Trust reduces uncertainty by limiting those anticipated behaviors of the trustee that relate to the trustor's vulnerability, to those that are benevolent to the trustor (e.g., Kramer, 1999). Organizational rules and procedures are another mechanism for reducing uncertainty and increasing predictability (e.g., Luhman, 1971; March, Schulz, & Zou, 2000; Reed, 2001). Despite the overwhelming scholarly agreement on the importance of both rules and interpersonal trust in organizations, there seems to be some disagreement whether rules and procedures hinder or facilitate vulnerability, in turn, vulnerability related outcomes (e.g., Sitkin, 1995) In this manuscript I therefore examine conditions when rules and procedures facilitate or hinder the development two such outcomes: the propensity to trust at the national level, and organizational commitment at the individual level of analysis. Specifically, I examine how the embeddedness of rules in interpersonal and institutional contexts differentially impacts vulnerability related outcomes. I empirically test these conditions using archival data at the nation-state level of analysis and at the individual level of analysis within organizations
