At the core of the mind-body problem for substance dualism is causation between the immaterial mind and the material body. The philosopher Jaegwon Kim argues that this intersubstance causation fails in substance dualism because the doctrine does not have viable "pairing relations" to underlie the causal relations between the immaterial and the material. In this thesis, I respond to Kim's "pairing problem" by proposing and then defending Pseudo-Cartesian dualism, a new version of substance dualism that redefines the mind, body, and consciousness to offer an alternative solution for intersubstance causation. The first chapter describes how consciousness should be understood under this new version. The second chapter first examines two other versions of substance dualism, comparing their explanation for the mind-body problem, then finally, explain what Pseudo-Cartesian dualism is and how it is different in its approach to the mind-body problem. The third chapter analyzes Kim's pairing problem and Pseudo-Cartesian dualism's solution for it. The last chapter addresses what I consider to be the most problematic consequence of Pseudo-Cartesian dualism's approach to the mind-body problem.