In this work I argue for a theory of imagination based on a naturalistic conception of mind and knowledge. I survey the relevant evidence from cognitive psychology and argue for the conclusion that, while there is no consensus about the correct account of mental imagery, there are some suggestive results to be found in these experiments. I argue for a view that attempts to capture the significance of some of these results and I attempt to set forth a theory to explain them In addition to the psychological evidence, I consider the long tradition of philosophical thinking about imagination that centers on an Autonomy Thesis. Philosophers holding the Autonomy Thesis argue that imagination is an independent, autonomous power (Hume) or faculty (Kant) of the mind or an independent, autonomous form of consciousness (Sartre). I argue that the Autonomy Thesis is indefensible Finally, I defend the need for a naturalistic epistemology and I argue for a greater rapport between philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology. In the course of this work I discuss the views of a number of philosophers, including Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Alvin Goldman, and Eric Lormand. By relying on philosophical arguments as well as results from cognitive psychology, this work is not only an account of the naturalistic approach to mind and knowledge, but also an exercise in that method