How is an international crisis created? And once in existence what determines the outcome, viz., escalation into open conflict or de-escalation of an international crisis? These questions are explored by looking at a crisis situation through the perceptual lenses of the crisis actors involved and the subsequent bargaining strategies executed by them in the international sphere. The clue to understanding the dynamics of an international crisis, it is contended, lies in discovering the connection between the perceptual process and the bargaining strategy adopted by each crisis actor. The outcome of an international crisis is decided by the bargaining position taken by the crisis actors within an interdependent setting. The international crisis precipitated by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989) is analyzed by making the crisis actors (the Soviet Union, U.S., Pakistan, India, China and Iran) the focal point of inquiry. The perception and the bargaining strategies of each of the aforementioned crisis actors is investigated at the time of crisis initiation (1980-1981) and crisis dissipation (1987-1988) to discern shifts in their respective positions, It is argued that this shift was the catalytic factor in propelling the Afghanistan crisis towards de-escalation. The overarching purpose of this study is to draw theoretical inferences that may be applied to examine the phenomena of international crises
