, Afghanistan 2009–2013," *Asian Development Bank*, (November 2008), http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2008/CPS-AFG-2009-2013.pdf

[74] Livestock products include sheep and goat meat, hides, skins and wools from small stock, chicken, eggs, and dairy produce. Agriculture included sugar beets, cotton lint and oil, and other vegetable oils. Cotton was a major crop, occupying (in 1978) 112,000 ha, much of it in Helmand province which is well suited to the crop. Beet occupied 5,000 ha (3,000 ha in the Jalalabad area. Source: Christopher Ward, David Mansfield, Peter Oldham and William Byrd, *Afghanistan Economic Incentives and Development Initiatives to Reduce Opium Production*, World Bank Report, February 2008, 16.

Afghanistan's Economy in the 1970s and 1980s

In the late 1970s, Afghanistan dominated the world's pistachio market and supplied some 20% of the global market for raisins. It also exported livestock and wool products in the region.

The composition of development expenditures from foreign donors, principally the United States and the Soviet Union, is listed in figure 41.[75] Aid to agriculture saw a steady increase, and the level in education decreased by over 50%.

Years	Education	Health	Transport & Communication	Agriculture	Industry & Mines	Other
1954-56	10.8	1.4	16.2	2.2	1.6	67.8
1957-61	8.8	3	53.2	13.5	12	9.4
1962-66	5.4	1	41.4	15.6	29.6	7
1967-71	6	2.2	20.2	42	19.6	10
1972	4	4	15	45	16	16

Table 41: Developmental Indicators 1954-1972

Large industrial projects were less successful in the 1970s than were small-scale agricultural projects. There were some successes producing fertilizer, construction, repair and large-scale food factories.[76] From the 1950s through 1979, the Soviets initiated more than 140 projects and began, but did not complete, another 180 projects.

[75] Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in The International System*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 60.

[76] It also produced a dependency on Soviet industrial good technology, spare parts, technical education and knowledge Source: Andrei Dorre and Tobias Kraudzun, "Persistence and change in Soviet and Russian relations with Afghanistan" *Central Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4,* (December 2012), 425–443. http://www.academia.edu/2558411/Persistence_and_change_in_Soviet_and_Russian_relations_with_Afghanistan

The uncompleted project disproportionately involved natural gas development and irrigation projects, which had not been completed, as a consequence of the war.[77]

President Daoud Khan, who came to power in 1973, nationalized most of the economy. In the 1970s, the government focused on developing industries, such as cement, fertilizers, and food processing. Despite the government's efforts and the resulting increased output in these larger industries, the smaller privately controlled industries contributed more to the country's economy in terms of domestic output and to exports.[78] These results would be studied and used in building developmental platforms after the Taliban.

A constant source of revenue of the 1970s was the exploitation of natural gas reserves.[79] At peak production during the 1980s, natural gas sales accounted for $300 million a year, which comprised 56% of the total export revenues. Of this amount, 90% was bartered to the Soviet Union to pay for debts. However, during the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Afghanistan's natural gas fields were closed for fear of their being

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[77] Andrei Dorre and Tobias Kraudzun, "Persistence and change in Soviet and Russian relations with Afghanistan" *Central Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4,* (December 2012), 433. http://www.academia.edu/2558411/Persistence_and_change_in_Soviet_and_Russian_relations_with_Afghanistan

[78] Robert S. Ford, Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, (Eds.), *The Economy, Afghanistan Country Study.*

[79] First tapped in 1967, output reached 275 million cubic feet per day in the mid-1970s. Source "Afghanistan: Economy, " *Global Edge*, (Michigan State University), http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/afghanistan/economy/

destroyed by different parties of the civil war.[80] Foreign aid declined, as donors became increasingly disillusioned.[81]

In the first half of the 1970s, there were steady gains in agriculture, Afghanistan's most-important economic sector, as shown in tables 42 and 43. From 1971-1977 there was a steady increase in agricultural staples – wheat, corn, rice, barley, cotton, sugar beets, vegetables, fruits. Non-agricultural production increased, particularly in ginned cotton and vegetable oil.[82]

	1971/72	1972/3	1973/4	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
Wheat	81	104	115	117	121	125
Corn	87	93	98	100	101	104
Rice	87	100	104	104	108	111
Barley	98	97	100	105	106	110
Cotton	89	82	152	204	225	224
Sugar Beets	97	102	103	108	162	147
Vegetables	111	101	104	107	110	140
Fruits	78	96	101	104	106	108

Table 42. Agricultural Production Index (1968/69 is equal to 100)[83]

[80] "Afghanistan: Economy, *Global Edge*," Michigan State University. http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/afghanistan/economy/

[81] Stefanie Nijseen, "Special Report on Economic Development in Afghanistan," *Civil-Military Fusion Center*.

[82] The war years degraded agricultural production because of uncertain availability of irrigation water, "low level of fertilizer use poor extension service and poor access to institutional credit, absence of trellised vineyards, and weak marketing infrastructure." Source: Project Completion Report, Afghanistan, Fruit And Vegetable Export Project, (CREDIT 779-AF), World Bank Report No. 6103, *World Bank*, March 21, 1986. 2.

[83] "Afghanistan - The Journey to Economic Development Volume I: The Main Report, Report No 1777a-AF," *World Bank*, (March 1978), 29. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/08/18/000178830_98101912301637/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf

Non-agricultural productions in the first half of the 1970s, generally had success. The table is shown below: [84]

	1971/72	1972/3	1973/4	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
Coal	108	57	93	92	120	128
Natural Gas	150	171	165	174	178	157
Refined Sugar	160	134	140	168	257	209
Vegetable Oil	129	126	184	274	342	326
Ginned Cotton	124	113	185	242	327	390
Cotton Textiles	126	125	126	140	124	151
Cement	81	100	149	167	163	138

Table 43. Non-agricultural Production Index (1968/69 is equal to 100)[85]

Though the agriculture sector expanded substantially in the 1970s, there were problems with massive corruption, inefficiencies in tax collection, regional conflicts, and threats to local tax collectors. By the late 1970s, the government lost the ability to control many parts of the country because of the growth of criminal syndicates.[86] There were also problems with smuggling and opium trafficking. Kabul increased funding of the communications and transport sectors by forming state-owned transport companies that used Soviet and Czech built trucks.[87]

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[84] The World Bank placed refined sugar and vegetable oil Afghanistan in non-agricultural output. Source: "The Journey to Economic Development Volume I: The Main Report, Report No 1777a-AF," *World Bank*, (March 1978).

[85] "Afghanistan- The Journey to Economic Development Volume I: The Main Report, Report No 1777a-AF," *World Bank*.

[86] "Because trade taxes, especially import duties, represented such a large part of its revenue, the smuggling constituted a major revenue loss for the government. All sorts of Western consumer goods were illegally brought into Afghanistan from Pakistan, and they kept the bazaars of Kabul well supplied." Source: Robert S. Ford Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, *The Economy in Afghanistan Country Study*.

[87] Robert S. Ford, Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, *The Economy in: Afghanistan Country Study*.

The basic needs program,[88] advocated by economists Paul Streeten and Hahbub al Haq, in the late 1970s, was well suited for Afghanistan because of its desperately poor citizens, low levels of education, and weak health and sanitation.[89] The more successful rural programs were those that lowered the tax burden on agriculture, promoted infrastructure for agriculture, and made technology accessible to small farmers.[90]

The 1970s showed promise, but the decade ended with a devastating jolt to the economy- the Soviet invasion in December 1979. As a consequence, Afghanistan's modest gains of the 1970s were eviscerated.[91] In April 1978, the Soviet-sympathizing President Nur M. Taraki seized power and began, what was seen by Afghan traditionalists, as sweeping reform. The shock of reform alienated tribal chiefs, mullahs,

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[88] Paul Streeten, *First Things First: Meeting Basic Needs in Developing Countries,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 206. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3990836?uid=3739704&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104119283893

[89] Pradip K. Ghosh, "Third World Development, A Basic Needs," (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 29.

[90] "This perspective inspired the creation of the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index, which uses health and education measures together with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to calculate an overall index of development success." Source: Jonathan M. Harris, "Basic Principles of Sustainable Development," Global Development and Environment Institute Working Paper 00-4, June 2000, 3. http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/working_papers/Sustainable%20Development.PDF

[91] War does not necessarily hamper economic development. In the short term, wars create an initial demand for goods and services, which, in turn leads to employment and economic growth. In the long term, wars can, but not always do, have a devastating effect on the economy. Protracted wars can sap natural resources; kill human capital; distort the market system; harm the environment; destroy consumer confidence; and lead to the destruction of villages, cities, and industrial bases.

and many others. As a result, entire Army units mutinied. The Soviets, then, intervened.[92]

The years of war created significant market distortions and disincentives for private investment, which spurred the flight of human capital. The most productive, ambitious, and promising elements of Afghan society emigrated to build better lives in the West. Those who stayed had little incentive to risk their resources in family-owned farms or similar small enterprises.

The Soviets – Destroying Development

The Soviets could not counter Mujahideen targets effectively. They bombed infrastructure, and, by doing so, destroyed irrigation systems, orchards, cropland, farms, villages and livestock.[93] Ironically, the Soviets destroyed the infrastructure they had built just years earlier.[94] The Soviets found early in their counterinsurgency that they could not win the confidence of the Afghan public with their tactics. They, therefore, determined to

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[92] General (Ret) Mohammad Yahya Nawroz and Lester W. Grau, "The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War?" *Military Review*, (September/October 1995). http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/waraf.htm

[93] "Agricultural production grew at a rate of only 0.2% per year during the conflict period (1978-2001), compared to 2.2% per year in the pre-conflict period (1961-78)." Source: Afghanistan: Priorities for Agriculture and Rural Development, *World Bank*, Accessed on May 15, 2014. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EXTSAREGTOPAGRI/0,,contentMDK:20273762~menuPK:548212~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:452766,00.html

[94] MSG Robert McCathern and SMG Dennis Woods and MSG Deon Hinton and MSG Darryl Dean; MSG Mink Sutton, "The Soviet-Afghanistan War," *United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, Class #58,28 Nov 07*, 13.

intimidate their enemies and eliminate food stocks, wheat fields, livestock, and water wells.[95] Soviets depopulated parts of the countryside.[96]

Afghanistan's Sub-economies during Periods of Weak National Confidence

Jonathan Goodhand identifies three characteristics, or sub-economies, of the Afghan war economy, which continued for years after the Soviets left in 1989.[97] First, there was the "combat economy," in which the nation mobilized toward the "deliberate disempowerment of specific groups."[98] In Afghanistan during the 1980s, opposing Afghan factions competed for economic resources to pursue their military goals. Second, the shadow economy expanded.[99] A shadow economy refers to economic activities that are conducted outside state-regulated frameworks and are not audited by the state institutions.[100]

Third, a coping economy grew in response to shattered hopes for economic stability. A coping economy is one in which a substantial number of households struggle to survive and feed their families. Households postpone long-term economic planning

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[95] J. Bruce Amstutz, "Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation," (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1986), 145.

[96] Martin Ewans, "Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics," (New York: Perennial, 2001), 221.

[97] Jonathan Goodhand, "From War Economy to Peace Economy? Reconstruction and State Building in Afghanistan," *Journal of International Affairs*, (September 22, 2004).

[98] Phillipe Le Billon, "The Political Economy of War: What Relief Workers Need to Know," *Humanitarian Practice Network Paper, no. 33, Overseas Development Institute*, (London: 2000).

[99] Antonio Donini and Norah Niland, "Nation-Building Unraveled? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan," (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 2004), 174.

[100]Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper and Jonathan Goodhand, "War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transition," (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2004).

because of great uncertainty of the future and insufficient national confidence. The World Bank referred to an informal "social security," in which societies pool their efforts to distribute scarce resources and share the burden of providing for families. Many Afghans lived perennially on the margin of subsistence. During the war, many Afghans fell into destitution. [101]

During the Taliban's tenure, 1996-2001, certain important economic sectors improved, as shown in table 44. There was a sharp increase in agricultural crop revenue per acre of Afghanistan's main crops. There were significant fluctuations in prices from 1996-2001, the years of Taliban rule. By far, the most significant increase in per acre revenue was in opium, with revenues increasing tenfold from 1995 to 2002. Table 44 shows the increase in crop revenue, per acre, from 1991 through 2002, a period that partly covers the Taliban's epoch. However, as metrics will show, the overall economic performance declined under the Taliban.

[101] "Promoting Economic Opportunities for The Poor," *World Development Bank*," (1990), http://wdronline.worldbank.org/worldbank/a/c.html/world_development_report_1990/chapter_2_poor/page/9 Accessed February 3, 2011

	Barley	Maize	Millet	Rice	Wheat	Opium
1991	3,000	12,000	1,500	5,400	1,600	----
1992	2,200	10,700	1,400	4,800	1,600	--- -
1993	2,800	12,000	1,400	4,800	1,600	----
1994	2,500	13,000	1,400	5,300	1,600	29,200
1995	2,600	13,700	2,600	13,800	2,900	20,100
1996	8,400	18,000	3,500	15,600	4,400	19,100
1997	15,000	12,100	4,400	15,000	6,300	33,300
1998	17,800	15,500	5,300	21,000	7,800	28,100
1999	18,300	18,400	6,600	23,300	9,100	40,600
2000	7,200	10,200	6,800	22,800	5,500	22,600
2001	10,300	23,200	6,500	17,000	6,600	140,800
2002	14,000	33,200	6,500	18,000	11,400	232,400

Table 44. Calculations of crop revenue per acre for 1991 to 2002 for the main crops in Afghanis [102]

Licit revenues declined throughout the 1990s, but the Taliban financed their operations through their control of the main roads, cities, airports, and border crossings. They collected revenue through tolls.[103]As the Taliban's influence grew, they harnessed the power of local warlords, which they replaced with state power.[104]

[102] The methodology the economist used was stated as follows: "Namely, there are problems with converting the dollar denominated farm gate opium prices per pound into Afghanis. In January 2003, a new form of currency was created by the Afghan government called the new Afghani that replaced the old Afghani at 1000 to 1. Since all crop prices for Afghanistan are in new Afghanis regardless of year, the opium prices in dollars need to be converted into new Afghanis for all years. The official exchange rate for the number of Afghanis per dollar from 1982 to 1996 was 50.6 and from 2002 to 2007 it was 50 with a gap in between." Source: Wesley Oliphant, "Understanding Afghanistan's Recent Economic Development: A Comparative Analysis with Pakistan, 134.

[103] Conrad Schetter of the University of Bonn reports that by charging 6% on each item imported into Afghanistan "the Taliban earned $2.1 billion from trade in 1997 alone. Source: Christine Nölle-Karimi and Conrad Schetter, "The 'Bazaar Economy' of Afghanistan. A Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan – A Country a without State?" (Schriftenreihe der Mediothek für Afghanistan Frankfurt, 2002).

[104] Stefanie Nijseen, "Special Report on Economic Development in Afghanistan, Civil-Military."

Labor Participation Rates and Organized Criminal Activity

There was a steady decline in the labor force participation rate from the Taliban's entry into the conflict until their expulsion in December 2001. The World Bank defines the labor participation as "the percent of the population ages 15 and older that is economically active. That includes the employed and the unemployed individuals."[105] Labor force participation is shown in graph 1.



Graph 1. Labor Force Participation[106]

The World Bank refers to the female labor force as women and girls over the age of 15 who are economically active and who are either employed or unemployed.

[105] Afghanistan Economic Indicators, *Theglobaleconomy.com*, http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/Labor_force_participation/

[106] Afghanistan Economic Indicators, *Theglobaleconomy.com*, http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/Labor_force_participation/

According to the World Bank, there was a 1% decline from 14.5% in 1994, the year the Taliban began to contest power, to the last year of its rule to in 2001, as shown in graph 2.



Graph 2. Women and Girls in the Afghan Workforce[107]

The Taliban funded much of their operations through the proceeds of narcotics production and trafficking. Opium became, essentially, a licit commodity, and the government profited from the drug trade by collecting a 20% tax on harvested opium. "By the year 2000, Afghanistan's economy still consisted of the transit trade, the drug trade and the gem trade, with service industries stimulated by their growth."[108]

[107] Afghanistan Economic Indicators, *Afghanistan Female Labor Force Participation*. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/Female_labor_force_participation/

[108] Stefanie Nijseen, "Special Report on Economic Development in Afghanistan."

In sum, the 1980s and 1990s were years of natural and man-made disasters, namely drought and war. Resources, which could have been channeled to sustained human development, were diverted to war. The war also depleted factors of production and created an outflow of educated Afghans, including those in the civil service. It also weakened the rule of law. [109]

[109] "Country Partnership Strategy, Afghanistan, 2009–2013," *Asian Development Bank*, (November 2008). http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2008/CPS-AFG-2009-2013.pdf

PART TWO: NON-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Public Administration, Institutions, Associations, and Limited Modernization

The key Afghan document that established a constitutional monarchy, based on the democratic principle of the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial authorities, was the Constitution of 1964. There were constitutions issued in Afghanistan[110] in 1923, 1931, 1963/64, 1977, 1987, 1990, and 2004. The 1923 Constitution abolished slavery;[111] offered limited protection for the practitioners of religions, other than Islam, while still asserting that Afghanistan was an Islamic state;[112] and granted some measure of other freedoms. The right to own private property was codified.[113] The constitution declared that men and women possessed inherent rights that are unconnected to any theology.[114]

The 1923 Constitution asserted the supremacy of Sharia,[115] or Islamic law.[116] Of enduring significance in the 1923 Constitution is a Loya Jirga, which was codified as a

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[110] J. Alexander Their, "The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan," *New York Law School Law Review, 2006/2007, Vol. 51 Issue 3,* (2007), 557-579.

[111] "Article 10, Afghanistan Constitution, April 9, 1923," *Afghanistan Online.* http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1923.html.

[112] "Article 2, Afghanistan Constitution, April 9, 1923," *Afghanistan Online.* http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1923.html

[113] "Articles 12, 19, and 20, Afghanistan Constitution, April 9, 1923," *Afghanistan Online.* http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1923.html

[114] Richard Johnson Dagger, *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 18.

[115] The constitution endorsed the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence.

[116] "Article 21, Afghanistan Constitution, April 9, 1923," *Afghanistan Online*. http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1923.html

consultative body in the document.[117] The Jirga, which is a loose assembly of village elders, is a Pashtun tradition. The protected status of the Jirga would prove to have enduring importance because the Jirga would reemerge as an important component in Afghan law and policy making in the post-Taliban era.

King Zahir's constitution was ratified by the Jirga in 1964.[118] Granting limited democratic rights to Afghans, within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, the 1964 constitution strengthened the role of the Shura, or parliament, based on a bicameral legislature. It was comprised of a 214-member Wolesi Jirga, House of People, and an 84-member Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders. These bodies would be given new power during the donors' first significant, international conference in Bonn, Germany. The judiciary was another important creation of the 1964 Constitution.[119]

The 1964 Constitution made references to "basic principles" of democratic rule, such as freedom of speech, but its wording was ambiguous.[120] Its civil and criminal protections for women were weaker than for men. [121] But, the 1970s saw significant attempts to modernize the Afghan legal code, which was a pre-condition for meaningful

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[117]Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, 2nd edition,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 51.

[118] "In Afghanistan, the 1964 Constitution does not mention the Sharia but uses the phrase "basic principles of Islam." Source: Democracy and Islam. Source: Cheryl Benard and Nina Hachigian, *New Constitution of Afghanistan*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003), 4.

[119] J. Alexander Their, *The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan,* 557-579.

[120] Mohammed Daud Miraki, "Factors of Underdevelopment in Afghanistan 1919-2000," 218.

[121] "Afghanistan's Flawed Constitutional Process," *International Crisis Group* CG *Asia Report, Number 56*, (Kabul/Brussels: June 12, 2003).

sustained economic development. Revisions to the Constitution in 1977 introduced secular elements into the Afghan legal code, within the broader context of Islamic law.[122]

The Afghan civil service was traumatized by the Taliban who ruled from 1996 until 2001. The purge of able administrators created a void in capacity.[123] Those who did not conform to the Taliban's norms were sometimes beaten by state employees. Many administrators who stayed were or became corrupt.[124] According to the World Bank, Afghanistan's level of corruption reached its nadir in 2000, the last full year of Taliban rule.[125] This resulted in a hemorrhage of honest and educated talent in many public bureaucracies.

There was some initial resistance within the civil service, which began to despise the Taliban soon after it established control in 1996.[126] Passive resistance to the Taliban became widespread in the late 1990s, as a result of poor and infrequent pay. There was

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[122] Civil Law of the Republic of Afghanistan (Civil Code), *Official Gazette, No. 353*, January 5, 1977. http://www.asianlii.org/af/legis/laws/clotroacogn353p1977010513551015a650/

[123] Kenneth J. Cooper, "Kabul Women under Virtual House Arrest; Afghan Radicals Bar Access to Jobs, School," *The Washington Post*, 1996, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-814137.html

[124] Kim Barker, "Pervasive Corruption Fuels Deep Anger in Afghanistan," *Chicago Tribune*, (November 25, 2008). http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-11-25/news/0811250113_1_president-hamid-karzaitaliban-led-bribes

[125] The World Bank offers a scale of state corruption from -2.5 weak through 2.5 strong. The World Bank (govindicators.org) provides data for Afghanistan from 1996 to 2012. "The average value for Afghanistan during that period was -1.59 points with a minimum of -1.91 points in 2000 and a maximum of -1.38 points in 2004." Source: Afghanistan Economic Indicators, Voice of Economic Reality, 1996-2012, *The World Bank*, Accessed July 5, 2014. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/wb_corruption/

[126] Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, "Disgruntled Afghans Reported Scheming To Undermine Regime," *Boston Globe*, (October 10, 2001).

also wide-spread resentment at their decline in status and social prestige and their isolation from important decision making.[127]

Communications that did not promote the expansion of Islam were neglected or prohibited. In a country with very limited print, radio, and electronic communications, it became very difficult for men and women to communicate at all, other than between immediate family members. Communications for girls and women were severely curtailed, as they could not leave the home without a male guardian.

The neglect of infrastructure was evidenced by the decline in electricity consumption and generation. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, electricity consumption under the Taliban collapsed, see graph 3. After the Taliban's expulsion, the rate increased by nearly 500%, to 2.49 billion kilowatt hours in 2010.

[127] The Islamic Council for the Solidarity of Nationality in Afghanistan, a pro-democracy NGO, estimated that by October 2001 approximately 2,000 among an estimated 45,000 civil servants were prepared to actively fight the Taliban. This never occurred, perhaps because the United States invaded Afghanistan, perhaps because there was not sufficient organization or resistance or perhaps for other reasons. Source: Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, "Disgruntled Afghans Reported Scheming To Undermine Regime," *Boston Globe*, (October 10, 2001).



Graph 3. Electricity Consumption in Billion Kilowatt Hours 1980-2010[128]

The trend lines in graph 3 show that the hydroelectricity generation followed the same declining pattern as the declining electric power. From 1994-2000, the hydroelectric power steadily declined.[129]

[128] The Global Economy, *Afghanistan Economic Indicators.* http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/Access_to_electricity/

[129] For that indicator, the U.S. Energy Information Administration provided data for Afghanistan from 1980 to 2010. The average value for Afghanistan during that period was 0.61 billion kilowatthours with a minimum of 0.3 billion kilowatthours in 1998 and a maximum of 0.9 billion kilowatthours in 2010.



Graph 4. Hydroelectricity Generation 1980-2010

Health

The quality of health, poor before the Taliban's ascent to power, declined under their governance.[130] The statistics in table 45 demonstrate the results of poor health care, including disease and wide-spread malnutrition, recorded at the end of the Taliban period. Under the Taliban, Life expectancy was 46 years old, and nearly one-quarter of all children died before the age of five. Children and adults suffered from chronic malnutrition and diseases. During the period of the Taliban and the immediate post-Taliban period, only 3-out-of-133 hospitals, clinics, and tuberculosis centers in Kabul met even basic international standards.

[130] Statistics on Afghanistan's public health is uneven before 2002. After 2002, there are many selected indicators. Other statistics come from the Afghanistan: health profile at the World Health Organization. http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country.country-AFG

Basic Indicators	Total Population (1998)	24 million
	Life Expectation at Birth	45 men; 47 women
	Number of Afghans with no or very little access to medical care	6 million
Mother and Child Heath	Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births	165
	Under 5 mortality per 100 live births	257
	Maternal mortality per 1000 live births	1,700
	Provinces with obstetric care	11 of 31 provinces
	Low birth weight	20%
	Children under five with symptoms of malnutrition	10% acute; 50% chronic
Disease Burden	Immunization coverage for life-savings vaccination	Less than 40% of Afghan children
	Death from tuberculosis	15,000
	Measles	35,00 a year
	Malaria	2-3 million per year

Table 45. Health Statistics of the Taliban Era Ending in Approximately 2000[131]

As in all other sectors of human development sectors, girls and women suffered disproportionately.[132] Women's health care was particularly neglected under the Taliban, and the status of girls and women declined precipitously.[133] Religious police strictly

[131] "Health in Afghanistan – Situation Analysis," *World Health Organization*, (January 22, 2001). http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/7543.doc

[132] In the State Department's 1998 Human Rights Report, then-Assistant Secretary of State Harold H. Koh described "the Taliban's devastating disregard for the physical and psychological health of women and girls. The Taliban drastically limited access to medical services. Source: Harold H. Koh, U.S. Department of State, "Overview to Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998," *Human Rights Report*, (1998). http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/drl_reports.html.

[133] Religious police strictly segregated health care, often denying even basic services to women. Source: Jessica Mendes, "Taliban Rulers Curtail Women's Freedom, Health Care," *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, (November 13, 2001).

segregated health care, often denying even basic services to women.[134] In 1997, Taliban officials denied service to women in all-but-one hospital in Kabul.[135] The low levels of mental health in the Taliban era were revealed in a 2002 study conducted by the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention.[136] The Center found that approximately 70% of Afghan people showed signs of clinical depression and anxiety.[137]

When Physicians for Human Rights conducted a survey of women's health in 724 households in 2001, it found high rates of depression, suicidal ideation, and suicide attempts, among study participants.

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[134] Women's healthcare providers were effectively banned until the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) intervened.

[135] Jessica Mendes, "Taliban Rulers Curtail Women's Freedom, Health Care," *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, (November 13, 2001).

[136] The Taliban' rules, which were promulgated in November 1996, required, as taken directly from their statements: "1. Female patients should go to female physicians. In case a male physician is needed, the female patient should be accompanied by her close relative. 2. During examination, the female patients and male physicians both will be dressed with Islamic hijab. 3. Male physicians should not touch or see the other parts of female patients except for the affected part. 4. Waiting room for female patients should be safely covered. 5. The person who regulates turn for female patients should be a woman. 6. During the night duty, rooms in which female patients are hospitalized, the male doctor without the call of the patient is not allowed to enter the room. 7. Sitting and speaking between male and female doctors are not allowed. If there be need for discussion, it should be done with hijab. 8. Female doctors should wear simple clothes, they are not allowed stylish clothes or use of cosmetics or make-up. 9. Female doctors and nurses are not allowed to enter the rooms where male patients are hospitalized."

[137] The rates were even higher for women and the disabled. After the Taliban were ejected, the collective mental health of the Afghan people, particularly females, improved, though unevenly and not everywhere. Source: Ghulam Dastagir Sayed, "Mental Health in Afghanistan – Burdern, Challenges and the Way Forward," *The World Bank, Health, Nutrition, and Population, Discussion Paper,* (August 2011). https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13589/658840WP00PUBL0736B0MHinAfghanistan.pdf?sequence=1

Education

Before the Taliban seizure of power, Afghanistan's educational system was low by international standards.[138] Nearly 1,000 of the 2,200 schools in the country were supported with the assistance of international organizations. These schools served about 25% of the estimated one million children enrolled in primary schools in Afghanistan. One half of Afghanistan's children had access to primary education in the 1960s and early 1970s. These figures declined when the Taliban took power. Girls' gross enrollment ratio fell from 32% just before the Taliban took over Kabul in 1995 to 6.4% in 1999.[139] By 1998, the Taliban had closed about 100 NGO-supported girls' schools and home-based vocational training programs for women in Kabul.

Reflecting the Taliban's view of non-religious education, in 2002 less than 40% of primary-aged school children attended school, and only 3% of girls did so. The figures were lower at secondary school, at 10% attendance for all students and only 2% of the girls. In the Taliban's era, almost 80% of pre-Taliban-era school buildings had been destroyed or had fallen into disrepair. Many teachers and administrators had either fled the country or had been killed. Those who remained had often not been paid for six months. The Taliban further dismantled non-religious the education system by

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[138] "Afghanistan: Education," *EIU ViewsWire*, New York, August 24, 2007.

[139] Hassan Mohammad, "Education and the Role of NGOs in Emergencies: Afghanistan 1978-2002," U.S. *Agency for International Development*, August 8, 2006. http://www.equip123.net/docs/e1-RoleofNGOsAfghanistan.pdf

transforming all schools into Madrasas under the direction of Ministry of Religious Affairs.[140]

Security and Rule of Law

The Taliban brought peace to Afghanistan. They brought security and relief from killing, which, in turn, brought a modified return to normal living. [141] Clan disputes were suppressed, as the Taliban's vast informant network and para-military Islamic police crushed defiance of the law.[142] Nonetheless, there was a nationwide sense of imprisonment.[143]

Many Afghans had hopes of renewed prosperity when the civil war ended, but relatively few could envision the full implications of Taliban rule. The Taliban's security was unlike anything Afghanistan experienced in its collective memory. There was an initial and guarded sense of relief because the civil war was over. But the Taliban would arrest people for a wide variety of transgressions against Islamic law, Sharia.[144]

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[140] Hassan Mohammad, "Education and the Role of NGOs in Emergencies: Afghanistan 1978-2002," U.S. Agency for International Development, August 8, 2006. http://www.equip123.net/docs/e1-RoleofNGOsAfghanistan.pdf

[141] Kathy Gannon, The Associated Press, "Afghan Poverty, Crime Boost Taliban," *The Record (Bergen County, NJ)*, 2002, HighBeam Research, December 10, 2010. http://www.highbeam.com

[142] Kathy Gannon, The Associated Press, "Afghan Poverty, Crime Boost Taliban."

[143] Kenneth J. Cooper, "Afghanistan's Taliban: Going Beyond Its Islamic Upbringing," *The Washington Post*, 1998, HighBeam Research, May 17, 2014. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-648974.html

[144] John Pomfret, "Inside the Taliban's Torture Chambers," *Washington Post*, December 17, 2001. http://afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2001/december/dec17i2001.html

The Taliban's rule of law was characterized by a wide-ranging set of measures that insinuated themselves into all elements of daily life.[145] The Taliban eliminated all activity that led men to neglect religious study.[146] They demanded that all human activity be channeled towards replicating religious behavior of the time of Muhammad.[147] The legal system segregated women, who were banned from schools and most workplaces. Those arrested or convicted of crimes were tried by Islamic courts.[148]

From its earliest days in power, the Taliban imposed zakat, or required Islamic taxes. Not all zakat is extortionist, and many Muslims give alms out of a sense of strong Islamic obligation. But the Taliban forced a tax to support their administrative activities. During its 1996-2001 tenure, the Taliban required that narcotic cultivators and traffickers pay them a specified amount of their revenue. Several years into their rule, the Taliban controlled 96% of Afghanistan's poppy-growing regions and taxed the poppy growers and those who refine poppies into opium. Despite protestations to the contrary, the Taliban were heavily engaged in the narcotics trade.[149]

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[145] A partial lists of behavior and items banned included: "women working and driving, television, satellite dish, movies, photographs of people and animals, statues, stuffed toys, the internet, computer disks, non-religious music, musical instruments, cassettes, dancing, kite-flying, playing cards, chess, neckties, lipstick, nail polish, fireworks, fashion catalogues, pig-fat products, anything made with human hair." Source: Tom Mashberg, "Taliban Ready to Fight U.S.-Afghan Extremists Abhor Western Culture," *The Boston Herald*, (September 19, 2001).

[146] Hafizullah Emadi, *Repression, Resistance, and Women in Afghanistan*, (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 127.

[147] Nancy J. Hirschmann, *The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2003), 270.

[148] Amnesty International claimed that 1,000 people were arrested within a month of the takeover and that many disappeared. Source: "Women in Afghanistan: The Backstory," *Amnesty International*, (October 25, 2013). http://www.amnesty.org.uk/womens-rights-afghanistan-history#.UwlEaDiYbt4

[149] This is what is often referred to as "narco-terrorism." It is a symbiosis in which both sides profit; the narco-traffickers have their products protected, and the terrorist group, such as Sendero

The Taliban transported, taxed, and sold opium in Afghanistan.[150] Their claims that they discouraged and tried to prevent narcotics use and sale were false.[151] In 1999, Afghanistan produced a peak of over 4,581 metric tons of raw and refined opium.[152] In response to a temporary surplus of opiates that the market could not absorb, the Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in late 2000, but allowed the opium trade to continue.[153]

Luminoso in Peru, obtains necessary funding. The TTP has a flexible taxation. Sometimes the wheat farmers can pay in fuel or agriculture

[150] Lee V. Barton, *Illegal Drugs and Governmental Policies*, (New York: Nova Publishers. 2007). 97.

[151] Lee V. Barton, *Illegal Drugs and Governmental Policies*, 97.

[152] "CIA World Factbook – Afghanistan," *CIA World Factbook*.

[153] Lee V. Barton, *Illegal Drugs and Governmental Policies*, 97.

PART THREE -POST-TALIBAN DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

As mentioned earlier, leading international donors met in Bonn in December 2001 to map-out a long-term developmental program for Afghanistan.[154] Signatories to the agreement determined to "promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, and stability."[155] This required broad-based economic and infrastructure development; political, administrative, and legal reforms; political pluralism and women's reforms; laws preventing corruption, and illegal drugs; and tax reform.[156]

In this conference and subsequence agreements, international and domestic investment was encouraged. Rural development was promoted by the National Solidarity Program by building rural roads, irrigation, electrification, and drinking water.[157] The government approved a Public Finance and Expenditure Management (PFEM) Law in 2005.

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[154] The conference was led by five countries and 15 NGOs. Source: Charles Recknagel, "Bonn Conference Participants Tell Afghanistan "We will Not Abandon You," *Radio Free Europe*, April 12, 2011. http://www.rferl.org/content/bonn_2_conference_hopes_to_chart_afghan_future/24411914.html

[155] Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement), posted on Council on Foreign Relations, December 2001. http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/agreement-provisional-arrangements-afghanistan-pending-re-establishment-permanent-government-institutions-bonn-agreement/p20041

[156] Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement), posted on Council on Foreign Relations, December 2001. http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/agreement-provisional-arrangements-afghanistan-pending-re-establishment-permanent-government-institutions-bonn-agreement/p20041

[157] "Afghanistan: Supporting State Building and Development," The World Bank, April 11, 2014. http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2014/04/11/afghanistan-supporting-state-building-and-development

Economic Development Program

In the immediate post-Taliban period, there was concern that Afghanistan could not grow without a substantial infusion of funding. Economists at the World Bank determined that it was insufficient to build the country to its pre-Taliban economic level because that would still keep the country at a relatively low level of human development. This would keep an impoverished Afghanistan hostage to the Taliban's resurgence.[158]

Based on its experiences in Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s, the World Bank tried to encourage broadly based rural programs to increase the returns to small-farm production and rural wage labor.[159] The World Bank determined that policies geared toward feeding, sheltering, and providing basic medical needs to Afghanistan's poorest citizens were more productive than the more ambitious, large-scale agricultural or industrial strategies of early decades.[160]

The World Bank was among the aid and lending institutions that provided the basic needs - food, shelter, fuel and clothing - to Afghans.[161] World Bank economists voiced concern about the poor state of the Afghan public administration and attributed

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[158] *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2,* 4-9.

[159] Walter Eberlei, "Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World, (Book review)," *Journal of Development Studies*, 2001, HighBeam Research. (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-80090248.html

[160] "The Rebirth of a Nation; Afghanistan, (Progress in Afghanistan)," The Economist (US), 2003, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-96391060.html

[161] Marc Kaufman, "IMF and World Bank Try to Help Afghans Stabilize Currency, Construct a System," *The Washington Post*, 2002, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-322122.html

the low level of success of health and education programs to failures in the civil service.[162] For this reason, building capacity became a central goal of the conferees at the Bonn Conference in 2001, to be discussed later. In table 46 the leading donors to Afghanistan's development are listed.

Rank	Donor	2002-2013 Pledge	2002-2009 Committed	2002-2009 Disbursed
1	USA	38000	28366	23417
2	UK	2897	1810	1546
3	WB	2800	1881	1364
4	ADB	2200	1552	618
5	EU/EC	2037	1973	1576
6	Japan	1900	1378	990
7	Canada	1679	1206	898
8	India	1200	1236	662
9	Germany	1188	1044	584
10	Norway	983	598	324

Table 46. Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan Figures in U.S. $ Million[163]

The World Bank targeted agricultural development as the engine for broad-based, poverty-reducing growth.[164] The contribution of agriculture compared to other sectors in the pre-Taliban period is shown in table 47.[165] As with many developing countries, the

[162]"Afghanistan, The Journey to Economic Development, Volume I: The Main Report, Report No 1777a-AF," *World Bank,* (March 1978). http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default

[163] "Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan," *Baawar Consulting Group, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance*, 25. http://pd-website.inforce.dk/content/pdf-countryreports/afghanistan.pdf

[164] "Especially in low-income countries, there is a strong association between growth in agricultural purchasing power and rural wages—a key welfare indicator for the rural poor Moreover, agricultural growth helps the rest of the economy. Typically (as noted in World Development Report 1986) countries with rapid agricultural growth have also had rapid industrial growth." Source: "Promoting Economic Opportunities for The poor," *World Development Bank*.

[165] Adam Pain and Jonathan Goodhand, "Afghanistan: Current Employment and Socio-economic Situation and Prospects, Working Paper 8, InFocus Program on Crisis Response and Reconstruction," Recover and Reconstruction Department, *International Labor Organization*, (March 2002), 16. http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2002/102B09_42_engl.pdf

economy was heavily agricultural. The contribution of agriculture, livestock, and handicrafts was over 60% in 2002. The contribution of the service sector was not listed.

Item	Magnitude
Contribution of agriculture (including livestock & forestry)	50% of GDP
Contribution of livestock	16% of GDP
Contribution of handicrafts (largely woolen, rugs and handicrafts)	8-10%
Exports- Contribution of livestock products	14% of exports
Exports- carpets and rugs	9%

Table 47: Magnitude of Key Sectors in the Pre-Taliban Period

The World Bank's first estimate of basic economic reconstruction and development was upwards of $100 billion. The cost of clearing landmines from the Soviet era was expected to be at least $500 million.[166] Other challenges included stabilizing the Afghani, the Afghan currency; ensuring that projects were sufficiently funded and directed to the appropriate persons; and reducing corruption.[167]

The Coalition's donors' development plan would reflect some of the basic goals advocated in the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, as outlined in Manual 3-24 and post-conflict stability operations, to be discussed in chapter five, which advocated supporting economic and infrastructure development and capacity building.[168] The manual 3-24

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[166] Economists also cited the examples of aid to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who, with a population of less than two million, received a total of over $3 billion in reconstruction and development assistance. Source: Sonia Kolesnikova, "Economic Reconstruction for Afghanistan," *United Press International*, (November 19, 2001).

[167] The National Development Framework, the National Development Budget, and the Priority Reform and Restructuring process were institutionalized as the core of the reform and reconstruction process.

[168] The 3-24 elements particularly relevant to Afghanistan were supporting private sector and agricultural development programs and transportation infrastructure and telecommunications infrastructure. Source: *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2*,-4-9.

underscored the importance of providing basic "facilities, services, and installations needed for a community or society to function."[169]

Some of the statistics on Afghanistan's economic development from the pre-Soviet and pre-Taliban period to the immediate post-Taliban period are presented in table 48 and are helpful in showing trend. First, there was relatively flat economic growth from 1975 to 2002, during which the official per capita GDP grew only from $169 to $189. The total GDP grew from $2.4 billion to $6.5 billion but the population grew from $14 million to $21.8 million. Therefore, benefits from the increase in GDP were offset by the increase in the population growth. Donors in Bonn in 2001 were determined to spur sustained growth with broader distribution of wealth than in previous decades.

[169] Typical key infrastructure includes sewers, water, electrical, academic, trash, medical facilities, safety, and other considerations (also known as SWEAT-MSO). Source: "Tactics in Counterinsurgency," *FM 3-24.2*, 4-9.

Economic Indicators	1975	2002	2003
Official GDP (US$ billion)	2.5	4.0	4.6
Opium GDP (US$ billion)	----	2.5	2.3
Total GDP (US$ billion)	2.4	6.5	6.9
Official annual growth (%)	3.0	29	16
Total annual growth (%)	3.0	10.2	5
Population (million)	14.0	21.8	22.2
Official GDP per capita ($)	169	186	207
Total GDP per capita ($)	169	300	310
Inflation (%) (+)	6.6	52.3	10.5
Exchange rate (% increase) (+)	--	52.2	(3.6)
Domestic currency in circulation (growth %)	--	20.1	40.9
Gross foreign exchange reserves (US$ million)	--	426	
Current account (% GDP)	(2.7)	(2.1)	(0.9)
Domestic revenues (% official GDP)	11.4	3.3	4.3
Ordinary expenditures (% official GDP)	9.1	8.6	9.7
Development exp. (% official GDP) (-)	6.1	13.4	31.6

Table 48. Economic Indicators in 1975, 2002, 2003[170]

(+) March to March
(*) Excludes opiate exports; 1978 instead of 1975
(-) Estimate for 2003/04
2002 refers to Afghanistan's solar year 1381, from March 02 to March 03.
Source: Statistical Appendix, Table A1

Some of the initial optimism was borne out. Afghanistan's economy improved in the post-Taliban period for several reasons.[171] Donors in the post-Taliban period determined not to replicate the focus on macro-developmental plans of the 1950s and 1960s. They would avoid large, centralized planning. Instead, they would concentrate on human needs. With sustained, broadly based economic developmental platforms, economists anticipated improvement.[172]

[170] "Afghanistan—State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty," *A World Bank Country Study 31673, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/*The World, (February 2005), 5.

[171] "The Rebirth of a Nation; Afghanistan. (Progress in Afghanistan)," *The Economist (US),* 2003, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-96391060.html

[172] Donors pledged funds to Afghanistan's development through a succession of international conferences: Bonn Conference (December 22, 2001); Tokyo Conference (January 21-22, 2002) Berlin

The main cash crop of the early post-Taliban period was the poppy, which in 2002/03, generated gross revenues of some $1 billion for farmers and $1.3 billion for traffickers.[173] The donors determined to reduce significantly the level of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The livestock sector produced milk, meat, and wool. Other sectors targeted for development included minerals, oil, gas, and gemstones; as well as existing industries, such as carpet manufacturing and cashmere production.[174]

The GDP in billions, real growth, inflation rate, exports, imports, debt-external of GDP of the post-Taliban years, 2002-2010, are shown in table 46. The GDP almost quadrupled from $4.13 to $15.94 billion from 2002 through 2010.[175] In 2007-08, real GDP growth declined precipitously, largely because of poor agricultural production.[176] In 2009, the year in which in the insurgent attacks, independent variable was measured, the exports reached the third highest level of the eight-year period at $547 million.[177] The

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Conference (April 1, 2004); London Conference (February 1, 2006); London Conference (February 1, 2006); Paris Conference (June 12, 2008); Hague Conference (March 31, 2009); London Conference (January 28, 2010).

[173] Even by 2008, up to 45% of the rural population did not receive the minimum level of dietary energy needed to sustain a healthy life. Source: "Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387-1391 (2008-2013). A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (ANDS)," (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Kabul, 2008), 30.

[174] Afghanistan Economy 2010, *CIA Factbook*, http://www.workmall.com/wfb2010/afghanistan/afghanistan_economy.html
.

[175] The year of in which the independent variable of this dissertation, the civilian fatalities, were measured was the year of the highest growth rate, which was 21.02%.

[176] "Afghanistan Economic Update," *The World Bank*, Accessed May 10, 2014. http://www.netflix.com/WiPlayer?movieid=70267584&trkid=13462050&tctx=0%2C3%2Cf37de93a-678b-44b5-8cbf-f63ab677d8b2-8349167

[177] "With the main crop season (May – September) nearly over, cereal production, accounting for three quarters of agriculture, is projected to increase by 74%. As agriculture accounts for a third of the GDP. "Afghanistan Economic Update," *The World Bank*, Accessed May 10, 2014,

inflation rate was the highest of the period at 28%, in large part because of the high GDP growth rate. The peak year was 2009, in which growth in the GDP was 21.02%.

	GDP in Billions	GDP Real Growth	Inflation Rate	Exports	Imports	Debt-external of GDP
2002	4.13	NA%	NA%	1.2BN	1.3 BN	NA
2003	4.58	8.44	NA%	1.2 BN	1.3 BN	NA
2004	5.29	1.06	5.2%	98 MN	1.00BN	NA
2005	6.28	11.18	10.3%	446MN	3.75BN	NA
2006	7.02	5.55	16.3%	582MN	7.24BN	11.81
2007	9.84	13.74	13%	471MN	4.5BN	19.83
2008	10.19	3.61	26.8%	603MN	5.3BN	19.74
2009	12.49	21.02	28%	547MN	5.14BN	19.64
2010	15.94	8.43	7.7%	571MN	5.15BN	15.98

Table 49: Economic Indicators 2002- 2010[178]

The economic indicators shown in table 49 shows a much greater expanding and dynamic economy compared to the 1975 to 2002 figures in table 48. Though the economy grew by 62% from 1975 to 2002, it grew 370% from 2002 through 2010. The real GDP growth from 2002 through 2010 averaged 9.4%.

In the post-Taliban period, the peak year of growth was 2009, 21.02%, to 2004, the lowest year of growth, at 1.05%. The year of highest inflation was 2009, also the year of highest GDP growth. Afghan exports fluctuated, as did imports.

http://www.netflix.com/WiPlayer?movieid=70267584&trkid=13462050&tctx=0%2C3%2Cf37de93a-678b-44b5-8cbf-f63ab677d8b2-8349167

[178] "The Global Economy, Afghanistan," *World Bank*, http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/indicators_data_export.php

Economic performance during 2009, the year in which the independent variable was measured, followed patterns of the past five years, with only a few exceptions. The GDP grew steadily since 2005, from 322.2 in 2005; 385.5 in 2006; 484.6, in 2007; 600.5 in 2008 to 715.1, in 2009.[179] The real GDP growth in 2009 grew from 16.1%, in 2005; 8.2%, in 2006; 14.2%, in 2007; 3.4%, in 2008, to 22%, in 2009.[180] Inflationary trends slackened, as the increase in consumer prices declined.[181] According to the IMF's International Financial Statistics, earnings from exports increased from $2.46 billion in 2008 to $2.51 billion in 2009.[182]

Business Climate

Investment in Afghanistan was examined by the World Bank in Afghanistan Investment Climate Survey (ICS) in 2005.[183] Investors and potential investors, 335 were interviewed, cited infrastructure issues as among the most-significant disincentives against private investment. For example, 64% of surveyed enterprises cited problems with intermittent electricity as a severe obstacle to doing business.[184] This was followed

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[179] "Country Report Afghanistan, 2011, Economic Structure, Annual Indicators," *Economist Intelligence Unit*, (London, May, 1, 2011).

[180] "Country Report Afghanistan, 2011, Economic Structure, Annual Indicators," *Economist Intelligence Unit*.

[181] "Country Report Afghanistan, 2011, Economic Structure, Annual Indicators," *Economist Intelligence Unit*.

[182] Country Report Afghanistan, 2012, 4the Quarter 2012, Economic Structure, Annual Indicators, *Economist Unit*, *Intelligence Unit*, (London, May, 1, 2011).

[183] Afghanistan: Investment Climate, *The World Bank*, Accessed May 5, 2014 http://web.worldbank.org

[184] Afghanistan: Investment Climate, *The World Bank*, Accessed May 5, 2014.

by difficulties in accessing land. Corruption was also a frequently cited obstacle. But, investors cited an improving security climate as an incentive to invest.[185]

Table 50 presents the relative business climate and gives an indication of the early post-Taliban period. Many of the problems relating to public administration of the Taliban period continued, if mitigated. For example, protecting investments and registering property was difficult.

Ease of …	Economy Rank	Best Performer	Worst Performer
Doing Business	12	New Zealand	Congo, Dem. Rep
Starting a Business	16	Canada	Angola
Dealing with Licenses	….	Palau	Tanzania
Hiring and Firing	25	Palau	Burkina Faso
Registering Property	150	New Zealand	Nigeria
Getting Credit	153	United Kingdom	Cambodia
Protecting Investors	145	New Zealand	**Afghanistan**
Paying Taxes	7	Maldives	Belarus
Trading Across Borders	128	Denmark	Iraq
Enforcing Contracts	93	Norway	Timor-Leste
Closing a Business	142	Japan	West Bank and Gaza

Table 50: Doing Business in Afghanistan in 2005[186]

Capital investment as percentage of GDP increased steadily from 12.33 in 2002, to 17.87 in 2010.[187] Peak years were 2005, at 21.57; and 2006, at 23.36. Capital

[185] Afghanistan: Investment Climate, *The World Bank*, Accessed May 5, 2014.

[186] Afghanistan: Investment Climate, *The World Bank*, Accessed May 5, 2014.

[187] According to the World Bank, "investment decisions usually depend on the availability of five basic factors: political and economic stability and security, clear unambiguous regulations, reasonable tax rates that are equitably enforced, access to finance and infrastructure, and an appropriately skilled workforce. In Afghanistan, these conditions are lacking." Source: Afghanistan: Investment Climate, The *World Bank*, Accessed May 5, 2014. http://web.worldbank.orgml

investment is a signal of national confidence because it gages investor confidence in the future. The GDP per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) increased from 760.83 to 1,183.05.

	Capital investment as percent of GDP	GDP per capita Purchasing Power Parity
2002	12.33	760.83
2003	16.85	792.47
2004	18.79	770.74
2005	21.57	827.85
2006	23.36	947.56
2007	19.86	937.75
2008	18.87	948.07
2009	17.89	1118.19
2010	17.87	1183.05

Table 51. Additional Economic Metrics[188]

Table 52 shows statistics on agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, other industry services in terms of GDP from 2002-2010. Several figures show a maturing of the economy. An estimated 85% of the population depended directly or indirectly on agriculture and agricultural products, which also accounted for nearly half of all exports in that period.[189] The agricultural sector declined from 38.5% in 2002 of the GDP to 23.3% of the GDP in 2011, while the service sector of the GDP increased from 37.8% in 2002 to 50.7% in 2010. Manufacturing declined, but construction increased, as shown in table 52.

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[188] The Global Economy, Afghanistan, *World Bank*, http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/indicators_data_export.php

[189] Country Assistance Program Evaluations, "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," *Asian Development Bank*, *Independent Evaluation*, (October 2012), 9-12. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/cape-afg-web3.pdf

Sector	2002 03	2003 04	2004 05	2005 06	2006 07	2007 08	2008 09	2009 10	2010 11
Agriculture	38.5	36.8	28.5	30.2	27.2	27.3	22.4	27.0	23.3
Mining	0.1	0.1	.2	.3	.3	.5	.5	.4	.6
Manufact-uring	18.7	18.1	18.8	17.4	17.1	15.6	15.4	13.5	13.0
Construct-ion	4.8	6.0	9.4	11.2	13.8	13.2	14.0	12.5	12.4
Other Industry	0.1	0.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
Services	37.8	38.8	43.1	40.9	41.6	43.4	47.6	46.5	50.7

Table 52. Sector shares in GDP percent[190]

Construction in 2002, at 4% of GDP, grew to 12.4% of GDP in 2010/11. Assets in the banking system rose by almost 20% a year, from 6% of GDP in 2004/05 to 20%, in 2008/09.[191] By 2008, most industrial production still consisted of fertilizers, handicrafts, or industry connected to agriculture.

Statistics on the GDP, foreign aid, and aid as percentage of GDP are shown in graph 5. There was a steady increase in foreign aid, as indicated in the blue bar, from less than $1 billion to over $4 billion.

[190] IMF and CSO, and World Bank staff calculations. Source: "Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014 Volume 2: Main Report." *World Bank*, (May 2012), 24. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Images/305983-1334954629964/AFTransition2014Vol2.pdf

[191] Thibaut Muzart, "Afghanistan's Economic Prospects and Challenges Draft, 10-14-09," *Weidemann Associates*, (2009). http://egateg.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Afghanistan%20Final.pdf



Blue bar is Foreign aid **Green bar is GDP** **Red line, on top, is aid of GDP**

Graph 5. External Funding and GDP in Afghanistan, 2001-2008[192]

In terms of public finance, the government succeeded in boosting tax collection, as shown in graph 6, through improved tax collections measures, administrative improvements, and consolidation of earlier reforms.[193] There were fluctuations. Although total revenue excluding grants (percent of GDP) and tax revenue (percent of GDP) both experienced a 1% dip in 2007, they recovered to 2006 levels at 7.6% and 5.8% respectively by the end of 2008.[194]

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[192] Stefanie Nijseen, "World Development Indicators, 2002-2009, Special Report on Economic Development in Afghanistan."

[193] Country Assistance Program Evaluations "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," *Asian Development Bank, Independent Evaluation,* (October 2012), 9-12. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/cape-afg-web3.pdf

[194] Revenue grew substantially as a percent of the GDP. The average value for Afghanistan during that period was 7.41% with a minimum of 5.23 % in 2007 and a maximum of 9.12 % in 2010. Source: Stefanie Nijseen, "Special Report on Economic Development in Afghanistan Tax," *Civil-Military Fusion Center,* (October 2010). https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Documents/Economic/Afghanistan_Economic_Brief_History.pdf

Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment

Economic indicators for tax revenue and for FDI were positive. Under the Taliban, tax collection was made erratically and unpredictably, often through demanding a percentage of illicit narcotics sales. This will be discussed in chapter four. Tax collection tests the ability of the public administration to perform professionally and without high levels of corruption.



Graph 6. Afghanistan's Tax Revenue Percent of GDP 2006-2010 [195]

[195] Theglobaleconomy.com, *World Bank*, Afghanistan Economic Indicators Taxes. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/Tax_revenue/

The banking sector grew rapidly from 2001 through 2010. Bank assets and deposits increased by more than 50% annually from 2006 through 2010.[196] In 2010, total assets of the banking sector amounted to about $4 billion, which was a third of GDP.[197] The incidence of poverty was higher in 2008, 36%, than in 2005, 33%, because of a decline in agricultural production caused by drought.[198]

The World Bank provided figures for FDI as percentage to GDP from 2002 through 2010. The year 2005 was the highest level of investment, with over 4%, but 2009 saw an uptick from approximately .7 to 1.7. Further the trend of FDI *net inflows* grew substantially in post-Taliban period. For example, the net inflows were $94,388,000.00 in 2008; to dip in 2009 to $75,735,560.00 in 2009, and to increase substantially in 2010 to $211,253,700.00.[199]This was one indicator that both national confidence and international investment confidence grew in Afghanistan.

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[196] "Country Assistance Program Evaluations - Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Independent Evaluation," *Asian Development Bank*, (October 2012), 12. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/cape-afg-web3.pdf

[197] "Country Assistance Program Evaluations -Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Independent Evaluation," *Asian Development Bank*, (October 2012).

[198] "Country Assistance Program Evaluations -Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," *Asian Development Bank*, Independent Evaluation, 9-12. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/cape-afg-web3.pdf

[199] International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, from Index Mundi, Afghanistan – Foreign Direct Investment, Accessed July 5, 2014. http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/afghanistan/foreign-direct-investment



Graph 7. FDI as Percentage of GDP 2002-2010[200]

Building in the Villages and in the Provinces

The data presented above in this chapter referred to the national-level development in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Much of this developmental effort was directed centrally from Kabul. However, a substantial amount of development was undertaken on the provincial level. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs, which were discussed in chapter one's literature review, were natural instruments to maintain a light foreign military presence, while providing protection for developmental experts.[201] The

[200] The Globaleconomy.com, *The World Bank*, Afghanistan. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan

[201] "Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction: Bobby Wilkes," *Congressional Testimony*, (2007), Highbeam Research, (March 25, 2013). Http://Www.Highbeam.Com/Doc/1p1-144593929.Html

first phases of the conflict removed the Taliban and al Qaeda from power; the next phase concentrated on stabilizing the Karzai Regime and developing the country.[202] By early 2002, the U.S. Army deployed the PRT's precursor, the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells,[203] as small outposts to determine reconstruction and developmental needs.[204]

The first PRT was deployed to Gardez, in November 2002.[205] It included staff from several U.S. agencies with equities in developing Afghanistan and securing peace. Specialists employed by USAID served in the front lines of Afghanistan's developmental efforts.[206]

PRTs were also intended to be temporary tools to provide stability, confidence in institutions, and economic optimism. After the developmental and stabilization fundamentals were achieved, the PRT would be dismantled to allow traditional, indigenous development efforts. According to plan, PRTs would coordinate the

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[202] Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction: Bobby Wilkes," *Congressional Testimony*.

[203] They were soon nicknamed "Chiclets," and were comprised of 10-15 soldiers, generally with civil affairs backgrounds. Soldiers worked with NGOs in the field. The title of these teams was, once again, changed in November 2002 to PRT.

[204] "Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams" Bahram Air Base, *455th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affair*, Accessed January 2013. http://www.bagram.afcent.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4652

[205] The province was considered to be a permissive environment for developmental activities. Source: Robert Border, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: A Model for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development," *Journal of Development and Social Transformation*. Accessed September 20, 2014. http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/moynihan/dst/borders1.pdf?n=8411

[206] Beth Cole, Director, Office of Civil-Military Cooperation, The U.S. Agency for International Development, said this at the Civil Affairs Engagement Roundtable XVII, George Mason University, Arlington Campus, on March 22, 2013. Mr. Silinsky was in attendance.

reconstruction process, identify and prioritize local projects, conduct village assessments, and coordinate with regional commanders.[207] The map in figure 4 shows the location of the PRTs in 2010, which are identified by a star.[208] The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) began in Afghanistan, in late 2003, as means for commanders to fund developmental projects without having to go through bureaucratic channels for approval. [209] The PRT, in the context of its being a counterinsurgency tool, will be discussed in greater details in chapter five.

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[207] Web Relief Site, Center for Humanitarian Cooperation, May 31, 2003. http://reliefweb.int/

[208] The Commanders Emergency Response Project (CERP) is 1 element of funding the PRTs. BAAWAR Consulting Group "Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase Two," (2010). http://pd-website.inforce.dk/content/pdf-countryreports/afghanistan.pdf

[209] Mark S. Martins, "The Commander's Emergency Response Program," *Joint Force Quarterly 37*. www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0937.pdf.



Province	Estimated Cost
Badakshan	$55,000.00
Badghis	$1,837,539.00
Baghlan	$36,203,396.00
Balkh	$13,108,715.00
Bamian	$84,692,574.17
Daykundi	$3,107,699.00
Farah	$61,267,191.00
Faryab	$6,149,253.00
Ghazni	$146,862,472.00
Ghowr	$436,000.00
Helmand	$68,557,004.00
Herat	$50,390,059.00
Jowzjan	$636,604.00
Kabul	$231,738,616.00
Kandahar	$645,634,227.00
Kapisa	$107,246,417.00
Khost	$191,116,281.00
Kunar	$354,305,205.00
Kunduz	$8,052,887.00
Laghman	$227,971,243.00
Lowgar	$213,433,975.00
Nangarhar	$406,666,035.00
Nimroz	$4,862,748.00
Nuristan	$163,952,656.00
Paktika	$254,157,757.00
Paktya	$338,565,618.00
Panjshir	$158,030,538.00
Parwan	$241,526,035.00
Samangan	$1,360,000.00
Sar-e Pol	$353,500.00
Takhar	$920,000.00
Uruzgan	$72,291,367.00
Vardak	$42,091,537.00
Zabul	$88,328,961.00

Figure 4. PRTs Identified by Star in 2010[210]

Education

Before the Taliban's conquest in 1996, education was expanding, modernizing, and becoming more secular and accessible, particularly to girls.[211] One half of Afghanistan's children had accesses to primary education in the 1960s and early 1970s, and Kabul University attracted the country's top intellectual talent. This changed with the Taliban.

[210] "Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase Two," *BAAWAR Consulting Group* (2010), http://pd-website.inforce.dk/content/pdf-countryreports/afghanistan.pdf

[211] "Afghanistan: Education," *EIU ViewsWire*, (New York. August 24, 2007).

Virtually all elements of Afghan education declined during the Taliban's tenure. Secular education was largely criminalized.[212] Education that contradicted Islam was banned, and technical skills were discouraged.[213] Women and girls were the first to suffer and were the ones who suffered most.[214] Kabul University, once a regional educational powerhouse, was denuded of secular teaching.[215] Beginning in 1996, the Taliban began to shutter 15 of Kabul's 18 libraries.[216]

There were several basic educational challenges in early 2002. [217] Primary goals were to build more facilities to teach K-12 students, to develop teaching capacity, and to provide greater opportunities for girls. During the Taliban's reign, many teachers left the country; or had their skills atrophy under the weight of the Taliban's religious police; or stopped teaching, if they could afford to do so.[218]

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[212] Alvi Hayat, "Reconstruction in Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Women and Education." Resources for Feminist Research. 2004, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-125957094.html

[213] From Alvi and Doebbler: Pre-war estimates of literacy by the Library of Congress (www.loc.gov) state that "the literacy rate was estimated at 11.4 % (18.7 % male; 2.8 female)." Accessed at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0070) (June 26,2002).

[214] He wrote in the State Department's 1998 Human Rights Report, former Assistant Secretary of State Harold H. Koh described the inhumane conditions that Afghan women face under the Taliban "The situation facing women in Afghanistan represented perhaps the most severe abuse of women's human rights in the world. Source: Harold H. Koh, "Overview to Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998," *Human Rights Report*, (1998). http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/drl_reports.html.

[215] Thomas Grose, "Down & out in Afghanistan," *ASEE Prism*, (February 2003).

[216] Anne Garner, "Rebuilding Afghanistan, One Book at a Time: Though They Lack Some of the Most Basic Resources, Libraries Play a Key Role in Reviving This War-Depleted Nation," *American Libraries*, (November 2007).

[217] "Afghanistan's Education System Assessed in Special Report by ADB and Partners." *M2 Presswire*, (July 30, 2002).

[218] By 2001, many of the teachers had only religious training. Few could teach math and science.

Building vocational education was particularly important because skilled workmen were vital to promote and sustain every aspect of human development.[219] The economy, civil service facilities; communications, health, and educational building and infrastructure; and security-related facilities, all need skilled workers to build and maintain them. Graphs 8 and 9 demonstrate the steady increase in school attendance for primary and secondary school children in the post-Taliban period. The primary school enrollment increased from less than 65%, in 2002, to over 95% in 2011. Secondary school enrolled increased from less than 15% in 2002 to nearly 50% in 2011.

From the early post-Taliban period, the cause of educating Afghan girls resonated among Western donor states, international organizations, and churches.[220] Other programs included U.S. non-religious efforts such as CARE, which built fast-track programs for girls, because girls had been denied vital years of primary education.[221] The new constitution guaranteed free education to boys and girls but, during the period

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[219] A team led by the ADB predicted, in July 2002, that the cost of rebuilding Afghanistan's educational system would total $1.4 billion over 10 years. Source; The Comprehensive Needs Assessment (CAN) recommended that the Afghan government spend 3% of the GDP on education, with a particular focus on early "childhood education, teacher training, emergency school reconstruction, and a special education program for disadvantaged groups.

[220] An example of church activity came from American Presbyterians who launched the Afghanistan Challenge to provide 1,800 girls with quality education in 2010-2011. Source: Shama Mall, "The $106 Investment: Changing A Country through Girls' Education, (Letter from Afghanistan)," *Presbyterian Record*, 2010, HighBeam Research, (July 19, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-243044152.html

[221] The New England Women's Initiative has raised enough money to send 700 Afghan children to school through CARE programs. COPE, the Community Organized Primary Education project, has served about 30,000 Afghan boys and girls by building schools and retraining female teachers. Source: Megan Tench, Globe Staff. "Group Spotlights Education Issues Care Aims To Put Girls In Schools In Afghanistan," *The Boston Globe, (Boston, MA*), 2002, HighBeam Research, (July 19, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-7752681.html

covered in this dissertation, problems continued. Girls were needed to supplement family income, and attitudes relegating the position of girls in Afghanistan continued.[222]



Graph 8. Percentages of Children Attending Primary Schools from 2002-2011

[222] Education in Afghanistan." *Herizons*, 2005, HighBeam Research, (July 19, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-809488841.html



Graph 9. Percentages of Children Attending Secondary Schools from 2002-2011 [223]

Health

Afghanistan has faced some of the worst health statistics ever recorded worldwide. [224] Both indigenous Afghans and non-Afghans who invaded the country, from the British through the Soviets, faced hazardous health conditions. In the 1980s, sickness took a heavy toll on Soviet forces in Afghanistan.[225] "Hepatitis A, typhoid fever,

[223] "Afghanistan," *The Globaleconomy.com, Education,* http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/Female_to_male_ratio_secondary_school_students/

[224] For example, in 2005 there was an infant mortality rate of 16.5 % and 1,600 maternal deaths for every 100,000 live births. The United States, by comparison, had 12 deaths per 100,000. More than 25 % of Afghan children died before their fifth birthday.

[225] Nearly two-thirds of all Soviet troops who served in Afghanistan were hospitalized for disease. Source: Mike Eckel, "Preventing Disease Tough in Afghanistan," *Associated Press*, December 2, find I.

malaria, dysentery and even plague were the primary diseases that afflicted Soviets."[226]

The Taliban had no standardized medical training programs, and admissions to medical school were made on the basis of ethnic and religious preference and prejudice.[227] In 2002, a survey by the WHO showed 70% of nurses, midwives, and laboratory technicians did not meet minimum knowledge and skills standards when they were tested. As a result, a nationwide survey indicated a shortage of least 7,000 physicians and 20,000 nurses, midwives, and allied health professionals.[228]

For this reason, the donor states that met in Bonn in late 2001 made health care a top priority. Leading contributors were the governments of wealthy, western states, such as United States, Germany, and the Britain. Contributions also came from large NGOs such as German and Japanese Committees for UNICEF; Rotary International: and others.[229] There were three basic health goals: develop a basic package of health services; develop domestic health-care capacity in poorly served areas; and focus on health care for girls and women.

Afghanistan was over 80% rural, and many roads were largely impassable without a donkey or four-wheel-drive vehicles, which were rare. Many Afghans had no access to

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[226] Mike Eckel, "Fighting diseases while fighting a war on terror: preventative military medicine in Afghanistan," *AP Worldstream*, 2002, HighBeam Research, (March 23, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-70024899.html

[227] TW Sharp and FM Burkle and AF Vaughn, et al. "Challenges and opportunities for humanitarian relief in Afghanistan," *Journal of Infectious Diseases*, 2002, 34.

[228] World Health Organization. Country cooperation strategy for WHO and Afghanistan, 2006–2009. http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccs_afg_en.pdf.

[229] Country Programme Evaluation Government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, (2003-2002), UNICEF, November 2005. http://www.unicef.org/afghanistan/resources.html

health care. Often, isolated villagers could not leave for a clinic in a provincial capital, and health care providers could not enter remote villages to treat preventable and curable diseases, such as measles, diphtheria, tuberculosis, typhoid fever and meningitis.[230]

Category	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09
External assistance	138.9	165.5	198.8	220.7	223.5
Operating budget	25.2	27.4	27.6	30.7	27.7
Total funding	163.6	192.9	226.4	251.4	251.2

Table 53 Total Public Funding (US$ mil) on the Health Sector, 2004/05-2008/09[231]

A key health care goal was developing and implementing a basic health care plan with broad application and could bring quick results to even remote areas.[232] Foreign donors divided Afghanistan into different geographic regions. The major donors were the World Bank, USAID, and the European Commission, all of which subcontracted to NGOs. The World Bank also supervised public health ministries in Afghanistan.[233]

Health posts were established to service between 1,000–1,900 villages, and there were regional hospitals in Kandahar, Gardez, Mazar-e Sharif, and Herat. They were often

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[230] "Health Care in Afghanistan," *Horizons*, (April 1, 2005).

[231] The goals of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) were to reduce infant and maternal mortality ratios, to control communicable diseases, and to manage malnutrition and disabilities. It was developed by international agencies, particularly the World Health Organization. There was a particular focus on women's needs. Source: "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan Figures in US$ Million," *Baawar Consulting Group*. http://pd-website.inforce.dk/content/pdf-countryreports/afghanistan.pdf

[232] Results from assessments conducted by researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Indian Institute of Health Management Research show substantial improvements in the health status. Source: "Substantial Improvements Achieved in Afghanistan's Health Sector," *Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health*, (July 5, 2007).

[233] B. Sabri, "Towards Sustainable Delivery of Health Services in Afghanistan: Options For The Future," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, World Health Organization, Accessed July 5, 2014. http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/9/06-036939/en

staffed by workers with only rudimentary training. The largest were staffed with obstetricians/gynecologists, a surgeon, an anesthetist, a pediatrician, midwives, laboratory and X-ray technicians, a pharmacist, and a dentist and dental technician. Each district hospital cover a population of 100,000–300,000.[234]

In 2006, 82% of the entire population continued to live in districts where primary care services were provided by NGOs.[235] By 2009, coordinated health care infrastructure had not been developed countrywide.[236] Many Afghans in 2009 did without primary health care, [237] and 70% of medical programs in Afghanistan were implemented and overseen by NGOs.[238] As of 2009, the WHO data showed that there were only 6,000 physicians and 14,000 nurses for a population of 28 million people.[239]

According to the World Bank, the per capita spending on health care in Afghanistan from 2002-2011 was $29.58, with a minimum of $14.25 in 2002 and a

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[234] Tekabe A. Belay, "Building on Early Gains in Afghanistan's Health, Nutrition, and Population Sector, Challenges and Options," *World Bank,* (Washington, DC: 2010). http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2010/06/04/000333037_20100604020800/Rendered/PDF/548950PUB0EPI11C10Dislosed061312010.pdf

[235] R Waldman, L Strong, "Afghanistan's Health System Since 2001: Condition Improved, Prognosis Cautiously Optimistic*," Afghanistan Research And Evaluation Unit Briefing Paper Series*. http://www.areu.org.af.

[236] W. Kondro, "Where's the health in Afghanistan's reconstruction?" *CMAJ*, 2007, 177.

[237] P.M. Hansen and D.H. Peters and K Viswanathan.et al, "Client Perceptions of the Quality of Primary Care Services in Afghanistan," *International Journal of Qualitative Health Care*, 2008, 20.

[238] A. Yusufzai, "Poor Medical Facilities In Afghanistan Mean Patients Turn To Hospitals In Pakistan," *BMJ*. 2008, 337.

[239] "Core health indicators, Afghanistan," *World Health Organization*, Accessed November 5, 2008, http://www.who.int/whosis/database/core/core_select_process.cfm

maximum of $55.93 in 2011.[240] The health spending as percent of GDP more than doubled, as shown in graph 10.



Graph 10. Health Spending 2002-2011[241]

Life expectancy grew from over 45 years old to nearly 48 ½ years, as shown in graph 11.

[240] The Globaleconomy.com, the World Bank, Afghanistan. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/Health_spending_per_capita/

[241] The Globaleconomy.com, *The World Bank*, Afghanistan, http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/create_charts.php



Graph 11. Afghanistan Life Expectancy 2002-2010[242]

From the early post-Taliban period through 2010, there were direct and measurable improvements in health care for Afghans. Religious restrictions impeding access to health service and medicine were significantly reduced after the expulsion of the Taliban, and the quality of medical care, including mental health, throughout most of Afghanistan and for most Afghans improved.

Post-Taliban Public Administration

The victors found a hollow civil service when they expelled the Taliban from Kabul in 2001. Problems included a lack of capacity, weak communications between Kabul and outlying provinces, and an ineffective police force. The post-Taliban donors to Afghanistan remarked on the lack of experience, talent, ambition, and general

[242] The Globaleconomy.com, Afghanistan, *The World Bank*. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/Health_spending_per_capita

competence in the civil service.[243] The World Bank likened the situation to the "Dutch Disease," in which a large influx of money diverted administrators with in-demand skills, literacy and technical skills from sustained human development towards illicit occupations, mainly drug trafficking.[244]

A competent and honest civil service in post-Taliban Afghanistan was particularly important in building national confidence because of the country's extra-ordinary low levels of development, literacy, and education.[245] There was sudden demand for Afghans with basic public administration skills. Their insights into social norms, linguistic nuances, and tribal hierarchies often could not be replicated by western developmental specialists.

The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) sought to create incentives in public administration by raising salaries and ensuring reliable payment. [246] This would draw the more talented, ambitious, and well-educated candidates to the civil service.[247] The most important of the early, post-Taliban, international development platforms was crafted

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[243] Peter Middlebrook and Mark Sedra, "Lessons in State Building in the Post 9/11 Era, (Afghanistan's Problematic Path to Peace)," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, (March 1, 2004).

[244] William A. Byrd, "Responding To Afghanistan's Development Challenge An Assessment of Experience During 2002-2007 and Issues and Priorities for The Future," Report No. SASPR-1, *The World Bank*, (October 2007), iii.

[245] For this reason, there remained great competition for human capital in Afghanistan through-out the period covered in this dissertation. A college-educated Afghan could be paid more by NGOs, who may have only a five-year work horizon in Afghanistan, than by the country's civil service.

[246] "Round-up: Afghanistan Embarks upon Efforts for Efficient, Transparent Governance*," Xinhau Press Service*, (June 16, 2003).

[418]The wage scale increased to begin at $80.00 per month to $800.00 for top talent. This is less than an average of $2,000 per month that NGO paid some trusted Afghans, and it is less than what many skilled workers earn. Sediqullah, Bader and Dad, Noorani "Afghanistan: Karzi Hope Civil Servant Wage Hike Stems Graft," *Inter Press Service English News Wir*e, (November 17, 2006).

during the Bonn Agreement, which created and legitimized the Afghan government; the basic legal structure, particularly the constitution and the Supreme Court.[248]

In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement created the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) whose chairman, Hamid Karzai, took office December 22, 2001.[249] The Agreement created three major areas of activity, or "pillars"- security; governance and human rights; and economic development.[250]

On the national level, the Bonn Agreement built the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) to oversee the Public Administrative Reform (PAR).[251] This was the first, comprehensive, post-Taliban effort to build a new, viable civil service on modern administrative procedures.[252] At the core of the PAR were merit-based appointments and promotions.[253]

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[248] "Five Years after the Fall of the Taliban: Afghanistan beyond the Bonn Agreement. A public meeting of the Afghanistan Working Group," U.S. *Institute for Peace*, December 6, 2006. http://www.usip.org/events/2006/1206_afghanistan_bonn.html

[249] Thomas Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War," *Central Asian Survey*, (March-June 2006), 3.

[250] The Compact established benchmarks for performance in each area, explicitly tied to Afghanistan's National Development Strategy (ANDS). Source: "Afghanistan since the Fall of the Taliban: The Taliban's Ouster, the Bonn Process, and the Afghan Compact," *Human Rights Watch.* http://www.hrw.org

[251] Afghanistan National Development Strategy- Government of Afghanistan PAR strategy, *The Embassy of Afghanistan.* http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/page/afghanistan-national-development-strategy

[252] The IARCSC established two programs - Afghan Expatriate Program (AEP) and the Lateral Entry Program (LEP) to build capacity quickly and to make government service more attractive.

[253] "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Public Administration- Country Profile," *United Nations, Division for Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM),* (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, January 2006).

The PAR built milestones to identify achievements in building the civil service.[254] First, there was to be an overhaul of "government machinery" by 2010. Reforms were to ensure that core functions would become "fiscally sustainable," though specific objectives were left ambiguous.[255]

Corruption was a central problem in Afghanistan's public administration.[256] In June 2008, President Karzai, created a department to oversee the campaign against administrative corruption in government.[257] This high level of corruption was reflected in Transparency International's chart in table 54, which ranks Afghanistan's corruption level as tied as the 172nd least-corrupt country, or eighth most-corrupt, in a community of 180.

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[254] William Byrd, "Afghanistan-State Building. Sustainable Growth and Reducing Poverty," *World Bank*, (Washington, 2005). http://www.scribd.com/doc/16060551/AfghanistanState-Building-Sustaining-Growth-and-Reducing-Poverty-

[255] In 2005, the PAR expanded reforms in sub-national units; introduced a new pay and grade system, as well as a new pension system; published new administrative models and established new managerial procedures; developed legal framework; and focused on capacity enhancement through training. Source: World Bank, "Preliminary Assessment of Proposed Pay and Grading Reform," (Washington, DC: 2006).

[256] "Taming the Mafia State; Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Drive," *The Economist (US*), 2009, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-212420050.html

[257] "Afghan Cabinet Agrees To Set Up New Anti-Corruption Office," *Kabul National TV*, (In Dari and Pashto, June 4, 2008).

Year	Rank	Number of Countries Surveyed
2010	176	178
2009	179	180
2008	176	180
2007	172 (T)	180
2006	No data	163
2005	117 (T)	159

Table 54. Afghanistan's Rank in Transparency International's Annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)[258]

Building a Police Force

Some of the conferees in Bonn, in 2001, understood the historical importance of a strong national police to forge national confidence. In the early 20th century, then-Captain John Pershing built a constabulary force in the Philippines, which became a model for future counterinsurgency operations.[259] Strong policing helped to establish zones of security. As the French counterinsurgency theoretician David Galula pointed out, police help to identify insurgents and their supporters.[260] The field manual 3-24 states that the police, not the military, are the front-line forces in a counterinsurgency.[261] This will be discussed in the context of counterinsurgency in chapter five.

[258] Transparency International Annual CPI Report, Afghanistan, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
.

[259] "WWI General Portrayed As Unsung Hero in U.S. History, (Daily Break)," *The Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA)*, 2009, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-204887723.html

[260] Robert B. Killebrew, "Trenchant Analysis of Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Army*, 2006, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1015543791.html

[261] John Kiszely, "Learning about Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, 2007, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-160811627.html

In rural Afghanistan the police were responsible for maintaining security, addressing community problems, and brokering disputes. Police interacted with the population daily, forging ongoing relations with key members of the community. Through these daily interactions and relationships, police developed intimate knowledge of the physical and human terrain.[262] It is for these reasons that the Taliban targeted police.

In table 55, the number of authorized and assigned police units gives a partial picture of the status of these nine police departments in Afghanistan.

	Number Authorized	**Number Assigned**	**Percent Assigned**
Ministry of Interior Headquarters	6,015	5,237	87
Uniformed Police	44,319	42,969	97
Border Police	17,970	12,213	68
Auxiliary Police	0	9,318	NA
Civil Order Police	5,365	1,523	28
Counter Narcotics Police	4,148	2,815	68
Customs Police	3,777	2,265	60
Counter Terrorism Police	406	411	101
Standby/Highway Police	0	2,536	N/A
Total	82,000	79,910	97

Table 55. Detailed Breakdown of Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces, 2008[263]

Listed in table 56 is a 2008 GAO assessment of the capabilities of the selected police departments, which are under the operational control of the Ministry of the

[262] Tom Niblock, U.S. *Embassy blog*, (Kabul, April 2, 2008).

[263] "Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces," *Government Accountability Office*, (June 2008), 33. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf

Interior. The range of capabilities is "capable of operating independently," at CM 1 to "formed but not yet capable of performing primary operational missions," at CM 4.

CM 1: capable of operating independently
CM 2: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support
CM 3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces
CM 4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions
N/A: Not yet formed or not reporting

Police Units (Number of Units)	CM 1	CM 2	CM3	CM4	N/A
Uniformed Police Districts (365)	0	6	6	296	57
Border Police (33)	0	0	0	33	9
Civil Order Police Battalions (20)	0	6	2	2	10
Counter Narcotics Police Units (15)	2	0	10	3	2
Total (%)	0	12 (3%)	18% (4%)	334 (77%)	69 (16%)

Table 56. Assessment of Afghanistan National Police, 2008 [264]

Security

Building Security Forces in Post-Taliban Afghanistan

In 2002, Afghanistan did not have organized armed forces. There was no standardized training, career advancement, nation-wide billeting program, unified

[264] "Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces," *Government Accountability Office*, (June 2008), 32. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf

ranking system or associated with a modern, professional army.[265] The last military entity that could be classified as an Army collapsed with Dr. Mohammad Najibullah's Soviet-supported regime in 1992.[266]

Developing the Afghan National Security Forces, ANSF, which included the Army, or ANA, became a top priority for western donors to Afghanistan, particularly for the United States. An important and early security-related task for the new Army was disarming many of the Afghans, particularly the Taliban. There could not be an effective, unified, and credible armed forces until local militias and former Taliban surrendered most of their weapons, particularly crew-served weapons.[267] Even before the September 11 attacks, the United Nations required "that disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants should take place in the earliest stages of the peace process."[268]

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[265] The Army's facilities had been shattered during the incessant wars of the previous two decades. The military's leadership was sapped, and most of the weapons were antiquated and not serviceable.

[266] Samuel Chan, "Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army," *Working Paper 128 of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies*, (Singapore: June, 1, 2007).

[267] Amin Tarzi, "Disarmament in Afghanistan -- Which Militias And What Weapons?" *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, (April 20, 2005).

[268] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines, (United Nations, December 1999), 20.

Disarmament,[269] demobilization,[270] and reintegration[271] (DDR) was a central Coalition goal since 2001.[272] Soon after the Taliban were defeated, ISAF determined to disarm the regional militia by giving the regional "war lords" positions of influence in the transitional administration.[273] This was a plan to demobilize specific, quasi-autonomous tribal groups, particularly the Northern Alliance of non-Pashtun fighters. Many of these troops and the Taliban fighters were amnestied.[274] Coalition Forces tried to reintegrate many of these foreign fighters in the mainstream of Afghan life.[275]

According to plan, a strong security apparatus—robust military capabilities,

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[269] "Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes." (United Nations 2009). Source: Harris Wahidi, "The Process of DDR in Afghanistan," University of Birmingham, UK, May 2013. http://www.academia.edu/5115224/The_Process_of_DDR_in_Afghanistan

[270] "Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion." (United Nations 2009). Source: Haris Wahidi, "The Process of DDR in Afghanistan," (University of Birmingham, UK, May 2013). http://www.academia.edu/5115224/The_Process_of_DDR_in_Afghanistan

[271] "Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance," (United Nations 2009).

[272] Matthew Q Rodano, "The Road to Reconciliation: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration." *Military Review*, 2011, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-268311122.html

[273] Patricia Gossman, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Afghanistan," *Research Unit International Center for Transitional Justice*, June 2009.

[274] Michael W. Mosser, "The 'Armed Reconciler': The Military Role in Amnesty, Reconciliation, and Reintegration Process," *Military Review*, (November-December 2007).

[275] Matthew Q. Rodano, "The Road to Reconciliation: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration." *Military Review*, 2011, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-268311122.html

effective paramilitary forces, strong civil-military relations—would shore-up the government. It would also underscore the government's monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the importance of which was discussed in chapter one.

In building the Afghan Army, there were problems from the beginning, such as high levels of desertion, drug use, illiteracy, and national confusion.[276] The high rates of desertion declined by 2009, the year selected to measure civilian casualties in this dissertation.[277] The lower rate of desertion was attributed to a presidential decree that criminalized taking leave without authorization, a media campaign to discourage this activity, and higher unemployment. It is also an indication that employment in the Army became a more attractive career prospect for many soldiers than traditional occupations, such as farming or craftsmanship.[278]

Afghanistan has made building security as it leading priority, as indicated by its relative standing among other developing countries in budget allocations. There is a wide

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[276] Another reason why the desertion rate was high was because some recruits felt swindled. They claimed that they were promised extravagant benefits such as a $200.00 bonus and training in America. When it became apparent that they would receive neither, some deserted their posts and returned to their villages. Others claimed to have been impressed into the army by local commanders. Source: "Hopes For Rapidly Building Army Fade; Afghanistan: Low Wages Cause Some Soldiers To Quit So Training Takes Longer." *Telegraph - Herald (Dubuque)*, (August 15, 2002).

[277] U.S. Lieutenant General William Caldwell, the commander of NATO's training mission in Afghanistan, put the loss at 32 % of its personnel each year and that nearly 23 % of police desert. Source: Slobodan Lekic. "Exclusive: Afghan forces to start taking over," *Associated* Press Online, (2011). HighBeam Research. (September 17, 2012). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1A1-8cb35e2e8c894f16a21504e52688ed78

[278] Antonio Giustozzi, "Afghanistan's National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanization," *Global Terrorism Analysis*, (The Jamestown Foundation, May 1, 2008). http://www.jamestown.org/single?

range of expenditures, as a percent of national budget, of developing countries.[279] The first column is total expenditures of GDP. Afghanistan had the highest level of defense, by far at 13.2%. It also has the highest level of expenditures on public safety at 6.4%.

	Total Expenditures	Defense	Public Order and Safety
Afghanistan	56.5	13.2	6.4
Belarus	18.4	1.2	1.2
Bolivia	18.1	1.7	1.8
Bulgaria	20.6	2.3	1.9
India	16.7	2.6	n/a
Jordan	31.7	6.0	2.9
Kazakhstan	13.7	0.6	1.3
Kyrgyz Republic	18.0	1.7	1.1
Moldova	21.2	0.4	1.3
Pakistan	22.8	4.5	0.3
Philippines	19.6	1.0	1.14
Romania	16.4	1.3	1.8
Senegal	13.1	1.6	n/a
Sri Lanka	25.6	4.5	1.

Table 57. Public Expenditures in the Security Sector (% of GDP) in 2008.[280]

The status of the ANA, the development of which was a cornerstone of the Coalition's development program, was mixed. The ANA recruited an additional 35,000 Afghan troops from September 2008 through September 2009. However, nearly 25% of the recruits deserted, indicating an increase in the desertion rate over 2007 and 2008.[281]

[279] Defense expenditures in percent of GDP are in table 57. The lowest complete expenditure is Senegal with 13.1% and the highest is Afghanistan at 56.5 %.

[280] William Byrd and Stéphane Guimbert, "Public Finance, Security, and Development, A Framework and an Application to Afghanistan," *The World Bank, South Asia Region, Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development Department,* (Washington, DC: January 2009), 13. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/4004/WPS4806.txt?sequence

[281] Country Report Afghanistan, 2011, "The Political Scene: The Training of the Army and the Police is Complicated," *Economist Intelligence Unit,* (London: May, 1, 2011).

Summary

Chapter three analyzed different developmental platforms and patterns in Afghanistan. Three of the more important causes for poverty in Afghanistan are isolation; poor economic planning; and constant warfare.[282] The economy improved in the 1970s because natural gas was exploited and because the national-level planning of the 1950s and 1960s were substituted with a basic-needs approach to development and more focus on agriculture. But the return of war in 1979 undid the gains of the decade, as Afghanistan developed three sub-economies: a combat economy; a shadow economy; and a coping economy. These economies continued until the Taliban were routed from the country.[283]

The Taliban's defeat in 2001 promised broad-sector development. But within several years of their expulsion, the Taliban regrouped to pose a threat to human development. The Bonn Accords were a pivotal point in the history of Afghanistan. They solidified and codified a loose democratic form of government in Kabul. There have been basic elements of consensual politics for hundreds of years in the form of the shura and the jirga. Participatory, multi-party, elections were a major goal of the Bonn Accords, and their continued legitimacy will remain an important metric in the government's legitimacy.

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[282] There are other reasons, such as externalities- droughts, substitutions for world demand for copper, cultural constraints.

[283]Training is focused on light infantry tactics and generally takes place at Kabul Military Training Center or the Regional Basic Warrior Training Center. Examples of the training programs are the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), which serve in an advisory capacity. Source: "NATO in Afghanistan NATO support to Afghan National Army (ANA)," *ISAF Website*, (February 2008). http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/ana-support.html

Socioeconomic indicators improved since 2002, but Afghanistan remains in the bottom decile of countries on the U.N. Human Development Index, where it ranks 172 out of 187 countries.

Per capita GDP, in current dollars, rose for 2001–2011, from an estimated $180 to $585, but 36% of the population still lived on less than $1 a day in 2008, with an even higher percentage falling under the poverty line in remote, rural, and mountainous areas.[284]

[284]"Country Assistance Program Evaluations -Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," *Asian Development Bank, Independent Evaluation*, (October 2012), 9-12. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/cape-afg-web3.pdf

CHAPTER FOUR: THE TALIBAN IN AND OUT OF POWER

"The Taliban are like a medicine for Afghanistan that has expired. They want people to live like in the time of our Holy Prophet. I am in favor of how he lived, too. But it's impossible to bring that time back. The people of Afghanistan need something new." Khaksar, a middle-aged, religious scholar.[1]

Chapter three discussed the sources and nature of Afghanistan's poverty and the interplay between civil administration and stability. It briefly traced human development, with a view towards developing national confidence. Chapter four will discuss living conditions during the Taliban rule and the use of violence.

PART ONE: THE TALIBAN

The Mind of the Taliban

The mind of the Taliban is an amalgam of ethnic, geographic, historic, and religious elements. The Taliban's religious principles are framed by essentially three fundamentals: Salafism, Deobandism, and Sharia. These elements overlap and intertwine with each other. All three are expressions of puritanical and political Islam, which made a resurgence in the late 20th century.

Salafism is an Islamic revivalist philosophy intended to purify Islam from Western and modern influences.[2] The Taliban's political philosophy is based on the

[1] N. C. Aizenman, "Former Members of the Taliban Turn Their Backs on Insurgency: Among Hundreds Returning From Exile, Some Running for Office," *The Washington Post*, (August 14, 2005).

[2] Maha Azzam, "The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe: Local and Global Dimensions," *The Brown Journal of World Affair*s, (2007), HighBeam Research, (September 16, 2012). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1516229171.html

absolutist belief system surrounding the life of Mohammed.[3] Salafists strive to recreate the world in which they imagined their prophet lived.[4] This requires expurgating elements of modern society which, in the view of the Taliban, are superfluous, degenerate, or, in any way, are contrary to the Koran.[5] Not all features of modernity are discarded. To spread their ideology, Salafists use state-of-the-art technology.[6]

The Taliban's outlook is also shaped by the Deobandi movement, which is a particular South Asian Salafist philosophy.[7] Deobandi refers to both an Islamic seminary and an Islamic philosophy, which reaches far beyond the northern Indian town of Deoband.[8] It is one of Sunni Islam's more influential Islamic schools in South and Central Asia and continues to produce edicts, or fatwas, based on Muslim law.[9] Life's conduct can be divided into two basic categories -permitted or prohibited. The Taliban's

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[3] For the Taliban, Sharia is non-negotiable. It does not evolve and cannot be refined or abrogated. As the word of God that was revealed to his prophet, Sharia is not subject to criticism. For this reason, Muslims who criticize Sharia are subject to the death penalty because they can be labeled apostates.

[4] The term "Salafist" refers to the era in which Islam was created and which many Muslims believe is a period of moral purity.

[5] Juan R.I. Cole, "The Taliban, Women, and the Hegelian Private Sphere, Part III: Individual, Family, Community, and State," *Social Research*, (September 22, 2003).

[6] 'The Prophet Muhammad Left No Legacy to the Ummah Except Weapons'; 'The Mujahideen… Are More Ready Than Ever to Conquer Pakistan through the Path of the Prophet (Jihad and Qital in the Path of Allah," *MEMRI, Special Dispatch No.4596*, (March 21, 2012) . .http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/842/6207.htm

[7] Seth Jones, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan" RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 4," *RAND Corporation*, (Santa Monica, 2008), 62.

[8] Farzand Ahmed, "Fatwa Factory; The Latest Religious Edict From Deobandi's Dar-Ul-Uloom Forbidding Women From Working In Proximity To Men Creates a Furor And Highlights Growing Intolerance," *India Today, Financial Times Ltd*. 2010, HighBeam Research, April 23, 2013 http://www.highbeam.com.

[9] It is an extreme and highly legalistic view of Islam that governs most of a Muslim's daily activities. Rules include what type of pet a Muslim can own, when and where he is allowed to fly a kite, how often he should bathe, what type of clothes should he wear, and myriad other daily activities.

theocracy fuses orthodox strains of Islam Wahabbism from Saudi Arabia[10] and the Deobandi philosophy, which is taught in Pakistan and lavishly funded by Saudis.[11]

Deobandism also has paramilitary elements. The school in Deoband mandated military training to groom its seminary students to be warriors of Islam.[12] Deobandi thinking was born of nationalistic and religiously fervor following the Sepoy revolt in the mid-19th century, which is often called the Indian Mutiny.[13] It rejected the Indian Civil Service, the adoption of European tastes, mannerisms, and secularism among the Indian elite.[14] It remained decidedly opposed to all elements of modernity, western life and thought, and democratic norms.[15]

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[10] Abdelkader Zerougui, "The Two Faces of Islam: the House of Saud from Tradition to Terror. (Book Review)," *Middle East Policy*, 2003, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-111857057.html

[11]"*The Christian Science Monitor*, (2000), HighBeam Research, February 21, 2012. http://www.highbeam.com

[12] The origins of the Deobandi brand of Islam can be traced to a town, Deoband, in Uttar Pradesh state, in northern India. Here can be found the second-largest Sunni seminary in the world, the Darul Uloom (House of Knowledge). Dar Uloom was officially founded on May 30, 1866, shortly after the British had destroyed the remaining fragments of the Muslim Moghul Empire in 1857. Often referred to as the 'University of Jihad', the madrassa has been given donations by the Saudi kingdom, most certainly because of the similarities of Deobandi and Wahabbi ideologies." Source: William Kampsen, independent scholar, in correspondence with this author, (October 19, 2012).

[13] "On May 10, 1857, Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army, drawn mostly from Muslim units from Bengal, mutinied to offer their services to the Mughal emperor, and soon much of north and central India was plunged into a year-long insurrection against the British," Sepoy Mutiny, Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sepoy-mutiny.htm

[14] Noah Tucker and Sue Sypko, "Salafist and Wahhabist Influence in Afghanistan*," Cultural Knowledge Report, Human Terrain System-Research Reachback Center*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: March 15, 2009), 3.

[15] "Deoband power struggle could change the face of Muslim society in India," *Tehelka*, 2011, HighBeam Research, (September 16, 2012). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-2257329521.html

The Taliban's Rise to Power

The Taliban's ascent to power fits into the pattern of modern Afghan authoritarian and clan-based politics.[16] In the summer of 1994, the Taliban entered a general fracas to control Afghanistan.[17] Mullah Mohammad Omar led an army of religious leaders and students to gain control of 90% of the country in five years.[18] By September 2000, the Taliban controlled 95% of the country and were fighting mainly against Ahmed Shah Massoud, Prime Minister Rabbani's former Defense Minister, who defended parts of the Panshir Valley, which was the remaining part of the country not controlled by the Taliban.[19]

The Taliban controlled large parts of Afghanistan from 1996-2001. The group's recruits were largely drawn from slums and refugee camps in Afghanistan and adjacent areas in Pakistan. They were often chronically unemployed, with low levels of education and weak skill sets. Many were drifters or very young. Some were religious zealots

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[16] John F. Burns, "For Afghans, Full Circle," *New York Times*, (August 13, 1998).

[17] Emily MacFarquhar, "The Rise of the Taliban: A New Force of Muslim Fighters is Determined to Rule Afghanistan," U.S. *News and World Report*, (March. 6, 1995).

[18] Tim McGirk and Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Mullah with a Mission: One-Eyed Mohammad Omar Rules Afghanistan's Taliban with a Firm Hand and a Strongbox of Cash," *TIME*, (March 31, 1997).

[19] Jason Burke, "Waiting for a Last Battle with the Taliban; Jason Burke Travels through Afghanistan's Panjshir Valley to Meet a Guerrilla Hero who Yearns for Peace," *Observer*, (June 27, 1999).

searching for a community.[20] This social segment was and remains an important draw for Taliban recruits.[21]

During the ascent to power, the Taliban killed unarmed civilians and soldiers.[22] They proclaimed Afghanistan to be the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the law of the land to be Sharia, [23]or fundamentalist Islamic law.

The Characteristics of the Taliban

The Taliban had at least four defining characteristics. They were Pashtuns, Salafists, isolated, and totalitarian.[24] The two other insurgent groups prominent in the period covered in the period of this dissertation were the Haqanni Network, which was tightly connected to the Taliban, and Hizb Al Islami- Glubuddin. In Afghanistan, the largest social or ethnic group, the Pashtuns, came to dominate others. [25] The Taliban were and are overwhelmingly Pashtun and this tribe holds regional prestige and power.

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[20] "The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security," Report of the Secretary General, 54th Sess., UN. Doc. A/54/536-S/1999/994, March 7, 2014. http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/situation-afghanistan-and-its-implications-international-peace-and-security-35

[21] "Taliban," Jane's *World Insurgency and Terrorism,* internet, (April 16, 2008). www.intelink.ic.gov/reference/janes.

[22] Daniel Consolatore, "The Pashtun Factor: Is Afghanistan Next in Line for an Ethnic Civil War?" *Humanist, 00187399, May/Jun2006, Vol. 66, Issue 3,* (2006).

[23] "Taliban," *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism*, (April 16, 2008). www.intelink.ic.gov/reference/janes.

[24] The manual 3-24 stresses the cultural component to insurgencies. Social structure involves the arrangement of the parts that constitute society, the organization of social positions, and the distribution of people within those positions. Source: *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2,* 1-18.

[25] Today, they are the largest tribe, constituting approximately 42% of all Afghans. Source: This book uses the term ethnic group as synonymous with "tribe." The Pashtuns themselves are divided in five confederations: the Durrani, Ghilzai, Karlanri, Sarbani, and Ghurghusht.

The area in which Pashtun is the dominant ethnicity extends into much of Pakistan and is called the Pashtun Belt.[26] This region is remote, barren, and inaccessible. Its borders are porous, and its resident clans often make their livings by smuggling. The Pushtuns are a tapestry of major clans, minor clans, and sub-clans of varying levels of prestige and influence.[27] Deeply conservative, the Pashtun social code, or Pashtunwali, is a fusion of religious and clan supremacy.[28]

When they held power, the Taliban imposed their Pashtun social codes on all those whom they conquered. The Taliban alienated many non-Pashtun Afghans.[29] Though some Pashtun recruits were attracted to the Taliban by tribal affinity, non-Pashtuns resented them, which would have repercussions in following years.[30]

Though the sub-tribes have some regional and clan differences, Pashtuns share a common social code. The home of "Pashtunwali" is a fiercely independent tribal region that straddles Afghanistan and Pakistan.[31]

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[26] Vern Liebl, "Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A short View," *Small Wars and Insurgencies 18:3*, (2007), 492-510.

[27] Gregorian Vartan, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1969), 29-32.

[28] Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, (Pan Books, 2001), 82-94.

[29] Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, 82-94.

[30] Ben Arnoldy, "Pakistan's Pashtuns, Looking For Statehood, May Look to Taliban, (World)," *The Christian Science Monitor*, (Christian Science Publishing Society, 2009), HighBeam Research, April 16, 2011. http://www.highbeam.com

[31] Stephen Frederic Dale, "Afghanistan: Political Frailty and Foreign Interference," *The Middle East Journal*, (2007), HighBeam Research, (February 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1273640261.html

Pashtunwali rests on five principles: honor, revenge, hospitality, absolution, and protection.[32] Honor, or nang, requires each Pashtun male to protect the honor of the family. A Pashtun must exact revenge, or badal, if his family is shamed. Hospitality, or melmastia, the third principle, is a Pashtun trait that has been acknowledged by many non-Pashtuns, as well as Pashtuns. A fourth principle is forgiveness, or nanwatay.[33]

If a Pashtun wants to end a feud with a fellow Pashtun, he can approach his rival and ask forgiveness. It is an alternative to revenge. The fifth Pashtun principle is allegiance with a stronger force, or hamsaya. This happens when a group or individuals give allegiance or switch sides to a stronger clan or subclans. These traits are shown in table 58.

Pashtun Traits	Application to the Taliban
Nang- Honor	Serving as a warrior brings honor to family
Badal- Revenge	Revenge taken on those considered betraying the tenants of Pashtunwali or collaborating with pro-government forces
Melmastia- Hospitality	Reason given to refuse extraditing bin Laden to the United States
Nanawatay- Absolution	The Taliban could require services of those who want to seek their forgiveness.
Hamsaya- Protection	The Taliban rose to power quickly because they distinguished themselves as the strongest of all the tribes. If the Taliban appear weak to most Afghans, the Coalition appears to be the stronger tribe and will attract Afghans to it cause.

Table 58. Pashtun Fundamentals and the Taliban

Many Afghans take their primary identity from their tribal affiliation and only secondarily see themselves as Afghan nationals. There are five dominant Pashtun tribes. The Durrani tribal confederation, mostly concentrated in southeast Afghanistan, has

[32] Afghanistan Language and Culture Program, "Pashtunwali," http://larc.sdsu.edu/alcp/resources/afghanistan/culture-2/pashtunwali/ Accessed February 18, 2014.

[33] "Pashtunwali," *Afghanistan Language and Culture Program*, Accessed February 18, 2014, http://larc.sdsu.edu/alcp/resources/afghanistan/culture-2/pashtunwali/

disproportionately produced Afghan leaders since Ahmad Shah Durrani, considered to be the founder of modern Afghanistan, founded a monarchy in 1747.[34] The historic Pashtun rivals of the Durranis are the Ghilzai tribal group, who are concentrated mostly in eastern Afghanistan. Some of the major Taliban leaders today are Ghilzais.[35]

The rivalry continued throughout the period covered in this dissertation. Hamid Karzai, the recent president of Afghanistan, is a Durrani, and Mullah Omar, the long-serving leader of the Taliban, is a Ghilzai. The Karlanris, or "hill tribes," are the third-largest group of Pashtuns.[36] Although geographically separated, two major groups make up the Sarbani.[37] The last major tribal group is the Ghurghusht, who live in and around Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Provinces.[38] Sometimes the sub-tribes coexist peacefully, and sometimes they do not.[39] The Taliban continued to be led by Ghilzais, but by 2008-

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[34]Malou Innocent, "Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History," *The Cato Journal*, 2011. HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-2301785011.html

[35] The Durrani and Ghilzai are both tribal confederations and sub-tribes. Dr. Lester Grau, in email correspondence with Mark Silinsky, April 1, 2013.

[36] They straddle the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Waziristan, Kurram, Peshawar, Khost, Paktia, and Paktika.

[37] The larger group, located north of Peshawar, includes tribes such as the Mohmands, Yusufzais, and Shinwaris, while the smaller segment consists of Sheranis and Tarins scattered in northern Balochistan.

[38] They are found mostly in northern Balochistan and include tribes such as the Kakars, Mandokhels, Panars, and Musa Khel.

[39] In building the Afghan Army, the issue of Durrani versus Ghilzai commanders and cadre was an issue in the Pashtun rivalry. Source: Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, "Tribal Dynamics of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Insurgencies," (West Point: New York, Combating Terrorism Center, August 15, 2009), 1. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tribal-dynamics-of-the-afghanistan-and-pakistan-insurgencies

2009 Durrani commanders had been given stronger leadership roles and positions of trust and responsibility.[40] The Pashtun clans are shown in table 59.

	Location	Important Characteristics
Durranis	Southeast Afghanistan	Leader of Pashtun areas Ahmad Shah Durrani founded a monarchy in 1747
Ghilzais	Eastern Afghanistan	Rival of the Durranis
Karlanris	Pakistan and Afghanistan in Waziristan, Kurram, Peshawar, Khost, Paktia, and Paktika.	Seen as hill tribes
Sarbanis	Located north of Peshwar, Pakistan and Baluchistan	Includes tribes such as the Mohmands, Yusufzais, and Shinwaris, while the smaller segment consists of Sheranis and Tarins
Ghurghushts	Baluchistan and Northwest Frontiers Provinces	Includes tribes such as the Kakars, Mandokhels, Panars, and Musa Khel.

Table 59. Pashtuns' Characteristics and Clans

Taliban's Philosophy

The Taliban's political philosophy was based on a reactionary and absolutist interpretation of Sharia.[41] The Taliban were Salafists, who strove to recreate the world in which their prophet and his followers lived. This required purging elements of modern society which, in the view of the Taliban, did not conform to the Koran.[42]

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[40] Two-thirds of the Pashtuns are Durrani or Ghilzai, and these two sub-tribes sparred and tangled on many issues over many centuries. Source: Vern Liebl, "Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A short View," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* (2007), 492-510.

[41] For the Taliban, Sharia is non-negotiable. It does not evolve and cannot be refined or abrogated. As the word of God that was revealed to his prophet, Sharia is not subject to criticism. For this reason, Muslims who criticize Sharia are subject to the death penalty because they can be labeled apostates.

[42]"However, it was argued that the Taliban had no business enforcing Sharia law because their knowledge of it was rudimentary and flawed. This view was supported by the al Azar—trained Egyptian clerics, who met with Taliban leaders in a failed attempt to forestall the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001." Source: Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History,* (Princeton; Princeton University Press; 2010), 262.

The Taliban eliminated all activity that led men to neglect religious study. All human efforts were to be channeled towards replicating the time of Mohammed.[43] As a result, morale plummeted among the educated, and those who had the ability to flee often did so, as discussed in chapter three.[44] It also placed difficulties in reconstruction and development efforts of non-Muslims and women in Afghanistan.[45] The Taliban established a system of strict segregation between the sexes.[46] There were many allegations of state-sponsored sexual crimes and rape.[47]

The Taliban were totalitarian. How people behaved and thought; raised their children; spoke to their spouse; engaged in civil society; and taught religion, values, culture, all were monitored by the state and agents of the state.[48] There was a communally shared responsibility to expose those who do not conform to political/economic orthodoxy and to eliminate any contagion of deviationism. Shown in

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[43] "Music, dancing, kite flying, chess playing were all banned. Soccer matches were allowed, but the only legal cheer Afghans can shout at a soccer match was "Allahu Akbar.." Source: Patricia Smith. "The Agony of Afghanistan: No Music, No TV, No Dancing--And That's Just The Beginning of The Hardships of Life under The Taliban," *New York Times*, (November 12, 2001).

[44] The games themselves had sadistic elements, as those convicted of crimes were publicly whipped, beaten, and killed. Limbs were amputated, as Taliban leaders exhorted the audience to yell that God is great. Source: Jan Goodwin, "Buried Alive: Afghan Women under the Taliban." *On the Issues 7:3*, (Summer 1998).

[45] The Taliban demanded that non-Muslims accommodate themselves to a subordinate position in Afghanistan. Historically, this has been a common practice in Islamic-dominated societies in which Jews and Christians have been subject to special taxation and ritualized degradations designed to enforce their second-class status, a practice called dhimmitune.

[46] Alicia Galea, "No Freedom for Afghan Women: The Taliban Hides Behind Religion To Control Its People," *Mercy Law Review*, (2001).

[47] Mark Drumbl, "Put the Taliban on Trial--In Afghanistan; U.N.--Assisted Tribunals," *Roanoke Times & World News*, (December 2, 2002), A13.

[48] Wendy Kaminer, "Absolutisms on Parade. (OP-ED)" *Free Inquiry*, 2001, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-82137204.html

table 60 is a table of the Taliban's defining characteristics. These characteristics are placed in the context of the Taliban's goals and those of human development.

	Taliban's Goals	**Conflict with Human Development in Afghanistan**
Salafism	To recreate the political, social, and economic world of the early 7th Century. To rid Afghanistan of all modern and corruptive influences.	Antithetical to all modern norms of economic and social development. Undercuts all economic and financial innovations of the last 1300 years.
Pashtun	To assert the primacy of the Pashtun tribe over all others and to have that status acknowledged	Pashtun supremacist policies alienate the 60% non-Pashtun of Afghanistan. The social code of Pashtunwali was harsh, often cruel and alienating.
Isolation	To keep Afghanistan separate from globalization. The Taliban prized the geographic isolation as barrier against Western contamination	By 2008, wireless communications have made strides linking Afghans to their villages and their country to the outside world. The Taliban threaten to reduce these gains.
Totalitarian	To monitor the behavior of all Afghans by recreating and expanding informant networks. Any deviation of Islamic law is punished.	States that become heavily regulated reduce entrepreneurial creativity and risk taking. The quality of life deteriorates and people become fatalistic.

Table 60. The Four Traits of the Taliban and Human Development

PART TWO: THE INSURGENCY AND INSURGENTS

The Taliban were one of three dominant groups facing the Kabul government. There were several Jihadi groups of Afghans that tried to replace the government in Afghanistan. Some insurgents were well trained, well armed, highly motivated, and experienced, having fought in other areas of the international Jihad, including Iraq and Chechnya. [49]

Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son Sirajuddin, led their own insurgent band and operated often autonomously, but also in conjunction with other militant groups, including the Taliban.[50] The tribally diverse network was comprised of Chechens, Kashmiris, Pakistanis, and Uzbecks who live in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Its areas of influence extended from North and South Waziristan to Parachinar and Kurram agencies, which are all in Pakistan. From these bases, the Haqqanis attacked border areas of Paktika, Khowst, and Paktia provinces.[51] The Haqqanis had a strong Osama bin Laden connection.[52]

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[49] Jihad means struggle and sometimes refers to an internal, ethical struggle to be a better Moslem. But Jihad is largely used in the Koran and by Jihadists today to mean a defensive war to protect the interests of Muslims or an aggressive war to expand the frontiers of Islamic influence. Muslims are commanded to struggle in war against non-Muslims.

[50] "Return of the Taliban- Jalaluddin Haqqani," *Frontline website.* www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban

[51] Carlotta Gall, "Taliban Commander is Face of Rising Afghan Threat," *New York Times*, (June 17, 2008).

[52] Steven Coll, "Return of the Taliban- Jalaluddin Haqqani," *Frontline website*. www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban.

Another group, Hezb-i-Islami, was led by Hekmatyar Gulbuddin, former two-time prime minster of Afghanistan, veteran politician, and long-term antagonist of the Karzai government.[53] It was active during the years covered in this dissertation. Hekmatyar and his group were among those most active insurgents against the Soviets. They continue as a threat to pro-government forces today. Characteristics of the groups are shown in table 61:

	Taliban	**Haqqani Network**	**Hizb Al Islami-Glubuddin**
Goals	Create Sharia State	Create Sharia State	Create Sharia State
Ethnicity	Largely Pashtun	Multi-ethnic: Kashmiris, Uzbecks, Chechens, Pashtu	Many regional ethnicities
Level of Capabilities 2001-2010	Strongest of all groups. Growing strength in Pakistan and border areas of Afghanistan	Moderate levels of strength in east	During the period covered in this dissertation, the weakest of the three groups.
Areas of Operations	The south and east	The east	East and northeast
Bin Laden Connection	Initially, Omar had strong working relationship with bin Laden. Taliban provided sanctuary for Osama bin Laden	Ambiguous relationship Osama bin Laden	No known connection

Table 61. The Three Major Insurgent Groups in Afghanistan

[53] Afghanistan Online http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/today/ghekmatyar.html

The Structure of the Taliban

The Taliban was organized hierarchically from the supreme leader, Mullah Omar, to the foot soldiers. At the top, the Supreme Leadership, in conjunction with the Shura Council, gave guidance. The cadre was composed of dedicated and generally mid- to senior-level operatives. Foot soldiers were the rank and file of the Taliban. Finally, mercenaries served for lack of better employment opportunities.

Rings of Support

The Taliban's structure was hierarchical, from the Supreme Shura, through the foot soldiers, to the pool of mercenaries.[54] But levels of support could be seen in terms of concentric rings. As with other insurgent and terrorist groups, such as the defunct German Red Army Faction, the Taliban had expanding rings of progressively weakened support.[55] There was a nucleus of hardened fighters and key decision makers at the Taliban's core.[56] The rings beyond this nucleus were increasingly less senior, though still important.

The ring beyond the inner nucleus was that of the active fighters. This nucleus was built of the most dedicated and hardened and, usually, veteran support. Moving

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[54] Anand Gopoal, "Can Afghanistan Taliban absorb blow to Quetta Shura? (World)," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2010, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-219808176.html

[55] William Drozdiak, "Notorious Terror Group Disbands." *The Washington Post*, 1998, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-649315.html

[56] The manual 3-24 refers to a core of "idea people" and planners who often exert leadership through charisma and competence. Source: *FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, 2-3.

centrifugally, there was a second ring of active key cadre who serve as leaders and trainers. They, too, were veteran fighters but did not have the high-leadership positions of the first-ring cadre. The authors of 3-24 referred to this group as the guerrillas.[57]

Beyond this ring was a third ring of active, non-combatants. They were active in the political, fundraising, and information activities of the group. They served, in the words of 3-24, as an underground and as auxiliaries.[58] They sometimes conducted intelligence and surveillance activities, and they provided safe haven, shelter, financial contributions, medical and transit assistance. They were particularly instrumental in madrassas, where they recruited and groomed future foot soldiers and leaders. The fourth ring was one of passive supporters and sympathizers. Sympathizers were useful for political activities, fund raising, and intelligence gathering and other non-violent activities.[59] This is the Taliban's mass base.[60] This conforms loosely to the 3-24's, model of an insurgent group, which is shown in figure 5, with a nucleus of leaders, and concentric rings expanding outward.[61]

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[57] *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2*, 2-3.

[58] *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2*, 4-2.

[59] *Terrorist Organizational Models, Chapter Three, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (Department of the Army, August 2007). http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/guidterr/ch03.pdf

[60] *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2* 4-2.

[61] In 3-24 they are referred to as five elements of an insurgency are— leaders, guerrillas, underground, auxiliaries, and a mass base. Source: *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2*, 4-2.



. **Figure 5. Organizational elements of an insurgency**[62]

The Committees

Along with the four regional commands, the Afghan Taliban had 10 functional committees that addressed specific issues. Some of the members of the committees were also members of the Quetta Shura. The committees were: Ulema Council, or Religious Council; Finance; Political Affairs; Culture and Information; Military Council; Prisoners

[62] *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2, 4-2.*

and Refugees; Education; Recruitment; Repatriation; and Interior Affairs.[63] Table 62 shows the committees and their functions.

Committees	Functions
Ulema, or Religious Council	Built and maintained Sharia courts; vets, appoints, promotes, cashiers judges; approves death sentences
Finance	Raised funds and distributes money to provincial leaders. Budgeted money and pays for operations
Political Affairs	Served as diplomats and fund raisers. Maintained contacts with Gulf states patrons
Culture and Information	Propaganda arm of the Taliban. Served as a media arm for information operations**;** distributes videos; maintained Taliban websites; prints large-circulation material, including books and pamphlets
Military Council	Maintained military capabilities; directed operations; trained recruits; equipped insurgents
Prisoners and Refugees/Martyrs	Provided financial assistance to families of Taliban killed or captured
Education	Organized, recruited, and partially funded madrassas under Taliban control
Recruitment	Recruited for the Taliban
Repatriation	Mission not clear
Interior Affairs	It is likely that it has an intelligence and counterintelligence function

Table 62. The Committee of Ten Council[64]

[63] Bill Roggio, "The Afghan Taliban Top Leaders," *The Long War*, (February 23, 2010). http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php

[64] Waheed Mozhda, *Afghan daily Hasht-e Sobh*, (May 18, 2008).

The Four Goals of the Taliban and the Battle of Confidence

The goal of Taliban was to erase the western presence from Afghanistan and reintroduce Sharia. To achieve this, the Taliban built a strategy on four basic strategic pillars to destroy national confidence. These strategic pillars were to cripple Afghanistan's economy, terrorize the enemy, increase their support base, and destroy the national confidence of states that support Kabul's government.

One of the Taliban's strategic goals was to increase the misery of the Afghan people in order to weaken national confidence. This was done by attacking the economy through multiple, persistent, and unpredictable attacks on infrastructure and developmental projects. Insurgents targeted the economy because an economically prosperous Afghanistan would shore-up the credibility of the government; attract greater international investment, particularly in extractive resources; encourage domestic savings and investment; and promote the development of human capital, as was discussed in chapters two and three.

The Taliban saw sustained development as a threat because Afghans would become stakeholders in the economy if the returns of their investments brought high returns. In turn, young people would be more attracted to vocationally based education and technological, engineering, and scientific subjects likely to bring financial reward.

A second goal was to *terrorize* the Afghan and non-Afghan enemy. The insurgents had a long list of enemies, to include all those involved in modernizing the country and building confidence in the government. In 2009, the year of this dissertation's independent variable, the insurgents targeted teachers, health-care

practitioners, public administrators, all those involved in the armed forces and intelligence and security, as well as others seen as collaborators. Those who feared the insurgents and had little confidence that the government could protect them would be less inclined to participate in national development.

A third goal was to expand the Taliban's financial support, accesses to weapons, and recruitment capabilities from all over the Islamic world.[65] In the case of Afghanistan, Pakistan was the major hub of external support. There was strong solidarity with elements from Pakistan.[66] Donors in that country provided millions of dollars, arms, and a supply of adolescent mujahidin to the Taliban in the 1990s, according to declassified State Department documents. Barnett Rubin opined that, "The Taliban are a joint Afghan-Pakistani organization."[67] Pakistan also supported other insurgent groups[68] because many Pakistani leaders felt solidarity with the insurgents after the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001.

In addition to domestic and Pakistani support, insurgents received significant aid from Arabs, particularly Osama bin Laden and his supporters. The Taliban redoubled their efforts to expand their network in Pakistan, to which most retreated and encamped,

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[65] "External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. Source: *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, 1-13.

[66] "End of the Road for The Taliban? The Islamic Zealots Who Have Conquered Much of Afghanistan Face Stalemate: Afghanistan and Pakistan.(Brief Article)," *The Economist (US)*, 1998, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-20901124.html

[67] Jacki Lyden, "Barnett Rubin on The Taliban And Its Relationship To Al-Qaida And Osama Bin Laden" *Weekend Edition - Sunday (NPR),* (September 23, 2001).

[68] Neamatollah Nojumi, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

throughout the Salafist world. The Pashtun diaspora community provided external support and sanctuary, which was important in this, or any, insurgency.[69] Sanctuaries were traditionally safe havens, such as base areas to rebuild and reorganize without fear of counterinsurgent interference.[70] The fourth goal was to convince Kabul's allies that the Karzai regime was weak and incapable of defending itself.[71]

The Taliban's Tactics and National Confidence

The Taliban's grand strategic goals required a specific set of tactics to lower national confidence. While strategic goals are broad, tactics are ways to achieve those goals. The Taliban proved to be flexible and resilient. As the U.S. Army was refining its lethal and non-lethal counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan, the Taliban experimented with tactics designed to prevent the Karzai government and its national developmental policies from taking root. The Taliban successfully adopted their tactics to suit their environment and circumstances.[72] There were three main groupings of tactics: violent attacks; non-violent intimidation; and information operations.

The first tactic was the use of brute violence. Violence was the instrument to terrorize the Taliban's enemy. Insurgents killed and maimed their enemies; suicide bombings were their weapon of choice. Assassination is a proven, cost-effective weapon in an insurgency because of the fear it induces. The insurgents followed trends from Iraq

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[69] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5,* 1-13.

[70] *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5,* 1-13.

[71] Gabriela Perdomo, "The Afghanistan Question," (May 1, 2008), http://www.angusreidglobal.com/analysis/40012/the_afghanistan_question/

[72] "War without end; Afghanistan's Taliban," *The Economist (US),* 2007, HighBeam Research. (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-170252429.html

and Israel and calculated that human bombs were more effective than road-side improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[73]

Volunteers to perform suicide attacks were sometimes mentally balanced but often mentally ill, mentally retarded, addicted-to and high-on narcotics, and sometimes too young to make their own decisions. Incentives included monies paid to the families of suicide bombers, often from foreign patrons, and the lure of paradise. Finally, there was the praise and appreciation boys received from insurgent leaders who often served as father figures.[74]

Tactics from Michael Collins

Elements of the Taliban's strategy, that directly target perceived enemies, are reminiscent of Michael Collins' strategy of killing those whom he thought collaborated with the British government or cooperated with local police.[75] Collins, the head of the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) intelligence sector, refined the strategy of targeted

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[73] In "On Killing-The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society," LTC Dave Grossman notes the use of atrocity work well "when institutionalized as policy by revolutionary organization, armies and governments." He cites the example of the Viet Cong in the early phases of the war in Vietnam. Source: Dave Grossman, *On Killing- The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, (New York: Back Bay Books, 1996), 207.

[74] Brian Glyn Williams, "Mullah Omar's Missiles: A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in Afghanistan," *Middle East Policy*, 2008, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-191646580.html

[75] J. B.E. Hittle, *Michael Collins and the Anglo-Irish War: Britain's Counterinsurgency Failure*. http://www.amazon.com/Michael-Collins-Anglo-Irish-War-Counterinsurgency/dp/1597975354

assassinations in Ireland, particularly in 1919-20.[76] In what has been referred to as The Black War, Collins targeted the "Black and Tans," who were British auxiliary officers.[77]

Collins created death squads, given the moniker the "12 Apostles," to paralyze the British intelligence service. In 1920, they murdered 19 British Secret Service agents in one day.[78] In addition to targeted killings, the IRA leaders killed those whom they considered as collaborators. These included "Protestants, tramps, ex-servicemen, and sexual deviates."[79]

Like the IRA, the Taliban targeted government leaders, particularly those who closely cooperated with Coalition Forces. Some attacks were sophisticated and required extensive planning. Others were directed broadly, attempting to kill and maim many persons completely unconnected with the government. Both the IRA and the Taliban extensively used intelligence and pre-operational surveillance.

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[76] Richard Clutterbuck, *Guerrillas and Terrorists*, (Chicago: Ohio University Press, 1980), 32.

[77] Walter Morris-Hale, *Conflict and Harmony in Multi-Ethnic Societies: An International Perspective*, (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 105.

[78] Dana Green, "Michael Collins: A Beloved Irish Patriot," *History Online*. http://www.history-online.com/

[79] Paul Bew. "The IRA and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-23, (Review)." *Canadian Journal of History*, (1999), HighBeam Research, (March 1, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-58054446.html

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	Collins Strategy in Ireland	Taliban Offensive Strategy
Killing collaborators	Sent his "Twelve Apostles" to execute British agents and Irish informers[80] Killed Protestants and persons considered to have low ethical behavior	Killed broad range of those Taliban consider collaborators, particularly those who work in public administration
Emphasis on intelligence collection	Penetrated British Intelligence HQ in Dublin Castle By the time the War Office reorganized its intelligence effort against Collins, in mid-1920, it was too late to reverse the ascendancy of the IRA	Taliban used a broad range of human intelligence tactics. Strong counterintelligence emphasis to uncover and kill government infiltrators

Table 63. The Collins' Strategy, 1919-1920, as Applied to the Taliban's Strategy

Targets

The Taliban targeted persons, businesses, associations, schools, communications facilities and operators, civil servants, police and security forces, associated with local, regional, and national governments.[81] The Taliban's target set centered on businesses or businessmen who catered to affluent Afghans, foreigners, or pro-government personnel. Upscale hotels and restaurants were prime targets. The Taliban and the Haqqani

[80] J.B.E. Hittle, *Michael Collins and the Anglo-Irish War: Britain's Counterinsurgency Failure*, (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2011).

[81] Renne Montagne, "Laughter and Memories Shared amid Danger: An Interpreter Says That If the Taliban Fighter 'Found out I Worked for Foreigners'-Here Qahir Ran His Finger across His Neck-'No More Questions, I'm Slaughtered," *Nieman Reports,* 2007, HighBeam Research. (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-162786985.html

insurgents saw upscale hotels as pretentious and viewed the proprietors and wait staff as collaborators serving a foreign, conquering force. The Taliban also attacked cafes, markets, and shopping centers.[82]

From the beginning, the Taliban persistently and aggressively targeted education. During their five-year rule, they shuttered schools, completely segregated the sexes, and purged the texts of what they considered un-Islamic elements. Out-of-power, the Taliban feared the power of education in building national capacity, empowering women, creating physical infrastructure, assuring competent administration, promoting job creation, and fostering a sense of national purpose and confidence.

They attacked a broad set of educational targets: students, teachers, parents, facilities.[83] Tactics included stand-off attacks; assassinations; murders; and morbid, disfiguring attacks, such as throwing acid into the faces of school children. In some cases government forces kept Afghanistan's schools open; and, in other cases, they compromised with the Taliban on school content and attendance. In other cases the Taliban closed schools down entirely.

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[82] The Taliban also terrorized the entrepreneurial poor. The Taliban's morality police beat those who listen to music, wear western clothes, watch television and engage in all-but-the-most the most Islamic and primitive forms of recreation. They also punished, often with great severity, entrepreneurs who sell the proscribed clothing, DVDs, and television sets. By doing so, the Taliban restricted the ability of Afghans to earn a living. Source: "Lash and Burn: Taliban Vice Squads Returning to the Fray," *London Sunday Times*, (June 24, 2012), 24.

[83] If a teacher taught any material that was deemed to conflict with the Koran, he was warned once to stop. If he continued, he might be beaten. If this did not dissuade him, he would often be killed. Schools that did not conform to Taliban standards were often burned. Source: Translation from the German: Lucy Powell and Toby Axelrod, "A New Law for the Mujahideen," *Die Weltwoche*, (November 29, 2006).

The Taliban also targeted communications systems and their operators. The Taliban regularly attacked radio programing. Counterinsurgency operators used transmissions to fight the insurgents. The Taliban attacked towers and threatened to kill operators and technicians who serviced them. The Taliban believed informants used cell phones to alert Coalition troops after dark.

Taliban killed Afghans who worked for the Kabul government and Coalition Forces. From the beginning of the counterinsurgency, there was limited pool of well-educated Afghans who had in-demand skills. Taliban need to kill them or dissuade them from helping the government. Of the branches of the civil service, the Afghan police were the most targeted.

The Taliban used fear of impending violence. A common tactic to accomplish this is the shabnamah, or "night letter," which was a communiqué to a target that he or she is subject to punishment.[84] The recipient was notified that unless he or she behaves as the insurgents demand, the punishment would be swift and severe.

The insurgents, particularly the Taliban, used the media to generate propaganda. There were several dominant themes. First, they portrayed the government as corrupt; illegitimate; inept; and controlled by outside, western powers. Second, they stated that Afghanistan is a front in an international crusade against Islam led by the United States. The third theme was that Islam was a solution to the problems that confront Afghans.

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[84] "McChrystal Reports On Progress In Afghanistan," *States News Service*, 2010, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-221374300.html

They also effectively spread conspiratorial rumors anti-Coalition spread to convince Afghans vaccination campaigns were, in fact, sterilization campaigns.[85]

Listed in table 64 are the three broad categories of the Taliban's tactics and the purpose, type, and examples.

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[85] Eran Fraenkel, Emrys Shoemaker, and Sheldon Himelfarb, "Afghanistan Media Assessment, Opportunities and Challenges for Peacebuilding, *United States Institute for Peace*, (2010), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW68_Afghanistan_Media_Assessment.pdf

	Violent Tactics	Non-Violent Intimidation Tactics	Information Operations
Purpose	To kill opposition figures; to set examples to others; to drive out foreigners; to cause enough sensational violence that the will of foreign states will collapse. Project image that the Taliban are everywhere and are all powerful and merciless	To stop or to prevent unwanted behavior. A target is given a warning that he/she or his/her family would be harmed unless target complies with Taliban. Create climate of fear	To reach large audiences. To respond to and to pre-empt government broadcasts. To threaten individuals or groups. To send messages to the government and to lower morale of their supporters
Type	Bombings in public places, targeted assassinations, morbid violence to include tape-recorded beheading	"Night letters" delivered to target or target's family. Verbal warning	Broadcasts from Taliban-controlled and Taliban-directed stations and presses. Cooperation with international, Jihadist-sympathizes, such as al Jazeera
Examples	A bombing at a Kabul hotel frequented by foreigners, many of whom are participants in reconstruction and development. A school teacher is beheaded in front on pupils. After surveillance, a Taliban operative will place a roadside IED and wait until a thin-skinned ISAF vehicle passes by. Then the bomb is detonated.	A man returns home after work to find a letter placed under his door. The letter demands that he stop working on a construction project or his children will be killed. Children are approached by a stranger who tells them that their fathers will be killed if they continue to attend a secular school.	Taliban broadcasts accused Coalition Forces of intentionally killing children and poisoning water systems.

Table 64. The Purpose, Type, and Examples of the Taliban's Tactics

Taliban as a Criminal Enterprise

During its rule from 1996-2001, the Taliban controlled the level crime in Afghanistan.[86] When the Taliban were driven from Afghanistan, they turned to crime to fund their operations. In a significant role reversal, the Taliban, who were enforcers of the law when they ruled Afghanistan, became a criminal syndicate when they were removed from power. To obtain the revenue necessary to continue operations and to sustain a force in the field, the Taliban turned to crime including extortion, kidnapping, bank robbery, murder, and narcotic trafficking.

When the Taliban fled to Pakistan, they took their infantry weapons with them. The Taliban moved into several border areas in late 2001 and 2002, and they expanded their bases of insurgent and criminal operations. Afghanistan's regional warlords financed operations through criminal activity. This not only weakened the rule of law and promoted extortion, it helped to fund the insurgent enemy purchase weapons and created the logistical base with which to attack the Coalition Forces.[87]

Though the Taliban robbed banks largely to steal money, they also did so for secondary benefits, including lowering the confidence in the security forces and police. Some operations caused social disruptions and diverted the capabilities of police forces. As an example, government forces, already strapped of well-trained, uncorrupted security personnel, needed to divert scarce resources to protect both financial institutions and

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[86] According to 3-24, insurgencies may turn to crime for funding.

[87] "Supply chain in Afghanistan," *The Nation*.

government facilities.[88] Many Afghan security personnel, Army, paramilitary, and police, became vulnerable to bribes or threats by the Taliban.[89]

The Taliban kidnapped high-value targets because ransoms paid very well. Kidnapping is not uncommon in Latin America and other areas of the world where there are desperately poor groups of criminals or terrorists and a tier of rich and vulnerable targets. Kidnapping became a significant source of the Taliban's overall income.[90] Foreigners, high-profile political or administrative figures, and businessmen were prime targets.

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[88] "Three Suspected Taliban Bank Attackers Killed In Kabul Encounter," *Asian News International, Al Bawaba (Middle East) Ltd*. (2009), *HighBeam Research*, December 31, 2010. http://www.highbeam.com.

[89] "Theft Under The Taliban. Perish the Thought,"- *The New York Times*, (2000), *HighBeam Research*, December 31, 2010. http://www.highbeam.com.

[90] "Taliban Kidnapping VIPs to Raise Funds for Terror activities," *The Press Trust of India Ltd*. (2010), *HighBeam Research*, December 9, 2010. http://www.highbeam.com.

PART THREE: FATALITIES CAUSED BY INSURGENT ATTACKS IN 2009

The year in which the independent variables, insurgent attacks, took place was 2009. There was a significant increase in civilian fatalities from 2007 through 2009, as shown in table 65, which serves as trend line. From 2007 to 2009, the yearly number of civilians killed increased from 1,523 to 2,412.

	2007	2008	2009
January	50	56	141
February	45	168	149
March	104	122	129
April	85	136	128
May	147	164	271
June	253	172	236
July	218	323	198
August	138	341	33
September	155	162	336
October	80	194	162
November	160	176	165
December	88	104	164
Total	1523	2118	2412

Table 65. Civilian Monthly Fatalities 2007, 2008, 2009

According to UNAMA, 2,412 civilians were killed, and at least 5,978 civilians were killed *or* injured in 2009, which made it the deadliest year since the Taliban were driven from power in 2001. The fatalities rate was a 14% over the 2,118 civilian deaths recorded in 2008.[91] Violence in Afghanistan both increased and metastasized in 2009, particularly in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan and

[91]"Afghanistan: Over 2,400 civilian deaths in 2009 – UNAMA," *Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN*), (January 13, 2010). http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b4f20eb2e.html

Zabul. The United Nations claimed that the Taliban often violated international humanitarian by using their countrymen as human shields.[92] The average monthly number of security incidents was 960 in 2009 which was up from 741 in 2008 and was a 29.6% rise.[93] Suicide and IED attacks caused more civilian casualties than any other tactic, killing 1,054 civilians, or 44% of the total civilian casualties, in 2009.

Several provinces near the heavily Pashtun region straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan had been relatively calm before 2009, such as those in northeast, became victim to rural and urban attacks. According to UNAMA, Taliban attacks exacerbated the problems with refugees, unemployment and underemployment in areas of intense conflict.[94]

Insurgents in 2009 targeted civilians whom they judged to be collaborators. Victims included tribal leaders who were seen as supportive of the Afghan regime or its foreign supporters. Tribal leaders in the south were particularly targeted and disproportionately victimized. Police officials, medical and educational professionals

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[92] Customary international humanitarian law prohibits "the use of human shields." This means that the "intentional collocation of military objectives and civilians or persons … with the specific intent of trying to prevent the targeting of those military objectives" is prohibited (ICRC Study, Rule 97; see also Protocol I, art. 57(7)). Taking over a family's house and not permitting the family to leave for safety so as to deter the enemy from attacking is an example of the use of "human shields."

[93] "Afghanistan: Over 2,400 civilian deaths in 2009 – UNAMA," *Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN*).

[94] "Afghanistan: Over 2,400 civilian deaths in 2009 – UNAMA," *Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN*).

were often targets of choice.[95] Other civilians were killed indiscriminately in IED attacks.

UNAMA attributed the 225 targeted assassinations and the execution of tribal elders, teachers, doctors and humanitarian workers to the insurgents.[96] The report said the Taliban killed 2.73 times more civilians in 2009 than did pro-government forces. UNAMA blamed Taliban insurgents for 1,630 civilian deaths.[97] IEDs and suicide attacks killed 1,054 civilians, 44% of the total deaths.[98] Civilian casualties resulting from military operations by pro-government Afghan and foreign forces dropped by 28% in 2009 compared to 2008, according to UNAMA.[99] Over 180 deaths could not be attributed to any of the conflicting parties and resulted from cross-fire or unexploded ordnance.[100 and 101]

Afghans in the southern part of the country suffered the most. Nearly half of all civilian casualties, approximately 45%, occurred in the southern region. High casualty

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[95] "Afghanistan: Over 2,400 civilian deaths in 2009 – UNAMA," *Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN*).

[96] "Afghanistan: Over 2,400 civilian deaths in 2009 – UNAMA," *Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN*).

[97] Deaths in 2009 represented a 41% increase on 2008, when 1,160 deaths were attributed to the insurgents.

[98] "Afghanistan: Over 2,400 civilian deaths in 2009 – UNAMA," Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN).

[99] In total 596 civilian deaths (25% of total) were attributed to Afghan and foreign forces.

[100] "Afghanistan: Over 2,400 civilian deaths in 2009 – UNAMA," Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN).

[101] "Afghanistan: Over 2,400 civilian deaths in 2009 – UNAMA," Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN).

figures also occurred in the southeastern, 15%; eastern, 10%; central, 12%; and western, 8%; regions.[102]

The figures of fatalities each month attributed to anti-government forces, (AGE), pro-government forces (PGF) and undetermined attacks are listed in graph 13.



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
AGE	48	80	81	80	165	168	169	294	208	114	117	106
PGF	73	46	29	30	87	47	18	24	118	38	38	48
Undetermined	20	23	19	18	19	21	11	15	10	10	10	10

Graph 13. Civilian Death per Month- 2009

[102] "Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009," *United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan*, (2009). http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Protection%20of%20Civilian%202009%20report%20English.pdf

Civilian Fatalities by Individual Regions and All Regions in 2009

	Anti-government Extremists	Pro-Government Forces	Undetermined
January	6	2	1
February	24	4	2
March	6	4	5
April	6	9	1
May	10	9	5
June	10	4	5
July	31	2	0
August	30	0	1
September	26	6	1
October	34	6	1
November	17	1	0
December	13	1	0

Table 66. Central Region: Civilian Reported Killed in 2009 by Month and Party

	Anti-government Extremists	Pro-Government Forces	Undetermined
January	11	30	0
February	4	1	0
March	10	1	0
April	3	7	0
May	20	0	0
June	10	7	0
July	12	1	0
August	20	3	0
September	42	4	2
October	16	13	1
November	5	3	0
December	4	12	0

Table 67. Eastern Region: Civilian Reported Killed in 2009 by Month and Party

	Anti-government Extremists	Pro-Government Forces	Undetermined
January	11	0	3
February	12	0	1
March	10	0	0
April	3	0	0
May	20	0	1
June	10	0	0
July	12	1	1
August	20	2	7
September	42	83	2
October	16	0	1
November	5	0	0
December	4	2	0

Table 68. Northeastern Region: Civilian Reported Killed in 2009 by Month and Party

	Anti-government Extremists	Pro-Government Forces	Undetermined
January	1	0	1
February	0	0	2
March	10	0	0
April	0	0	0
May	3	0	0
June	12	0	0
July	9	0	4
August	13	1	0
September	9	0	0
October	2	0	0
November	4	0	2
December	5	0	0

Table 69. Northern Region: Civilian Reported Killed in 2009 by Month and Party

	Anti-government Extremists	Pro-Government Forces	Undetermined
January	7	3	0
February	11	0	0
March	14	8	0
April	26	4	5
May	47	1	3
June	41	5	3
July	43	3	2
August	31	4	3
September	17	8	3
October	21	4	0
November	25	3	2
December	12	3	4

Table 70. Southeastern Region: Civilian Reported Killed in 2009 by Month and Party

	Anti-government Extremists	Pro-Government Forces	Undetermined
January	22	31	15
February	41	23	18
March	41	15	14
April	40	10	10
May	81	11	3
June	85	7	12
July	51	11	4
August	171	14	4
September	97	17	0
October	33	15	0
November	47	31	4
December	70	30	0

Table 71. Southern Region: Civilian Reported Killed in 2009 by Month and Party

	Anti-government Extremists	Pro-Government Forces	Undetermined
January	1	7	0
February	0	21	0
March	0	1	0
April	4	0	2
May	0	66	5
June	6	6	1
July	12	0	0
August	15	0	0
September	14	0	2
October	0	0	7
November	17	0	2
December	2	0	6

Table 72. Western Region: Civilian Reported Killed in 2009 by Month and Party

	Anti-government Extremists	Pro-Government Forces	Undetermined
January	43	73	20
February	80	46	23
March	81	29	19
April	80	30	18
May	165	87	19
June	168	47	21
July	169	18	11
August	294	24	15
September	208	118	10
October	114	38	10
November	117	38	10
December	106	48	10

Table 73. All Regions 2009: Civilian Reported Killed in 2009 by Month and Party

In figure 6, civilian casualties and violent events over a 15-month period, beginning with January 2009, are graphically presented to show areas of highly concentrated attacks.[103]



Figure 6. Attacks against Civilians [104]

[103] These show all recorded attacks and are not limited to fatalities, this dissertation's independent variable.

[104] "Civilian casualties' estimates based on data from the Civilian Casualties Tracking Cell, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) headquarters. Violent Events based on data on significant actions (SIGACTs) against ISAF. SIGACTs include direct fire, indirect fire, improvised explosive device explosions, improvised explosive devices found and cleared, improvised explosive device. hoaxes, and premature detonations Source: Luke N. Condra; Joseph H. Felter; Radha K. Iyengar; Jacob N. Shapiro, "The effect of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq; Working paper 16152," *National Bureau Of Economic Research*; (July 2010). http://www.nber.org/papers/w16152

Summary

There were two Afghan insurgent groups, in addition to the Taliban. They were the band of Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin and the Hezb-i-Islami, led by Hekmatyar Gulbuddin. There was an operational hierarchy within the Taliban, from the supreme leader, Mullah Omar, to the foot soldiers at the bottom. These basic strategies of the Taliban were to cripple Afghanistan's economy, terrorize the enemy, increase their support base, and destroy the national confidence of states that support the current government. There were three main groupings of tactics: violent attacks; non-violent intimidation; and information operations.

There was a significant increase in civilian casualties in 2009, particularly in the Pashtun-dominated south of the country. Tribal leaders and persons associated with the government are particular targets.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE COUNTERINSURGENCY AND NATIONAL CONFIDENCE

"*The Taliban's fanatical interpretation of Islam, not supply and demand, dictated economic policy. That meant no interest, no international banking system, no fiscal accounts, no monetary policy, no female workers, and no gathering of statistics. The size of Afghanistan's gross domestic product is not known, nor is the rate of inflation, employment, or growth.*" U.S. reporter commenting on the state of the Afghan economy in October 2002 [1]

"*If the only tool that you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail*." Abraham Maslow[2]

The first four chapters discussed the Taliban's efforts to derail the expansion of human development in Afghanistan and to lower national confidence. Chapter five shifts the focus towards Coalition programs that promoted capacity and confidence. In particular, this chapter focuses on the counterinsurgency efforts to build national confidence, as a tenant of counterinsurgency.[3] The manual 3-24 advocated building a government that is considered legitimate by the people, enjoys their support, and is capable of mitigating some of the structural national problems.

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[1] Steven Gutkin, "Rebuilding Shattered Afghan Economy Will Require Colossal Effort," *Associated Press, Worldstream*, (2002), HighBeam Research, (1 February 2011), <http://www.highbeam.com>.

[2] Brandon Anderson, "The Hard Choice: Decisive Points in Counterinsurgency," *Infantry Magazine*, (2007), HighBeam Research, (March 1, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-167894887.html

[3] The term "security forces" in this chapter includes all forces under HN control with the mission of protecting against internal and external threats. Elements of the security forces include, but are not limited to, military forces, police, corrections personnel, and border guards at the local through national levels.

Developmental Challenges

In the late 20th century, "nation building," a term generally referring to using armed forces to build national capacity, was repudiated by many U.S. national leaders.[4] The failed U.S.-led efforts to feed starving Somalis, in 1993, created broad cynicism about nation building. Presidential-candidate George Bush campaigned against nation building. But this changed after the attacks of September 2001.[5]

To root-out the Taliban enemy and deny it opportunities to regenerate, a multi-national coalition conquered Afghanistan.[6] In October 2001, the Bush Administration vowed a long-term military presence to help restore stability and to foster sustained human development after three decades of chaos and war.[7]

This is not the first Western attempt to revive and stabilize a failing state threatened by insurgents. U.S. efforts to integrate human development in the context of war began at the turn of the 19th century, when the U.S. Army was tested in a long insurgency. The Philippines Insurrection began during the early 20th century and lasted

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[4] Brent Scowcroft and Samuel Berger, "In the Wake of War: Getting Serious about Nation-Building," *The National Interest*, 2005, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-137874469.html

[5] Douglas Feith, then undersecretary of defense for policy, stated the term 'nation building' had become laden with normative baggage and that neither political party was eager to claim the term as part of its foreign policy agenda Source: David Greene, "Nation Building Plan for Afghanistan Marks a Change in Plan for Bush," *Milwaukee Sentinel*, (October 27, 2002).

[6] Brent Scowcroft and Samuel Berger, "In the Wake of War: Getting Serious about Nation-Building," *The National Interest*, 2005, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-137874469.html

[7] Bob Deans, "Bush Changing His Stance on Nation Building," *Dayton Daily News*, (April 13, 2003).

for many years. The counterinsurgency against the Muslims in Moro areas was a long, but eventually successful, struggle, led by Brigadier General John Pershing.[8] Pershing pioneered many of the tactics used in Afghanistan today. He used indigenous populations in military and non-military roles to defeat the insurgents and build enduring national confidence in local and national governments.[9]

Pershing stressed the importance of understanding local habits, customs, and religious practices. He worked with locals to foster a public administration that would build stakeholders, strengthen nation confidence, and undercut the credibility of the insurgent Moros.[10] The focus on human development and building confidence in local institutions, as well as the effective and innovative military tactics, became the bedrock of success there, and many of the lessons were applied in Afghanistan during the period of this dissertation.[11]

Britain also made contributions to Afghanistan's developmental strategy. In the early 20th century, the United States was a new world power and looked to Britain, with

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[8] One of the more remarkable figures in U.S. military history, Pershing began the counterinsurgency as a captain and was promoted over many senior officers to brigadier general during the war.

[9] Thomas S. Bundt, "An Unconventional War. The Philippine Insurrection 1899." (May 1, 2004).

[10] "From 1899 to 1902, the United States used over 500 small garrisons (increased from 53 in 1900) throughout the Philippines" Source: Timothy K. Deady, "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902," *Parameters*, 35, (Spring 2005), 57.

[11] "The U.S. military, with a field strength of 24,000 to 42,000 plus a large number of Philippine auxiliaries, defeated an insurgent force estimated at 80,000 to 100,000." Source: Glenn A. May, *A Past Recovered* (Manila: New Day Publishers, 1987), 152, quoted in Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902* , (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 325.

its long history of managing oversea territories, as a model for overseas administration.[12] The Indian Civil Service[13]expanded British influence and commercial holdings by creating highly effective administration.[14] The British developed proven methods to control vast areas in the Northwest Frontier along Afghanistan's border using few personnel and low levels of financial resources.[15]

Experience in maintaining an empire and tapping natural resources taught the British lessons that applied to Afghanistan.[16] Though the United States distanced itself from many of the political elements of British colonial practices, Washington saw in the British model of imperial rule and development an efficient and low-cost system of semi-autonomous governance.

Another exemplar of successful 20th century counterinsurgency was the British

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[12] The British experience in India was largely successful, and, by the standards of the day, it was humane. The British developed proven methods to control vast areas in the northwest Frontier along Afghanistan's border using minimal personnel and financial resources. Source: Andrew Roe, "British Governance of the Northwest Frontier (1919 to 1947): A Blueprint for Contemporary Afghanistan?" *Master of Military Art and Science Thesis,* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005).

[13] One reason the Indian Civil Service served as a model is because it was seen as effective despite its small size. It never numbered more than 12,000. Source: Ann Ewing, "Administering India: The Indian Civil Service," *History Today; Vol. 32 Issue 6,* (June 1982), 43.

[14] Hugh Purcell, "The Ruling Caste: Imperial Lives in the Victorian Raj," *History Today*. (London: July 2006. Vol. 56, Issue. 7), 62.

[15] Andrew Roe, "British Governance of the Northwest Frontier (1919 to 1947): A Blueprint for Contemporary Afghanistan?" *Master of Military Art and Science thesis,* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005).

[16] Namely, political and economic reforms solidify achievement of accompany military operations to achieve enduring stability and confidence in national institutions. Source: Andrew Roe, "To Create a Stable Afghanistan: Provisional Reconstruction, Good Governance, and a Splash of History" *Military Review*, (November 1, 2005).

counterinsurgency in Malaysia.[17] This exemplified, what has been referred to as, the "British approach," to insurgency. Similar to what would become U.S counterinsurgency the British approach focused on "political primacy, close coordination of the civil-military-police triumvirate, the minimum use of force, and social and economic development."[18]

The Malaya/Indochina period of the 1950s and 1960s was a "Golden Age" of counterinsurgency literature. The lessons and ramifications of these wars influenced counterinsurgency doctrine of leading western powers, particularly France, Britain, and the United States.[19] Leading counterinsurgency theoreticians were the British officer and diplomat Sir Robert Thompson;[20] French Officer Lieutenant Colonel David Galula,[21]called the "Clausewitz of counterinsurgency;" and the American former

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[17] The U.S. Army studied the British mid-century counterinsurgency in Malaya, which was very successful and which emphasized a human development strategy and confidence building. It also studied the unsuccessful French counterinsurgency operations in French Indo-China and Algeria, which used force and the threat of force more frequently and, ultimately, with less success. The lessons from all insurgencies were distilled and codified in U.S. professional journals and written into doctrine Robert M Cassidy , "US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976" *RUSI Journal*, (August 1, 2007).

[18] Andrew M. Roe, "Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency: The British Army and Small War Strategy since World War II," *Military Review*, 2014, HighBeam Research. (May 29, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-361848287.html

[19] Michael Dewar, *Brushfire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army Since 1945*, (London: Robert Hale, 1990), 180-81.

[20]*Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2* (Headquarters Department of The Army, April 2009), 3-9. www.us.army.mil.

[21] Galula is cited and praised often in 3-24. "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice," written in 1964, became an instant COIN classic and reflected his experience fighting against the Germans in WWII and later devising COIN doctrine while serving in China, Greece, Indo-China, and Algeria. Source: *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2* (Headquarters Department of the Army, April 2009), 3-29. www.us.army.mil

advertising executive-turned-counterinsurgency theorist Edward Landsdale. [22] The writings and observations of these men would serve as pillars for a revised U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.[23] The Malaya counterinsurgency, for example, became a much-lauded campaign after General Sir Gerald Templer took command in 1952.[24]

In Indochina, the French theoretician David Galula underscored that support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.[25] Galula wrote that support from the population is conditioned on confidence in the counterinsurgents' strength, will, and capability to win, and demonstrated success against the insurgents.

An early masterwork of the Vietnam era was Robert Taber's "War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare," in which the author stressed the value of public relations in counterinsurgency. [26] Insurgents calculated that western states fatigue quickly of war, particularly if the public cannot see a clear purpose for continuing military operations.[27]

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[22] Terence J. Daly, "Classical Principles of Counterinsurgency," *Marine Corps Gazette, 90* (December 2006), 53-57.

[23] Terence J. Daly, "Classical Principles of Counterinsurgency," 53-57.

[24] John Cloake, *Templer: Tiger of Malaya*, (London: Harrap, 1985), 198.

[25] Terence J. Daly, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Book review*)," Military Review*, 2006, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-152935290.html

[26] Rod Propst, "Insurgency and the Role of the 21st Century Foreign Area Officer: An Introductory Guide," *FAO Journal, Volume XII, Number 1,* (March 2008), 9.

[27] Rod Propst, "Insurgency and the Role of the 21st Century Foreign Area Officer: An Introductory Guide," 9.

Counterinsurgency doctrine evolved during Vietnam. One important counterinsurgency innovation, which was revised, updated, expanded, and given a different name for use in Afghanistan and Iraq, was the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS).[28] CORDS leveraged the capabilities of military and civilian agencies in a "unique hybrid civil-military structure." [29] It harnessed the efforts of the U.S. military and all the civilian agencies involved in counterinsurgency efforts, including the State Department, the USAID, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and the CIA. [30]

Historians differ on the full extent to which CORDS eviscerated the communist insurgency, but most agree that by 1972 the domestic communist base had largely been destroyed.[31] Leveraging tactics from the British in Malaya, CORDS focused on human development fundamentals, particularly health, security, and economic growth. [32]

Table 74 below shows some overlapping traits of the three epochs of counterinsurgency literature and their applications to Afghanistan. These are not discrete epochs, and many of their lessons apply to conflicts of counterinsurgency generally.

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[28] Dale Andrade and James Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review*, 2006, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-145473353.html

[29] Al Hemingway "CORDS: 'Winning Hearts and Minds in Vietnam," *Historynet.com*. http://www.historynet.com/cords-winning-hearts-and-minds-in-vietnam.htm

[30] Al Hemingway, "CORDS: 'Winning Hearts and Minds in Vietnam."

[31] Shawn Brimley and Vikram Singh "Averting the System Reboot Innovations and Critical Lessons from Iraq Must be Preserved," *Armed Forces Journal* on line. http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/

[32] Shawn Brimley and Vikram Singh, "Averting the system reboot Innovations and critical lessons from Iraq must be preserved."

	Philippines	The Golden Age of COIN	Vietnam
Legacy traits	Stressing non-kinetic action over direct attacks, Pershing saw the need to develop respectful relations with Muslim Filipinos and understand their culture and ceremonies; Pershing expanded and professionalized constabulary force and basic public administration. The counterinsurgency survived bad publicity of torture by U.S. troops, particularly water-boarding.[33]	In Malaya, British determined that building and securing settlements and isolating the insurgent contagion is more effective than focusing almost exclusively on search-and- destroy missions. Greater emphasis of education, training, health than in earlier conflicts in the developing world. This was in striking contrast to the Japanese and German counterinsurgency tactics of mass murder during WWII, which alienated those who survived and who might have been their allies. The French win the Battle for Algiers, but lose the war in Algeria.	CORDS fused development and military counterinsurgency efforts as never before, hoping to achieve unity of command. Secure public housing, sometimes referred to as" strategic hamlets" were developed on a large, systematic scale. All relevant sectors of human development were stressed in isolating the insurgents – the National Liberation Front –from the population. The success of counterinsurgency would be replicated in Iraq and Afghanistan in the PRTs.
Application to Afghanistan	Human development is stressed over kinetic operations. Focus on respecting Muslim beliefs and norms. Project image of being friends not conquerors.	Understand the need to have long-term, sustainable development across many sectors. Reduce level of collateral killings and damage. When accidents occur, move quickly to make restitution.	From Vietnam, and from Golden Age, strategic hamlets program copied. Engage and destroy the enemy and hold the area. Separate population from the insurgents. Build human development.

Table 74. Legacy Traits of Three Epochs of COIN and Their Application to Building Confidence in Afghanistan

[33] The Philippines Insurrection was long, bloody, and often morbid. Reports of U.S. soldiers humiliating and brutalizing Philippinos led to Congressional investigations.

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union fought a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, [34] which provided many lessons for U.S. counterinsurgency planners.[35]

A New Doctrine

Over 30 years later, U.S. strategists would examine lessons from the Soviet experience to update American counterinsurgency doctrine.[36] In February 2006, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, then-commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, directed a team of soldiers and scholars to revise and reinvigorate counterinsurgency doctrine.[37]

The Pentagon's approach to devising a new counterinsurgency doctrine drew lessons from the previous insurgencies and from the scholarship in the counterinsurgency canon.[38] Authors explored new military tactics and technologies, particularly advances in

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[34] Stephen Pomper notes that the Soviets saw early in the fight that they would have to train local forces and secure and maintain their sympathies, similar to the U.S. effort in the Philippines or they would have to field an army of over 600,000 men. Source: Stephen Pomper, "Don't Follow the Bear: The Soviet Attempt to Build Afghanistan's Military," *Military Review*, (September 1, 2005).

[35] "The Soviets' failed Afghan invasion cost them their claim to be the leader of the oppressed masses of the Third World; it also angered the Arab world, spoiled the Moscow Olympics, and gave Solidarity in Poland a gasp of air. Eventually, the Red Army's forced withdrawal from Afghanistan ended the myth that history had a direction, toward the ever wider spread of Communism. It was a very thick nail indeed in the coffin of the Evil Empire." Source: Radek Sikorski, "Mujahedin Memories," *National Review*, (August 23, 2004).

[36] "An Interview with LTC John Nagl," *Armed Forces Journal*, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com, (April 1, 2007).

[37]Sarah Sewall, "Modernizing U.S. Counterinsurgency Practice: Rethinking Risk and Developing a National Strategy," *Military Review*, (September 1, 2007).

[38] Terence J. Daly, "Classical Principles of Counterinsurgency," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 90, (Dec. 2006), 53-57.

surveillance and reconnaissance.[39] It combined recent approaches to human development, such as civil engineering, public health, wireless communications, and agriculture to defeat insurgencies and build national confidence.[40]

The new doctrine, the previously discussed U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 3-24, was produced in partial response to the inadequacies of existing Army and Marine war-fighting doctrine, which focused primarily on large wars and only secondarily on insurgencies.[41] The authors of 3-24 saw that a calculus for measuring success in counterinsurgency should focus on developmental indicators.[42] For example, the number of schools built in a contested area may be a more important metric than the number of insurgents killed in the area.

The ratio of military-to-developmental activity in the new counterinsurgency varied according to circumstance, location, and enemy strength. But 3-24 set as a standard an 80% non-lethal to 20% lethal ratio. An average insurgency would be countered with 80% developmental and reconstruction, or non-kinetic efforts, and 20%

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[39] "State Department- Military Counterinsurgency Manual Stresses Cultural Awareness," U.S. *Fed News Service*, Including U.S. State News, 2007, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1191783061.html

[40] Jacob Kramer, "The Two Sides of COIN: Applying FM 3-24 to the Brigade and Below Counterinsurgency Fight."

[41] Al Hemingway, "CORDS: 'Winning Hearts and Minds in Vietnam."

[42] For a complete list of the doctrine and external sources that contributed to the development of FM 3-24, reference the book's extensive bibliography. A few of the more important references for company commanders and battalion staffs include FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations, 30 APR 03; FM 7-98, Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict, 19 OCT 92 (specifically Appendix C); FM 3-05.202, Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces, 20 SEP 94; FM 90-8, Counter-guerrilla Operations, 29 AUG 86; FMI 3-34.119 / MCIP 3-17.01, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat, 21 SEP 05 (21 SEP 07)

military firepower, or kinetic efforts.[43] Because of the heavy emphasis on non-lethal measures, counterinsurgency efforts would require a wide variety of skills to include economics, anthropology, city planning, law, medicine, and many others.[44]

The new doctrine offered kinetic and non-kinetic tactics to separate the insurgents from the populace, in the hopes of isolating the contagion of insurgency. It tried to destroy the insurgents' bases of support, while gaining credibility and the cooperation of the populace.[45] It also rewarded populations who resisted the insurgents by helping them build their villages and enjoy the benefits of human development, including higher living standards, better health and education, and increased security.

The authors of 3-24 found that successful confidence-building practices often required engaging with the population; learning their habits, customs, and idiosyncrasies; protecting and building infrastructure; tailoring information operations; engaging local politicians; and denying the insurgents sanctuary.[46] The field manual is very clear on the primacy of human development in defusing insurgencies. Counterinsurgency operators

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[43] The 80%-20% ratio is an approximate number. To any extent that there is an average insurgency, it should, according to doctrine, be fought with 80% developmental efforts and only 20% kinetic efforts. In any insurgency, this ratio shifts over time. If a counterinsurgency is very successful, there would be less need to engage and kill the enemy in combat operations. If the insurgents are very active and lethal, the counterinsurgency may need to devote more than 20% of counterinsurgency efforts to kinetic effects.

[44] John Kiszely, "Learning about Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, 2007, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-160811627.html

[45] Robert Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters*, 34, (Spring 2004). http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/04spring/tomes.pdf

[46] John Kiszely, "Learning about Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, 2007, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-160811627.html

became, in effect, custodians of the populace, as long as the insurgency thrived.[47] Killing was de-emphasized, as the doctrine stressed the confidence-building, non-lethal theories of Lawrence, Galula, and Thompson.[48] Only when a requisite level of national confidence was achieved could foreign forces be removed.

Another reason why the 3-24 authors subordinated kinetic efforts to non-kinetic efforts was based on lessons they gleaned from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. The Soviets pursued a harsh and sometimes indiscriminate counterinsurgency that built resistance to their occupation and forfeited the good will they built through their often-successful developmental programs of the preceding 30 years.[49] It collapsed the Soviet Union's remaining prestige in the Third World, and it alienated the Islamic world.[50]

Armed Development: The Micro-Economic Development Mission

The PRTs, discussed in chapter four, were designed primarily to produce stability and confidence in provinces. Their mission was not to engage in combat and defeat the enemy.[51] Instead, they were deployed to give local, provincial, and national authorities

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[47] *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

[48] Jacob M. Kramer, "The Two Sides of COIN," *Infantry Magazine*, 2007, HighBeam Research, (March 23, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1400108251.html

[49] "Looking for The Exit; Afghanistan's Interminable War. (Lessons from the past)(Ghosts of Afghanistan: The Haunted Battleground)(Book review)," *The Economist* (US), 2011, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-272664003.html

[50] Radek Sikorski, "Mujahedin Memories," *National Review*, (August 23, 2004).

[51] "Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)," *PRT Handbook, Handbook No. 07-34, U.S. Army*, (September 2007), 5. http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/07-34/07-34.pdf

time to develop necessary capabilities to stabilize contested areas and build confidence in local, provincial, and the national government. By partnering with local Afghans, a nucleus of specialists from the defense, diplomatic, and development communities[52] worked to strengthen local administrative capacity, promote business and agriculture, develop health and education, and deliver essential social services.[53]

PRTs also provided information and intelligence to NATO and Afghan national government decision makers.[54] PRTs delivered vital services and developmental aid that could not be provided by Kabul.[55] The PRTs expanded their purpose to include strengthening local governance and community development.[56]

As the counterinsurgency developed, several principles emerged, which were drawn from current experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq; from historical experiences in counterinsurgencies, including those listed in the literature review; and from current counterinsurgency scholarship. These principles, and others, were listed as doctrine in 3-24.

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[52] Michelle Parker, "Role of DoD in Provincial Reconstruction Teams," *Congressional Testimony*, (September 5, 2007).

[53] "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq*," U.S. GAO Office*, (Washington DC: October 1, 2008).

[54] "Provincial Reconstruction Teams," *NATO and ISAF Webpage* (Updated September 17, 2008). http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html

[55] Major Andrew Roe, "To Create a Stable Afghanistan: Provisional Reconstruction Teams, Good Governance, and a Splash of History" *Military Review*, (November-December 2005) http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/roe.pdf

[56] "U.S. Army Distrusted To Give Afghans Aid Source," *China Daily*, (January 15, 2003).

Principles of Counterinsurgency

"*When the healthy body becomes weakened, it's susceptible to things it ordinarily could fight off. Exactly same in a state. An intervention, rebuilding health, rebuilding immune defense is a complex approach to a complex problem. And …the counterinsurgency must be a well-informed, complex response to an extraordinarily complex problem."*[57] General Stanley McChrystal, 2013

The Field Manual 3-24 states that to be successful against insurgents in a particular area and to avoid alienating the populace, counterinsurgents must understand the local environment. This includes local social issues and national issues that affect the local environment. For instance, Coalition units may interact with groups of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Nuristanis across their areas of operations.[58] Hannah Gurman, a counterinsurgency analyst, noted that it has been easy for Western aid donors and counterinsurgents to lose the confidence of indigenous persons through insensitive behavior and an overreliance on firepower.[59]

It is possible to distill the underlying principles of 3-24 to six basic principles, as they related to Afghanistan in the time period covered in this dissertation. All six elements were designed to build national confidence, to include strengthening the economy, building a public administration, and establishing security.

The first principle was unity. Unity meant harnessing all relevant operators and

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[57] "How Is Counterinsurgency Like the Way the Human Body Fights Disease?" *States News Service*, 2013, HighBeam Research, (May 29, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-

[58] *Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2* (Headquarters Department Of The Army, April 2009), www.us.army.mil 1-4

[59] "Gallatin's Gurman Captures "Hearts and Minds" in New Book," *States News Service*, 2013, HighBeam Research, (May 29, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-347296716.html

decision makers in counterinsurgency into a single policy-making tool.[60] In practice, it meant smoothing issues of potential conflict and territorial rivalry in counterinsurgency.[61] Unity of effort was a fundamental principle in Afghan provinces and with high-level decision makers in Kabul.[62] Teams of high-level civilian and military decision makers coordinated efforts to defeat the insurgents, while simultaneously promoting human development.[63]

A second principle was sustaining area ownership throughout Afghanistan. Soldiers in Afghanistan explored lessons learned by their predecessors in Vietnam and elsewhere. Observers of the Vietnam insurgency remarked that the U.S. troops owned villages during the day, but the Vietnamese insurgents, or the Viet Cong, owned them during the night. Owning territory for 12-of-24 hours was insufficient for counterinsurgency success and confidence building. In the case of Afghanistan, that meant assigning military units to specific battlespace for extended periods. This contrasted to "raid strategy," in which government forces were not assigned long-term control.[64]

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[60] Charles Oleszycki, "Update on Department of State and Department of Defense Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance," *Army Lawyer*, 2006, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1078720151.html

[61] Contributing Writer Discusses Counterinsurgency Manual," U.S. *Fed News Service*, Including U.S. State News, 2007, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1384188341.html

[62] John Hillen, "Developing a National Counterinsurgency Capability for the War on Terror." *Military Review*, (January 1, 2007).

[63] Eliot Cohen and Conrad Crane and Jan Horvath and John Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency."

[64] David Barno, "Fighting the Other war: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005," *Military Review*, Vol 87, No.5, September/October 2007.

If an area was effectively controlled by government forces, it was, by definition, denied to the insurgents. As a consequence, human development could take root.[65] This was the theory behind British General David Richards "ink spot" theory, which was based on the works of Golden Age writer Sir Robert Thompson,[66] who led counterinsurgency efforts in Malaya.[67] U.S. and other Coalition soldiers focused on securing key centers and improving living conditions and only secondarily on killing the enemy, particularly in the immediate post-Taliban environment.[68]The Coalition tried to grow the ink spots to gain national confidence.[69]

In Afghanistan, there was a three-stage strategy, which is clarified in 3-24, to spread developmental "ink." First, in areas of high-insurgent activity, soldiers, increasingly ANA soldiers, engaged, defeated, and cleared the area of enemy forces. Second, Coalition forces secured and held the area, allowing developmental specialists to begin the third stage. The third stage was planning development projects with key economic and social "multiplier value, such as bridges and roads or wells and clinics."[70]

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[65] "The Taliban resurgent; Afghanistan (The Taliban resurgent)," *The Economist (US*), 2006, HighBeam Research, (May 18, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-146799416.html

[66] Terence J. Daly, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Book review)," *Military Review*, 2006, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-152935290.html

[67] The metaphor refers to the slow, steady drops of ink on a white page of paper. As small drops of ink hit the page, they expand centrifugally. With enough ink drops, even if the rate of dropping is slow, the entire page will become black given enough time.

[68] Greg Mills and Terence McNamee and Denny Lane, "Security Vortex: Warlords and Nation Building. (Afghanistan)," *National Interest*, (September 1, 2006)

[69] Greg Mills and Terence McNamee, "Finding The 'Right Stuff' In Afghanistan- Reducing Violence And Bringing The U.S. Military Under NATO Command Won't Be Easy," *Christian Science Monitor*, (July 10, 2006).

[70] Greg Mills and Terence McNamee and Denny Lane, "Security Vortex: Warlords and Nation Building, (Afghanistan"), *National Interest*, (September 1, 2006).

Employment schemes drew potential recruits away from the Taliban and toward the government.

This hands-on strategy for sustaining Afghan ownership, which was prerequisite for confidence building, required Afghan and U.S. soldiers to expose themselves to danger daily.[71] If soldiers remained closeted in their compounds, they lost the vital contact with people required to maintain credibility and friendly relations.[72] When insurgents understood that Coalition forces would not be forced from the streets, markets, or village gathering centers, they would need to operate in different areas or refine their tactics.

The third principle was seizing and holding the initiative. Writing more than 100 years ago, C.E. Callwell, the British military historian, in his classic text, Small Wars, argued the necessity for keeping strong the initiative against the insurgents.[73] This mandated that field operators experiment and innovate in the human development aspects to war fighting.[74]

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[71] Terence J. Daly, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Book review)," *Military Review*, 2006, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-152935290.html

[72] Sarah Sewall, "Modernizing U.S. Counterinsurgency Practice: Rethinking Risk and Developing a National Strategy," *Military Review*, (September 1, 2007).

[73] "It is not a question of merely maintaining the initiative, but of compelling the enemy to see at every turn that he has lost it and to recognize that the forces of civilization are dominant and not to be denied." Source: LTC David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,"*IOsphere, Joint Information Operations Center*, (March 2006). http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf

[74] In a set of U.S. Army counterinsurgency rules published in 2007, the text read, "Don't drive in the ruts. I hold you responsible to do what is right and effective not to simply follow what has been done before." "Flat Ass Rules, Version 1.2," *CSTC-A/CJTF-Phoenix*, (November 12, 2007).

Constantly applying the pressure on the enemy often required shifting military and developmental tactics.[75] Callwell spoke of maintaining the initiative largely in military terms. However, subsequent counterinsurgency theoreticians advocated using developmental projects as initiative.[76] In Afghanistan, war planners saw the need to keep the insurgents on the defensive in order to build national confidence.[77]

Keeping the initiative, the third principle, required that local commanders have both military and financial resources at their disposal. CERP, mentioned in chapter three, allowed PRT commanders to distribute money quickly and efficiently for quick developmental responses.[78] CERP efforts complemented U.S. government and other international efforts to build Afghanistan.[79] A powerful tool in their developmental arsenal was the Quick Impact Project (QIP), which built over 450 small-scale economic, developmental, health, administrative, and communications projects.[80]

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[75] "If a tactic works this week, it will not work next week; if it works in this province, it will not work in the next." Source: Eliot Cohen and Conrad Crane and Jan Horvath and John Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency" *Military Review*, (April 1, 2007).

[76] Thomas S. Bundt, "An Unconventional War. The Philippine Insurrection 1899," *Military Review*, (May 1, 2004).

[77] LTC David Kilcullen, Australian army, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency."

[78] Mark Martins, "The Commanders Emergency Response Program."

[79] Mark Martins, "The Commanders Emergency Response Program."

[80] The QIP was managed by USAID and was used extensively between 2003 and 2006 to start-up small developmental projects to promote the "core objectives of stability, reconstruction, and building support for the central government of Afghanistan. Source: "US AID Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, November 2007. http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/documents/countries/afghanistan/afgh_prt_jul2007.pdf

A fourth principle that emerged was engaging and promoting local Afghan efforts to achieve self-sufficiency and self-confidence. U.S. Army personnel developed relationships with tribal leaders, mullahs, professionals, displaced persons civil society leaders, and government officials regularly.[81]As long as foreign donors performed basic developmental tasks, many Afghans saw themselves in a quasi-occupational status.

Brigadier Pershing understood this principle in the Philippines, the British understood it in India, and subsequent military and developmental scholars argued vehemently that locals must be directly engaged in building their nations. Some initial indigenous efforts failed and proved, at best, marginally successful. But efforts that succeeded gave locals the necessary self-confidence to develop their villages.[82]

A fifth principle that came from the post-Taliban period was using extreme care in kinetic operations.[83] The Field Manual's ratio of 80% development to 20% lethal varies depending on the environment and strength of the enemy.[84] But, the ratio leans heavily toward the developmental end of the equation in the period covered in this

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[81] "Counterinsurgency Leaders Course- Afghanistan, Student Handbook CLC-A XIII," *Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy*, 9. COIN_ACADEMY@swa.army.mil

[82] T.E. Lawrence said of his experience leading the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turkish Empire, "Do not try and do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them."

[83] The Counterinsurgency Academy stressed, "Balance force protection requirements with Afghans. Don't make unnecessary enemies," Counterinsurgency Leaders Course- Afghanistan, Student Handbook CLC-A XIII," 110.

[84] "Counterinsurgency Leaders Course- Afghanistan, Student Handbook CLC-A XIII," *Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy*, 8.

dissertation.[85] Overwhelming force was crucial in conventional battle, but it had many hazards in counterinsurgency.

In counterinsurgency, indiscriminate or area attacks were often counterproductive because civilian casualties anger and alienate villagers.[86] This outrage was exploited by the insurgents to paint counterinsurgency forces as murderers, rather than defenders. Harsh security measures based on collective guilt project the image of a brutal foreign occupation.[87] When Coalition Forces kill non-combatants, the Taliban claim victory because of the propaganda value. [88] Finally, a sixth principle was promoting effective training. These principles are shown in table 77.

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[85] At the outset of the Vietnam War, Colonel John Paul Vann, who would emerge as one of the most thoughtful and ultimately tragic COIN personalities of the war, explained that "The best weapon for killing is a knife. The next best is a rifle. The worst is an airplane, and after that the worst is artillery. You have to know whom you are killing. Peter Maas, "Professor John Nagl's War," *New York Times*, (January 11, 2004).

[86] Lester W. Grau, "The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. (Book review)," *Military Review*, 2007, HighBeam Research, (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-172010730.html

[87] "Counterinsurgency Leaders Course- Afghanistan, Student Handbook CLC-A XIII, 59.

[88] John Lynn, "Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Military Review, Vol. 85, No. 4,* (July 2005).

	US Military General Developmental Principles	Principles as Goals in Afghanistan as They Relate to the Coalition Efforts
Unity of Effort	Harnessing all relevant operators and decision makers in counterinsurgency into a single policy-making tool. In practice, it means smoothing issues of potential conflict and territorial rivalry in counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency operators work in harmony.	U.S Army leaders work with national-level in concert with ISAF, U.N. Coalition, and NGO partners to forge one dominant, agreed-upon plan. On the provisional level, it means cooperation among all players.
Sustain Area Ownership	Government forces control all the territory all the time. It is insufficient for government forces to control most to the country all of the time or all of the country most of the time. According to doctrine, the insurgents are engaged and defeated, the area is secured, and the area is developed, assuming it is rid of insurgents.	Coalition forces help to create developmental zones, or "ink spots" of government control would, according to plan, expand to cover the entire country.
Seize and Hold the Initiative	Government forces keep the momentum against the insurgents. Keep them off balance, and do not give them the time or the space to take the offensive. Make sure the insurgents are reacting to government's initiative and military attacks.	In a counterinsurgency that is overwhelmingly non-kinetic, U.S. soldiers keep the developmental pressure at many places and at all times in Afghanistan.
Engage and Promote Local Efforts	Donor nations providing the capital and employ the labor and local skills. Successful counterinsurgency requires a transfer of skills and responsibility to the host nation.	Bring Afghans into the military and developmental mix. Convince them that they are stakeholders in their country and that their generation will increasingly take leadership responsibilities.
Exercise Extreme Care in Kinetic Operations	Counterinsurgency stresses non-kinetic activity. Killing of non-combatants angers and alienates the population.	The Taliban exploit the propaganda value of accidental combat-related deaths. They portray mistakes in targeting as intentional murders in a larger war against Islam.

Stress Effective Training	If indigenous military forces and the civil service are to become effective, it must be trained. This is the production of human capital, which is necessary for effective counterinsurgency.	National, provincial, and local training schemes.
Create Metrics for counterinsurgency	Because counterinsurgency doctrine is heavily developmental, many metrics relate to improvements in living standards. Metrics in counterinsurgency have been fraught with problems and outright fraud in the past. Examples of this are the inflated body counts in Vietnam More important metrics focus on the number of soldiers and police trained, paid, and fielded.	The metrics are drawn from the goals set in the national-level and provincial-level plans.

Table 75. Counterinsurgency General Principles and How They Apply to Afghanistan

Summary

In the 20th and 21st centuries, the U.S. Army has been involved in both lethal efforts to defeat insurgents, as well as efforts to build national confidence. The period 2001-2006 was one of experimentation in which successful counterinsurgency practices of the past were tested, updated, or discarded. In 2007, a new counterinsurgency crystalized and was applied to operations in Afghanistan.

U.S. Army doctrine has shifted emphasis toward fighting small wars. The way the counterinsurgency is fought is guided by many doctrinal documents and executive-level policy papers.[89] There are many ideas common to these documents and papers, and

[89] John Kiszely, "Learning about Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, 2007, HighBeam Research., (May 17, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-160811627.html

these have been referred to as the seven core principles. They are: promote unity of effort; sustain area ownership; seize and hold the initiative; engage and promote local efforts; take extreme care in kinetic operations; stress effective training; and create metrics for counterinsurgency.[90] These principles were applied in fighting the insurgents in Afghanistan during the period of this dissertation. Some of the results were tested and measured in the pre-post test discussed in chapter six.

[90] John Kiszely, "Learning about Counterinsurgency."

CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS

Earlier chapters offered a literature review, a survey of political and economic theories relating to sustained development, and discussion of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This chapter will present results from conducting one-way ANOVA that make several overall comparisons of whether or not the level of national confidence in 2008 significantly shifted when measured again in 2010. These analyses will help determine the success or failure of the Taliban's insurgency. It will also gauge the success of the counterinsurgency.

Measuring the Changes in National Confidence 2008-2010

The methodology used to measure shifts in national confidence was discussed in chapter two. However, it may be helpful to restate the national confidence indicators to understand the results, which is the subject of this chapter. Indicator one is national morale; indicator two is economic prosperity, indicator three is confidence of citizens in institutions, organizations, and officials; and indicator four is security. They can be more fully described as follows:

- Indicator 1: National morale (measured as the average of nine survey items) was only asked in 2008. Nonetheless, it was considered helpful for gauging the level of optimism in Afghanistan. It asked respondents to predict an increase or decrease in their quality of life.
- Indicator 2A: Economic prosperity (measured as the average of eight survey items). Questions asked respondents to compare their current economic status to their status in earlier years. The 2008 survey asked respondents to compare their

economic situation of 2006, as they remembered it; similarly, the 2010 survey asked respondents to compare their current status to that in 2009. The survey items used to measure this indicator were: financial well-being of households; employment opportunities; availability of products in the market; quality of respondent's food diet; and physical condition of your house/dwelling; health well-being of respondent's family members; electricity supply; and access to schools.

- Indicator 2B: Economic Prosperity: Measuring conditions in villages/neighborhoods where citizens live (measured as the average of nine survey items). Questions measured the opinions of economic status. Survey items were: availability of clean drinking and irrigation water, jobs, electricity, health care, medicine, education, as well as security and freedom of movement.
- Indicator 3A: Confidence of citizens in institutions, organizations, and officials (measured as the average of 16 survey items). Questions tried to gauge the level of confidence, from no confidence to a great deal of confidence in the following institutions: the Army and police; political parties; the judicial system; local, provincial, and national ministries; public administration; local militias; community development councils and community shuras, local councils, and jirgas, regional or national-level councils; electronic and print media; and national and international NGOs.[1]
- Indicator 3B: View of confidence in national and provincial governments (measured as the average of nine survey items). Questions sought to measure how

[1] Shuras and jurgas are consultative bodies of Afghan elders.

well Afghans view the performance of the national and provisional governments in education, healthcare system, creating job opportunities, maintaining relations with neighboring countries, reviving/developing the economy, fighting corruption, security, and provincial government.

- Indicator 4: Security (measured as the average of nine survey items). Questions asked opinions on perceptions of security. Is the Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National Police (ANP) honest and fair with the Afghan people or unprofessional and poorly trained? Can it operate by itself, and does it help improve the security? Are they efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes?

Overall Scale Results from Using ANOVA Methods

Scale 1, national morale is not included as part of ANOVA results presented in Table 58 since the corresponding survey items used in the 2008 survey were not used in the 2010 survey. For the survey items measured twice and the scales developed from those, there was a decline of national confidence in four scales, but an increase in one scale.

There were decreases in scale 2A-economic prosperity: measuring conditions in villages and neighborhoods where citizens live, from 2.15 to 1.91; scale 2B-economic prosperity: measuring conditions in villages and neighborhoods where citizens live, from 2.54 to 2.52; scale 3B-confidence of citizens in national and provincial governments, 2.43 to 2.41. In scale 4 security, there was a very slight decline from 2.24 to 2.21.

However, there was an increase in Scale 3A-confidence of citizens in institutions, organizations and officials. The greatest decline was .2 of a scale unit in Scale 2A-economic prosperity; followed by Scale 2B declining by .02 and Scale 3B, also by .02 of a rating scale unit. The larger increase occurred in Scale 3A at .07, and in Scale 4 at .02. These are shown in Table 76.

Topic		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
SCALE 2A SCORE--ECONOMIC PROSPERITY: MEASURING SITUATIONS IN CITIZENS' HOUSEHOLDS	2008	6082	2.1525	.41304	.00530
	2010	6161	1.9154	.42997	.00548
	Total	12243	2.0332	.43798	.00396
SCALE 2B SCORE--ECONOMIC PROSPERITY: MEASURING CONDITIONS IN VILLAGES & NEIGHBORHOODS WHERE CITIZENS LIVE	2008	6315	2.5376	.51366	.00646
	2010	5962	2.5235	.53652	.00695
	Total	12277	2.5307	.52491	.00474
SCALE 3A SCORE--CONFIDENCE OF CITIZENS IN INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND OFFICIALS	2008	4249	2.2529	.52633	.00807
	2010	5238	2.3236	.53478	.00739
	Total	9487	2.2919	.53214	.00546
SCALE 3B SCORE--CONFIDENCE OF CITIZENS IN NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS	2008	5713	2.4300	.54873	.00726
	2010	5792	2.3905	.52615	.00691
	Total	11505	2.4101	.53782	.00501
SCALE 4 SCORE--SECURITY (DO CITIZENS FEEL SECURE IN VARIOUS WAYS?)	2008	5914	2.243	.43457	.00612
	2010	6086	2.213	.37198	.00619
	Total	12001	2.228	.40327	.00435

Table 76: **Means and Standard Deviations of Five Scale Scores by Year of Interview**

The differences in means indicate only a slight shift from year to year, in either direction, between all the measured scales comprising National Confidence. The magnitude of those differences may be deceptive to a few reasons, with evidence shown in the Methodology section of this dissertation: (1) Respondents to the two years of surveys did significantly differ on several control variables or background characteristics,

which have affected their views on some of the topics covered in these surveys, and (2) Those responding to all items comprising a given scale in one year did significantly differ in some background characteristics from those responding to all items comprising the same scale in the other year, another factor which may affected their response patterns and levels.

Furthermore, due to the large sample sizes in each comparison group, as shown in Table 76, these small differences between groups still were found to be statistically significant. Since all results were run by using a weighting factor, to ensure that results became nationally representative, even this level of difference reflects a national view of Afghani citizens on these issues. Results of these one-way Analyses of Variance -one-way since the only factor used in these analyses was Year of Interview - are shown in Table 77.

		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
SCALE 2A SCORE--ECONOMIC PROSPERITY: MEASURING SITUATIONS IN CITIZENS' HOUSEHOLDS	Between Groups	172.069	1	172.069	967.829	.000
	Within Groups	2176.318	12241	.178		
	Total	2348.387	12242			
SCALE 2B SCORE--ECONOMIC PROSPERITY: MEASURING CONDITIONS IN VILLAGES & NEIGHBORHOODS WHERE CITIZENS LIVE	Between Groups	.612	1	.612	2.221	.136 *
	Within Groups	3381.885	12275	.276		
	Total	3382.496	12276			
SCALE 3A SCORE--CONFIDENCE OF CITIZENS IN INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND OFFICIALS	Between Groups	11.714	1	11.714	41.541	.000
	Within Groups	2674.413	9484	.282		
	Total	2686.127	9485			
SCALE 3B SCORE--CONFIDENCE OF CITIZENS IN NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS	Between Groups	4.491	1	4.491	15.543	.000
	Within Groups	3323.059	11502	.289		
	Total	3327.549	11503			
SCALE 4 SCORE--SECURITY (DO CITIZENS FEEL SECURE IN VARIOUS WAYS?)	Between Groups	1.380	1	1.380	6.075	.000
	Within Groups	2725.972	11998	.227		
	Total	2727.352	11999			

* = p>.05, statistically non-significant, all other results are significant

Table 77: ANOVA Source of Variation Table for Scales Compared by Year of Interview

Explaining Differences in Year to Year Scale Scores Using Factorial ANOVA Methods

As explained in Chapter Two, in which the methodology was discussed, six sets of factors (or groups of background characteristics based on survey items) created by using cluster analysis methods would be used in a follow-up analytic role. They were intended to measure if any of those factors were significantly associated with the shifts in scores from year to year, and thus could be used to explain those shifts. These factors are

listed in Table 78. Each set is numbered; the number of factors in each set ranges from one to three, as shown in the second column from the left. The factor is listed in the third column, followed by the description of those factors. The largest number of factors was in set number 2, with three factors, followed by two factors in set 6.

Set Number	Number of Factors	Name of Factor	Defined As
1	1	Region	Eight regions
2	3	Geographic Subdivisions Gender Age on last birthday	Villages, towns, city, or Kabul Metro area Male or female Grouped into four categories based on data patterns: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-82
3	1	Current Employment Status	Grouped into: Working, retired, housewife, student, unemployed
4	1	Ethnic Group	11 Ethnic Groups
5	1	Highest level of school completed	Grouped into: Never went to school, two levels of primary school, two levels of secondary school, high school, university education or above
6	2	Living standard of household Number of people living at address	Six categories in low-to-high order, codes assigned by interviewer on the basis of: "impressions from the dwelling of the household, the environment, and the appearance of household members" Grouped into four categories based on data patterns: 2-5, 6-7, 8-10, 11-39

Table 78: Factors Used in Follow-Up Analyses of Variance

A factorial ANOVA was therefore run to determine if each set was statistically significant in being associated with Year of Interview, and the results are shown in summary form in Table 79. (Due to the number of such factorial ANOVA results and their size, they appear in Appendix B) Indicator 1 was not measured because it was not included in the 2010 survey, and Indicator 2B already had not been found to be

statistically significant so it was not used further. Each of the other indicators had some factors that were significant, by themselves in combination with Year of Interview, or more than one of them being jointly significant with Year of Interview. In several sets, only one factor was significant.

	National Confidence Indicator	Not Measured	Statistically Significant (p<.05)	Not Significant
1	National Morale	Not Measured	NA	NA
2A	Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in Citizens' Households		Set 1 Set 2 –geographic Subdivisions , and geographic Subdivisions by gender Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6 –standard of living only	Set 2- gender by itself Set 6 – number of people at residence
2B	Economic Prosperity: Measuring Conditions in Villages/Neighbor-hoods Where Citizens Live	Not Measured	NA	NA
3A	Institutions, Organizations, and Officials		Set 1 Set 2 –geographic Subdivisions only Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6- Standard of living only	
3B	Confidence of Citizens in National and Provincial Governments		Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 6	Set 4 Set 5
4	Security (Do citizens feel secure in various ways?)		Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5	Set 6

Table 79: Summary of Factorial ANOVA Results

All Explanatory Variables in Set were Statistically Significant	Some Variables in Set were Statistically Significant	At least one explanatory variable in Set was Significant and one Explanatory Variable was not Significant
Set 1 Set 3	Set 2 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6	Set 2 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6

Table 80: Pattern of Sets and Statistical Significance

Two sets that were found to be statistically significant in all analyses were sets 1 and 3, each consisting of one variable. These are the regions and employment status.[2] This may be because in addition to a growing number of civilian casualties, conflict-affected populations in all parts of the country have also experienced loss of livelihood, displacement, and destruction of property and personal assets."[3]

The Shifts in the Indicators

1- National Morale

Indicator 1 was defined as National Morale, considered to be the overarching faith in the direction of the country and its leaders. The 2008 level of national morale was not able to be tested against the corresponding level in 2010 because that group of questions were not asked in 2010.

[2] The significance of the regions may have resulted from the intensification and spread of the armed conflict in Afghanistan throughout 2009. At least 5,978 civilians were killed and injured in 2009, the highest number of civilian casualties recorded since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. Afghans in the southern part of the country, where the conflict is the most intense, were the most severely affected. Nearly half of all civilian casualties, namely 45%, occurred in the southern region.

[3] Afghanistan: Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Army Conflict," United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), (Kabul: 2009).

Scale 2A--Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in Citizens' Households

Referring to Table 78, the listing of factors used in these follow-up analyses, certain factors were found to be highly significant ($p < .000$), in combination with Year of Interview. These were: Region; Geographic Subdivisions; Geographic Subdivisions in combination with Gender; Current Employment Status; Highest Level of School Completed; and Living Standard of Households. The number of people living at an address was found to not be statistically significant as an explanatory variable of shifts in Economic Prosperity data from year to year.

Scale 3A-Confidence of Citizens in Institutions, Organizations, and Officials

When using the six sets of explanatory variables here in combination with Year of Interview, some highly significant interaction effects ($p<.000$) results were found. This included: Region; Geographic Subdivisions ($p<.05$) but not Age Group or Gender (both of which were found to be non-significant in combination with Year of Interview ($p>.05$); Age on Last Birthday ($p<.002$); Ethnic Group ($p<.002$); Set 5, Living Standard of Households ($p<.02$) but not Number of People Living at Address ($p>.05$).

Scale 3B- Confidence of Citizens in National and Provincial Governments

When measuring shifts on this scale from year to year in combination with each of the six sets of explanatory variables, results showed that the interaction of Region with Year of Interview was highly significant ($p<.05$). Current Employment Status was also highly significant ($p<.05$) in combination with Year of Interview. However, neither Ethnic Group nor Highest Level of School Completed was statistically significant, in

combination with Year of Interview ($p>.05$). Living Standard of Households was however, highly statistically significant ($p<.05$) in combination with Year of Interview.

Scale 4- Security

As with other analyses, certain explanatory variables were indeed statistically significant in combination with Year of Interview when making comparisons of Scale 4 data from year to year. Region was found to be highly significant ($p<.05$). Similarly, geographic subdivisions significantly interacted with year of interview ($p<.05$), but not Gender. There were significant effects found in the interaction of Ethnic Group with Year of Interview ($p<.000$), and in the interaction of Highest Level of School Completed ($p<.002$) with Year of Interview. However, neither Living Standard of Household nor Number of People Living at Address significantly interacted with Year of Interview.

Table 81 is also informative. It displays (on a scale by scale basis) the statistically significant interactions of various explanatory variables in two or three-way combination with Year of Interview, and the size of differences in comparison group means. In adjacent columns it also displays (using multiple comparison methods of certain group means versus other means) what most accounted for the two- or three-way significant interactions that were found. Thus Table 81 extends the overall findings of shifts in scale scores from year to year that were presented in Table 78. The differences between cell means also indicate that certain groups were much more affected by shifts in scale scores than were other groups, since those differences are much larger than the overall differences presented in Table 78.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT TWO- AND THREE-WAY INTERACTIONS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES WITH YEAR OF INTERVIEW					
SCALE SCORE	**SET NUMBER**	**SIGNIF. TWO-WAY INTERACT-IONS**	**PAIRWISE COMPAR-ISONS WITH LARGEST DIFFERENCES**	**SIGNIF. THREE-WAY INTER-ACTIONS**	**PAIRWISE COMPARISONS WITH LARGEST DIFFERENCES**
2A	1	Region	Kabul .410 Central/Hazarat .288 Western .281 South East .239 South Western .207	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	2	Geographic Subdivisions Gender	Metro/Kabul -.491	Male : Villages, Towns, city, Metro-Kabul Female: Village, Towns, city, Metro-Kabul	Male-Metro-Kabul-.535 Female- Metro-Kabul .464 Female –Towns .361 Female- City .280
	3	Employment Status	Retired - .395 Unemployment .335 Student .250	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	4	Ethnic Group	Hazara .351 Sadat .309 Tajik .300 Aimak .270 Pashtun- . 209	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	5	Level of Education	Secondary (7-8) .274 Secondary .265 Secondary (finished 9) .263 University .255	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	6	Standard of Living	Bad condition .282 Poverty .251	Well off; Living with difficulty	Bad condition .282 Moderate existence .275 Poverty .251 Well off- .235
3A	1	Region	North East -.222 Central/Kabul -.145 Eastern .132 Western -.128	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	2	Geographic Subdivisions Gender Age	City .222 Metro/Kabul -.155	Geographic Subdivisions Gender	City--.222 Metro Kabul -.155 Towns- .124 Male .181 Female -.085

	3	Employment Status	Student -.122 Working -.099	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	4	Ethnic Group	Arab -.276 Hazara -.135 Tajik -.133	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	5	Level of Education	High School -.151 Secondary (7-8) -.148 Primary -.147	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	6	Standard of Living Number of dwellers		Standard of living	Fair well- being -.148 Living with difficulty -.135 Moderate existence -.104
3B	1	Region	Western .233 North East -.122 Central/Kabul .091	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	2	Geographic Subdivisions Gender Age		Geographic Subdivisions Geographic Subdivisions and Gender	Female by Metro-Kabul .209 Female by town -.169 Male by Metro-Kabul .127
	3	Employment Status	Retired .219 Working .075 Unemployed .071	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	4	Not Significant		NA— only 1 factor in set	
	5	Not Significant		NA— only 1 factor in set	
	6	Standard of Living Number of dwellers	Well-off .100 Bad Condition .098	Standard of Living	Bad Condition .098 Moderate Existence .055
4	1	Region	Central Hazarjat .197 Southwest -.144 South East -.105	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	2	Geographic Subdivisions Gender Age		Geographic Subdivisions Gender Geographic Subdivisions - Gender	Males by cities -.243 Males by town .236 Females by Towns .166
	3	Employment Status	Retired .214 Working -.045	NA— only 1 factor in set	
	4	Ethnic Group	Aimak .211 Turkman .134	NA— only 1 factor in set	

			Pashtun -.071	
	5	Level of Education	High School .091 Secondary (finished 9)-.091 Primary School -.06	NA— only 1 factor in set
	6	Both Variables Not Significant		

Table 81: Two- and Three-Way Interactions of Explanatory Variables with Year of Interview

Strength of Association of Explanatory Variables with Scale Scores

Previous analyses and results identified: (a) which of five dependent variables or scale scores had statistically significant shifts from 2008 to 2010, and (b) which explanatory variables, by themselves or in combination as interactions, were significantly related to those shifts. Pairwise comparisons of explanatory variables' response categories were also tested for statistical significance, to determine which response categories most differed from others, and thus contributed to any significant interactions that were found.[4]

However, given the large sizes of each comparison group (about 6000 respondents, totaling close to 13,000 survey participants), small differences in group means still could be considered statistically significant (at the $p<.05$ level). To expand on this pattern, the results also include discussions of practical significance where suitable (whether or not meaningful differences between groups seemed to exist). To complement these comparisons, follow-up analyses also were computed: measures of the strength of relationship of these significant explanatory variables with dependent variables.[5]

[4] These results were presented in summary form in preceding pages; full tables of ANOVA results appear in Technical Appendix B.

Table 83 presents the effect sizes of each statistically significant explanatory variable found when analyzing their relationships with particular scale scores.[6] To complement these comparisons, follow-up analyses also were computed: measures of the strength of relationship of these significant explanatory variables with dependent variables.[7]

As a standard for interpreting effect size results, they generally range from 0-1.00, since they represent the proportion, or percentage, of explained variance (after considering the effects of other predictors included in the same analysis). Their strength of association has been categorized by Jacob Cohen and others as: Less than .02 = small or weak effect; up to .13 = medium effect; and up to .26 (or higher) = large effect.[8]

Given such criteria, the results in table 83 show that these sets of explanatory variables were only minimally related to their corresponding dependent variables or scale scores. (Similar results were found when examining the differences between comparison group means.) Turning to results for each scale score, the maximum Total Effect Size

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[5] The measure of "effect size" chosen to gauge the strength of association was that of "partial eta squared," which was computed via SPSS software as the ratio of: SSeffect of interest/ (SSeffect + SSerror term associated with that effect. These statistics were copied from SPSS ANOVA output in the factorial ANOVA. Partial eta squared was considered suitable for use since it is appropriate for factorial ANOVA results, and its effect size statistics are considered relatively unbiased (or measures of population statistics) when large sample sizes are used, as in this study.

[6] Each scale score was analyzed by using six sets of explanatory variables. Those variables found to be statistically significant are listed above for a given scale score, and do not necessarily come from the same ANOVA source of variation table. They therefore cannot be added together to obtain an overall percentage of explained variation in a given scale score (or dependent variable).

[7] The total effect size presented here was formed by adding the effect sizes of each significant variable but is actually only an estimate of that size level since these results were gathered from separate ANOVA analyses. These variables were not included in the same analysis to minimize their being overly intercorrelated and thus adversely affecting results.

[8] See the Internet website-- http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/statswiki/FAQ/effectSize.

was .04 (considered a low effect) for the explanatory variables significantly associated with Scale 2A, Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in Citizens' Households. The largest Average Effect Size was .004, found for explanatory variables significantly associated with Scales 2A (Economic Prosperity) and 3A (Confidence of Citizens).

Parallel results (on a variable-by-variable basis that also indicate low effect sizes) show up from scale to scale, with Region generally being the largest in being associated with relatively larger effect sizes. However, even that variable also shows less than 1% of explained variance in its corresponding scale score (such as indicating an effect size of .016 for Region when associated with Scale 2A).

An important finding is the strength of the factor"region" in all sets. This strong association was expected because most of the 2009 attacks were concentrated in a belt contiguous to Pakistan and to the north. This is graphically shown in figure 6 and statistical format in tables 66-73.

Scale No.	Name of Scale	Statistically Significant Explanatory Variables (in combination with Year of Interview)	Effect Size Measure (Partial Eta Squared Statistics) [9]
2A	Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in	Region Geographic Subdivisions	.016 .012 .002

[9] Partial Eta Squared effect sizes are computed within SPSS software as the ratio of: Sum of Squares effect (Sum of Squares effect + Sum of Squares error). Since all of the ANOVA models listed above had more than one explanatory variable or predictor, then partial eta squared is the variance explained by a given variable of the variance remaining after excluding variance explained by other predictors. It is an estimate of how large is the difference between two groups, and is relatively independent of sample size (which in this study was quite large, since each of the two survey years included about 6000 persons).

	Citizens' Households	Geographic Subdivisions [10] Gender	.002
		Current Status	.007
		Ethnic Group	.000
		Highest Level of School Completed	.001
		Household Size X Living Standard of Household	**.040**
		Sum of Effect Sizes	**.004**
		Average Effect Size	
3A	Confidence of Citizens in Institutions, Organizations and Officials	Region	.011
		Geographic Subdivisions	.003
		Geographic Subdivisions; Gender	.001
		Current Status	.002
		Ethnic Group	.005
		Highest Level of School Completed	.003
		Household Size X Living Standard of Household	.001
		Sum of Effect Sizes	**.025**
		Average Effect Size	**.004**

3B	Confidence of Citizens in National and Provincial Governments	Region	.008
		Geographic Subdivisions	.002
		Geographic subdivision X Gender	.003
		Current Status	.001
		Ethnic Group	.001
		Highest Level of School Completed	.001
		Household Size X	.001
		Living Standard of Household	.002
		Sum of Effect Sizes	**.019**
		Average Effect Size	**.002**
4	Security (Do Citizens Feel	Region	.008
		Geographic Subdivisions	.001

[10] "X" appearing between two variables means that a three-way interaction (together with Year of Interview) was found to be statistically significant. If an "X" does not appear, that means that a two-way interaction (a single variable in combination with Year of Interview) was found to be significant. No main effects appear in this table, since the purpose of these explanatory variables was to determine the extent of shifts in mean scores from 2008 to 2010, in combination with these variables.

	Secure in Various Ways?)	Geographic Subdivisions X Gender	.004
		Current Status	.001
		Ethnic Group	.003
		Highest Level of School Completed	.002
		Household Size X Living Standard of Household	.003
		Sum of Effect Sizes	**.022**
		Average Effect Size	**.003**

Table 82: Measures of Effect Size in Explaining Statistically Significant Associations with Shifts in Year-to-Year Scale Scores

Summary

There was only a slight shift in the means in the ANOVA. The sets of explanatory variables were only minimally related to their corresponding dependent variables or scale scores. Among the statistically significant explanatory variables, "region," set number 1, has the largest effect size, as measured by the partial eta squared. In the pairwise comparisons of all subsets, Kabul, has the highest statistically significant interaction at .410. This confirms the approach of the dissertation's methodology because insurgent attacks, the independent variable, were concentrated specific regions.

CHAPTER SEVEN: MEASUREMENT AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

Earlier chapters discussed the literature; design of the survey and methodology of the ANOVA test, as well as its results; Afghanistan's economic development; and principles of counterinsurgency; and results. Chapter two explained how the national confidence model was built; chapter five discussed the basis of current counterinsurgency strategy, and chapter six presented the results of the ANOVA. This chapter will examine, in greater detail, the structure of testing methodology, contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine, and the ANOVA results of the pre-post test. It will build a case that the national confidence model of this dissertation has external, predicative, and ecological validity useful to measuring other counterinsurgencies. Finally, it will analyze the results of the ANOVA and related tests in the context of the three hypotheses.

Measuring Success or Failure in Counterinsurgencies

Measuring the effects of counterinsurgency operations, particularly those operations that promote sustained development, present challenges for the researcher, as was discussed in the literature review and chapter two. As discussed in chapters two and five, insurgencies, as small wars, are distinguished from large and total wars by several factors.

The bedrock distinction in strategy between large-war doctrine and counterinsurgency doctrine is latter's focus on *building* sustained human development and the former's on *destroying* anything of military value to the enemy. However, in both large wars and counterinsurgency targeting national confidence is vital, as exemplified in

the last total war of the 20th century. Allied forces, led by the United States, tried to *break* the national confidence of the Germans and Japanese in their governments. In Afghanistan, ISAF forces, led by the United States, has been trying to *strengthen* the national confidence in their government. For this reason, different metrics for understanding strategic success or failure in large wars and counterinsurgencies are required.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Strategy

During the Second World War, planners and historians sought to measure the effects of tactics and strategy. Lessons would guide future planning and the allocation of scarce allocation. For this reason, military analysts and planners conducted ad hoc and formalized instruments to gauge the success of military operations in both theaters of war.[1]

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), chartered by President Franklin Roosevelt, examined the causes of Japanese and German surrenders.[2] The Allied grand

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[1] There were similar metrics used against Germany. "When the analysts of the British and American air forces moved to Germany in 1945, unpacked their bags and began to take account of the bomb damage inflicted on that country throughout the course of the war, they gained an accurate assessment as to the abilities and the limits of air power. By the end of 1945 they were able to figure out what percentage of their bombing tonnage was needed to destroy the vital (and some not terribly vital) elements of the Nazi war machine." Source; Allied Bomb Damage During World War II How Effective Was the Bombing Campaign Over Nazi Germany?" *Yank Magazine*, 1945. http://www.oldmagazinearticles.com/WW2_bomb_damage_to_Germany_bombing_of_Germany_effective

[2] The leadership of John Kenneth Galbraith, the economist; Paul Nitze, the strategist and international relations theoretician; and George Ball, the diplomat, gave credibility and prestige to the USSBS. The study became iconic in the growing field of strategic measurement and systems analysis. Meilinger, Phillip S. "How Effective is Strategic Bombing?: Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo," *Naval War College Review*, 2001. *HighBeam Research.* (November 25, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-90687988.html

strategy against Japan was forged on blockading the Japanese islands;[3] eliminating industrial capacity through strategic bombing;[4] incapacitating transport systems by tactical bombing and sabotage; and stressing island hopping to cut resupply and deployment.[5] Strategic bombing patterns against Germany were similar, while other elements of strategy were different. The USSBS tried to determine which elements of the grand strategy, particularly strategic bombing, were more successful than others.[6]

Of particular importance to this dissertation was the USSB's Morale Division, which was chartered to conduct an attitudinal survey on the effects of bombing on German morale.[7] The Morale Division's data collection methods were both similar and dissimilar to those used in the Asia Foundations' survey, used in this dissertation, nearly 70 years later.[8] Both tried to

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[3] Robert W. Coakley, "World War II: The War Against Japan, Chapter 23," *American Military History*, Center of Miltary History, US Army Washington DC, 1989, 524. http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH/AMH-23.htm

[4] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) was organized in November 1944 to "establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potential of air power as an instrument of military strategy." Source: Technical Reports and Standards, "Reports of the United States Strategy Bombing Survey Held at the Library of Congress," United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 1945. 18. http://loc.gov/rr/scitech/trs/trsbombingsurvey.html

[5] Robert W. Coakley, "World War II: The War against Japan,"509.

[6] The USSBS attempted measure the effects of air power in the war, as well as other instruments of military power. It tried to determine the relative merits of strategic bombing compared to contributions of land and sea warfare.

[7] Gabriel A. Almond and Wolfgang Krauss, "The Size and Composition of the Anti-Nazi Opposition in Germany," Political Science & Politics, 1999. *HighBeam Research,* (November 25, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-59520513.html

[8] Gabriel A. Almond, the head of Morale Division I, wrote "My section consisted of two six-men teams: one headed by me, and a second headed by Wolfgang Kraus, a political scientist knowledgeable about National Socialist Germany who was on leave from George Washington University. Each team had a jeep and weapons carrier, and consisted of two German-speaking GIs and one or two military personnel." Researchers in Afghanistan also work in contested areas and partnered with political scientists. Source: Almond, Gabriel A.; Wolfgang Krauss, The Size and Composition of the Anti-Nazi Opposition in Germany.

determine the effect of attacks on the morale of the counties, Germany and Afghanistan, through surveys.[9]

Measuring Post-World War Counterinsurgencies-

In post-war academia and centers of military science, there were breakthrough in measuring social phenomena. These advances were driven by quicker and more accurate computers and by the growth of systems analysis. But measuring the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy continued to be difficult. Sarah Sewall, an author of the 3-24 manual, wrote, "Simply put, counterinsurgency success is elusive and difficult to measure."

Some of the difficulties in measuring kinetic and non-kinetic tactics in counterinsurgencies were discussed in chapter one. There are other challenges. Effectiveness of lethal operations is difficult to calculate because, as strategist David Kilcullen said, analysts "usually can't know how many insurgents there were to start with, how many moved into the area, how many transferred from supporter to combatant status, or how many new fighters the conflict has created."[10] Areas in which "government forces can defeat insurgents in battle but cannot hold that area cannot be considered under

[9] The means and methodology of collection were different. The survey in Germany was targeted to a specific cohort, and the survey in Afghanistan was distributed randomly. But both surveys stressed the importance of national confidence in war and tried to measure it scientifically.

[10] He offers some metrics to include "percentage of engagements initiated by our forces versus those initiated by insurgents; longevity of friendly local leaders in positions of authority; number and quality of tip-offs on insurgent activity that originate spontaneously from the population; and economic activity at markets and shops. These mean virtually nothing as a snapshot; it is trends over time that help you track progress in your sector." Source: David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, May 1, 2006.

government control. In addition, numbers are subject to interpretation, speculation, and sometimes rank fraud, as in the inflated body counts of Vietnamese communists.

Measuring economic development in a counterinsurgency environment can also be challenging. Nancy Blacker and Charlie Kim note, "The most difficult task in measuring economic development is simply gaining access to reliable data."[11] However, the manual 3-24 and contemporary strategists have presented indicators, some of which were used in this dissertation's ANOVA. They are listed below:

Measurement in Afghanistan – Strategic Doctrine and Strategic Opinion

The strategist Dennis Steele distilled sets of responsibilities,[12] listed in the manual 3-24, into six indicators. Many of the 60 questions in the dissertation's pre-post ANOVA relate to one or more of these indicators. They are: Indicator One- "The ability to provide security for the populace (including protection from both internal and external threats);"[13] Indicator Two- "Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the population;" Indicator Three- "A high level of popular in or support for the political processes;" Indicator Four- "A culturally acceptable

[11] "In the United States, researchers often commission a survey designed to gather the target data (such as a written survey, personal interview, focus group discussion, phone survey, etc.) All of these methods become more difficult in a foreign country where travel and trust are major issues." Source: Blacker, Nancy E.; Charlie Kim, "Measuring Economic Development in a Coin Environment." Military Review. 2010. *HighBeam Research.* (November 27, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-253536808.html

[12] These were mentioned briefly in chapter two and are presented in table 83 in the context of questions used in the national confidence model.

[13] Dennis Steele, "The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Counterinsurgency," The Association of the US Army, (July 2007), 58.

level of corruption:"[14]Indicator Five- "A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development shocks to its social system;: Indicator Six- "A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions:"[15] The relevance of these six indicators to the questions asked of surveyants in the pre-post ANOVA is shown in figure 83.

The manual 3-24 is the doctrinal basis upon which the ANOVA was built. Contemporary strategists echo the manual 3-24's centrality of national confidence in building and maintaining stability in conflict zones, such as Afghanistan. Strategists Elliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath and John Nagl, in jointly written article, are emphatic that in a counterinsurgency "Legitimacy is the main objective. It engenders the popular support required to manage internal problems, change, and conflict."[16]

They offered five actions that are indicators of legitimacy: "Free, fair, and frequent selection of leaders; a high level of popular participation in and support for the political process; a low level of corruption; a culturally acceptable level or rate of political, economic, and social development; a high level of regime support from major social institutions."[17] These indicators are listed in figure 83.

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[14] Dennis Steele, "The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Counterinsurgency."

[15] Dennis Steele, "The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Counterinsurgency."

[16] He continues, "Illegitimate governments are inherently unstable. Misguided, corrupt, and incompetent governance inevitably fosters instability. Thus, illegitimate governance is the root cause of and the central strategic problem in today's unstable global-security environment." Source: Elliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, "Principles, imperatives, and paradoxes of counterinsurgency" *Military Review*, (April 1, 2007).

[17].Elliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, And Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency."

The strategist Kalev Sepp identified key actions that must be taken in order to defeat insurgents. The actions can be formed into six questions directly related to the dissertation's ANOVA test. In question form, they include: Is there an adequately sized and trained police force able to gather and act upon intelligence at the community level, supported by an incorrupt and functioning judiciary? Does the population see itself protected from the insurgents? Do the people see themselves as stakeholders in the country? Do they trust their government to control, militarily and diplomatically, the future of their country? Do the people see the military forces, both indigenous and supporting, as well organized and well trained to support the police and fight insurgents? Do the people see their country's borders as secure?[18]

Figure 83 demonstrates the relevance of the questions used in the Asia Foundation's 2008 and 2010 surveys to contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine and strategic thought. Five indicators of counterinsurgency success are presented by strategists Cohen, Crane, Horvath, Nagl, and Sepp. Figure 83 is the intersection of counterinsurgency doctrine and opinion with the Asia Foundation's survey questions used to measure national confidence in this dissertation. The Asia Foundation's specific questions were presented in chapter two.

[18] Kalev I. Sepp, Ph.D. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, May-June 2005, 8.

	Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 Six Indicators for Success in Counter-insurgency	Cohen's, Crane's Horvath's, and Nagl's Five Indicators for Legitimacy of Host Regime	Sepp's Six Indicators for Success in Counterinsurgency
Dissertation's Indicators 1: Morale	Q17c; Q17e; Q17i:	Q17c; Q17e; Q17i	Q17e; Q17i
Dissertation's Indicators 2: The Strength of the Economy	Q41a; 41b; Q16c; Q16e; Q16I	Q41a; 41b; Q16c; Q16e; Q16I	Q16e; Q16I
Dissertation's Indicators 3: The Strength of Public Administration	Q52b; Q52c; Q52d; Q52e; Q52f; Q52g; Q52h; Q52i; Q52j; Q52k; Q52l; Q52m; Q54n; Q52o; Q52	Q52b; Q52c; Q52d; Q52e; Q52f; Q52g; Q52h; Q52i; Q52j; Q52k; Q52l; Q52m: Q54n; Q52o; Q5 Q54n; Q52o; Q522;	Q52b; Q52c; Q52d; Q52e; Q52f; Q52g; Q52h; Q52i; Q52j; Q52k; Q52l; Q52m; Q54n; Q52o; Q52
Dissertation's Indicators 4: The Strength of Security	Q53a; Q53b; Q53c; Q53d; Q54a; Q54b; Q54c; Q54d; Q54e	Q53a; Q53b; Q53c; Q53d; Q54a; Q54b; Q54c; Q54d; Q54e	Q53a; Q53b; Q53c; Q53d; Q54a; Q54b; Q54c; Q54d; Q54e

Figure 83: The Questions Used in this Dissertation's National Confidence Model in the Context of Doctrine and Strategic Opinion[19]

Discussion of Results

Chapter six presented the results, and it is helpful to discuss them further. Table 84 below lists the dissertation's null hypotheses and research hypotheses (originally presented in Table 1). Each hypothesis is addressed by presenting a summary of results obtained by the study's overall and factorial ANOVA tests of statistical significance.

[19] The questions can be found on pages 100-106.

Null and Research Hypotheses	
Null Hypothesis 1	H0.1--- There was no decline in levels of National Confidence in the economy from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks
Research Hypothesis 1	H1.1--- There was a decline in levels of National Confidence in the economy from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
Null Hypothesis 2	H0.2--- There was no decline in levels of National Confidence in public administration from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
Research Hypothesis 2	H1.2--- There was a decline in levels of National Confidence in public administration from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
Null Hypothesis 3	H0.3--- There was no decline in levels of National Confidence in security from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.
Research Hypothesis 3	H1.3--- There was a decline in level of National Confidence in security from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.

Table 84 – Overview of Results Addressing Null and Research Hypotheses

National Confidence in the Economy

H1 -There was a decline in levels of national confidence in the economy from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.

Results - There was a decline, 2.15 to 1.91, or .24 or a three-point scale,[20] in the national confidence in the economy, as measured in scale 2A. Scale 2B scores were found to not be statistically significant (p>.136). Scale 2A measured the level of confidence that respondents had in their families immediate living conditions. This included access to quality food, employment, access to electricity and education and electricity.

[20] The other response formats in the national confidence model had four options.

The results from Scale 2A scores confirm the hypothesis. However, the decline was very small.

National Confidence in Public Administration

H2- There was a decline in levels of national confidence in public administration from 2008 to 2010 associated with insurgent attacks.

Results - There was a decline in Scale 3B scores, 2.43 to 2.39. or .04, but there was an increase in Scale 3A scores, from 2.25 to 2.32, or .07. Both question sets 3A and 3B included questions relating to local, regional, and national public administration.

Both changes were relatively small. Giving 3A and 3B equal weight, the total shift was a positive .03, which would indicate a slight gain in national confidence in public administration. Without averaging the combined scores of 3A and 3B, the results would be considered inconclusive.

National Confidence in Security

H3- There was a decline in level of national confidence in security from 2008 to 2010, associated with insurgent attacks.

Results - There was a decline, from 2.24 to 2.21, or .03, in national confidence in security.

Returning to return to the first indicator, national morale, which was measured only in 2008 because identical questions were not asked in 2010, it was not possible to measure shifts in the means of identical questions dealing with elements of national

morale, such as satisfaction with the direction of the country. It is helpful to compare the levels of national confidence in 2010 to 2013, the last full year of the Asia Foundation survey currently available for measurement.[21]

Those results show that in 2013, a majority of Afghans (57%) said Afghanistan was moving in the right direction.[22] This is 19% points higher than in 2008 and 11% points higher than in 2010, as shown in graph 14.



Graph 14: Is Afghanistan Moving in the Right Direction, or Do You Think They Are Going in the Wrong Direction?[23]

[21] "In 2013 the sample size was increased to 9,260 respondents (from 6,290 in 2012). This increase in sample size by 47% from previous years meets more aggressive margins of error. Respondents were selected using stratified finite sampling techniques, with a minimum target set of 192 respondents per province (last year, the minimum set was 100 respondents per province)." Source; Keith Shawe, Afghanistan in 2013- A Survey of the Afghan People, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2013), 7.

[22] Nancy Hopkins, "Afghanistan in 2013- A Survey of the Afghan People," The Asia Foundation, (San Francisco: 2013), 16.

[23] Nancy Hopkins, "Afghanistan in 2013- A Survey of the Afghan People," 16.

The Asia Foundation concluded in 2008 there was an increase in violence, and a shift in insurgent tactics towards more suicide and IED attacks. These attacks continued in 2009, the year that violence against civilians was used in this dissertation as an independent variable.

Throughout 2013, UNAMA noted increased public messaging by the Taliban on civilian casualties. However, the situation on the ground for Afghan civilians did not improve. The Taliban increased their indiscriminate use of IEDs and continued to attack civilians. In 2013, the Taliban claimed responsibility for 153 attacks affecting civilians, an increase of 292% in such claims by the Taliban compared to 2012.

In 2013, a majority of Afghans (57%) said their country was moving in the right direction, a figure that has fluctuated since 2006.[24] When asked why things were moving in the direction, Afghans listed reconstruction (32%), good security (24%), an improved education system (13%), improved education for girls (13%), and more ANA and ANP units (13%). Since 2006, good security and reconstruction have been consistently identified in these surveys as the main reasons for optimism.[25]

The Asia Foundation noted an element explaining the rise in morale, or what the survey referred to as optimism. In 2010, the rise in optimism may have been linked to the

[24] The level of national morale, as indicated by asking if the country is moving in the right direction, been increasing: from 46% in 2011 to 52% in 2012 to 57% in 2013. Keith Shawe, Afghanistan in 2013- A Survey of the Afghan People, 7.

[25] Keith Shawe, Afghanistan in 2013- A Survey of the Afghan People, 7.

shift in U.S. and NATO strategy towards a more active counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy was discussed in chapter five.[26]

Summary of Results

The results of the ANOVA test indicate that two of the three indicators of national confidence, the economy and security, slightly decreased. But the confidence in public administration slightly increased. In this sense, two of the three hypotheses were valid and one was invalid. But this obscures, in some ways, the importance of the very low shift in national confidence. The year in which the independent variable was measured, 2009, was one of unprecedented Taliban violence and a peak year of fatalities. That national confidence would shift so little in the economy and security and, in fact, rise in public administration underscores the overall failure of the Taliban to erode national confidence to any appreciable level. Further, the level of national morale, the first indicator of national confidence, remained high, as shown in graph 14. In sum, the Taliban lowered the national confidence only slightly in two-of-three indicators and raised confidence in one indicator. It would be difficult to claim that the Taliban's efforts were successful in the period measured in this dissertation.

[26] It emphasized the number of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops peaked that year at 150,000, which emphasizes protecting the civilian population and reducing public support for insurgents by more development assistance, as mentioned in chapter five

Suggestions for Further Research

Several research initiatives could further investigating National Confidence, counterinsurgency among Afghan residents, perhaps dealing with different topics or subsets of citizens. These researchable ideas include:

- Development and national confidence in Iraq and Afghanistan 2005-2013. A comparative analysis of U.S. developmental efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan 2005-2013. Did the U.S. and its allies use similar developmental platforms to build national confidence in Iraq and Afghanistan? What were the successes and failures of these developmental platforms in terms of building national confidence and morale?

- The Taliban's insurgent strategy and that of the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) focusing on national morale. Do they have fundamentally different strategies and tactics? Are their targeting patterns and priorities, particularly as they involve civilians, similar or different or both.

- Measuring national confidence in developing countries in which there is a substantial Islamic population and an insurgency.

Summary

Measuring success and failure in counterinsurgency has and continues to bedevil military analysts and operators. Strategy and tactics in large wars and counterinsurgencies different and results need to be measured differently. An important study of the importance of national confidence in war was the USSBS. Other studies used advances in social science to analyze and formulate counterinsurgency strategy.

Contemporary doctrine and strategic thought highlight the importance of national confidence in local, provincial, and national governments. Indicators of stability and national confidence were formulated as questions and used in this dissertation.

In two-of-the-three indicators of national confidence, the economy and security, there was a very slight decline, and its public administration there was a slight increase. This confirms two of the three hypothesis and disproves and another. Nonetheless, in 2009 the Taliban did not appreciably weaken national confidence.

CHAPTER EIGHT: COMMENTARY

"*Only the Roman legions fought more simultaneous counterinsurgencies (than are U.S. forces)"* Dennis Steele [27]

The previous seven chapters measured the impact of attacks on national confidence in one year. In this dissertation, this author tried to remain objective. What concludes this dissertation is personal commentary, reflecting the opinions of the author and not, necessarily, that of his employing agency – the U.S. Army.[28] This author will try to answer the question asked of him by a dissertation committee member, "Were the results of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency, as detailed in this dissertation, worth the costs of fighting?' This author thinks that they were for several reasons.

The Taliban Made War on the United States

This author's response begins with the premise that the Taliban presented the United States with no viable alternative to war. The Taliban made war on the United States by hosting and supplying al Qaeda operatives, who used Afghanistan as a base to launch the September 11, 2001 attack on the U.S. mainland. Prior to this date, the United

[27] Dennis Steele, "The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Counterinsurgency," *Army*, 2007, *HighBeam Research*, November 26, 2014. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1305385721.html

[28] Personal commentary was included at the request of a dissertation committee chair who requested that I reflect on whether or not the combined U.S war effort in Afghanistan was, in my estimation, worth the expense.

States imposed sanctions on the Taliban, which was an intermediate response between rhetoric and war.[29]

But for reasons never fully explained by their leaders, the Taliban allowed bin Laden broad license to be interviewed by Western journalists. In his verbal attacks against America, bin Laden underscored his commitment to kill American citizens, preferably en mass. On September 11, 2001, he did so.

The Taliban were then given the opportunity to surrender bin Laden and his compatriots to U.S. authorities, avoiding war. But, the Taliban's foreign minister boasted that the Taliban would never deport bin Laden.[30] President Bush and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld determined to destroy the Taliban unless they surrendered Osama immediately.[31] Secretary of State Colin Powell cautioned the Taliban to "think properly.[32]" President Bush offered to spare the Taliban war if they extradited bin Laden.[33] They did not, and this intransigence ended negotiation. Only then did America and her allies initiate hostilities.

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[29] Pamela Constable, "New Sanctions Strain Taliban-Pakistan Ties; U.N. Action Angers Islamic Militants," The Washington Post, Washington Post Newsweek Interactive Co. 2001. HighBeam Research. December 18, 2010. http://www.highbeam.com

[30] "We will not hand him to an infidel nation." Source: Pamela Constable. "U.N. Imposes Air, Economic Sanctions on Afghanistan; Taliban Still Refuses To Hand Over Bin Laden," *The Washington Post*, Washington Post Newsweek Interactive Co, 1999, HighBeam Research, (November 1, 2010) <http://www.highbeam.com>.

[31] Linda Wertheimer and Noah Adams, "Profile: US briefs NATO Defense Ministers On Status Of US Military and Economic Plans after Terrorist Attacks," *NPR* All Things Considered, (2001), HighBeam Research, March 4, 2013. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-89606971.html

[32] Barry Schweid, "Taliban Better "Think Properly," *Albany Times Union*, NY, September 26, 2001.

[33] Barry Schweid, AP Diplomatic Writer," US: Bush Offer Designed in Fairness," *AP Online. Press Association*, Inc. 2001, HighBeam Research, (July 21, 2012). http://www.highbeam.com.

After the Taliban were Routed

U.S. leaders determined to root-out the enemy and deny it opportunities to regenerate. Afghanistan would be conquered and rebuilt with a view towards greater public participation in national-level decision making and greater prosperity[34] Douglas Feith, then undersecretary of defense for policy, stated that the United States had a compelling interest "in helping to create the conditions that will allow an Afghan government to assume responsibility for the country, provide security in the country, lay a foundation for economic activity in the country and prevent the country from reverting to a base of operations for terrorists."[35] It was clear to decision makers that the failure of human development in geographically distant lands had new implications for the international system and for U.S. security, and this was particularly true regarding Afghanistan.[36]

It is helped to examine to possible sets of strategies debated by U.S. leaders in early 2002. This will help to answer the question about costs versus benefits of the counterinsurgency. Some strategists, such as Larry Goodson, advocated a large and robust [37] U.S. soldiers, with their disparate skill sets, could move into the power vacuum

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[34] In October of 2001, the Bush Administration vowed a long-term military presence to help restore stability and to foster sustained human development after three decades of chaos and war. "We should not just simply leave after a military objective has been achieved." Source: Bob Deans, "Bush Changing His Stance on Nation Building."

[35] Bob Deans, "Bush Changing His Stance on Nation Building."

[36] Greene, David. "Nation Building Plan for Afghanistan Marks a Change in Plan for Bush." *Milwaukee Sentinel*, October 27, 2002.

[37] Larry Goodson and Jack Spencer, "Should We Rebuild Afghanistan? Afghanistan Has Auffered Through Decades of War," *New York Times,* February 11, 2002

very quickly. Vast poverty needed to be addressed quickly to pre-empt the Taliban, and US Army personnel could secure territory and engage in small-scale development. They could protect Afghans.[38] There was also the ethical imperative to move quickly and decisively. Goodson opined thought the United States was partly responsible for the destruction of living standards through negligence. Washington lost interest in the country after Afghan fighters defeated the Soviets.

Some argued that it would be cheaper in the long-term to move in quickly and comprehensively. Fielded military and developmental personnel could control the spread of militant Islam before it spread to contiguous territories in central and south Asia. U.S. military could also perform tasks that were ill-suited for civilian agencies and NGOs. Disarmament was linked to sustained economic development and US soldiers were better suited for this task than bickering Afghan ethnic groups.[39]

Finally, a US military presence would assure Muslims that the United States was in an Islamic land to help and would stay until long-term stability is achieved. This would expand Washington's credibility and might help erase the images of American soldiers leaving Somalia after the fighting became difficult.

There was an opposing view, which cautioned against a significant military role. Jack Spence, Policy Analyst of the Heritage Foundation, gave the position of the

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[38] The return of human capital, particularly engineers, businessmen, computer technicians, was seen as essential for sustained economic development. Moreover, Afghanistan has a positive pre-war history of cost recovery for key infrastructure services like electric power, and "green field" investment opportunities in sectors like telecommunications, energy, and oil/gas pipelines

[39] It was safer for an American to disarm a Tajik than for a Pashtun to demand he surrender his weapons. Disarmament required force and military professionalism.

“small footprint” camp and argued that the US should keep its military and economic commitment very low.

Spence argued that this was Afghanistan’s war; it was not America’s war. If U.S. military assumed most of the kinetic or non-kinetic work, Afghans would be less inclined to take responsibility for their country. The historical Afghan allergy to foreign troops would work against U.S. soldiers, no matter how well intentioned the developmental and stabilization plans. Further, soldiers were not developers or social workers. The mission of the Army was to destroy the enemy, and soldiers were not trained to be social workers. Rather, the United States should offer economic and political assistance, but the military effort needed to come from the Afghans.

The argument for a small military presence asserted that that it was not in Washington’s interest to fight the Taliban. The compelling interest for the United States was to rid Afghanistan of al Qaeda. With this mission accomplished, the United States had no interest in significant developmental schemes. Finally, U.S. soldiers were needed elsewhere. With so many forces deployed abroad, what would happen if there were humanitarian disasters at home such as Katrina?

The debate was settled when the United States committed itself to the Bonn Accords, which were discussed in length in chapter three. The counterinsurgency then evolved along lines presented in chapter five. This author contends that, despite the length and cost of the war, the large footprint, dear as it was in human, material, and opportunity costs, was likely the only strategy that would have kept the Taliban at bay.

Had the Taliban reconquered Kabul, it would have bolstered the prestige and draw of both the Taliban and al Qaeda. It would have reinforced the view that the United States was weak and could be defeated, in time, with persistent and lethal attacks. A hasty retreat would have invited attacks by Islamist in South Asia and elsewhere.

Further, it is this author's view that war is the defining characteristic of history. Chapter one discussed the various schools of political philosophy as they relate to the subject of this dissertation. The realist school holds that war is inevitable, and states should prepare for it. In that sense, Afghanistan serves as a test bed for current and future military and developmental tactics. Lessons from this war will help to fight the next war. Perhaps most important, the military-developmental strategy achieved its goal, so far, to promote and maintain national confidence in Afghanistan.

Those Who Disagree

Many observers of the Afghan scene are pessimistic about the ability of Afghanistan's central and provincial governments to withstand the anticipated increase of Taliban attacks in 2015. They have argued that the expense has not been worth the meager rewards, which are, themselves, dubious. These skeptics see the national Afghan government's power as tenuous, its ability to control events outside the capital region as very limited, and the confidence of the Afghans in the national and regional authorities as weak.[40] Among the many critics across the political spectrum, Daniel Pipes, a

[40] Jeremy A. Haugh, "The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War," *Army Lawyer*, HighBeam Research, (October 4, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-3409042801.html

conservative, independent scholar, predicts failure.[41] In 2013, Jeffery Zhao, of the Council on Foreign Relations, concurred, and there are many others.[42]

They, as well as the many others who share their views, may be correct. Time will judge. However, this author has yet to see a socially scientific model that makes the case for these claims. This author has not found, in his extensive review of the literature, a model and data set build on statistically sound principles that make a case for the collapse of national confidence.

History demonstrates, as discussed in chapter two, that most insurgencies fail. Based on the development on the national confidence model and the findings of the ANOVA test, this author is optimistic that Afghanistan will be able to prevent the Taliban from reconquering Kabul for at least two years, baring externalities that could not be calculated in the model.

Finally, this author will conclude his dissertation with the quote he used to begin it. It captures the enduring importance of understanding and measuring war, be they

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[41] "Barack Obama's announcement today that the number of U.S. troops will be reduced to 9,800 by year's end and to zero two years later virtually declares that this war, which will have lasted slightly over 15 years and nearly all of four presidential administrations, will end in total American failure... As I have often predicted, about both Afghanistan and Iraq, it's only a matter of a few more years before the impact of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars devoted to their liberation will disappear with little more than a trace." Source: Daniel Pipes, "The Afghan War's Dismal End: Blame Bush, Too," *National Review Online*, May 28, 2014. https://us-mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/launch

[42] It has been over a decade since the war in Afghanistan first began, and the United States is still feeling consequences from the failures of the counterinsurgency strategy. The eventual failure of these efforts in Afghanistan should serve as a harsh warning to the United States forces that these sorts of military strategies are fundamentally flawed…However, unfortunately, in Afghanistan, this was nearly impossible; the Pashtun population hated U.S. military presence and maintained a very xenophobic attitude towards the soldiers' presence. The assumption that the U.S. military would be able to win over the local populace was fundamentally flawed." Source: Jeffrey Zhao, "Doomed from the Start: Looking Back on Afghanistan, 2001," *Harvard International Review*, 2013, HighBeam Research, (May 29, 2014). http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-346928491.html

large or small wars or distant or local wars or popular or unpopular wars. The words ring as universally true today as they were when they were offered to the world two and one-half millennia ago. They are attributed to Plato. “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”

Appendix A: Results from the Asia Foundations 2008 and 2010 Surveys on Afghanistan

Indicator 1: National Morale

		Much Better	Some-what better	Some-what worse	Much worse	NA
17a	The availability of clean drinking water	46	37	11	4	3
17b	The availability of water for irrigation	36	38	14	6	1
17c	The availability of jobs	35	27	20	13	5
17d	The supply of electricity	36	26	16	17	5
17e	The security situation	45	30	12	9	5
17F	The availability of clinics and hospitals	41	35	14	6	3
17G	The availability of medicine	40	36	15	5	3
17h	The availability of education for children	49	33	11	5	3
17i	Your freedom of movement-the ability to move safely in your area of district	44	34	12	6	5

Table A1: Question 1A, 2008 - What is your expectation for (insert item here) in your area a year from now? Do you expect it to be much better, somewhat better, somewhat worse, or much worse?

Indicator 2A. Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in Citizens' Households

		Better	The same	Worse	Ref	DK
41a	Financial well-being of your household	24	48	28	0	0
41b	Employment opportunities	7	33	59	0	1
41c	Availability of products in the market	13	43	41	0	3
41d	Quality of your food diet	13	39	46	0	2
41e	Physical conditions of your house/dwelling	18	52	27	0	3
41f	Health well-being of your family members	29	50	20	0	1
41g	Electric supply	13	37	49	0	0
41h	Access to schools	44	39	15	0	2

Table A2: Question 2A, 2008 - Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in Citizens' Households

		Better	The same	Worse	Ref	DK
14a	Financial well-being of your household	42	49	9	*	*
14b	Employment opportunities	17	44	38	*	1
14c	Availability of products in the market	27	49	22	*	2
14d	Quality of your food diet	33	50	16	*	1
14e	Physical conditions of your house/dwelling	25	54	20	*	1
14f	Health well-being of your family members	35	46	18	*	1
14g	Electric supply	23	36	40	*	1
14h	Access to schools	42	42	15	*	1

Table A3: Question 2A, 2010 - Economic Prosperity: Measuring Situations in Citizens' Households

Indicator 2B. Economic Prosperity

		Very Good	Quite Good	Quite Bad	Very Bad	DK
16a	The availability of clean drinking water	20%	42%	26%	12%	0
16b	The availability of water for irrigation	11%	36%	32%	17%	4
16c	The availability of jobs	4%	17%	42%	36%	1
16d	The supply of electricity	6%	19%	30%	44%	1
16e	The security situation	21%	41%	22%	15%	1
16f	The availability of clinics and hospitals	12%	39	35% %	14%	0
16g	The availability of medicine	11%	38%	36%	14%	0
16h	The availability of education for children	26%	44%	20%	9%	0
16i	Your freedom of movement-the ability to move safely in your area or district	26%	41%	22%	10%	0

Table A4: Indicator 2B 2008 -Conditions in Villages and Neighborhood

		Very Good	Quite Good	Quite Bad	Very Bad	DK
16a	The availability of clean drinking water	23	40	25	12	
16b	The availability of water for irrigation	14	35	31	16	3
16c	The availability of jobs	5	22	38	34	1
16d	The supply of electricity	15	19	25	41	2
16e	The security situation	26	39	20	13	1
16f	The availability of clinics and hospitals	10	33	38	17	
16g	The availability of medicine	10	33	38	17	1
16h	The availability of education for children	23	45	22	10	1
16i	Your freedom of movement-the ability to move safely in your area or district	24	39	24	12	1

Table A5: Indicator 2B 2010 -Conditions in Villages and Neighborhood

Indicator 3A: National Confidence Indicator Three: Confidence Of Citizens in Institutions, Organizations, and Officials

		A great deal of confi-dence	A fair amount of confi-dence	Not much confi-dence at all	No confi-dence	Re-fused	Don't know
52a	Afghan National Army	46%	43%	7%	3%	0	1%
52b	Afghan National Police	40%	42%	13%	5%	0	1%
52c	Political Parties	8%	35%	33%	17%	0	1
52d	The Government Justice System	8%	38%	33%	16%	0	5%
52e	Government Ministries	11%	40%	28%	16%	0	5%
52f	Independent Election Commission	16%	41%	24%	11%	0	5%
52g	Public administration	13%	42%	27%	10%	0	8%
52h	The Municipality	10%	32%	30%	19%	0	10%
52i	Local militias	10%	26%	25	31%	0	9%
52j	Community Development Councils	19%	46%	19%	9%	0	7%
52k	Provincial Councils	19%	46%	22%	8%	0	6%
52l	Community Shuras/Jirgas	19%	45%	18%	6%	0	6%
52m	National NGOs	16%	46%	23%	9%	0	7%
52n	International NGOs	24%	40%	20%	9%	0	6%
52o	Electronic media such as radio, TV	38%	38%	13%	7%	0	6%
52p	Newspapers, print media	26%	37%	14%	8%	0	15%

Table A6: Q-52 Confidence Officials, Institutions, and Organizations in Afghanistan 2008

		A great deal of confi-dence	A fair amount of confi-dence	Not much confi-dence at all	No confi-dence	Re-fused	Don't know
52a	Afghan National Army	59%	32%	6%	2%		1%
52b	Afghan National Police	41%	38%	15%	6%		
52c	Political Parties	11%	32%	33%	21%		3%
52d	The Government Justice System	11%	38%	33%	17%	2%	
52e	Government Ministries	15%	39%	29%	15%		2%
52f	Independent Election Commission	18%	36%	27%	17%		2%
52g	Public administration	12%	34%	30%	19%		5%
52h	The Municipality	9%	24%	26%	36%	1%	3%
52i	Local militias	18%	43%	25%	11%		3%
52j	Community Development Councils	19%	43%	24%	11%		3%
52k	Provincial Councils	19%	40%	25%	13%		3%
52l	Community Shuras/Jirgas	24%	42%	22%	10%		3%
52m	National NGOs	16%	39%	29%	13%		3%
52n	International NGOs	17%	37%	27%	15%		3%
52o	Electronic media such as radio, TV	33%	37%	19%	8%		2%
52p	Newspapers, print media	21%	36%	23%	12%	1%	6%

Table A7: Q-34 Confidence Officials, Institutions, and Organizations in Afghanistan 2010

Indicator 3B. Confidence of Citizens in National and Provincial Governments

		Very good job	Some-what good job	Some-what bad job	Very bad job	Re-fused	Don't know
37a	National government	16	51	22	8	1	2
37b	Education	36	48	11	4	0	1
37c	Healthcare system	18	48	25	8	0	1
37d	Creating job opportunities	4	20	37	38	0	1
37e	Maintaining relations with neighboring countries	17	45	22	12	0	5
37f	Reviving/Developing the country	6	27	34	30	0	2
37g	Fighting corruption	8	23	30	36	0	2
37h	Security	23	36	22	17	0	1
64b	Provincial government	23	51	16	6	0	4

Table A8: Confidence in Provincial and National Confidence 2008

Indicator 4. Security

		Very good job	Some-what good job	Some-what bad job	Very bad job	Re-fused	Don't know
37a	National government	17	56	20	5		2
37b	Education	38	47	12	3		1
37b	Healthcare system	16	47	28	8		1
37c	Creating job opportunities	7	26	36	31		1
37d	Maintaining relations with neighboring countries	15	42	27	12		2
37e	Reviving/Developing the country	9	34	35	21		1
37f	Fighting corruption	7	22	33	36		1
37g	Security	22	40	23	15		1
38a	Provincial government	23	55	15	4		3

Table A9: Confidence in Provincial and National Confidence 2010

		Strongly agree	Agree some-what	Disagree some what	Strongly disagree	Re fused (vol.)	DK (vol)
Q53a	the ANA honest and fair with the Afghan people	48	41	8	2	0	2
Q53b	Unprofessional and poorly trained	18	37	28	13	0	4
Q53c	The ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	32	37	18	9	0	4
Q53d	The ANA helps improve the security	51	35	9	3	0	2
Q54a	The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people	40	40	13	5	0	1
Q54b	The ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained	22	38	25	12	0	3
Q54c	The ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operative by itself	32	37	19	8	0	3
Q54d	The ANP helps improve security	40	40	12	5	0	2
Q54e	The ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that the can be brought to justice	34	39	16	8	0	4

Table A10: Security Questions about the ANA and the ANP 2008

		Strongly agree	Agree some what	Disagree some what	Strongly disagree	Re fused (vol.)	DK (vol)
35a	Is the ANA honest and fair with the Afghan people	58	34	6	2		1
35b	Unprofessional and poorly trained	18	33	30	17		2
35c	The ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	30	40	21	8		2
35d	The ANA helps improve the security	53	33	10	3		1
36a	The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people	44	40	12	4		1
36b	The ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained	20	38	29	11		1
36c	The ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operative by itself	28	41	21	8		2
36d	The ANP helps improve security	37	40	15	6		1
36e	The ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that the can be brought to justice	30	40	21			2

Table A11 Q35a-Q35d, and Q36a-Q36e. Questions about the ANA and the ANP 2010

Appendix B- ANOVA Results from Factorial Analysis

M8	Year of Interview (2008 vs. 2010)
M4	Region (8 regions)
M6	Geographic Subdivisions (villages, towns, city, or Metro/Kabul)
D1	Gender (male or female)
AGEGRP	Age on last birthday (in single years), grouped into four categories based on data patterns: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-82)
D3	Current Status (working, retired, housewife, student, unemployed)
D10	Ethnic group to which respondent belongs (11 groups)
D6	Highest level of school completed (never went to school, two levels of primary school, two levels of secondary school, high school, university education or above)
D15	Living standard of household (6 categories currently in sequence from high to low, all other variables sequenced from low to high; codes assigned by interviewer on the basis of "impressions from the dwelling of the household, the environment, and the appearance of household members")
HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP	Number of people living at address (grouped into four categories based on data patterns: 2-5, 6-7, 8-10, 11-39)

Reference 1B: Table for Use in this Appendix: SPSS Variable Names of Explanatory Variables Used in Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Tables[1]

[1] * appearing in a table = Interaction of Two or Three Variables Used In Combination; Entries in Boldface represent statistically significant results at p<.05)

Results for Scale 2a- Economic Prosperity

Year of Interview	Region	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Central/Kabul	2.2013	.43084	1107
	Eastern	2.0082	.42014	535
	South East	2.1365	.43839	500
	South Western	2.3497	.34992	677
	Western	2.2122	.35590	652
	North East	2.1284	.42567	885
	Central/Hazarjat	2.1681	.42474	577
	North West	2.0353	.35967	839
	Total	2.1578	.41372	5772
2010	Central/Kabul	1.7908	.43986	1307
	Eastern	1.9171	.39285	532
	South East	1.8977	.36219	617
	South Western	2.1425	.40997	680
	Western	1.9311	.46760	756
	North East	1.9279	.42625	890
	Central/Hazarjat	1.8797	.38068	211
	North West	1.9299	.41998	859
	Total	1.9170	.43245	5852
Total	Central/Kabul	1.9791	.48130	2414
	Eastern	1.9627	.40912	1067
	South East	2.0046	.41528	1117
	South Western	2.2459	.39490	1357
	Western	2.0613	.44227	1408
	North East	2.0279	.43748	1775
	Central/Hazarjat	2.0909	.43247	788
	North West	1.9820	.39477	1698
	Total	2.0366	.44003	11624

Table B1: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview and Region

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	279.358[a]	15	18.624	109.677	.000
Intercept	41136.792	1	41136.792	242256.670	.000
m8	128.209	1	128.209	755.028	.000
m4	**76.604**	**7**	**10.943**	**64.446**	**.000**
m8 * m4	**33.032**	**7**	**4.719**	**27.790**	**.000**
Error	1971.116	11608	.170		
Total	50463.031	11624			
Corrected Total	2250.474	11623			

Table B2: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview and Region

Year of Interview	Region	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
2008	Central/Kabul	2.201	.012	2.177	2.226
	Eastern	2.008	.018	1.973	2.043
	South East	2.137	.018	2.100	2.173
	South Western	2.350	.016	2.319	2.381
	Western	2.212	.016	2.181	2.244
	North East	2.128	.014	2.101	2.156
	Central/Hazarjat	2.168	.017	2.134	2.202
	North West	2.035	.014	2.007	2.063
2010	Central/Kabul	1.791	.011	1.768	1.813
	Eastern	1.917	.018	1.882	1.952
	South East	1.898	.017	1.865	1.930
	South Western	2.142	.016	2.111	2.173
	Western	1.931	.015	1.902	1.960
	North East	1.928	.014	1.901	1.955
	Central/Hazarjat	1.880	.028	1.824	1.935
	North West	1.930	.014	1.902	1.957

Table B3: Means of Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview and Region

Region	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Central/Kabul	2008	2010	.410*	.017	.000	.378	.443
Eastern	2008	2010	.091*	.025	.000	.042	.141
South East	2008	2010	.239*	.025	.000	.190	.287
South Western	2008	2010	.207*	.022	.000	.163	.251
Western	2008	2010	.281*	.022	.000	.238	.324
North East	2008	2010	.200*	.020	.000	.162	.239
Central/Hazarjat	2008	2010	.288*	.033	.000	.223	.353
North West	2008	2010	.105*	.020	.000	.066	.145

Table B4: Differences in Scale 2A Means by Year of Interview and Region

Gender	Geographic Subdivisions / Subdivision	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Male	Villages	2008	2010	.244*	.012	.000	.221	.268
	Towns	2008	2010	.271*	.052	.000	.169	.373
	City	2008	2010	.105*	.047	.024	.014	.196
	Metro (Kabul)	2008	2010	.535*	.033	.000	.470	.599
Female	Villages	2008	2010	.161*	.013	.000	.135	.186
	Towns	2008	2010	.361*	.053	.000	.257	.465
	City	2008	2010	.280*	.046	.000	.190	.371
	Metro (Kabul)	2008	2010	.464*	.033	.000	.400	.528

Table B5: Differences in Scale 2A Means by Year of Interview, Gender and Geographic Subdivisions

Year of Inter-view	Employment Status?	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Working	2.1770	.42020	2335
	Retired	2.3166	.39766	77
	Housewife	2.1330	.40282	2308
	Student	2.0480	.42898	445
	Unemployed	2.2398	.39306	599
	Total	2.1578	.41367	5764
2010	Working	1.9356	.43714	2607
	Retired	1.9219	.46815	48
	Housewife	1.9192	.42977	2278
	Student	1.7983	.39206	401
	Unemployed	1.9052	.43367	518
	Total	1.9170	.43245	5852
Total	Working	2.0497	.44579	4942
	Retired	2.1650	.46598	125
	Housewife	2.0268	.42989	4586
	Student	1.9297	.43015	846
	Unemployed	2.0846	.44473	1117
	Total	2.0365	.44001	11616

Table B6: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview and Current Status

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	188.647	9	20.961	118.083	.000
Intercept	9486.522	1	9486.522	53442.627	.000
m8	46.915	1	46.915	264.298	.000
d3	15.510	4	3.878	21.844	.000
m8 * d3	3.997	4	.999	5.629	.000
Error	2060.164	11606	.178		
Total	50424.797	11616			
Corrected Total	2248.811	11615			

Table B7: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview and Current Status

Employ-ment Status	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Working	2008	2010	.241*	.012	.000	.218	.265
Retired	2008	2010	.395*	.077	.000	.243	.547
House-wife	2008	2010	.214*	.012	.000	.189	.238
Student	2008	2010	.250*	.029	.000	.193	.307
Unemployed	2008	2010	.335*	.025	.000	.285	.384

Table B8: Differences in Scale 2A Means by Year of Interview and Current Status

Year of Interview	Ethnicity	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Pashtun	2.1931	.41304	2423
	Tajik	2.1476	.40912	1950
	Uzbek	2.0530	.39794	583
	Hazara	2.1839	.42063	558
	Turkmen	2.0245	.45773	97
	Baloch	2.1250	.34542	12
	Kirghiz	2.2083	.26021	3
	Nuristani	2.1250	.69597	5
	Aimak	2.0574	.43759	37
	Arab	2.1250	.38041	66
	Sadat	2.1622	.39514	37
	Total	2.1578	.41375	5771
2010	Pashtun	1.9842	.42027	2521
	Tajik	1.8472	.44226	1834
	Uzbek	1.9255	.43102	525
	Hazara	1.8324	.39951	602
	Turkmen	1.8750	.46182	138
	Baloch	2.1724	.41513	29
	Kirghiz	2.1250	.45069	3
	Nuristani	1.9625	.52721	10
	Aimak	1.7874	.44832	87
	Arab	2.0887	.36069	86
	Sadat	1.8529	.25092	17
	Total	1.9170	.43245	5852
Total	Pashtun	2.0866	.42958	4944
	Tajik	2.0020	.45116	3784
	Uzbek	1.9926	.41863	1108
	Hazara	2.0015	.44571	1160
	Turkmen	1.9367	.46504	235
	Baloch	2.1585	.39233	41
	Kirghiz	2.1667	.33229	6
	Nuristani	2.0167	.56865	15
	Aimak	1.8679	.46040	124
	Arab	2.1044	.36858	152
	Sadat	2.0648	.38220	54
	Total	2.0366	.44004	11623

Table B9: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview and Ethnicity

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	211.684[a]	21	10.080	57.359	.000
Intercept	1594.331	1	1594.331	9072.169	.000
m8	3.018	1	3.018	17.174	.000
d10	27.004	10	2.700	15.366	.000
m8 * d10	14.580	10	1.458	8.297	.000
Error	2038.745	11601	.176		
Total	50457.969	11623			
Corrected Total	2250.428	11622			

Table B10: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview and Ethnicity

Ethnic Group	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pashtun	2008	2010	.209*	.012	.000	.185	.232
Tajik	2008	2010	.300*	.014	.000	.274	.327
Uzbek	2008	2010	.127*	.025	.000	.078	.177
Hazara	2008	2010	.351*	.025	.000	.303	.400
Turkmen	2008	2010	.149*	.056	.007	.041	.258
Baloch	2008	2010	-.047	.144	.742	-.329	.235
Kirghiz	2008	2010	.083	.342	.808	-.588	.754
Nuristani	2008	2010	.162	.230	.479	-.288	.613
Aimak	2008	2010	.270*	.082	.001	.109	.431
Arab	2008	2010	.036	.069	.596	-.098	.171
Sadat	2008	2010	.309*	.123	.012	.068	.550

Table B11: Differences in Scale 2A Means by Year of Interview and Ethnicity

Year of Interview	What is the highest level of school you completed?	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Never went to school	2.1767	.40438	3112
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2.1942	.41333	788
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2.1511	.39865	355
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2.1674	.43106	392
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2.1011	.40523	272
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	2.0774	.43198	704
	University education or above	2.0420	.45469	146
	Total	2.1578	.41373	5769
2010	Never went to school	1.9522	.42820	3320
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	1.9296	.43537	520
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	1.9337	.44317	326
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	1.8938	.42631	319
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	1.8384	.42486	239
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	1.8336	.42657	921
	University education or above	1.7871	.43177	202
	Total	1.9169	.43223	5847
Total	Never went to school	2.0608	.43165	6432
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2.0890	.44149	1308
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2.0470	.43407	681
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2.0447	.44975	711
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	1.9782	.43441	511
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	1.9392	.44550	1625
	University education or above	1.8940	.45852	348
	Total	2.0365	.43993	11616

Table B12: Means of Scale 2A Scores by Year of interview and Highest Level of Education Completed

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	193.760[a]	13	14.905	84.182	.000
Intercept	20994.647	1	20994.647	118578.947	.000
m8	80.756	1	80.756	456.113	.000
d6	23.637	6	3.940	22.251	.000
m8 * d6	.921	6	.153	.867	.518
Error	2054.158	11602	.177		
Total	50424.922	11616			
Corrected Total	2247.918	11615			

Table B13: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview and Highest Level of Education Completed

Level of Education	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]
Never went to school	2008	2010	.224*	.010	.000
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2008	2010	.265*	.024	.000
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2008	2010	.217*	.032	.000
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2008	2010	.274*	.032	.000
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2008	2010	.263*	.037	.000
High School (classes 10 to 12)	2008	2010	.244*	.021	.000
University education or above	2008	2010	.255*	.046	.000

Table B14: Differences in Scale 2A Means by Year of Interview, Gender and Geographic Subdivisions

Household Status:	Household Size Grouping	Year of Interview	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
The household is well-off	2-5	2010	1.7925	.53309	50
		Total	1.7925	.53309	50
	6-7	2008	2.1750	.32596	5
		2010	1.8461	.44641	95
		Total	1.8625	.44576	100
	8-10	2008	1.9500	.16771	5
		2010	1.8443	.42403	163
		Total	1.8475	.41883	168
	11-39	2008	2.0208	.45701	6
		2010	1.7708	.42456	180
		Total	1.7789	.42663	186
	Total	2008	2.0469	.33812	16
		2010	1.8122	.44087	488
		Total	1.8197	.43965	504
The household is enjoying a fair well-being	2-5	2008	2.0861	.43038	106
		2010	1.7941	.45290	68
		Total	1.9720	.46073	174
	6-7	2008	2.0560	.42054	201
		2010	1.8603	.50976	153
		Total	1.9714	.47065	354
	8-10	2008	2.0570	.40871	408
		2010	1.8738	.46289	318
		Total	1.9768	.44241	726
	11-39	2008	2.0432	.42923	350
		2010	1.8582	.41151	334
		Total	1.9529	.43043	684
	Total	2008	2.0552	.41952	1065
		2010	1.8592	.45169	873
		Total	1.9669	.44500	1938
Bears indications of moderate existence	2-5	2008	2.2067	.44044	182
		2010	1.8802	.49723	121
		Total	2.0763	.49007	303
	6-7	2008	2.1125	.40061	289
		2010	1.8756	.44407	225
		Total	2.0088	.43594	514
	8-10	2008	2.0936	.40681	601
		2010	1.8675	.44909	452
		Total	1.9966	.43976	1053
	11-39	2008	2.1560	.41952	456

		2010	1.8461	.40245	428
		Total	2.0059	.43934	884
	Total	2008	2.1293	.41499	1528
		2010	1.8628	.43721	1226
		Total	2.0106	.44511	2754
The household is in bad condition/in need of repair	2-5	2008	2.2280	.35980	159
		2010	1.9222	.43369	172
		Total	2.0691	.42761	331
	6-7	2008	2.1836	.39763	307
		2010	1.8984	.38757	320
		Total	2.0381	.41736	627
	8-10	2008	2.1588	.41653	628
		2010	1.9129	.40130	548
		Total	2.0442	.42734	1176
	11-39	2008	2.2023	.39769	456
		2010	1.9114	.42456	481
		Total	2.0530	.43645	937
	Total	2008	2.1836	.40209	1550
		2010	1.9104	.40940	1521
		Total	2.0483	.42805	3071
The household is living with difficulty	2-5	2008	2.2178	.40580	128
		2010	1.9838	.40694	170
		Total	2.0843	.42203	298
	6-7	2008	2.2116	.38292	218
		2010	2.0090	.40856	277
		Total	2.0982	.40964	495
	8-10	2008	2.1853	.40438	419
		2010	1.9823	.40646	439
		Total	2.0814	.41773	858
	11-39	2008	2.1680	.38623	372
		2010	2.0167	.40705	345
		Total	2.0952	.40327	717
	Total	2008	2.1883	.39452	1137
		2010	1.9982	.40697	1231
		Total	2.0895	.41206	2368
The household bears all signs of poverty	2-5	2008	2.3003	.44979	72
		2010	2.0430	.46020	93
		Total	2.1553	.47200	165
	6-7	2008	2.3568	.39667	110
		2010	2.0837	.45391	109
		Total	2.2209	.44663	219
	8-10	2008	2.3612	.40567	181
		2010	2.0414	.42907	169
		Total	2.2068	.44621	350
	11-39	2008	2.2555	.40415	113
		2010	2.1031	.41621	137
		Total	2.1720	.41697	250
	Total	2008	2.3259	.41133	476
		2010	2.0674	.43649	508

		Total	2.1925	.44354	984
Total	2-5	2008	2.2048	.41741	647
		2010	1.9243	.45795	674
		Total	2.0617	.46029	1321
	6-7	2008	2.1649	.40718	1130
		2010	1.9280	.43737	1179
		Total	2.0440	.43906	2309
	8-10	2008	2.1436	.41628	2242
		2010	1.9168	.43021	2089
		Total	2.0342	.43794	4331
	11-39	2008	2.1540	.41223	1753
		2010	1.9070	.42260	1905
		Total	2.0254	.43547	3658
	Total	2008	2.1578	.41372	5772
		2010	1.9167	.43246	5847
		Total	2.0365	.44007	11619

Table B15: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview, Household Living Standard and Household Size

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	235.228[a]	46	5.114	29.371	.000
Intercept	8256.178	1	8256.178	47420.985	.000
d15	40.867	5	8.173	46.945	.000
HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP	.333	3	.111	.637	.591
m8	29.536	1	29.536	169.644	.000
d15 * HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP	1.735	15	.116	.664	.822
d15 * m8	**2.744**	**5**	**.549**	**3.152**	**.008**
HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP * m8	.822	3	.274	1.574	.193
d15 * HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP * m8	2.839	14	.203	1.165	.295
Error	2014.730	11572	.174		
Total	50436.922	11619			
Corrected Total	2249.958	11618			

Table B16: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview, Household Living Standard and Household Size

Living standard of this household	Year of Interview	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
The household is well-off	2008	2.049[a]	.105	1.843	2.254
	2010	1.813	.021	1.771	1.855
The household is enjoying a fair well-being	2008	2.061	.015	2.032	2.089
	2010	1.847	.017	1.813	1.880
Bears indications of moderate existence	2008	2.142	.012	2.119	2.165
	2010	1.867	.014	1.840	1.894
The household is in bad condition/in need of repair	2008	2.193	.012	2.170	2.217
	2010	1.911	.012	1.888	1.934
The household is living with difficulty	2008	2.196	.014	2.169	2.223
	2010	1.998	.013	1.973	2.023
The household bears all signs of poverty	2008	2.318	.020	2.279	2.358
	2010	2.068	.019	2.031	2.105

Table B17: Means and Standard Errors for Scale 2A Scores by Year of Interview and Household Living Standard

Household living standard of this household •	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[d]
The household is well-off	2008	2010	.235*	.107	.028
The household is enjoying a fair well-being	2008	2010	.214*	.023	.000
Bears indications of moderate existence	2008	2010	.275*	.018	.000
The household is in bad condition/in need of repair	2008	2010	.282*	.017	.000
The household is living with difficulty	2008	2010	.198*	.019	.000
The household bears all signs poverty	2008	2010	.251*	.028	.000

Table B18: Differences in Scale 2A Means by Year of Interview and Household Living Standard

Scale 3A -Confidence of Citizens in Institutions, Organizations, and Officials

Year of Interview	Region	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Central/Kabul	2.1865	.48845	779
	Eastern	2.3375	.46017	442
	South East	2.3696	.57799	288
	South Western	2.6515	.55522	600
	Western	2.2514	.45540	390
	North East	2.0590	.49530	627
	Central/Hazarjat	2.2223	.57218	401
	North West	2.0683	.35799	526
	Total	2.2595	.53031	4053
2010	Central/Kabul	2.3318	.57823	1061
	Eastern	2.2059	.49709	489
	South East	2.3937	.51896	536
	South Western	2.6459	.57694	555
	Western	2.3795	.55719	569
	North East	2.2808	.41315	823
	Central/Hazarjat	2.1008	.49863	137
	North West	2.1572	.49798	778
	Total	2.3244	.54053	4948
Total	Central/Kabul	2.2703	.54663	1840
	Eastern	2.2684	.48415	931
	South East	2.3852	.54010	824
	South Western	2.6488	.56552	1155
	Western	2.3274	.52177	959
	North East	2.1849	.46357	1450
	Central/Hazarjat	2.1913	.55645	538
	North West	2.1214	.44879	1304
	Total	2.2952	.53690	9001

Table B19: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3A Scores by Year of Interview and Region

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	255.668[a]	15	17.045	65.484	.000
Intercept	37872.444	1	37872.444	145504.236	.000
m8	3.445	1	3.445	13.237	.000
m4	223.984	7	31.998	122.934	.000
m8 * m4	26.801	7	3.829	14.710	.000
Error	2338.653	8985	.260		
Total	50012.074	9001			
Corrected Total	2594.321	9000			

Table B20: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3A Scores by Year of Interview and Region

Region	(I) Year	(J) Year	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.b
Central/Kabul	2008	2010	-.145*	.024	.000
Eastern	2008	2010	.132*	.033	.000
South East	2008	2010	-.024	.037	.518
South Western	2008	2010	.006	.030	.854
Western	2008	2010	-.128*	.034	.000
North East	2008	2010	-.222*	.027	.000
Central/ Hazarjat	2008	2010	.121*	.050	.016
North West	2008	2010	-.089*	.029	.002

Table B21: Differences in Scale 2A Means by Year of Interview and Region

Employment Status		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Working	Contrast	9.611	1	9.611	33.598	.000	.004
	Error	2570.490	8986	.286			
Retired	Contrast	1.067	1	1.067	3.729	.053	.000
	Error	2570.490	8986	.286			
Housewife	Contrast	.753	1	.753	2.633	.105	.000
	Error	2570.490	8986	.286			
Student	Contrast	2.569	1	2.569	8.982	.003	.001
	Error	2570.490	8986	.286			
Unemployed	Contrast	.087	1	.087	.304	.582	.000
	Error	2570.490	8986	.286			

Table B22: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3A Scores by Year of Interview and Current Status

Employment Status	(I) Year	(J) Year	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Working	2008	2010	-.099*	.017	.000	-.133	-.066
Retired	2008	2010	.218	.113	.053	-.003	.439
Housewife	2008	2010	-.030	.019	.105	-.066	.006
Student	2008	2010	-.122*	.041	.003	-.202	-.042
Unemployed	2008	2010	-.020	.036	.582	-.091	.051

Table B23: Differences in Scale 3A Means by Year of Interview and Current Status

Year	Ethnicity	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Pashtun	2.4115	.52896	1841
	Tajik	2.1470	.50490	1276
	Uzbek	2.0985	.45921	401
	Hazara	2.0948	.49396	358
	Turkmen	2.3055	.61014	71
	Baloch	2.0234	.31682	8
	Kirghiz	1.3125	.	1
	Nuristani	1.5833	.62915	3
	Aimak	2.1901	.32891	24
	Arab	1.9815	.49865	44
	Sadat	2.3575	.28213	25
	Total	2.2594	.53033	4052
2010	Pashtun	2.4223	.57097	2160
	Tajik	2.2801	.52176	1500
	Uzbek	2.1598	.44898	478
	Hazara	2.2300	.50575	453
	Turkmen	2.3327	.45552	130
	Baloch	2.4213	.56239	27
	Kirghiz	2.4167	.32073	3
	Nuristani	2.1429	.73661	7
	Aimak	2.1368	.41317	85
	Arab	2.2578	.48596	88
	Sadat	2.0809	.42203	17
	Total	2.3244	.54053	4948
Total	Pashtun	2.4173	.55199	4001
	Tajik	2.2190	.51825	2776
	Uzbek	2.1318	.45445	879
	Hazara	2.1703	.50476	811
	Turkmen	2.3231	.51410	201
	Baloch	2.3304	.53969	35
	Kirghiz	2.1406	.61104	4
	Nuristani	1.9750	.72301	10
	Aimak	2.1485	.39536	109
	Arab	2.1657	.50551	132
	Sadat	2.2455	.36740	42
	Total	2.2952	.53691	9000

Table B24: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3A Scores by Ethnicity

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	140.331[a]	21	6.682	24.449	000
Intercept	1024.540	1	1024.540	3748.547	.000
m8	2.575	1	2.575	9.419	.002
d10	122.805	10	12.281	44.932	.000
m8 * d10	11.898	10	1.190	4.353	.000
Error	2453.836	8978	.273		
Total	50004.852	9000			
Corrected Total	2594.168	8999			

Table B25: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3A Scores by Year of Interview and Ethnicity

Ethnicity	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Differ-ence (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pashtun	2008	2010	-.011	.017	.517	-.043	.022
Tajik	2008	2010	-.133*	.020	.000	-.172	-.094
Uzbek	2008	2010	-.061	.035	.084	-.131	.008
Hazara	2008	2010	-.135*	.037	.000	-.208	-.063
Turkmen	2008	2010	-.027	.077	.724	-.178	.124
Baloch	2008	2010	-.398	.210	.059	-.810	.015
Kirghiz	2008	2010	-1.104	.604	.067	-2.288	.079
Nuristani	2008	2010	-.560	.361	.121	-1.267	.148
Aimak	2008	2010	.053	.121	.659	-.184	.290
Arab	2008	2010	-.276*	.097	.004	-.465	-.087
Sadat	2008	2010	.277	.164	.092	-.046	.599

Table B26: Differences in Scale 3A Means by Year of Interview and Ethnicity

Year of Interview	What is the highest level of school you completed?	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Never went to school	2.3020	.54713	2123
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2.2205	.53639	563
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2.2454	.47246	256
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2.2299	.48533	277
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2.2855	.51870	185
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	2.1514	.49903	528
	University education or above	2.2230	.48944	118
	Total	2.2595	.53040	4050
2010	Never went to school	2.3205	.54791	2742
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2.3147	.55539	436
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2.3925	.52189	282
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2.3775	.55695	275
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2.3597	.50058	217
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	2.3024	.51586	825
	University education or above	2.2702	.54258	167
	Total	2.3243	.54053	4944
Total	Never went to school	2.3124	.54759	4865
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2.2616	.54649	999
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2.3225	.50391	538
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2.3034	.52697	552
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2.3256	.50971	402
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	2.2435	.51448	1353
	University education or above	2.2507	.52087	285
	Total	2.2951	.53693	8994

Table B27: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3A Scores by Year of Interview and Highest Level of Schooling Completed

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	24.112[a]	13	1.855	6.485	.000
Intercept	21694.435	1	21694.435	75848.726	.000
m8	9.796	1	9.796	34.249	.000
d6	9.223	6	1.537	5.374	.000
m8 * d6	**7.060**	**6**	**1.177**	**4.114**	**.000**
Error	2568.481	8980	.286		
Total	49967.750	8994			
Corrected Total	2592.593	8993			

Table B28: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3A Scores by Year of Interview and Highest Level of School Completed

Level of school	Year of Inter-view	Year of Inter-view	Mean Difference	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Never went to school	2008	2010	-.018	.015	.233	-.049	.012
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2008	2010	-.094*	.034	.006	-.161	-.027
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2008	2010	-.147*	.046	.001	-.238	-.057
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2008	2010	-.148*	.046	.001	-.237	-.058
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2008	2010	-.074	.054	.165	-.179	.031
High School (classes 10 to 12)	2008	2010	-.151*	.030	.000	-.209	-.093
University education or above	2008	2010	-.047	.064	.463	-.173	.079

Table B29: Differences in Scale 3A Means by Year of Interview and Highest Level of Schooling Completed

Living standard of this household	Household Size Grouping	Year of Interview	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
The household is well-off	2-5	2010	2.0057	.45924	44
		Total	2.0057	.45924	44
	6-7	2008	2.1458	.63225	3
		2010	2.0765	.47287	76
		Total	2.0791	.47480	79
	8-10	2008	1.8625	.09270	5
		2010	2.1731	.54039	143
		Total	2.1626	.53431	148
	11-39	2008	2.6458	.29536	3
		2010	2.1856	.56910	164
		Total	2.1939	.56819	167
	Total	2008	2.1534	.46466	11
		2010	2.1434	.53447	427
		Total	2.1437	.53236	438
The household is enjoying a fair well-being	2-5	2008	2.1453	.63562	74
		2010	2.3403	.59397	63
		Total	2.2349	.62226	137
	6-7	2008	2.1454	.47346	147
		2010	2.3551	.56424	135
		Total	2.2458	.52849	282
	8-10	2008	2.1961	.50748	305
		2010	2.3170	.54445	275
		Total	2.2534	.52834	580
	11-39	2008	2.2147	.55585	260
		2010	2.2808	.55829	294
		Total	2.2498	.55763	554
	Total	2008	2.1880	.53076	786
		2010	2.3118	.55703	767
		Total	2.2491	.54723	1553
Bears indications of moderate existence	2-5	2008	2.2952	.59571	134
		2010	2.4120	.53696	103
		Total	2.3460	.57269	237
	6-7	2008	2.2146	.50813	189
		2010	2.3685	.49332	203
		Total	2.2943	.50577	392
	8-10	2008	2.2536	.51625	437
		2010	2.3904	.54626	403
		Total	2.3192	.53493	840
	11-39	2008	2.2620	.46067	324
		2010	2.2704	.58305	364
		Total	2.2664	.52860	688
	Total	2008	2.2544	.50940	1084
		2010	2.3476	.55090	1073
		Total	2.3008	.53237	2157
	2-5	2008	2.1776	.40694	101

The household is in bad condition/in need of repair		2010	2.2557	.52450	153
		Total	2.2247	.48187	254
	6-7	2008	2.2778	.52313	191
		2010	2.2960	.50876	272
		Total	2.2885	.51425	463
	8-10	2008	2.3013	.52034	408
		2010	2.3499	.48857	469
		Total	2.3273	.50389	877
	11-39	2008	2.3260	.56313	343
		2010	2.3426	.52929	396
		Total	2.3349	.54495	739
	Total	2008	2.2931	.52664	1043
		2010	2.3251	.51034	1290
		Total	2.3108	.51782	2333
The household is living with difficulty	2-5	2008	2.1014	.54467	90
		2010	2.3276	.50939	141
		Total	2.2394	.53382	231
	6-7	2008	2.2664	.54682	149
		2010	2.3526	.52550	226
		Total	2.3183	.53501	375
	8-10	2008	2.2475	.49482	272
		2010	2.3776	.53996	338
		Total	2.3196	.52391	610
	11-39	2008	2.3114	.50549	279
		2010	2.4101	.56679	269
		Total	2.3598	.53823	548
	Total	2008	2.2570	.51724	790
		2010	2.3735	.53985	974
		Total	2.3213	.53286	1764
The household bears all signs of poverty	2-5	2008	2.2292	.71736	42
		2010	2.3606	.63681	78
		Total	2.3146	.66608	120
	6-7	2008	2.3438	.66561	80
		2010	2.3517	.61204	83
		Total	2.3478	.63692	163
	8-10	2008	2.4170	.58231	131
		2010	2.2999	.51595	139
		Total	2.3567	.55125	270
	11-39	2008	2.3045	.54829	86
		2010	2.4264	.46127	113
		Total	2.3737	.50307	199
	Total	2008	2.3479	.61325	339
		2010	2.3564	.54752	413
		Total	2.3526	.57770	752
Total	2-5	2008	2.1973	.57039	441
		2010	2.3051	.54977	582
		Total	2.2586	.56102	1023
	6-7	2008	2.2406	.53384	759

	2010	2.3195	.52810	995
	Total	2.2854	.53188	1754
8-10	2008	2.2662	.52006	1558
	2010	2.3411	.52956	1767
	Total	2.3060	.52638	3325
11-39	2008	2.2838	.52484	1295
	2010	2.3160	.55698	1600
	Total	2.3016	.54298	2895
Total	2008	2.2595	.53031	4053
	2010	2.3244	.54067	4944
	Total	2.2952	.53697	8997

Table B30: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3A Scores by Year of Interview, Household Living Standard and Household Size

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	52.092[a]	46	1.132	3.987	.000
Intercept	6960.000	1	6960.000	24507.350	.000
d15	5.137	5	1.027	3.618	.003
HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP	3.661	3	1.220	4.297	.005
m8	1.623	1	1.623	5.716	.017
d15 * HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP	**8.050**	**15**	**.537**	**1.890**	**.020**
d15 * m8	**3.560**	**5**	**.712**	**2.507**	**.028**
HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP * m8	2.023	3	.674	2.374	.068
d15 * HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP * m8	5.337	14	.381	1.342	.173
Error	2541.768	8950	.284		
Total	49988.789	8997			
Corrected Total	2593.860	8996			

Table B31: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3A Scores by Year of Interview, Household Living Standard and Household Size

RESULTS FOR SCALE 3B-CONFIDENCE OF CITIZENS IN NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

Year of Interview	Region	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Central/Kabul	2.4974	.53287	1056
	Eastern	2.2292	.47363	506
	South East	2.5526	.55622	483
	South Western	2.5966	.57061	660
	Western	2.6546	.53195	581
	North East	2.2673	.56058	766
	Central/Hazarjat	2.4463	.50924	543
	North West	2.2396	.49213	829
	Total	2.4292	.55205	5424
2010	Central/Kabul	2.4067	.52394	1244
	Eastern	2.2311	.48236	477
	South East	2.4725	.53971	603
	South Western	2.5685	.65162	663
	Western	2.4219	.50537	701
	North East	2.3892	.48810	853
	Central/Hazarjat	2.4759	.47483	173
	North West	2.1865	.44930	783
	Total	2.3882	.53257	5497
Total	Central/Kabul	2.4483	.52988	2300
	Eastern	2.2301	.47764	983
	South East	2.5081	.54831	1086
	South Western	2.5825	.61247	1323
	Western	2.5274	.53020	1282
	North East	2.3315	.52701	1619
	Central/Hazarjat	2.4534	.50098	716
	North West	2.2138	.47242	1612
	Total	2.4086	.54269	10921

Table B33: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview and Region

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	207.136[a]	15	13.809	50.046	.000
Intercept	52734.268	1	52734.268	191116.839	.000
m8	3.883	1	3.883	14.072	.000
m4	181.996	7	25.999	94.226	.000
m8 * m4	25.337	7	3.620	13.118	.000
Error	3008.982	10905	.276		
Total	66571.160	10921			
Corrected Total	3216.118	10920			

Table B34: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview and Region

Region	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]
Central/Kabul	2008	2010	.091*	.022	.000
Eastern	2008	2010	-.002	.034	.957
South East	2008	2010	.080*	.032	.013
South Western	2008	2010	.028	.029	.329
Western	2008	2010	.233*	.029	.000
North East	2008	2010	-.122*	.026	.000
Central/ Hazarjat	2008	2010	-.030	.046	.518
North West	2008	2010	.053*	.026	.042

Table B35: Differences in Scale 3B Means by Year of Interview and Region

Year of Inter-view	Geographic Code/ Subdivision	Gender	Age Grouping	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Villages	Male	18-24	2.4845	.53301	541
			25-34	2.4846	.54852	631
			35-44	2.5253	.53279	492
			45-82	2.5457	.51057	554
			Total	2.5089	.53226	2218
		Female	18-24	2.3312	.55046	527
			25-34	2.3326	.53860	598
			35-44	2.3777	.56146	443
			45-82	2.3636	.55581	411
			Total	2.3488	.55046	1979
		Total	18-24	2.4089	.54684	1068
			25-34	2.4106	.54878	1229
			35-44	2.4554	.55122	935
			45-82	2.4682	.53763	965
			Total	2.4334	.54673	4197
	Towns	Male	18-24	2.3542	.49081	32
			25-34	2.2256	.52373	33
			35-44	2.4744	.52733	26
			45-82	2.4563	.55871	28
			Total	2.3688	.52733	119
		Female	18-24	2.3264	.49685	32
			25-34	2.2387	.53616	27
			35-44	2.2500	.45942	32
			45-82	2.1162	.47819	22
			Total	2.2429	.49145	113
		Total	18-24	2.3403	.49010	64
			25-34	2.2315	.52487	60
			35-44	2.3506	.49943	58
			45-82	2.3067	.54690	50
			Total	2.3075	.51296	232
	City	Male	18-24	2.3704	.52571	39
			25-34	2.2660	.59508	33
			35-44	2.1762	.59834	41
			45-82	2.3463	.60239	60
			Total	2.2961	.58344	173
		Female	18-24	2.2727	.54193	44
			25-34	2.1836	.49923	46
			35-44	2.3538	.47272	38
			45-82	2.1667	.42239	32
			Total	2.2451	.49205	160

		Total	18-24	2.3186	.53337	83
			25-34	2.2180	.53920	79
			35-44	2.2616	.54550	79
			45-82	2.2838	.55086	92
			Total	2.2716	.54126	333
	Metro (Kabul)	Male	18-24	2.5181	.55856	89
			25-34	2.4930	.55625	87
			35-44	2.5860	.51419	62
			45-82	2.5456	.46824	100
			Total	2.5322	.52319	338
		Female	18-24	2.5312	.55779	73
			25-34	2.4967	.68859	117
			35-44	2.4868	.61556	76
			45-82	2.5785	.65081	58
			Total	2.5168	.63518	324
		Total	18-24	2.5240	.55652	162
			25-34	2.4951	.63406	204
			35-44	2.5314	.57237	138
			45-82	2.5577	.54063	158
			Total	2.5247	.58032	662
	Total	Male	18-24	2.4765	.53445	701
			25-34	2.4654	.55338	784
			35-44	2.5062	.54157	621
			45-82	2.5262	.51696	742
			Total	2.4929	.53711	2848
		Female	18-24	2.3488	.55099	676
			25-34	2.3450	.56493	788
			35-44	2.3833	.55939	589
			45-82	2.3650	.56460	523
			Total	2.3588	.55985	2576
		Total	18-24	2.4138	.54618	1377
			25-34	2.4051	.56225	1572
			35-44	2.4464	.55351	1210
			45-82	2.4596	.54279	1265
			Total	2.4292	.55205	5424
2010	Villages	Male	18-24	2.4012	.51502	540
			25-34	2.4829	.55616	694
			35-44	2.3996	.57178	575
			45-82	2.4001	.55412	711
			Total	2.4230	.55159	2520
		Female	18-24	2.3548	.49823	534
			25-34	2.3094	.52917	501
			35-44	2.3830	.53865	414
			45-82	2.4414	.55403	331
			Total	2.3647	.52862	1780
		Total	18-24	2.3781	.50704	1074

		25-34	2.4101	.55147	1195
		35-44	2.3927	.55794	989
		45-82	2.4132	.55416	1042
		Total	2.3989	.54290	4300
Towns	Male	18-24	2.2472	.51963	40
		25-34	2.2533	.51071	25
		35-44	2.1818	.47371	33
		45-82	2.2904	.43413	44
		Total	2.2465	.47861	142
	Female	18-24	2.3191	.55508	39
		25-34	2.5118	.59637	33
		35-44	2.4028	.62968	16
		45-82	2.4316	.51862	26
		Total	2.4123	.56785	114
	Total	18-24	2.2827	.53518	79
		25-34	2.4004	.57110	58
		35-44	2.2540	.53335	49
		45-82	2.3429	.46864	70
		Total	2.3203	.52571	256
City	Male	18-24	2.4587	.46319	39
		25-34	2.4074	.39435	39
		35-44	2.4481	.39309	30
		45-82	2.3816	.44423	46
		Total	2.4206	.42457	154
	Female	18-24	2.3042	.37464	42
		25-34	2.3164	.49467	46
		35-44	2.2763	.47040	37
		45-82	2.2982	.37047	19
		Total	2.3002	.43642	144
	Total	18-24	2.3786	.42411	81
		25-34	2.3582	.45113	85
		35-44	2.3532	.44273	67
		45-82	2.3573	.42287	65
		Total	2.3624	.43382	298
Metro (Kabul)	Male	18-24	2.3989	.45208	117
		25-34	2.3384	.52783	66
		35-44	2.4422	.51703	50
		45-82	2.4458	.54778	83
		Total	2.4054	.50403	316
	Female	18-24	2.2703	.48522	74
		25-34	2.3152	.44228	110
		35-44	2.3376	.57119	78
		45-82	2.3043	.52274	65
		Total	2.3082	.49938	327
	Total	18-24	2.3490	.46817	191
		25-34	2.3239	.47481	176
		35-44	2.3785	.55098	128
		45-82	2.3836	.53973	148
		Total	2.3560	.50364	643

	Total	Male	18-24	2.3955	.50361	736
			25-34	2.4608	.54800	824
			35-44	2.3944	.55829	688
			45-82	2.3979	.54296	884
			Total	2.4131	.53927	3132
		Female	18-24	2.3406	.49343	689
			25-34	2.3205	.51817	690
			35-44	2.3698	.54124	545
			45-82	2.4145	.54203	441
			Total	2.3552	.52185	2365
		Total	18-24	2.3690	.49929	1425
			25-34	2.3968	.53899	1514
			35-44	2.3835	.55073	1233
			45-82	2.4034	.54250	1325
			Total	2.3882	.53257	5497
Total	Villages	Male	18-24	2.4429	.52551	1081
			25-34	2.4837	.55233	1325
			35-44	2.4576	.55742	1067
			45-82	2.4639	.54014	1265
			Total	2.4632	.54426	4738
		Female	18-24	2.3431	.52471	1061
			25-34	2.3220	.53420	1099
			35-44	2.3803	.55025	857
			45-82	2.3983	.55599	742
			Total	2.3563	.54021	3759
		Total	18-24	2.3935	.52736	2142
			25-34	2.4104	.55000	2424
			35-44	2.4231	.55542	1924
			45-82	2.4396	.54683	2007
			Total	2.4159	.54503	8497
	Towns	Male	18-24	2.2948	.50632	72
			25-34	2.2375	.51381	58
			35-44	2.3107	.51490	59
			45-82	2.3549	.48937	72
			Total	2.3023	.50414	261
		Female	18-24	2.3224	.52593	71
			25-34	2.3889	.58168	60
			35-44	2.3009	.52063	48
			45-82	2.2870	.52006	48
			Total	2.3279	.53678	227
		Total	18-24	2.3085	.51451	143
			25-34	2.3145	.55228	118
			35-44	2.3063	.51505	107
			45-82	2.3278	.50082	120
			Total	2.3142	.51920	488
	City	Male	18-24	2.4145	.49421	78

		25-34	2.3426	.49787	72
		35-44	2.2911	.53563	71
		45-82	2.3616	.53739	106
		Total	2.3547	.51776	327
	Female	18-24	2.2881	.46532	86
		25-34	2.2500	.49871	92
		35-44	2.3156	.47000	75
		45-82	2.2157	.40516	51
		Total	2.2712	.46658	304
	Total	18-24	2.3482	.48197	164
		25-34	2.2907	.49894	164
		35-44	2.3037	.50139	146
		45-82	2.3142	.50169	157
		Total	2.3145	.49514	631
Metro (Kabul)	Male	18-24	2.4504	.50307	206
		25-34	2.4263	.54782	153
		35-44	2.5218	.51813	112
		45-82	2.5003	.50689	183
		Total	2.4709	.51753	654
	Female	18-24	2.3998	.53693	147
		25-34	2.4087	.58820	227
		35-44	2.4113	.59628	154
		45-82	2.4336	.60011	123
		Total	2.4120	.58005	651
	Total	18-24	2.4293	.51729	353
		25-34	2.4158	.57162	380
		35-44	2.4578	.56632	266
		45-82	2.4735	.54630	306
		Total	2.4415	.55019	1305
Total	Male	18-24	2.4350	.52028	1437
		25-34	2.4630	.55046	1608
		35-44	2.4474	.55304	1309
		45-82	2.4565	.53492	1626
		Total	2.4511	.53967	5980
	Female	18-24	2.3446	.52255	1365
		25-34	2.3336	.54355	1478
		35-44	2.3768	.55054	1134
		45-82	2.3876	.55465	964
		Total	2.3571	.54194	4941
	Total	18-24	2.3910	.52325	2802
		25-34	2.4010	.55089	3086
		35-44	2.4147	.55289	2443
		45-82	2.4308	.54326	2590
		Total	2.4086	.54269	10921

Table B36: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview, Geographic Subdivision, Gender and Age Group

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	73.292[a]	54	1.357	4.693	.000
Intercept	19002.443	1	19002.443	65699.003	.000
m8	.378	1	.378	1.307	.253
m6	11.327	3	3.776	13.054	.000
d1	2.902	1	2.902	10.033	.002
AGEGRP	.362	3	.121	.417	.741
m8 * m6	7.958	3	2.653	9.172	.000
m8 * d1	.844	1	.844	2.919	.088
m8 * AGEGRP	1.055	3	.352	1.215	.302
m6 * d1	1.872	3	.624	2.158	.091
m6 * AGEGRP	.980	9	.109	.376	.947
d1 * AGEGRP	.406	3	.135	.468	.705
m8 * m6 * d1	4.801	3	1.600	5.534	.001
m8 * m6 * AGEGRP	1.052	9	.117	.404	.934
m8 * d1 * AGEGRP	3.117	3	1.039	3.592	.013
m6 * d1 * AGEGRP	2.999	9	.333	1.152	.322
Error	3142.826	10866	.289		
Total	66571.160	10921			
Corrected Total	3216.118	10920			

Table B37: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview, Geographic Subdivision, Gender and Age Grouping

Year of Interview	Employment Status	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Working	2.4807	.53931	2215
	Retired	2.5263	.53159	76
	Housewife	2.3750	.55628	2154
	Student	2.3304	.52564	419
	Unemployed	2.4973	.57808	553
	Total	2.4293	.55211	5417
2010	Working	2.4059	.54866	2511
	Retired	2.3073	.50399	47
	Housewife	2.3693	.52234	2086
	Student	2.3396	.46731	390
	Unemployed	2.4267	.53916	463
	Total	2.3882	.53257	5497
Total	Working	2.4409	.54552	4726
	Retired	2.4426	.53001	123
	Housewife	2.3722	.53979	4240
	Student	2.3348	.49808	809
	Unemployed	2.4651	.56151	1016
	Total	2.4086	.54272	10914

Table B38: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview and Current Status

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	27.636[a]	9	3.071	10.507	.000
Intercept	12820.618	1	12820.618	43868.112	.000
m8	2.884	1	2.884	9.868	.002
d3	18.557	4	4.639	15.874	.000
m8 * d3	4.305	4	1.076	3.682	.005
Error	3186.734	10904	.292		
Total	66531.877	10914			
Corrected Total	3214.371	10913			

Table B39: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview and Current Status

Employment Status	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Working	2008	2010	.075*	.016	.000	.044	.106
Retired	2008	2010	.219*	.100	.029	.022	.416
Housewife	2008	2010	.006	.017	.733	-.027	.038
Student	2008	2010	-.009	.038	.809	-.084	.065
Unemployed	2008	2010	.071*	.034	.038	.004	.137

Table B40: Differences in Scale 3B Means by Year of Interview and Current Status

Year of Interview	Ethnic Group	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Pashtun	2.4989	.54839	2317
	Tajik	2.4018	.56568	1826
	Uzbek	2.2409	.48525	535
	Hazara	2.4011	.49057	503
	Turkmen	2.4871	.65421	99
	Baloch	2.2685	.28212	12
	Kirghiz	2.7222	.37952	4
	Nuristani	2.3148	.85322	6
	Aimak	2.3401	.44003	33
	Arab	2.4505	.73093	55
	Sadat	2.4276	.55146	33
	Total	2.4291	.55199	5423
2010	Pashtun	2.4479	.58479	2417
	Tajik	2.3420	.48461	1703
	Uzbek	2.2270	.44054	487
	Hazara	2.4333	.49178	548
	Turkmen	2.4409	.43834	125
	Baloch	2.4573	.49324	26
	Kirghiz	2.6111	.07857	2
	Nuristani	1.7778	.59490	7
	Aimak	2.2958	.53280	74
	Arab	2.3053	.48788	91
	Sadat	2.2745	.29948	17
	Total	2.3882	.53257	5497
Total	Pashtun	2.4729	.56778	4734
	Tajik	2.3730	.52889	3529
	Uzbek	2.2343	.46431	1022
	Hazara	2.4179	.49123	1051
	Turkmen	2.4613	.54356	224
	Baloch	2.3977	.44266	38
	Kirghiz	2.6852	.30157	6
	Nuristani	2.0256	.74695	13
	Aimak	2.3094	.50436	107
	Arab	2.3600	.59304	146
	Sadat	2.3756	.48296	50
	Total	2.4085	.54266	10920

Table B41: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3B Scores by Ethnicity

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	68.565[a]	21	3.265	11.307	.000
Intercept	1984.571	1	1984.571	6872.768	.000
m8	.646	1	.646	2.236	.135
d10	59.618	10	5.962	20.646	.000
m8 * d10	3.752	10	.375	1.299	.224
Error	3146.891	10898	.289		
Total	66560.778	10920			
Corrected Total	3215.456	10919			

Table B42: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3A Scores by Year of Interview and

Ethnicity	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pashtun	2008	2010	.051*	.016	.001	.020	.082
Tajik	2008	2010	.060*	.018	.001	.024	.095
Uzbek	2008	2010	.014	.034	.680	-.052	.080
Hazara	2008	2010	-.032	.033	.333	-.097	.033
Turkmen	2008	2010	.046	.072	.523	-.096	.188
Baloch	2008	2010	-.189	.188	.314	-.556	.179
Kirghiz	2008	2010	.111	.465	.811	-.801	1.023
Nuristani	2008	2010	.537	.299	.072	-.049	1.123
Aimak	2008	2010	.044	.112	.694	-.176	.265
Arab	2008	2010	.145	.092	.114	-.035	.325
Sadat	2008	2010	.153	.160	.340	-.161	.468

Based on estimated marginal means
*. The mean difference is significant
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Sidak.

Table B43: Differences in Scale 3B Means by Year of Interview and Ethnicity

Year of Interview	What is the highest level of school you completed?	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Never went to school	2.4372	.55562	2926
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2.4293	.54010	728
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2.4267	.54166	326
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2.4438	.54283	365
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2.4267	.56111	251
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	2.3990	.54913	679
	University education or above	2.4074	.57413	144
	Total	2.4299	.55167	5419
2010	Never went to school	2.3917	.53359	3066
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2.4045	.57316	492
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2.4027	.57618	306
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2.4183	.52020	315
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2.3274	.50898	224
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	2.3781	.50094	893
	University education or above	2.3220	.51529	196
	Total	2.3877	.53231	5492
Total	Never went to school	2.4139	.54489	5992
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2.4193	.55357	1220
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2.4151	.55833	632
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2.4320	.53223	680
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2.3799	.53889	475
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	2.3871	.52223	1572
	University education or above	2.3582	.54182	340
	Total	2.4086	.54240	10911

Table B44: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3b Scores by Year of Interview and Highest Level of Schooling Completed

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	8.105[a]	13	.623	2.122	.010	.003
Intercept	28670.962	1	28670.962	97586.577	.000	.900
m8	2.687	1	2.687	9.146	.002	.001
d6	2.381	6	.397	1.351	.231	.001
m8 * d6	.916	6	.153	.519	.794	.000
Error	3201.541	10897	.294			
Total	66509.765	10911				
Corrected Total	3209.646	10910				

a.R Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = .001)

Table B45 ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview and Highest Level of School Completed

Level of Education	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Never went to school	2008	2010	.045*	.014	.001	.018	.073
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2008	2010	.025	.032	.432	-.037	.087
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2008	2010	.024	.043	.577	-.061	.109
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2008	2010	.025	.042	.541	-.056	.107
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2008	2010	.099*	.050	.046	.002	.197
High School (classes 10 to 12)	2008	2010	.021	.028	.450	-.033	.075
University education or above	2008	2010	.085	.059	.151	-.031	.202

Based on estimated marginal means

*. The mean difference is significant

b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Sidak.

Table B46: Differences in Scale 3B Means by Year of Interview and Highest Level of Schooling Completed

Living standard of this household	Household Size Grouping	Year of Interview	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
The household is well-off	2-5	2010	2.1300	.48616	47
		Total	2.1300	.48616	47
	6-7	2008	2.4000	.32011	5
		2010	2.2405	.48154	85
		Total	2.2494	.47414	90
	8-10	2008	2.1667	.11111	4
		2010	2.2077	.50400	153
		Total	2.2067	.49777	157
	11-39	2008	2.3333	.47140	2
		2010	2.2209	.56502	171
		Total	2.2222	.56300	173
	Total	2008	2.3030	.28149	11
		2010	2.2108	.52127	456
		Total	2.2129	.51691	467
The household is enjoying a fair well-being	2-5	2008	2.3059	.54301	93
		2010	2.4360	.54444	66
		Total	2.3599	.54569	159
	6-7	2008	2.3108	.55077	187
		2010	2.3671	.57868	148
		Total	2.3357	.56312	335
	8-10	2008	2.3229	.54927	382
		2010	2.3422	.52108	302
		Total	2.3314	.53670	684
	11-39	2008	2.2979	.55954	332
		2010	2.3056	.50373	308
		Total	2.3016	.53301	640
	Total	2008	2.3106	.55170	994
		2010	2.3405	.52773	824
		Total	2.3242	.54102	1818
Bears indications of moderate existence	2-5	2008	2.5107	.59653	166
		2010	2.4301	.53948	116
		Total	2.4775	.57414	282
	6-7	2008	2.4333	.50761	270
		2010	2.3931	.54108	210
		Total	2.4157	.52234	480
	8-10	2008	2.4559	.52775	570
		2010	2.4054	.49589	427
		Total	2.4343	.51470	997
	11-39	2008	2.4281	.54281	448
		2010	2.3781	.54087	390
		Total	2.4048	.54216	838
	Total	2008	2.4494	.53709	1454
		2010	2.3963	.52396	1143
		Total	2.4260	.53190	2597
	2-5	2008	2.4740	.54256	154
		2010	2.3856	.45851	168

The household is in bad condition/in need of repair		Total	2.4279	.50164	322
	6-7	2008	2.5137	.53694	284
		2010	2.3835	.52574	301
		Total	2.4467	.53473	585
	8-10	2008	2.5017	.54586	592
		2010	2.3918	.51079	515
		Total	2.4506	.53243	1107
	11-39	2008	2.4768	.53973	446
		2010	2.4135	.55366	453
		Total	2.4449	.54740	899
	Total	2008	2.4936	.54162	1476
		2010	2.3962	.52174	1437
		Total	2.4456	.53404	2913
The household is living with difficulty	2-5	2008	2.3451	.57818	113
		2010	2.3889	.48054	160
		Total	2.3708	.52259	273
	6-7	2008	2.4379	.57232	203
		2010	2.4203	.49348	248
		Total	2.4282	.52988	451
	8-10	2008	2.3704	.52110	396
		2010	2.4463	.53002	413
		Total	2.4091	.52672	809
	11-39	2008	2.4183	.58383	344
		2010	2.4833	.59955	332
		Total	2.4502	.59206	676
	Total	2008	2.3963	.55831	1056
		2010	2.4434	.53742	1153
		Total	2.4209	.54789	2209
The household bears all signs of poverty	2-5	2008	2.5434	.54689	64
		2010	2.4979	.56795	81
		Total	2.5180	.55728	145
	6-7	2008	2.6062	.56831	90
		2010	2.4808	.56517	104
		Total	2.5389	.56862	194
	8-10	2008	2.5247	.58493	173
		2010	2.3872	.54816	161
		Total	2.4584	.57082	334
	11-39	2008	2.3333	.57172	106
		2010	2.5133	.52802	134
		Total	2.4338	.55387	240
	Total	2008	2.4976	.57923	433
		2010	2.4613	.55068	480
		Total	2.4785	.56438	913
Total	2-5	2008	2.4407	.57027	590
		2010	2.3952	.50998	638
		Total	2.4170	.54005	1228
	6-7	2008	2.4489	.54625	1039
		2010	2.3896	.53116	1096

	Total	2.4185	.53925	2135
8-10	2008	2.4338	.54421	2117
	2010	2.3839	.51875	1971
	Total	2.4097	.53261	4088
11-39	2008	2.4072	.55865	1678
	2010	2.3892	.55624	1788
	Total	2.3979	.55740	3466
Total	2008	2.4292	.55205	5424
	2010	2.3881	.53257	5493
	Total	2.4085	.54270	10917

Table B47: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview and Household Living Standard

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	62.419[a]	46	1.357	4.679	.000
Intercept	7400.477	1	7400.477	25516.419	.000
d15	15.279	5	3.056	10.536	.000
HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP	.426	3	.142	.489	.690
m8	.234	1	.234	.806	.369
d15 * HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP	5.519	15	.368	1.269	.213
D15 * m8	7.599	5	1.520	5.240	.000
HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP * m8	.301	3	.100	.346	.792
d15 * HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP * m8	4.967	14	.355	1.223	.250
Error	3152.605	10870	.290		
Total	66543.494	10917			
Corrected Total	3215.024	10916			

Table B48: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview, Household Living Standard, and Household Size

Living Standards:	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.d	95% Confidence Interval for Differenced	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
The household is well-off	2008	2010	.100a	.177	.572	-.247	.448
The household is enjoying a fair well-being	2008	2010	-.053	.030	.077	-.113	.006
Bears indications of moderate existence	2008	2010	.055*	.024	.022	.008	.103
The household is in bad condition/in need of repair	2008	2010	.098*	.022	.000	.054	.142
The household is living with difficulty	2008	2010	-.042	.025	.097	-.091	.008
The household bears all signs of poverty	2008	2010	.032	.038	.392	-.041	.106

Based on estimated marginal means
*. The mean difference is significant
a. An estimate of the modified population marginal mean (I).
b. An estimate of the modified population marginal mean (J).
d. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Sidak.

Table B49: Differences in Scale 3B Means by Year of Interview and Household Living Standard

Scale 4 - Security: Do Citizens Feel Secure In Various Ways?

Year of Interview	Region	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Central/Kabul	1.8235	.39786	1099
	Eastern	1.9269	.46343	529
	South East	1.9607	.44839	537
	South Western	2.2634	.52253	664
	Western	1.9699	.38314	606
	North East	1.8482	.48024	862
	Central/Hazarjat	1.9333	.48984	503
	North West	1.9572	.46446	821
	Total	1.9472	.47221	5621
2010	Central/Kabul	1.8415	.44559	1307
	Eastern	2.0052	.44039	538
	South East	2.0660	.42700	608
	South Western	2.4075	.56237	652
	Western	2.0332	.47890	726
	North East	1.8435	.41625	879
	Central/Hazarjat	1.7360	.40392	197
	North West	1.8968	.43668	862
	Total	1.9735	.48905	5769
Total	Central/Kabul	1.8332	.42446	2406
	Eastern	1.9664	.45344	1067
	South East	2.0166	.44012	1145
	South Western	2.3348	.54719	1316
	Western	2.0044	.43891	1332
	North East	1.8458	.44895	1741
	Central/Hazarjat	1.8778	.47534	700
	North West	1.9263	.45132	1683
	Total	1.9605	.48097	11390

Table B50: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview and Region

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	279.374[a]	15	18.625	89.942	.000
Intercept	37139.199	1	37139.199	179350.377	.000
m8	.803	1	.803	3.876	.049
m4	263.277	7	37.611	181.629	.000
m8 * m4	18.213	7	2.602	12.565	.000
Error	2355.285	11374	.207		
Total	46413.309	11390			
Corrected Total	2634.659	11389			

Table B51: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview and Region

Region	(I) Year	(J) Year	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Central/Kabul	2008	2010	-.018	.019	.334	-.054	.019
Eastern	2008	2010	-.078*	.028	.005	-.133	-.024
South East	2008	2010	-.105*	.027	.000	-.158	-.052
South Western	2008	2010	-.144*	.025	.000	-.193	-.095
Western	2008	2010	-.063*	.025	.012	-.112	-.014
North East	2008	2010	.005	.022	.831	-.038	.047
Central/ Hazarjat	2008	2010	.197*	.038	.000	.122	.272
North West	2008	2010	.060*	.022	.006	.017	.104

Table B52: Differences in Scale 4B Means by Year of Interview and Region

Gender	Year of Interview	Geographic Subdivision	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	2008	Villages	2.0100	.48763	2316
		Towns	2.1230	.47352	122
		City	1.9470	.43740	176
		Metro (Kabul)	1.7933	.38159	351
		Total	1.9852	.47861	2965
	2010	Villages	2.0373	.50310	2633
		Towns	1.8874	.38553	152
		City	2.1898	.51430	144
		Metro (Kabul)	1.7082	.38197	337
		Total	2.0031	.49960	3266
	Total	Villages	2.0245	.49606	4949
		Towns	1.9923	.44198	274
		City	2.0562	.48802	320
		Metro (Kabul)	1.7516	.38387	688
		Total	1.9946	.48976	6231
Female	2008	Villages	1.9203	.47220	2027
		Towns	1.8812	.46556	115
		City	1.9376	.46801	171
		Metro (Kabul)	1.8047	.37187	343
		Total	1.9048	.46137	2656
	2010	Villages	1.9728	.46096	1874
		Towns	1.7154	.45255	130
		City	1.9630	.52394	168
		Metro (Kabul)	1.7912	.46642	331
		Total	1.9347	.47223	2503
	Total	Villages	1.9455	.46751	3901
		Towns	1.7932	.46521	245
		City	1.9502	.49594	339
		Metro (Kabul)	1.7981	.42071	674
		Total	1.9193	.46687	5159

Table B53: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview, Gender and Geographic Subdivision

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	115.133[a]	63	1.828	8.215	.000
Intercept	13035.235	1	13035.235	58597.182	.000
m8	.198	1	.198	.889	.346
m6	51.118	3	17.039	76.597	.000
d1	6.833	1	6.833	30.718	.000
AGEGRP	1.299	3	.433	1.946	.120
M8 * m6	11.323	3	3.774	16.966	.000
m8 * d1	.021	1	.021	.095	.758
m8 * AGEGRP	.713	3	.238	1.069	.361
M6 * d1	7.800	3	2.600	11.687	.000
m6 * AGEGRP	2.302	9	.256	1.150	.323
d1 * AGEGRP	1.342	3	.447	2.010	.110
m8 * m6 * d1	2.656	3	.885	3.980	.008
m8 * m6 * AGEGRP	2.216	9	.246	1.107	.354
m8 * d1 * AGEGRP	.784	3	.261	1.175	.318
m6 * d1 * AGEGRP	2.361	9	.262	1.179	.303
m8 * m6 * d1 * AGEGRP	2.157	9	.240	1.077	.376
Error	2519.525	11326	.222		
Total	46413.309	11390			
Corrected Total	2634.659	11389			

Table B54: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 3B Scores by Year of Interview, Geographic Subdivision, Gender and Age Group

Gender	Geographic Subdivision	(I) Year	(J) Year	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Male	Villages	2008	2010	-.027*	.014	.046	-.054	-.001
	Towns	2008	2010	.236*	.058	.000	.121	.350
	City	2008	2010	-.243*	.054	.000	-.349	-.137
	Metro (Kabul)	2008	2010	.085*	.037	.020	.013	.157
Female	Villages	2008	2010	-.052*	.015	.000	-.082	-.023
	Towns	2008	2010	.166*	.059	.005	.050	.282
	City	2008	2010	-.025	.050	.614	-.124	.073
	Metro (Kabul)	2008	2010	.013	.036	.706	-.056	.083

Table B55: Differences in Scale 4B Means by Year of Interview, Gender and Geographic Subdivision

Year of Interview	Employment Status	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Working	1.9806	.47358	2300
	Retired	2.0370	.53703	75
	Housewife	1.9180	.46433	2229
	Student	1.8920	.45222	429
	Unemployed	1.9606	.48981	581
	Total	1.9477	.47200	5614
2010	Working	2.0252	.50540	2580
	Retired	1.8231	.43088	49
	Housewife	1.9359	.46594	2216
	Student	1.9089	.46978	405
	Unemployed	1.9409	.49794	519
	Total	1.9735	.48905	5769
Total	Working	2.0042	.49112	4880
	Retired	1.9525	.50694	124
	Housewife	1.9269	.46517	4445
	Student	1.9002	.46063	834
	Unemployed	1.9513	.49353	1100
	Total	1.9607	.48087	11383

Table B56: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview and Current Status

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	21.772[a]	9	2.419	10.541	.000
Intercept	8590.548	1	8590.548	37431.357	.000
m8	.541	1	.541	2.356	.125
d3	16.979	4	4.245	18.495	.000
m8 * d3	2.766	4	.692	3.014	.017
Error	2610.119	11373	.230		
Total	46393.444	11383			

Table B57: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview and Current Status

Employment Status	(I) Year	(J) Year	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]
Working	2008	2010	-.045*	.014	.001
Retired	2008	2010	.214*	.088	.015
Housewife	2008	2010	-.018	.014	.211
Student	2008	2010	-.017	.033	.610
Unemployed	2008	2010	.020	.029	.496

Table B58: Differences in Scale 4B Means by Year of Interview and Current Status

Year of Interview	Which ethnic group do you belong to?	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Pashtun	2.0328	.48295	2395
	Tajik	1.8663	.43961	1886
	Uzbek	1.9468	.47421	570
	Hazara	1.8420	.46356	514
	Turkmen	2.1516	.50110	96
	Baloch	1.6068	.16111	13
	Kirghiz	2.1389	.49170	4
	Nuristani	1.7222	.30429	6
	Aimak	1.9278	.43037	40
	Arab	1.7897	.44882	65
	Sadat	1.9032	.34753	31
	Total	1.9472	.47226	5620
2010	Pashtun	2.1036	.51090	2469
	Tajik	1.8843	.46694	1791
	Uzbek	1.9000	.40360	519
	Hazara	1.8319	.44436	601
	Turkmen	2.0181	.39371	135
	Baloch	1.7000	.47154	30
	Kirghiz	2.1852	.54810	3
	Nuristani	1.8556	.48020	10
	Aimak	1.7168	.35019	102
	Arab	1.8514	.42166	92
	Sadat	2.0654	.33578	17
	Total	1.9735	.48905	5769
Total	Pashtun	2.0687	.49854	4864
	Tajik	1.8750	.45316	3677
	Uzbek	1.9245	.44239	1089
	Hazara	1.8366	.45313	1115
	Turkmen	2.0736	.44539	231
	Baloch	1.6718	.40351	43
	Kirghiz	2.1587	.47078	7

Nuristani	1.8056	.41673	16
Aimak	1.7762	.38490	142
Arab	1.8259	.43277	157
Sadat	1.9606	.34873	48
Total	1.9605	.48099	11389

Table B59: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview and Ethnic Group

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	127.122[a]	21	6.053	27.441	.000
Intercept	1551.136	1	1551.136	7031.524	.000
m8	.030	1	.030	.135	.713
d10	114.296	10	11.430	51.812	.000
m8 * d10	7.673	10	.767	3.478	.000
Error	2507.531	11367	.221		
Total	46409.741	11389			
Corrected Total	2634.653	11388			

Table B60: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview and Ethnic Group

Ethnic group	(I) Year of Interview	(J) Year of Interview	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]
Pashtun	2008	2010	-.071*	.013	.000
Tajik	2008	2010	-.018	.015	.245
Uzbek	2008	2010	.047	.028	.101
Hazara	2008	2010	.010	.028	.722
Turkmen	2008	2010	.134*	.063	.033
Baloch	2008	2010	-.093	.156	.550
Kirghiz	2008	2010	-.046	.359	.897
Nuristani	2008	2010	-.133	.243	.583
Aimak	2008	2010	.211*	.088	.016
Arab	2008	2010	-.062	.076	.417
Sadat	2008	2010	-.162	.142	.253

Table B61: Differences in Scale 4B Means by Year of Interview and Ethnic Group

Year of Interview	What is the highest level of school you completed?	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
2008	Never went to school	1.9693	.48040	3029
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	1.9232	.47632	773
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	1.9372	.47667	343
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	1.9483	.44708	372
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2.0208	.50717	256
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	1.8608	.42813	697
	University education or above	1.9267	.41011	147
	Total	1.9474	.47219	5617
2010	Never went to school	1.9767	.48644	3251
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	1.9831	.53739	514
	Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2.0097	.48885	322
	Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	1.9993	.50372	327
	Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	1.9303	.47621	239
	High School (classes 10 to 12)	1.9518	.47499	912
	University education or above	1.9464	.45207	199
	Total	1.9735	.48905	5764
Total	Never went to school	1.9731	.48351	6280
	Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	1.9472	.50226	1287

Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	1.9723	.48360	665
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	1.9722	.47475	699
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	1.9771	.49405	495
High School (classes 10 to 12)	1.9124	.45737	1609
University education or above	1.9380	.43424	346
Total	1.9606	.48096	11381

Table B62: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview and Highest Level of Schooling Completed

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	12.290[a]	13	.945	4.101	.000	.005
Intercept	19684.738	1	19684.738	85399.596	.000	.883
m8	1.167	1	1.167	5.062	.024	.000
d6	6.232	6	1.039	4.506	.000	.002
m8 * d6	4.710	6	.785	3.406	.002	.002
Error	2620.111	11367	.231			
Total	46380.728	11381				

Table B63: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview and Highest Level of Schooling Completed

Level of Education	(I) Year of Inter-view	(J) Year of Inter-view	Mean Differ-ence (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Never went to school	2008	2010	-.007	.012	.544	-.031	.016
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	2008	2010	-.060*	.027	.028	-.113	-.006
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	2008	2010	-.073	.037	.052	-.146	.001
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	2008	2010	-.051	.036	.161	-.122	.020
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	2008	2010	.091*	.043	.036	.006	.175
High School (classes 10 to 12)	2008	2010	-.091*	.024	.000	-.138	-.044
University education or above	2008	2010	-.020	.052	.706	-.122	.083

Table B64: Differences in Scale 4B Means by Year of Interview and Current Status

Standard of Household:	Household Size Grouping	Year of Interview	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
The household is well-off	2-5	2010	1.7885	.43856	52
		Total	1.7885	.43856	52
	6-7	2008	1.8000	.31817	5
		2010	1.8363	.45289	95
		Total	1.8344	.44598	100
	8-10	2008	1.8333	.11111	4
		2010	1.9157	.47887	170
		Total	1.9138	.47369	174
	11-39	2008	1.8889	.41574	7
		2010	1.9194	.47503	182
		Total	1.9183	.47202	189
	Total	2008	1.8472	.31655	16
		2010	1.8887	.46948	499
		Total	1.8874	.46533	515
The household is enjoying a fair well-being	2-5	2008	1.8646	.44364	105
		2010	1.8397	.52684	70
		Total	1.8546	.47734	175
	6-7	2008	1.8037	.38875	197
		2010	1.9606	.53583	155
		Total	1.8728	.46523	352
	8-10	2008	1.8615	.44954	406
		2010	1.9862	.50232	329
		Total	1.9173	.47761	735
	11-39	2008	1.9786	.45342	343
		2010	2.0160	.47326	333
		Total	1.9970	.46333	676
	Total	2008	1.8892	.44380	1051
		2010	1.9813	.50098	887
		Total	1.9314	.47294	1938
Bears indications of moderate existence	2-5	2008	1.9393	.48595	174
		2010	1.9360	.44144	118
		Total	1.9380	.46770	292
	6-7	2008	1.9410	.44086	277
		2010	1.9247	.45597	220
		Total	1.9338	.44723	497
	8-10	2008	1.9715	.46248	592
		2010	1.9811	.47377	458
		Total	1.9757	.46724	1050
	11-39	2008	1.9950	.43851	467
		2010	2.0146	.48044	410
		Total	2.0042	.45843	877
	Total	2008	1.9695	.45412	1510
		2010	1.9778	.47046	1206
		Total	1.9732	.46138	2716
	2-5	2008	1.8624	.43142	151

The household is in bad condition/in need of repair		2010	1.8656	.44188	172
		Total	1.8641	.43635	323
	6-7	2008	1.9104	.45895	295
		2010	1.9224	.45178	312
		Total	1.9165	.45494	607
	8-10	2008	1.9849	.48405	598
		2010	1.9748	.45357	538
		Total	1.9801	.46968	1136
	11-39	2008	2.0251	.46270	447
		2010	2.0316	.49917	475
		Total	2.0284	.48158	922
	Total	2008	1.9698	.47025	1491
		2010	1.9693	.46955	1497
		Total	1.9696	.46982	2988
The household is living with difficulty	2-5	2008	1.8391	.49820	125
		2010	1.9354	.48231	165
		Total	1.8939	.49069	290
	6-7	2008	1.9869	.47265	212
		2010	1.9064	.48627	254
		Total	1.9430	.48128	466
	8-10	2008	1.9707	.50306	402
		2010	1.9744	.48554	430
		Total	1.9726	.49379	832
	11-39	2008	1.9521	.51947	362
		2010	2.0801	.54759	326
		Total	2.0128	.53642	688
	Total	2008	1.9528	.50345	1101
		2010	1.9835	.50680	1175
		Total	1.9687	.50530	2276
The household bears all signs of poverty	2-5	2008	1.9882	.55577	66
		2010	1.9634	.55151	88
		Total	1.9740	.55166	154
	6-7	2008	1.9135	.51490	104
		2010	1.9601	.51950	103
		Total	1.9367	.51646	207
	8-10	2008	1.9278	.53381	177
		2010	2.0032	.52370	172
		Total	1.9650	.52944	349
	11-39	2008	1.8847	.45888	105
		2010	2.1330	.54730	137
		Total	2.0253	.52451	242
	Total	2008	1.9233	.51558	452
		2010	2.0229	.53733	500
		Total	1.9756	.52918	952
Total	2-5	2008	1.8930	.47799	621
		2010	1.8996	.47779	665
		Total	1.8964	.47771	1286
	6-7	2008	1.9136	.45336	1090

	2010	1.9207	.47890	1139
	Total	1.9172	.46650	2229
8-10	2008	1.9507	.48119	2179
	2010	1.9754	.48024	2097
	Total	1.9628	.48082	4276
11-39	2008	1.9834	.46746	1731
	2010	2.0301	.50271	1863
	Total	2.0076	.48655	3594
Total	2008	1.9472	.47221	5621
	2010	1.9735	.48922	5764
	Total	1.9605	.48106	11385

Table B65: Means, Standard Deviations and Group Sizes for Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview, Living Standard of Household, and Household Size

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	40.651[a]	46	.884	3.863	.000	.015
Intercept	7140.103	1	7140.103	31210.6	.000	.734
d15	3.295	5	.659	2.881	.013	.001
HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP	6.368	3	2.123	9.279	.000	.002
M8	.788	1	.788	3.444	.064	.000
D15 * HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP	2.588	15	.173	.754	.730	.001
D15 * M8	2.190	5	.438	1.914	.088	.001
HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP * M8	.654	3	.218	.953	.414	.000
D15 * HOUSEHOLDSIZEGRP * M8	6.546	14	.468	2.044	.012	.003
Error	2593.812	11338	.229			
Total	46394.864	11385				
Corrected Total	2634.464	11384				

Table B66: ANOVA Results Analyzing Scale 4B Scores by Year of Interview and Highest Level of Schooling Completed

Living Standard of This Household:	House-Hold Size Grouping	(I) Year	(J)	Mean Differ-ence (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[c]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[c]	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
The household is well-off	2-5	2008	2010	.[a]	.	.	.	.
	6-7	2008	2010	-.036	.214	.865	-.456	.384
	8-10	2008	2010	-.082	.236	.727	-.545	.380
	11-39	2008	2010	-.031	.179	.865	-.383	.322
The household is enjoying a fair well-being	2-5	2008	2010	.025	.072	.731	-.117	.166
	6-7	2008	2010	-.157*	.050	.002	-.255	-.058
	8-10	2008	2010	-.125*	.035	.000	-.193	-.057
	11-39	2008	2010	-.037	.036	.299	-.108	.033
Bears indications of moderate existence	2-5	2008	2010	.003	.055	.951	-.104	.111
	6-7	2008	2010	.016	.042	.696	-.065	.098
	8-10	2008	2010	-.010	.029	.738	-.066	.047
	11-39	2008	2010	-.020	.031	.529	-.081	.042
The household is in bad condition/ in need of repair	2-5	2008	2010	-.003	.052	.951	-.105	.099
	6-7	2008	2010	-.012	.038	.752	-.086	.062
		2010	2008	.012	.038	.752	-.062	.086
	11-39	2008	2010	-.006	.031	.834	-.067	.054
The household is living with difficulty	2-5	2008	2010	-.096	.060	.107	-.213	.021
	6-7	2008	2010	.081	.047	.085	-.011	.172
	8-10	2008	2010	-.004	.035	.915	-.072	.065
	11-39	2008	2010	-.128*	.038	.001	-.203	-.053
The household bears all signs of poverty	2-5	2008	2010	.025	.086	.772	-.143	.193
	6-7	2008	2010	-.047	.073	.524	-.190	.097
	8-10	2008	2010	-.075	.056	.181	-.186	.035
	11-39	2008	2010	-.248*	.068	.000	-.382	-.114

*. The mean difference is significant

[a] The level of factors in (I) is not observed

Table B67: Differences in Scale 4B Means by Year of Interview, Living Standard of Household and Household Size

APPENDIX C - ORDERS OF BATTLE 2009

Figure 1 shows the ISAF troop strengths during the period covered in this dissertation – 2008, 2009, 2010.

	2008	2009	2010
January	55,668	70584	119,879
February	58721	79006	124,413
March	57626	78612	134,448
April	62919	75465	133,261
May	64252	79801	147,596
June	64314	77722	144,076
July	64180	80319	137,976
August	65822	97402	138,934
September	65223	105264	139,935
October	64571	108070	149,257
November	70329	115647	146,106
December	70684	116692	142,104

Figure C1: ISAF Troop Number 2008-2010[1]

[1] International Security Assistance Force, ISAF Troop Numbers 2008 - 2010, 14 January 2011; as referred to in J. Bohannon, Science 331, 1256 (2011).

Figure 2 shows ISAF troop strength in the military regions, in each month of the 2009, the year of the independent variable.

	RC Capital HQ ISAF in Kabul	RC South	RC West	RC North	RC East
January	7,500	22,500	2,940	4,740	21,000
February	5,740	22,000	2,940	4,740	21,000
March	5,740	23,330	2,940	5,080	25,879
April	5,830	22,830	2,940	4,730	22,060
May	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
June	6,200	29,000	3,400	5,600	19,000
July	6,200	29,400	3,400	5,600	19,900
August	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
September	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
October	6,400	34,855	4,400	5,600	16,255
November	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
December	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Figure C2: The Coalitions Order of Battle in 2009

Figure C3 gives the low and high troop strength for each contributing allied country to ISAF from January 2009 through February 2010.

Country	Jan 2009 /Feb 2010	Country	Jan 2009 /Feb 2010	Country	Jan 2009 /Feb 2010
Albania	140/255	Georgia	1/175	Portugal	40/105
Armenia	0/NA	Germany	3405/4415	Romania	770/945
Australia	1550/1090	Greece	140/15	Singapore	20/40
Austria	1/2	Hungary	240/315	Slovakia	120/240
Azerbaijan	45/90	Iceland	8/3	Spain	780/1070
Belgium	410/575	Ireland	7/8	Sweden	290/10
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NA/10	Italy	2350/3150	Macedonia	140/165
Bulgaria	465/540	Jordan	0/0	Turkey	800/1755
Canada	2830/2830	Latvia	70/175	Ukraine	10/8
Croatia	280/295	Lithuania	200/165	United Arab Emirates	0/25
Czech Republic	415/440	Luxembourg	9/9	United Kingdom	8900/9500
Denmark	700/750	Netherlands	1770/1940	United States	23220/47085
Estonia	130/150	New Zealand	150/220		
Finland	110/95	Norway	490/500		
France	2890/3750	Poland	1590/1955		

Figure C3: Troop Contributing Nations (TCN): The ISAF Mission in 2009 Consisted of These Nations[2]

[2] The troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time

GLOSSARY

AC - Afghan civilians

ADB – Asian Development Bank

ADF – Asian Development Fund

ANA - Afghan National Army. ANA –

AISA – Afghanistan Investment Support Agency

ANDS – Afghanistan National Development Strategy

ANP - Afghan National Police.

ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces.

ASF - Afghan Special Forces. These are part of the ANA and are often called ANA Commandos.

BBIED - Body-Borne Improvised Explosive Device; see IED.

CALL - Center of Army Lesson Learned. U.S. Army think tank at Fort Leavenworth.

Casualties: May be of two classifications:

Direct: casualties resulting directly from armed conflict – including those arising from military operations conducted by pro-government forces (Afghan Government Forces and/or International Military Forces) such as force protection incidents; air raids, search and arrest events, counter insurgency or "Global War on Terror" operations. It also includes casualties arising from the activities of AGEs, such as targeted killings, IEDs, VBIEDs, and BMARKBIEDs, or direct engagement with pro-government forces, etc.

Other: casualties resulting indirectly from the conflict, including casualties caused by explosive remnants of war (ERW), deaths in prison, and deaths from probable underlying medical conditions that occurred during military operations, or where access to medical care was denied or was not forthcoming. It also includes deaths arising from incidents where responsibility cannot be determined with any degree of certainty, such as deaths or injuries arising from cross-fire. Finally, it includes casualties caused by inter/intra-tribal or ethnic conflict.

Civilian/Non-Combatant - Any person who is not taking an active part in hostilities. It includes all civilians as well as public servants who are not being utilized for a military purpose in terms of fighting the conflict, and encompasses teachers, health clinic workers and others involved in public service delivery, as well as political figures or office holders. It also includes soldiers or any person who are *hors de combat*, whether from injury or because they have surrendered or because they have ceased to take an active part in hostilities for any reason. It includes persons who may be civilian police personnel or members of the military who are not being utilized in counter insurgency operations, including when they are off-duty.

CCA - (Close Combat Air): Casualties caused by helicopters

CDC - Community Development Council

CIVCAS - is a military database of Afghan civilian casualties in Afghanistan, created by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This is a first attempt to compare those data to casualties reported in the media

Complex Attack - Any combination of multiple categories

CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies

DF - (Direct Fire): Casualties caused by ground forces with line of sight but mistaking civilians for combatants

DFA - discriminant function analysis

FM - Field Manual

FIU - Financial Intelligence Unit

FSU - Former Soviet Union

Force protection incidents: situations where civilians fail to heed warnings from military personnel when approaching or overtaking military convoys or failing to follow instructions at check points. Force protection incidents can also occur when individuals are perceived as too close to military bases or installations and there is a failure to follow warnings from military personnel.

FY – fiscal year

GDP – gross domestic product

GoA - Government (of the Islamic Republic) of Afghanistan

GAO - Government Accountability Office

GPRI - Global Political Risk Index

IDF - (Indirect Fire): Casualties caused by ground forces without direct line of sight

IED - Improvised Explosive Device. A bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action. IEDs can also take the form of suicide bombs, such as BBIEDs or Vehicle Borne (VBIEDs), etc.

Incidents - Events where civilian casualties resulted from armed conflict. Reports of casualties arising from criminal activities are not included in UNAMA's civilian casualty reports.

IFC - International Financing Corporation

I-ANDS – Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy

ILO - International Labor Organization

IMF - International Monetary Fund

Injuries - Include physical injuries of differing severity. The degree of severity of injury is not recorded in UNAMA Human Rights' Database. Injuries do not include cases of shock or psychological trauma.

Insurgents - Individuals classified by ISAF as enemy combatants

ISAF - International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. However, it is not a U.N. force but a "coalition of the willing" deployed under the authority of the U.N. Security Council. In August 2003, upon the request of the U.N. and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO took command of ISAF. The NATO force currently comprises some 55,000 troops (including National Support Elements) from 41 countries as well as 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

IU - Intelligence Unit

MOI - Ministry of Interior

MPW – Ministry of Public Works

NDS - National Directorate of Security. Afghanistan's national intelligence service.

NSPD- National Security Presidential Directive

PRTs - Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These are small teams of civilian and military personnel operating within ISAF's regional commands working in Afghanistan's

provinces to help reconstruction work. Their role is to assist the local authorities in the reconstruction and maintenance of security in the area.

UN – United Nations

UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

USJFCOM – United States Joint Forces Commands

UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNDCP - United Nations International Drug Control Programme

UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

VBIED - Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive device; See IED.

WB - The World Bank

Wounded - According to ISAF officials, "CIVCAS WIA (Wounded In Action) are survivors following injuries received as a result of ISAF, ANSF or insurgent actions. The term encompasses all kinds of wounds. There are no specifics regarding thresholds for counting the injury, according to our data practitioners."

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