A theoretical model on the dynamic impact of influence on two party political systems
Description
The purpose of this dissertation is to construct a theoretical model indicative of a viable two party democracy and then demonstrate how influence or political power is instrumental in moving the two party democratic system towards a political system where only one party is influential Chapter 1. The Theory of Political Systems: An Economic Interpretation and Survey. This literature survey focuses on the main aspects from which the model of the next chapter is formulated: voting, legislative competition, and the decline of political competition. Therefore three areas of the Public Choice literature are surveyed. (a) revelation mechanism in direct democracies; (b) competing interest or influence groups; and (c) the parallels between duopoly models in industry where competition is declining and the literature on political overthrows Chapter 2. Influence in the Dynamics of a Democratic Two Party Political System. A theoretical model is formulated to demonstrate that the political activities of fund raising, winning elections and passing legislative could give a political party an advantage in political influence such that over time just one party will exist. A dynamic model is presented although a period by period choice process is justified. The amount of influence the parties cumulate depends on the results of the electoral and legislative competition and is constrained by the resources raised by the two parties. The model shows that the political system will move towards one party rule as the amount of influence accumulated by a party in the present, attributed by an increase in perceived (past) influence, exceeds the amount by which influence declines (depreciates) constantly over time Chapter 3. The Evolution of Authoritarian Rule: The Philippines' Experience. This historical survey of modern Philippine political history aims to corroborate previous chapter's main results where the more influential party uses its political power to eventually drive its opponent from the system. The historical facts also demonstrate political scandals frequently served as the exogenous shock in all pre-martial law administrations which resulted in a decline in the incumbent's influence