Temporality and practical reason: a re-examination of Heidegger's phenomenological critique of Kant (self, freedom)
Description
The purpose of this dissertation is to show that an inherently moral use of reason, which according to Kant presupposes the existence of an eternal intelligible order, is possible precisely due to the design of the self's temporality. I develop an account of temporality which is guided by Heidegger's attempt in Being and Time to define the conditions which are necessary for the individual to choose himself in light of his finitude. On that basis, I outline the design of a normative ethic which is consistent with Kant's Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. By developing Heidegger's explanation of the individualizing function inherent in each of us (i.e., the call of conscience), I show that Being and Time is a continuation of the task which Kant himself initiated in the Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals In the course of this essay, I employ Heidegger's threefold phenomenological method of construction, reduction, and destruction to remove Kant's ethics from its artificial architectonic and to retrieve its essential elements within an existential framework. Ultimately, I establish that the freedom to follow unconditioned moral commands arises precisely from the individual's ability to affirm the limitations inherent in his existence. This analysis constitutes an existential formulation of the Kantian thesis 'ought implies can.' I conclude that the faculty Kant himself identified for applying a rule in a specific case, namely, the transcendental imagination, is the basis for moral judgments. This conclusion substantiates Heidegger's central thesis in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics that the imagination is the root of human reason in both its theoretical and practical employment