

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND ITS IMPACT ON POLITICS

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
WITH HONORS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY

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The military-industrial complex is the interaction between private national security manufacturing companies, elected officials, and the bureaucracy. These relationships are developed through lobbying efforts, campaign contributions, and the appointment of former employees of these private companies to bureaucratic positions; this network of people in all areas of government is utilized often to push for legislative and executive policy goals that benefit the profit sectors of major domestic weapons manufacturers. This Thesis will specifically examine Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin and their lobbying efforts. Because these firms can cloak their lobbying efforts and policy goals as in the name of national security, the military-industrial complex has a unique impact on domestic and foreign policy as compared to other similar lobbying groups. Importantly, since the transition from the Cold War to the War on Terror, the military-industrial complex has evolved from oriented toward research and development toward foreign arms sales. Overall, the military-industrial complex has reach into many areas of policy, and it needs to be examined because of its ties to national security.

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# I. Introduction

The military-industrial complex is the term used to refer to the relationship between the United States federal government and the major firms that produce weapons domestically. This Thesis will specifically examine how the military-industrial complex has shifted its focus since the end of the Cold War: where the military-industrial complex used to be focused on research and development, it now prioritizes foreign arms sales and dominating the international market for military-grade weapons. In this Thesis, this relationship will be explored in terms of the traditional forms of influence these weapons-producing firms have on governance – lobbying, campaign contributions, and bureaucratic appointments – and the burgeoning new area of influence in foreign arms sales. The four major firms that will be examined here as traditional members of the military-industrial complex are Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin; there are other firms that participate in the processes described below, but these four companies exhibit the most influence individually and collectively. Each of these firms operate via the same methods, but this Thesis will particularly touch upon examples from Boeing because of their recency and overt nature. Cloaked in national security, the lobbying, campaign contributions, and revolving door of bureaucracy in the military-industrial complex take a tone of patriotism, separating its effects from similar industries. The evolution of the military-industrial complex helps explain its shifting influence in the new era of politics and foreign policy.

The military-industrial complex is a typical iron triangle in how it creates relationships between industry, Congress, and the military. It is different in its ability to wrap itself in patriotism which make it less permeable to outside control, as it is so important to national sovereignty. Like all iron triangles, it evolves through time. Situations change, and this Thesis deals with that change: President Eisenhower and the Cold War Era of the military-industrial complex dealt in big ticket weapons items. During this time, lobbying was intense and the use of national security was intense. With the end of the Cold War, one of the main drivers in the

military-industrial complex changes substantially. Instead of the main focus being lobbying for weapons systems against a geopolitical enemy (like the USSR during the Cold War), there is much more emphasis on local military conflicts in which our role is advisory on the ground and sales of weapons systems. One example of this is Taiwan: instead of stepping in, the United States chooses to sell Taiwan weapons instead of engaging on the ground there. This new style of warfare has required the military-industrial complex to adapt and be more oriented toward foreign arms sales, as opposed to focusing on domestic research and development.

The military-industrial complex operates with every political party and administration: both Democrats and Republicans have relationships with weapons manufacturers. Again, due to the recency of the Trump Administration, this Thesis will focus primarily on the military-industrial complex's presence in this administration's bureaucracy and the foreign arms sales that took place during the Trump era. Notably, this analysis could be done with nearly every and all administrations since World War II.

The military-industrial complex is particularly evident in the United States because of the expansive military and the profit motivations of these companies. During World War II, many firms that were involved in traditional manufacturing transitioned into producing weapons to help with the war effort. After World War II, these firms were expected to transition back to traditional manufacturing; however, the consistent profits of military manufacturing were much more enticing to these firms than retreating to the inconsistent manufacturing market. As other countries nationalized this industry to prevent corruption and market inefficiencies, the United States allowed these firms the freedom to continue producing weapons. The near-total lack of oversight allowed these companies to flourish; further, the United States military continued to contract with these firms, ensuring their consistently high revenues over long periods. The military-industrial complex has evolved as United States war efforts have changed over the past century, and the different eras of the complex will be discussed throughout this Thesis.



Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin have worked hard to retain their structural political advantages. Their primary tool to ensure these profits continue to flow their way is through campaign donations: these firms pay substantial amounts of money to Presidential, Senate, and House campaigns in both parties, particularly to Senators sitting on subcommittees related to military spending. They also donate large sums of money to the Senators of states housing their headquarters and large manufacturing centers. They also invest heavily in lobbying, using premier lobbyists to expand their already large spheres of influence. Beyond speaking to elected officials, their industry expertise also means many former (and current) heads of these firms are appointed to influential positions in the executive office, working in defense, military, and national security policy arenas. They choose to lobby on specific bills specific to the military and those beyond, including tax cuts and other fiscal stimuli. All of these areas of influence have put people sympathetic to these firms at and connected to the highest levels of both the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch.

These four firms in particular benefit from the current styling of United States foreign policy. Foreign arms sales, or the sale of weapons and other military-grade equipment to foreign countries, are done with contracts with Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman specifically. These arms sales are often paired with other foreign policy agenda items, such as trade agreements or peace accords. The use of United States military equipment to persuade foreign countries to join with the United States in certain goals began in 1976, during the Cold War Era. Now these deals are a significant source of income for these firms and there has been significant pushback from progressive groups over how funding given to these firms eventually benefits non-allies of the United States.

There are some positives to the military-industrial complex. The military has essentially delegated research and innovation for many military projects to these firms; the long-term contracts with the Pentagon mean that these firms have financial incentives to innovate, become

more efficient, and improve on current technology as well. The aircraft and equipment that have been produced via private companies have allowed the United States to remain the dominant military force around the world. Further, the technology used in this production often leaks into other areas of the private and public sectors, typically in computer science or cybersecurity, advancing the rest of the economy as well. Also, these firms do contribute to the United States economy, whether it be through scientific or manufacturing jobs. These advantages make it difficult to imagine a world without these firms.

However, some scholars assert that the military-industrial complex is becoming less relevant. As large private firms like Apple and Dell invest in technology without military contracts, and as the Pentagon focused more on man-powered missions like Iraq and Afghanistan as a part of the War on Terror, these firms lose influence and the monopoly on military equipment. This does not and cannot detract from the millions spent in lobbying efforts and campaign donations, as well as the bureaucratic entrenchment of many of these firms.

Overall, the military-industrial complex manifests in many ways, many expected but some surprising. Although there is scholarly disagreement over the current influence of the complex, it is certainly functioning at a similar level as its peak during the Cold War Era. This Thesis will examine three of the primary ways it operates: lobbying and campaign contributions, bureaucratic appointments, and foreign arms sales. This Thesis hopes to address some of the concerns raised above and analyze the true impacts of the military-industrial complex.

## II. Historical Overview

This Thesis will speak to the military-industrial complex, its evolution and relationship to various administrations, and how its lobbying efforts impact votes of Congressional representatives. This will explore a history of the military-industrial complex then will move into a more specific examination of four major firms within the military-industrial complex and how

their congressional lobbying efforts have influenced the defensive and military trajectory of the United States.

The military-industrial complex is the marriage of large weapons-producing firms and the federal government. This phrase was coined by President Eisenhower, who saw that the massive influx of weapons manufacturers after World War II continued to produce weapons instead of returning to their pre-war, non-weapons manufacturing practices. Weapons and other military-grade products are much more profitable than other conventional manufacturing because of the small-market, big-buyer, high-impact nature of these sales; this leads to weapons producers having no incentive to stop making weapons. Now that there is a permanent sector of the economy devoted to military materials, this sector is now engaged in lobbying affecting a multitude of other aspects of government, many of which will be explored here.

## A. History of the “Military-Industrial Complex”

Although President Eisenhower was the first to popularize the term, the military-industrial complex is typically divided into three eras.<sup>1</sup> The first era is the inception of the United States until World War II, where the government only called upon weapons manufacturers during times of war. This dramatically shifted during World War II, specifically when President Roosevelt created the War Production Board, creating a systematic way for civilian producers to transition into weapons manufacturing.<sup>2</sup> During this period, as is typical during times of war, weapons production increased from one percent to forty percent of annual GDP.<sup>3</sup> This was the formation of the second era of the military-industrial complex, continuing through the Cold War era, typically ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union and a shrinking defense budget in

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<sup>1</sup> William J. Lynn III. The End of the Military Industrial Complex. *Foreign Affairs*, 2014, New York Vol. 93, Iss. 6, 104-110.

<sup>2</sup> National Archives. Records of the War Production Board. *National Archives*, 1942, <https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/179.html>

<sup>3</sup> William J. Lynn III. The End of the Military Industrial Complex. *Foreign Affairs*, 2014, New York Vol. 93, Iss. 6, 104-110.

1993.<sup>4</sup> This era saw major arms manufacturers constantly innovating and investing in research and development. The third, and current, era is primarily defined by consolidation within the defense industry and a shift toward bureaucracy and policy advocacy among these companies.

The end of World War II signified one of the most important dates in the history of the military-industrial complex: the National Security Act of 1947. This created a peacetime military establishment through the development of the Department of Defense and other intelligence agencies. In recognizing the beginning of a new time of international conflict with the emergence of the Cold War, the government decided there was now a need for a military outside of times of war. This was a natural place for the creation of an iron triangle of the military-industrial complex through congressional committees, lobbying, and these newfound bureaucratic positions.

In more detail, the first mention of the military-industrial complex occurred in President Eisenhower's Farewell Address, when he said, "We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist."<sup>5</sup> Despite President Eisenhower's previous military service, he found it necessary to use his final words as Commander in Chief to warn against the increasing ties between the military and those who are competing for its spending in the private sector. He referenced the increased ties, specifically relational and bureaucratic ties, between those producing weapons and those purchasing and using the weapons. Although he did not call for a decrease in arms, and famously said that our possession of a nuclear weapon effectively deterred nuclear war, he was very worried about the increased influence of those supplying the military with weapons.

The beginning of the military-industrial complex is typically seen as having occurred at the end of World War II. In order to provide for the huge military needs during World War II,

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<sup>4</sup> William J. Lynn III. The End of the Military Industrial Complex. *Foreign Affairs*, 2014, New York Vol. 93, Iss. 6, 104-110.

<sup>5</sup> HISTORY. President Eisenhower Warns of Military-Industrial Complex. *HISTORY*, 2009, <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/eisenhower-warns-of-military-industrial-complex>

many domestic industries in the private sector converted their manufacturing centers to weapons and military manufacturing. These firms discovered that the reliable purchases of these weapons by the government created higher profit margins (along with long-term guaranteed production contracts) than the goods they previously produced, especially during times of war. This is the first step of creating the military-industrial complex: firms which began producing conventional products were now engaged in the much-more-profitable military sector.

To match these increasing profits, there was no profit ceiling set by the government on this sector. In other areas with such high government involvement, such as health care, there is typically some type of limitation on profits; for example, the Affordable Care Act maximized private insurance profits at twenty percent. No such action occurred in this market. Additionally, unlike other markets, there was no attempt to nationalize military production in order to decrease corruption or minimize profit incentives. However, neither of these actions occurred, leaving room for the abuse of the inherent connection between the military and the government.

When the war ended, some of those private industries remained in military supply chains, and this "permanent armaments industry of vast proportions emerged."<sup>6</sup> Although Eisenhower recognized the importance this industry played in wartime efforts, he warned explicitly against the continued influence of these groups.<sup>7</sup> He warned that this influence might lead to abuse of power, calling on the American public to continue to monitor this so-called military-industrial complex.

Although Eisenhower was addressing this problem in the 1960s, many of the concrete concerns Eisenhower raised manifested themselves throughout the Cold War. This long arms race was another example of an era wherein many private firms converted to the military sector because of the high, consistent demand from the government for arms, and thus a higher overall

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<sup>6</sup> HISTORY. President Eisenhower Warns of Military-Industrial Complex. *HISTORY*, 2009, <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/eisenhower-warns-of-military-industrial-complex>

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

profit margin because of the consistent demand from the U.S. government and the lower number of suppliers. As the Cold War ended in the 1990s, many weapons manufacturers were presented with a profit dilemma: revert to their pre-war manufacturing consumables or remain in the weapons business. Again, many chose to remain as weapons manufacturers, a fact that was acknowledged at the time. George F. Kennan wrote, in *The Pathology of Power* in 1987, “Were the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under the waters of the ocean, the American military-industrial complex would have to remain, substantially unchanged, until some other adversary could be invented. Anything else would be an unacceptable shock to the American economy.”<sup>8</sup> Not only were profit incentives in favor of these manufacturers, but by even this time, defense contract spending was a substantial part of the American economy.

In addition to powering a significant portion of the American economy, the military-industrial complex does have some positive effects, including the advancement of unclassified and civilian technology stemming from the research and development of these large firms.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, civilian companies do benefit from this connection as well. Additionally, American universities around this time became bastions of academic research, and they quickly became a sort of glue between government and private industry.

## B. The End of the Cold War’s Economic Impact

The aforementioned third era of the military-industrial complex has shifted the focus of these companies toward foreign customers. As the United States entered the new era of the ‘War on Terror,’ ground warfare and other less-technical methods of war were prioritized, leaving the main comparative profit advantage of these companies, their funding for research and

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<sup>8</sup> George Frost Kennan. *At a Century's Ending: Reflections 1982–1995*. W.W. Norton and Company, 1997, p. 118. ISBN 9780393316094.

<sup>9</sup> Marc Pilisuk & Thomas Hayden. Is There a Military Industrial Complex Which Prevents Peace?: Consensus and Countervailing Power in Pluralistic Systems. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1967, 21 (3): 67–117. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1965.tb00506.x. ISSN 0022-4537.

development, lacking. With this in mind, these companies shifted their aims to foreign nations who would purchase weapons already developed by these companies; these sales will be detailed in a section to follow.

Also, the third era of the military-industrial complex demonstrated the intimate ties between the defense industry and the economy. For example, between the time the Berlin wall fell in 1989 and 1992, 300,000 jobs out of 3,000,000 were lost in this industry, which contributed directly to the recession experienced around that time.<sup>10</sup> In addition to the lack of Cold War spending about this time, Congress was assessing new legislation to decrease the national debt, focusing in on military spending. Louis Uchitelle of the New York Times described this new approach to the debt, writing, “Under the 1990 Deficit Reduction Law, military savings cannot automatically be spent elsewhere, but the restriction expires in 1993 ‘and that terrifies everyone in the defense industry,’ said Sam F. Iacobellis, chief operating officer of Rockwell International.”<sup>11</sup> Internally, the industry has seen rising exports of weapons offset domestic military budget cuts, but ultimately the declining profits domestically was a cause of concern. To combat this decline in profits because of defense spending cuts, defense industry firms now lobby Congress to ensure they are maximizing domestic and international sales – in order to maximize returns to shareholders. Now, the attitude is “make weapons or shut down,” which was not always the way that manufacturers thought about their own production: whereas before they considered making the business decision to revert to their previous manufacturing items, now they were committed to weapons manufacturing.<sup>12</sup>

Additionally, the government did attempt to combat this permanent military sector by providing subsidies to the firms converting back to non-military products, but often these incentive programs were inconsistent and thus not useful to these companies. One example of the

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<sup>10</sup> Louis Uchitelle. Arms Makers: Rather Fight than Switch. *The New York Times*, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/20/business/arms-makers-rather-fight-than-switch.html?pagewanted=all>

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

lack of profit incentive, and an inconsistency in messaging from the federal government, was Boeing's attempt to manufacture subway cars in addition to military helicopters. This venture failed, partially because Boeing was attempting this foray due in no small part to additional funding coming from the Urban Mass Transit Program; however, federal funding was cut from this program and the federal government failed to establish uniform standards that would have allowed Boeing to produce the same subway car for every state, increasing economies of scale to make this process even more profitable. The New York Times writes, "But for Lloyd Dumas, an expert on conversion at the University of Texas at Dallas, the Boeing Vertol failure only underscores Government's huge role in the conversion process. 'If there were a 10-year commitment to the development of a high-speed rail system,' Mr. Dumas said, 'that would give Boeing Vertol the assurance it needed to develop and make high-quality cars.'"<sup>13</sup> This failure of the government to make good on its promise to facilitate this conversion process makes it even more difficult for these firms to invest in the conversion process with such great unknowns.

Although the Cold War instigated the continuing production of military material, this trend was continued by the 'War on Terror' that began after September 11, 2001. This moment represents a turning point in the history of the military-industrial complex: the focus of the American military shifted from research and innovation of the Cold War Era to groundwarfare of this new time. Additionally, the United States began to take on the role of arming other nations and allowing them to take on their own conflicts instead of involving itself in them. This new focus required the military-industrial complex to adapt to provide for these foreign arms sales. This evolution in the military-industrial complex introduced a new era of lobbying for these companies.

Additionally, the rise of the military-industrial complex is not independent or uninfluential in America's military involvement in countries such as Libya, Syria, Afghanistan,

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<sup>13</sup> Louis Uchitelle. Arms Makers: Rather Fight than Switch. *The New York Times*, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/20/business/arms-makers-rather-fight-than-switch.html?pagewanted=all>



and Iraq. With this increased military spending, to be specified later in this Thesis, there was significant profit made in the weapons sector, again increasing the incentive for such companies to remain in the weapons business. An Aljazeera piece writes, "Investment in homeland security companies is expected to yield a 12 percent annual growth through 2013 - an astronomical return when compared to other parts of the tanking economy."<sup>14</sup>

Additionally, because defense is deemed critical to US government operations, there are numerous subsidies that defense contractors receive, even as their products are guaranteed to be bought back by the federal government. Louis Uchitelle of the New York Times wrote in 2017,

That outlay of taxpayer money is concentrated in eight sectors of manufacturing, including ammunition, aircraft, guided missiles, shipbuilding and armored vehicles. Shut down production in those areas and factory production in America, measured as value added, would shrink 10 percent or more, according to Richard Aboulafia, a vice president of the Teal Group, a defense consulting firm. Mr. Aboulafia based his estimate, he said, on an analysis of the Defense Department budget and export data. Dan Luria, research director of the Michigan Manufacturing Technology Center, concurred with those figures. To put the matter graphically, factories in the United States churn out one rifle barrel for every nine auto fenders.<sup>15</sup>

This implies, and the data heavily suggests, that the military-industrial complex is keeping American manufacturing economically powerful and internationally influential.<sup>16</sup> The dependence of the larger economy on the defense will continue to be explored throughout this Thesis.

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<sup>14</sup> Jonathan Turley. Big Money Behind War: the Military-Industrial Complex. *Aljazeera*, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/big-money-behind-war-military-industrial-complex-20141473026736533.html>

<sup>15</sup> Louis Uchitelle. Arms Makers: Rather Fight than Switch. *The New York Times*, 1992,

<https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/20/business/arms-makers-rather-fight-than-switch.html?pagewanted=all>

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

As another testament to how powerful these groups are, here is a comparison of the top governmental contractors and defense contractors: the overlap is striking:




Figure 1: Top Federal Contractors and Top Defense Contractors.

Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon are the primary firms this Thesis will examine; each are among the top recipients of governmental contracts, and correspondingly each are among the top lobbying firms in the nation.

## C. Comparative Military Growth

The military spending of the United States, especially as compared to nearly every other country, is a major impact of the military-industrial complex. During Eisenhower's administration at the end of the Korean War, instead of lowering the number of standing troops, which had been done after WWI and WWII, the United States instead maintained its standing army into the Cold War.<sup>18</sup> This timing, with the Cold War's expansion of defense research and development, led to many of these civilian corporations that would have returned to their pre-war productions to stay in the weapons manufacturing business.

<sup>17</sup> Bloomberg. BGOV Top 10 Lists. *Bloomberg*, 2020, <https://about.bgov.com/bgov200/>

<sup>18</sup> Louis Uchitelle. Arms Makers: Rather Fight than Switch. *The New York Times*, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/20/business/arms-makers-rather-fight-than-switch.html?pagewanted=all>

In terms of the United States' GDP, "roughly 10 percent of the \$2.2 trillion in factory output in the United States goes into the production of weapons sold mainly to the Defense Department for use by the armed forces," according to the New York Times.<sup>19</sup> This self-fulfilling cycle has dominated American manufacturing since the Cold War: weapons manufacturing is encouraged, and the research subsidized, by the US government, which then buys the produced weapons back from the manufacturers. It becomes a very profitable cycle for these manufacturers, who are thus willing to spend thousands on lobbying efforts to continue this trend.

Especially compared to other countries, on nearly every metric the United States spends more on the military. "According to a 2014 report by the Council of Foreign Relations, in the years after World War II, national defense spending as a percentage of GDP ranged from a high of 15 percent in 1952 (during the Korean War) to a low of 3.7 percent in 2000. Military spending rose sharply again the following year, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to the U.S. government declaring a global war on terrorism."<sup>20</sup> Although there is fluctuation over the years, dependent on whether or not the country is explicitly at war, the huge amounts of military spending can at least in part be traced to the military-industrial complex. The details of these connections will be explored later in this piece.

The following is a table of the countries spending the most on military and defense in the world in 2019 in billions of dollars:

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<sup>19</sup> Louis Uchitelle. Arms Makers: Rather Fight than Switch. *The New York Times*, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/20/business/arms-makers-rather-fight-than-switch.html?pagewanted=all>

<sup>20</sup> HISTORY. Military-Industrial Complex. *HISTORY*, 2018, <https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/military-industrial-complex>




Figure 2. Country Spending on Military and Defense.

As is evident from the table, the United States spending significantly more than even the second country on this list. Even presented as a percentage of GDP, the United States is still among the largest spenders on the military:




Figure 3. Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP

Additionally, Saudi Arabia participates in many arms sales with the United States, so even a significant portion of that defense spending is done through American companies. This is notable because it provides an additional avenue for revenue for these American companies, which will also appear in their lobbying efforts and their foray into foreign policy.

<sup>21</sup> Statista. The Countries with the Higher Military Spending in 2019. *Statista*, 2020, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/>

<sup>22</sup> Statista. Military Expenditure as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Highest Spending Countries 2019. *Statista*, 2020, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/266892/military-expenditure-as-percentage-of-gdp-in-highest-spending-countries/>

There is also a necessary distinction between the defense budget and the portion of that budget that goes to contractors, such as Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin. The Bloomberg Government releases an annual report on Federal Industry Leaders, analyzing the impact and influence that defense contractors specifically have in this field. According to their 2019 report, “Defense contract spending was \$404 billion in fiscal 2019, a \$30 billion increase from the prior year. In total, spending at the Pentagon surged by \$122 billion between fiscal 2015 and 2019.”<sup>23</sup> Additionally, “In fiscal 2019, DOD’s largest bureaus experienced spending increases of about 10%. The Navy added \$12.4 billion and accounts for \$127.4 billion. The Army increased by \$9.7 billion and totaled \$106.7 billion. The Air Force gained \$6.6 billion and totaled \$83.7 billion.”<sup>24</sup> Military and contractor spending has continued to increase, much to the joy of these firms.

The Trump administration has continued this trend with the military budget. Pew Research Center notes that “in fiscal year 2016...the U.S. government spent some \$604 billion on national defense, which made up 15 percent of its total spending of about \$3.95 trillion. By contrast, a two-year budget deal passed by Congress and signed by President Donald Trump in February 2018 approved some \$716 billion for defense spending in fiscal year 2019, compared with \$605 in non-defense domestic spending.”<sup>25</sup> This is a significant increase as compared with 2016. In the 2021 Budget Review, according to the Bloomberg report, “The funding patterns at each agency vary in fiscal 2021. The Defense, Veterans Affairs, Homeland Security, and Treasury departments, as well as NASA, are among the few agencies that would receive budget

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<sup>23</sup> Dan Snyder. BGOV 2020 Report. *Bloomberg*, 2020, <https://data.bloomberglp.com/bna/sites/3/2020/06/2020-BGOV200-Report.pdf>

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> HISTORY. Military-Industrial Complex. *HISTORY*, 2018, <https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/military-industrial-complex>

increases in President Donald Trump's budget plan."<sup>26</sup> This shows that the increase in defense spending is likely to continue to increase.

The Peter G. Peterson Foundation, along with the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, note that the United States spends as much on defense as the next ten countries combined, as noted by this chart:




Figure 4. U.S. Military Spending Compared to Other Countries.

Additionally, the United States has historically also devoted more of its GDP in percentage terms to defense spending than the rest of the G7, its comparable allies:




Figure 5. Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP in the G7 Countries.

<sup>26</sup> Dan Snyder. BGOV 2020 Report. *Bloomberg*, 2020.

<https://data.bloomberglp.com/bna/sites/3/2020/06/2020-BGOV200-Report.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> Peter G. Peterson Foundation. The United States Spends More on Defense Spending Than the Next Ten Countries Combined. *Peter G. Peterson Foundation*, 2020, [https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053\\_defense-comparison](https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison)

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

This chart notes an interesting trend in U.S. defense spending: the downward trend seen in the 1990s disappeared around 2001, presumably due to the 9/11 terrorist attack.

## D. Lobbying

The military-industrial complex is especially potent in the United States because of the integration of lobbyists into many of the key roles in federal administrations; this might be due to the inherent setup of the American government, where Presidential appointments are located in key areas of bureaucratic agencies and bureaus, although that is speculation. According to American Foreign Relations, the impacts of the permanent industrial complex are striking: "an undue influence on military policy and strategy, a tendency to extravagance and waste in defense spending, a negative long-range impact on the economy, and a possible weakening of the country itself."<sup>29</sup> This implies that the increased defense spending detailed in the previous section can be attributed to the employment of some of these lobbyists. Further, these lobbyists have shifted their goals over the past few decades to not only increase the domestic military budget, but to also encourage foreign arms sales to international buyers; these sales, and how the lobbyists interact with those writing these agreements, will be detailed in a section to follow.

Defense contractors receive some of the largest contracts from the federal government, and have only gotten larger as time has passed, detailed in the table below:

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<sup>29</sup> American Foreign Relations. The Military-Industrial Complex – the Impact of a Permanent Military Industry. *American Foreign Relations*. <https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/The-Military-Industrial-Complex-The-impact-of-a-permanent-military-industry.html>

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS, 1968			
Contractor	Headquarters	DOD Contracts FY 1968 (billions of dollars)	Main Projects
General Dynamics	New York	\$ 2.24	F-111 fighter-bomber, Polaris submarine
Lockheed Aircraft	California	1.87	C-141, C-5A transports, Polaris missile
General Electric	New York	1.49	jet engines, electronics
United Aircraft	Connecticut	1.32	jet engines, helicopters
McDonnell Douglas	Missouri	1.10	Phantom F-4, Douglas A-4 bomber
AT&T	New York	.78	Safeguard missile, antisubmarine projects
Boeing	Washington	.76	B-52, helicopters, Minuteman missile
Ling-Temco-Vought	Texas	.76	A-7 fighter, electronics, Lance missile
North American Rockwell	California	.67	avionics, submarine electronics
General Motors	Michigan	.63	gas-turbine aircraft engines, tanks, M-16 rifle
TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS, 1999			
Contractor	DOD Contracts		
Lockheed Martin	\$ 12.67 billion		
Boeing	11.57		
Raytheon	6.40		
General Dynamics	4.56		
Northrop Grumman	3.19		
United Technologies	2.37		
Litton Industries	2.10		
General Electric	1.71		
TRW	1.43		
Textron	1.42		

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Figure 6. Defense Manufacturers Contracts, 1968 versus 1999.

In this Thesis, I will focus on the lobbying efforts of the top five lobbying firms from 1999, which are also the top contractors today: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman.

One specific example of the impact of having a lobbyist in the federal government is the former Secretary Michael Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security. He was seen using his insider lobbying influence to put full-body scanners in airports. Independent of whether these machines have deterred terrorism, "When Chertoff was giving dozens of interviews to convince the public that the machines were needed to hold back the terror threat, many people were unaware that the manufacturer of the machine is a client of the Chertoff Group, his highly profitable security consulting agency."<sup>31</sup> Another less specific example is former Vice President Dick Chaney, who is the CEO of defense-contractor Halliburton; his position during Bush's

<sup>30</sup> American Foreign Relations. The Military-Industrial Complex – the Impact of a Permanent Military Industry. American Foreign Relations. <https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/The-Military-Industrial-Complex-The-impact-of-a-permanent-military-industry.html>

<sup>31</sup> Jonathan Turley. Big Money Behind War: The Military-Industrial Complex. *Aljazeera*, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/big-money-behind-war-military-industrial-complex-20141473026736533.html>



administration had significant influence when many decisions about the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan were being made.<sup>32</sup> By framing the debate as 'tough on terror' versus 'soft on terror,' these lobbyists have only expanded their power to increase military and security expenditure in the modern age.

Additionally, these lobbyists have an incentive to push American manufacturing from a foreign policy perspective: to increase dependence on American goods and decrease dependence on foreign-made weapons, coming from countries including Russia, an adversary. The following chart demonstrates the market shares of these countries:




Figure 7. Global Share of Major Arms Exports.

## E. Think Tanks

Although lobbying is the primary way by which the military-industrial complex makes their priorities known, some of these companies also funnel money into think tanks such as the Atlantic Council and the Lexington Institute, as well as other industry groups such as the National Defense Industrial Association.

<sup>32</sup> Jonathan Turley. Big Money Behind War: The Military-Industrial Complex. Aljazeera, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/big-money-behind-war-military-industrial-complex-20141473026736533.html>

<sup>33</sup> SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database. *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, 2020, <https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-and-military-expenditure/international-arms-transfers>

The Atlantic Council is funded by many groups, including Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman; the think tank's primary issue areas include "Security and Defense" and "Economy and Business."<sup>34</sup> The Lexington Institute is "a research group financed partly by military contractors" whose goal is to provide policy ideas around the military and defense.<sup>35</sup> By advocating for policy through the lens of these think tanks, the military-industrial complex has yet another avenue to pursue their own interests.

### III. Scholarship on the Military-Industrial Complex

The literature on the military-industrial complex often provides normative analyses of this iron triangle. In the early literature, most authors focused on weapons systems and provided normative analysis on the value of this complex. Some emphasized the positive aspects of the military-industrial complex and others emphasized the negative consequences. As the military-industrial complex evolved, the more recent literature recognizes that these new trends are related to weapons that can be used in ground warfare and foreign arms sales specifically. Again, this analysis was mostly normative: authors see many benefits around the military-industrial complex, including allowing the United States to expand its foreign policy goals and maintaining military dominance, but others see the negative consequences of the closer relationship of industry and government as a priority to combat. Although these perspectives are valuable, the goal of this Thesis is to not provide a normative analysis of this complex, but instead to characterize the military-industrial complex as it currently exists and to show its current focus.

The military-industrial complex is the subject of numerous research papers and journal articles in which authors have differing opinions on the benefits and costs of this relationship

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<sup>34</sup> Atlantic Council. Our Subject Areas. 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issues/>

<sup>35</sup> Christopher Drew. Bid Process for Air Force Tankers is Criticized. *The New York Times*, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/business/27tanker.html>

between bureaucracy and private companies, but overall, there are a few points made these authors. One grouping emphasizes that the military-industrial complex is a positive influence because it encourages research and innovation as well as improves the economy because of the many sectors that defense manufacturing touches and profits. Another group states that the military-industrial complex is gaining too much influence and needs to be stifled because of its influence on foreign policy and arm sales. Finally, a third group of authors argues that the military-industrial complex has diminished in influence since the Cold War Era and is thus ebbing out of the spotlight, making it an overused boogeyman in the face of other, more pressing defense issues. Although each of these viewpoints has merit, the military-industrial complex has a decreased domestic policy influence but an increased foreign policy influence due to their increased focus on foreign arms sales.

Daniel Sarewitz, in his article *Science Agencies must Bite the Innovation Bullet*, writes on the positives of the military-industrial complex in terms of sponsored innovation and incentives to invest in research and development.<sup>36</sup> He writes, “The [United States] preserved this advantage during the cold war through the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) central role in technology development, and through close and persistent ties between DOD and private industry.”<sup>37</sup> Further, this innovation expanded into other fields, like computer science and material sciences, which impacted whole ranges of the U.S. economy; this expansive innovation positively affected so many aspects of American manufacturing as well. The positive impact on both the economy and potential innovation has a beneficial ripple affect across the whole economy. Additionally, the military’s role as an “early customer for advanced technologies,” ensuring that these innovations would be immediately profitable for private companies.<sup>38</sup> Because of the constant need for

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<sup>36</sup> Daniel Sarewitz. *Science Agencies must Bite the Innovation Bullet*. *WorldView*, 2011, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.tulane.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=a561a5f1-0d20-4878-909f-21468b99c941%40sessionmgr101>

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

military contracts, private companies can basically guarantee future contracts thus creating a free-market incentive for these companies to continue to invest in these promising technologies.

Sarewitz implies that the lack of ability of the government to effectively and efficiently allocate innovation funds means this should be left to the private sector, and the military-industrial complex works perfectly in this role. This positive viewpoint of the military-industrial complex does correctly identify the research and development advantages that give America such military power; however, it does not correctly identify the profit-seeking motives of these companies that at times alter United States foreign policy.

Some authors disagree with this rosy outlook on the influences of the military-industrial complex. Matthew Farish and Patrick Vitale, in their paper *Locating the Military-Industrial Complex: An Introduction*, write, “A raft of studies, some polemical, others more analytical, tracked Eisenhower’s warning through a decade of what Seymour Melman called ‘Pentagon capitalism,’ as the ‘statemanagement’ typified by the actions of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara drew an ever-tighter loop around economic, military, and political authority.”<sup>39</sup> The overinfluence of these private firms, they propose, has overtaken governmental authority in a number of areas. Further, another consequence of this idea is the intertwining of minds from private industry and bureaucracy, blurring the line between public and private ideas. Additionally, instead of the phrase military-industrial complex, these authors prefer the phrase “militaristic cultural hegemony,” a fuzzy distinction that emphasizes the economic embeddedness of the military over the separation of industry and government.<sup>40</sup> By prioritizing the cultural aspect of this complex, these authors show that the revolving door between bureaucracy and lobbying has become a cultural cycle; additionally, the involvement and expectation of the military in everyday

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<sup>39</sup> Matthew Farish & Patrick Vitale. *Locating the Military-Industrial Complex: An Introduction*. *Antipode*, 2010, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.tulane.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=ba285992-31bf-4c73-834a-ec10e70e0ba3%40sessionmgr103>

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

life makes this system incredibly hard to dismantle. By becoming intertwined in civilian rhetoric and research, the military became a part of the fabric of the American economy and lifestyle. This primarily negative viewpoint of the military-industrial complex does speak to its impact, but it does not describe the shifting nature of the military-industrial complex's impact on foreign policy, or how this impact has ebbed and flowed over the years as American priorities overseas have also shifted.

Further, Edmund Byrne in *The Journal of Business Ethics* also takes a negative view of the military-industrial complex, noting that the military-industrial complex violates fundamental business codes of conduct by promoting wars and interventions that are not strictly self-defense motivated.<sup>41</sup> The author assumes a high level of influence from the private manufacturers in foreign policy, but the author is speaking to the ethics of these private companies in their involvement with both American wars and in foreign arms sales with perpetrators of human rights violations. Especially in the mid- and late-twentieth century, the continued ties between these private companies and war profits has created a motivation to continue to perpetuate these wars for the sake of private profit.<sup>42</sup> The lack of nationalization in the productions have left profit motives to be the primary driving factor for this important sector.

However, other authors think that the attention paid to the military-industrial complex is overblown. For example, William Lynn in *Foreign Affairs* thinks that the impacts of globalization have decreased the influence of the military-industrial complex. As companies like Google increase their influence in both the private and public sectors, begin to invest in fields such as automatic robotics, and subsequently turn down defense contracts because of its other uses for the technology, the US Department of Defense loses its edge in those fields and has to depend more

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<sup>41</sup> E.F. Byrne. The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex is Circumstantially Unethical. *J Bus Ethics*, 2010, 95, 153–165 <https://doi-org.libproxy.tulane.edu/10.1007/s10551-009-0361-0>

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

on exclusively civilian research, rather than research it funds, and patents, itself.<sup>43</sup> According to Strategy&, a think tank with PwC cited in this journal, “More than one-third of what the Pentagon spends on procurement and services goes to nontraditional companies such as Apple and Dell.”<sup>44</sup> Further, as movements by many progressives both in and out of government to reduce military spending have made future funding uncertain, “Defense companies are therefore reluctant to invest their own cash in research that, because of uncertainty in the Pentagon's budget, may never yield viable products.”<sup>45</sup> That, combined with a complicated defense contract bidding process and bureaucratic Pentagon requirements, creates a system with significant inefficiencies that private companies have started to shy away from. This gives way to a new era in defense spending as the US looks to gain nontraditional advantages over its competitors.

Adding to that point, Charles Dunlap in *The Military-Industrial Complex*, published in *MIT Press*, thinks that President Eisenhower's fears were not realized in the times after the Cold War, as man-powered missions like Afghanistan and Iraq take priority over technical advancement.<sup>46</sup> Those wars have been “manpower-intensive and inclined toward low-tech solutions,” decreasing the influence of firms focused on research and development in favor of historically prioritized man missions.<sup>47</sup> He also argues that even “innovations more often represent a repurposing of existing equipment designed and built for use against Cold War adversaries;” however much that may or may not be true, this again demonstrates a reduced dependence on the private innovation sector compared to the Cold War era.<sup>48</sup> Although Dunlap is not arguing that the military-industrial complex is a non-issue, he is stating that its influence has dropped since the end of the Cold War Era and the beginning of the War on Terror. This

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<sup>43</sup> William J. Lynn III. The End of the Military Industrial Complex. *Foreign Affairs*, 1994, New York Vol. 93, Iss. 6, 104-110.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Charles Dunlap Jr. *The Military-Industrial Complex*. MIT Press, 2011, [https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.tulane.edu/stable/23047354?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.tulane.edu/stable/23047354?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

viewpoint does describe the changing influence of the military-industrial complex, but it does not acknowledge how these companies have adapted to this shifting landscape.

Because the literature reaches quite different normative conclusions on the presence of the military-industrial complex, there is a definite need to continue examining the influences of the complex in order to quantify its effects on foreign policy, the American economy, and how the American bureaucracy functions. However, each of these authors have touched on aspects of the evolution of the military-industrial complex: as the traditional influence of this complex has given way for a new influence directed toward foreign arms sales, the impact of this complex has shifted as well. The positive side of the complex, that of research and development, has mostly given way to the foreign arms sales that are becoming the focus of the military-industrial complex.

## IV. Companies Contributing to the Military-Industrial Complex

Although there are many manufacturers who contribute in some way to the military-industrial complex, the four main firms who receive most of the government contracts include Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. These are both the companies that traditionally dominated the military-industrial complex, but also these companies by far receive the most foreign arms sales as well, making them the primary arms manufacturers in the international marketplace. Although they are independent companies, they use the same procedures to influence government policy and bureaucracy. Notably, the long-term nature of many of the contracts received by these companies solidifies their expected profit margins, allowing them to continue producing military equipment. With these profit margins come influence: the nature of military equipment means that these firms can advocate for themselves on behalf of national security to maintain these revenue streams. Also, each of these four companies

donate significant amounts of campaign funds to relevant and influential elected officials; those specific contributions will be examined in their own section. These four companies in particular will be briefly examined below.

## A. Boeing

Boeing as a military manufacturer specializes in aircraft and other fighter jets. As recently as July 2020, Boeing received a contract from the Air Force to produce eight F-15EX fighter jets for \$1.2 billion over three years.<sup>49</sup> This deal, a part of a \$23 billion update to the Air Force's fleet, was made to expressly provide competition for Lockheed Martin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.<sup>50</sup> This is an interesting glitch in the weapons manufacturing market: instead of competition being cultivated in the open marketplace, it is cultivated in the designs of the jets after the contracts have already been awarded.

In 2019, Boeing received \$28.1 billion from the federal government, primarily through contracts from the Department of Defense and the Air Force.<sup>51 52</sup> The following is a table details the contracts that were signed in 2019 but will be paid out over the next several years:

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<sup>49</sup> Aaron Gregg. Boeing lands \$1.2 billion deal for eight F-15EX fighter jets. *Washington Post*, 2011, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/13/boeing-f15ex-contract/>

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Stephen Stebbins et al. These 30 companies, including Boeing, get the most money from the federal government. *USA Today*, 2019, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2019/03/27/lockheed-martin-boeing-get-most-money-federal-government/39232293/>

<sup>52</sup> Dan Snyder. BGOV 2020 Report. *Bloomberg*, 2020, <https://data.bloomberglp.com/bna/sites/3/2020/06/2020-BGOV200-Report.pdf>



Agency / Department Ranking		FY 2019 Contracts
2	Department of Defense	\$26.3 billion
1	Defense: Air Force	\$12.4 billion
3	Defense: Navy	\$8.8 billion
5	Defense: Army	\$2.7 billion
2	National Aeronautics and Space Administration	\$1.8 billion
2	Defense: Missile Defense Agency	\$1.2 billion
7	Defense: Defense Logistics Agency	\$799.7 million
2	Defense: US Special Operations Command	\$424.7 million
3	Defense: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	\$104 million
6	Defense: Defense Microelectronics Activity	\$28.6 million
62	Homeland Security Department	\$17.2 million
12	Defense: US Transportation Command	\$9.5 million
28	Interior Department	\$6.9 million
60	Justice Department	\$3.3 million
48	Transportation Department	\$1.7 million
25	Defense: Defense Threat Reduction Agency	\$1.1 million
72	General Services Administration	\$1.1 million

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Figure 8. Boeing Defense Contracts to the U.S. Government


Additionally, Boeing has received defense contracts from foreign countries, coordinated and approved by the U.S. federal government. For example, in 2020 alone Boeing received defense contracts for various fighter jets with New Zealand, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Japan, Taiwan, Morocco, Germany, South Korea, United Kingdom, Israel, and Australia, often coordinated through the Department of State as a part of larger diplomatic arrangements.<sup>54</sup> These sales will be discussed in the section delineated by country below.

Boeing lobbying efforts, in terms of nominal dollars and number of lobbyists, appears as follows:

<sup>53</sup> Dan Snyder. BGOV 2020 Report. *Bloomberg*, 2020, <https://data.bloomberglp.com/bna/sites/3/2020/06/2020-BGOV200-Report.pdf>

<sup>54</sup> GovConWire. Boeing. 2020. <https://www.govconwire.com/?s=boeing>

Annual Lobbying by Boeing Co



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Figure 9. Annual Lobbying by Boeing.

In 2020, the total lobbying expenditure is \$9,290,000, not accounting for the fourth quarter. 83 of the 111 lobbyists at Boeing are “revolvers,” or people who were previously government employees and have now transitioned into the lobbying sector, using their insider contacts to create policy.<sup>56</sup> In this same vein, CNN notes that “a former Boeing lobbyist now serves as staff director on the Senate’s Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee.”<sup>57</sup>

Boeing’s PAC contributions are roughly evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats.<sup>58</sup> According to Politico, “Since 1982, it’s given an almost equal amount to Republicans (\$4.6 million) and Democrats (\$4.3 million).”<sup>59</sup> Boeing’s primary donations have been to major Democratic and Republican groups, including the Senate Leadership Fund, the Senate Majority PAC, and both the Democratic and Republican national committees, averaging

<sup>55</sup> Open Secrets. Client Profile: Boeing Co. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020. <https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2020&id=D000000100>

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Fredreka Schouten et al. Boeing a Major Lobbying Player on Capitol Hill. *CNN Politics*, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/12/politics/boeing-capitol-hill-lobbying/index.html>

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> James Hohmann. Boeing Helps Murray Play Defense. *Politico*, 2016, <https://www.politico.com/story/2010/06/boeing-helps-murray-play-defense-038178>

about \$200,000 each in this past election cycle alone.<sup>60</sup> Since 1998, Boeing has spent \$275 million on lobbying, making it the largest lobbyist in the defense aerospace industry.<sup>61</sup>

## B. Lockheed Martin

According to the 2019 Bloomberg BGOV Report, Lockheed Martin received government contracts primarily from the following agencies and groups, which will be paid out over the next several years:

Agency / Department Ranking		FY 2019 Contracts
1	Department of Defense	\$46.8 billion
1	Defense: Navy	\$20.2 billion
2	Defense: Air Force	\$10.8 billion
1	Defense: Army	\$9.4 billion
1	Defense: Missile Defense Agency	\$4.4 billion
3	National Aeronautics and Space Administration	\$1.4 billion
5	Defense: Defense Logistics Agency	\$950.5 million
1	Defense: US Special Operations Command	\$932.5 million
2	Defense: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	\$196.2 million
25	Homeland Security Department	\$111.7 million
26	General Services Administration	\$65.3 million
3	Defense: Defense Microelectronics Activity	\$62.5 million
37	Commerce Department	\$8 million
31	Transportation Department	\$7.5 million

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
Figure 10. Lockheed Martin Contracts with the U.S. Government.

Lockheed Martin's lobbying efforts and lobbyist personnel appear as follows:

<sup>60</sup> Open Secrets. Boeing Co. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/boeing-co/recipients?id=d000000100>

<sup>61</sup> Heather Timmons et al. How money and influence flows between the US government and Boeing. *Quartz*, 2019, <https://qz.com/1572381/the-relationship-between-boeing-trump-and-the-federal-government/>

<sup>62</sup> Dan Snyder. BGOV 2020 Report. *Bloomberg*, 2020, <https://data.bloomberglp.com/bna/sites/3/2020/06/2020-BGOV200-Report.pdf>



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Figure 11. Annual Lobbying by Lockheed Martin.

Again, as was the case with Boeing, the lack of accounting for the fourth quarter of lobbying efforts makes it appear like there is a drop-off. The total lobbying expenditure this far for Lockheed Martin is \$10 million, the majority of which is going to the defense and aerospace industries. Of the 69 lobbyists employed by Lockheed Martin, 50 are “revolvers.”<sup>64</sup>

## C. Northrop Grumman

According to the 2019 Bloomberg BGOV Report, Northrop Grumman received federal defense contracts primarily from the following agencies and groups, which will be paid out over the next several years:

<sup>63</sup> Open Secrets. Client Profile: Lockheed Martin. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2020&id=D000000104>

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.


Agency / Department Ranking		FY 2019 Contracts
5	Department of Defense	\$14.5 billion
3	Defense: Air Force	\$5.2 billion
7	Defense: Navy	\$5.1 billion
6	Defense: Army	\$2.6 billion
4	National Aeronautics and Space Administration	\$1.1 billion
2	Defense: Defense Microelectronics Activity	\$633.3 million
13	Defense: Defense Logistics Agency	\$539.1 million
4	Defense: Missile Defense Agency	\$373.7 million
1	Social Security Administration	\$218.9 million
13	General Services Administration	\$155.8 million
22	Health and Human Services Department	\$146.7 million
21	Homeland Security Department	\$129.9 million
11	Defense: Defense Information Systems Agency	\$86.2 million
9	Treasury Department	\$66.3 million
20	State Department	\$47.9 million
20	Transportation Department	\$26.7 million
7	Defense: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	\$25.2 million
41	Justice Department	\$13.1 million
9	Defense: US Transportation Command	\$12.2 million
6	Office of Personnel Management	\$12 million
2	Commodity Futures Trading Commission	\$10 million
16	Defense: Defense Threat Reduction Agency	\$5 million
19	Defense: Washington Headquarters Services	\$3.6 million
8	Defense: Defense Finance and Accounting Service	\$3.3 million
49	Veterans Affairs Department	\$2.5 million

65

Figure 12. Northrop Grumman Contracts with the U.S. Government.

The lobbying for Northrop Grumman is as follows:

Annual Lobbying by Northrop Grumman



66

Figure 13. Annual Lobbying by Northrop Grumman.

The total lobbying expenditure through the first three quarters of 2020 is \$9,390,000. Of the 51 lobbyists employed by Northrop Grumman, 40 are “revolvers.”<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Dan Snyder. BGOV 2020 Report. *Bloomberg*, 2020, <https://data.bloomberglp.com/bna/sites/3/2020/06/2020-BGOV200-Report.pdf>

<sup>66</sup> Open Secrets. Client Profile: Northrop Grumman. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020., <https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2020&id=D000000170>

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

## D. Raytheon Corporation

According to the 2019 Bloomberg BGOV Report, Raytheon Corporation received federal defense contracts primarily from the following agencies and groups, which will be paid out over the next several years:


Agency / Department Ranking	FY 2019 Contracts
4 Department of Defense	\$15.1 billion
6 Defense: Navy	\$5.2 billion
4 Defense: Air Force	\$3.7 billion
3 Defense: Army	\$3.4 billion
3 Defense: Missile Defense Agency	\$1 billion
1 Defense: Defense Microelectronics Activity	\$805.2 million
12 Defense: Defense Logistics Agency	\$573.9 million
4 Commerce Department	\$297.8 million
1 Defense: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	\$209.9 million
4 Transportation Department	\$199.4 million
6 Defense: US Special Operations Command	\$117.5 million
22 National Aeronautics and Space Administration	\$95.9 million
23 General Services Administration	\$69.7 million
50 Homeland Security Department	\$31.3 million
8 Interior Department	\$29.5 million
24 Defense: Defense Information Systems Agency	\$24.8 million
8 Defense: Defense Threat Reduction Agency	\$16.5 million
3 Defense: Defense Contract Management Agency	\$11.1 million
47 Justice Department	\$9.9 million
13 Defense: US Transportation Command	\$9.3 million
45 State Department	\$3.2 million
25 Defense: Washington Headquarters Services	\$2.2 million
80 Health and Human Services Department	\$1.1 million

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Figure 14. Raytheon Corporation Contracts with the U.S. Government.

Raytheon's lobbying appears as follows:

Annual Lobbying by Raytheon Co



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Figure 15. Annual Lobbying by Raytheon Corporation.

<sup>68</sup> Dan Snyder. BGOV 2020 Report. *Bloomberg*, 2020, <https://data.bloomberglp.com/bna/sites/3/2020/06/2020-BGOV200-Report.pdf>

<sup>69</sup> Open Secrets. Client Profile: Raytheon. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2019&id=D000000175>

The total lobbying expenditure through all of 2020 is \$4,043,000; of the 45 lobbyists employed by Raytheon, 28 are “revolvers.”<sup>70</sup>

## V. Examining Lobbying Efforts on Congressmen and Congresswomen

Although at times the military-industrial complex’s impact can seem nebulous, lobbying and campaign contributions have led to very tangible impacts on domestic policy. Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin all use their lobbying and campaign arms to elicit influence from influential Senators and Congressional people. In the following section, the specific donations from these firms will be noted, along with any extra campaign benefits they have given congresspeople on relevant subcommittees or from relevant states. These individual donations are one of the primary ways that lobbying is used by this sector; by financially supporting influential senators, both influential in the Senate writ large and influential on subcommittees concerned with military endeavors, these firms can ensure they have the ear of relevant parties when they want certain legislation.

### A. Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Members (Senate, 2020)

Presumably, the lobbying by Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman in particular will be targeted toward those members of Congress and the Senate who work most intimately on defense appropriations bills and other military funding measures; the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is one such body. Its members will be examined below, with their financial connections to these firms. Although only their most recent election cycles are

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<sup>70</sup> Open Secrets. Client Profile: Raytheon. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2019&id=D000000175>

listed here, similar figures and amounts are also present in the previous cycles, allowing these senators to rack up hundreds of thousands of dollars in these contributions.

Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) was (in the 2020 Congress) the ranking Democratic member of this subcommittee. He is a member of this influential subcommittee, and Boeing is headquartered in his home state of Illinois. Senator Durbin is open about his appreciation for the jobs that Boeing provides to the people of his state; for example, in 2018 Senator Durbin visited a Boeing plant in Illinois to highlight the funding he had directed toward defense production. In his office's press release, it says,

As Vice Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Durbin worked with Navy leaders to ensure the Fiscal Year 2019 budget includes the purchase of 110 new Super Hornets over the next five years – critical for employees in the region whose jobs depend on such production...Durbin and partners in the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee fought to add \$4.1 billion over four years billion to keep Boeing's Super Hornet and Growler production lines running. The Navy has now budgeted for the purchase of 110 Super Hornets over the next five years, including 24 aircraft in Fiscal Year 2019.<sup>71</sup>

In the 2018 election cycle, Durbin received contributions from a number of firms within the military-industrial complex. Durbin received \$67,000 from Northrop Grumman, \$48,000 from Boeing, \$29,000 from Raytheon PACs; and \$31,000 from Lockheed Martin.<sup>72</sup> All of these donations were only during the 2018 election cycle, but similarly high numbers can be found for the previous election cycles as well.

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<sup>71</sup> Dick Durbin. Durbin Visits Boeing, Highlights New Funding for Manufacturing Lines. *Dick Durbin, United States Senator of Illinois*, 2018, <https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-visits-boeing-highlights-new-funding-for-manufacturing-lines>

<sup>72</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Dick Durbin - Illinois. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/dick-durbin/contributors?cid=N00004981&cycle=2018&type=I>



Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) was the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the 2020 Congress. He received significant contributions from defense manufacturers in the 2020 cycle, including \$141,450 in contributions from Lockheed Martin, \$126,000 in contributions from Boeing, and \$78,000 in contributions from General Dynamics, another military manufacturing firm.<sup>73</sup> Additionally, Shelby drafted the July Coronavirus relief package, which, in his language, included \$8 billion in funding for F-35 jets, produced by Lockheed Martin.<sup>74</sup> Shelby, apparently, was responding to requests from the Trump Administration to add such defense funding; the Washington Post writes, “The administration never officially asked for the defense funding. It instead delivered informal requests to the powerful lawmakers like Shelby who sit atop the defense funding panel, aides say.”<sup>75</sup> Further, Senator Shelby advocated for Northrop Grumman on certain contracts from the Pentagon, including an aerial refueling tanker, over other American and European manufacturers.<sup>76</sup>

Each of the other Senators on this committee received funds from each of these four major firms; on average, they each receive about \$50,000 from each firm, totaling \$200,000 per election cycle in campaign funds for each candidate. The specific sums for each senator can be found in the Appendix.

Boeing’s primary manufacturing facilities are located in Washington, whose senators are Maria Cantwell and Patty Murray. Murray is on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, whose contributions are noted above. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA) is a major recipient of Boeing’s lobbying and contribution. For example, “Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Washington, was the

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<sup>73</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Richard Shelby - Alabama. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/richard-c-shelby/summary?cid=N00009920&cycle=2020&type=C>

<sup>74</sup> Andrew Taylor. GOP Tucks \$8 billion for Military Weaponry in Virus Bill. *Washington Post*, 2020, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/gop-tucks-8-billion-for-military-weaponry-in-virus-bill/2020/07/28/30d2ac22-d116-11ea-826b-cc394d824e35\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/gop-tucks-8-billion-for-military-weaponry-in-virus-bill/2020/07/28/30d2ac22-d116-11ea-826b-cc394d824e35_story.html)

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Christopher Drew. Bid Process for Air Force Tanker is Criticized. *The New York Times*, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/business/27tanker.html>

biggest recipient of money that Boeing's PAC and its employees directed to a candidate, totaling a little more than \$54,000 in the midterms, according to the center's data," according to CNN Politics.<sup>77</sup> Cantwell was also instrumental in the deregulation of F.A.A. standards, which many note led to the Boeing 737 MAX 8 jet's lack of safety standards.

The point of this long list of donations is to emphasize the donations by these four major firms to specifically members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee – those members of Congress who deal most directly with military budgets and arms deals. These large sums of money only note donations from their most recent election cycles, so the historical donations from these firms are even larger.

## B. Military-Industrial Leaders in Bureaucracy

President Trump appointed former Boeing executive Patrick Shanahan to be the Pentagon Chief after he was serving as the acting Secretary of Defense in 2019.<sup>78</sup> He had no military or foreign policy experience before being appointed to the role of acting Defense Secretary in 2017; before which, he worked at Boeing for 30 years.<sup>79</sup> Additionally, Shanahan was accused of degrading Boeing's competitors while acting as Defense Secretary by the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington: according to CNBC, "The nomination follows the end of a monthlong ethics investigation into Shanahan, conducted by the Defense Department's inspector general. The IG's office examined whether Shanahan had taken any actions in his official capacity to benefit Boeing, and it ultimately determined that he had not."<sup>80</sup> Although he

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<sup>77</sup> Fredreka Schouten et al. Boeing a Major Lobbying Player on Capitol Hill. *CNN Politics*, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/12/politics/boeing-capitol-hill-lobbying/index.html>

<sup>78</sup> Amanda Macias. Trump picks acting Pentagon chief and former Boeing executive Patrick Shanahan to become next secretary of Defense. *CNBC*, 2019, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/09/trump-picks-ex-boeing-exec-patrick-shanahan-to-be-secretary-of-defense.html>

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

had not acted in an official capacity to benefit Boeing, having him in this position of power is a prime example of the revolving door of bureaucratic appointments from industrial leadership.

Benjamin Cassidy, a former senior executive at Boeing, was appointed by President Trump in 2017 to be the assistant secretary for legislative affairs.<sup>81</sup> Additionally, Jonathan Raff Hoffman was appointed to the post of assistant secretary of foreign affairs, despite his previous work with the Chertoff Group, accused of advocating for invasive full-body scanners and other government contracts.<sup>82</sup> The Intercept also claims that up to 15 officials with financial ties to the military-industrial complex have been nominated throughout the administration.<sup>83</sup> This includes former Secretary of Defense Mattis, who was director of General Dynamics, before serving at this post.<sup>84</sup> Additionally, the Trump Administration has hired multiple former lobbyists for these defense manufacturers for other political appointments, primarily as advisers in the Department of Homeland Security and the White House.<sup>85</sup>

On this side note, President Trump has often used political appointments to reward loyal supporters or interest groups: for example, political appointments gave over six million dollars to the 2016 Trump campaign and related PACs during that election cycle.<sup>86</sup> Hugo Teufel, a former Raytheon employee, was nominated to be the Chief Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland Security after numerous donations to conservative groups.<sup>87</sup> After over \$70,000 in

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<sup>81</sup> Lee Fang. Donald Trump is Filling Top Pentagon and Homeland Security Positions with Defense Contractors. *The Intercept*, 2017, <https://theintercept.com/2017/03/21/revolving-door-military/>

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Open Secrets. Trump Administration Political Appointees. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/trump/political-appointees>

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

donations to Republican groups, Jim McNerney of Boeing was appointed to the President's Strategic and Policy Forum.<sup>88</sup>

Defense Secretary Mark Esper previously worked for the Aerospace Industries Association and has been called a “close ally” of lobbyist David Urban, a lobbyist for Lockheed Martin.<sup>89</sup> He is also the Vice President of Government Relations for Raytheon as recently as 2010 before becoming a registered lobbyist for the manufacturer.<sup>90</sup> Charles Kupperman, an assistant deputy to former national security adviser John Bolton and a member of both the Reagan administration, “served as a space operations executive at Lockheed Martin and in Boeing's missile defense sector.”<sup>91</sup> The normalization of the presence of high-level weapons producing executives in policy roles creates an undue arm of influence for these firms.

This “revolving door” flows both ways: Boeing has hired 19 ex-Department of Defense officials since 2008.<sup>92</sup> It nominated Nikki Haley, President Trump's former Ambassador to the United Nations, to its Board of Directors; notably, she resigned after the Boeing 737 MAX scandal, but she still presents an interesting case.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Open Secrets. Trump Administration Political Appointees. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/trump/political-appointees>

<sup>89</sup> Eliana Johnson et al. New Acting Pentagon Chief has Closer Ties to Trump. *Politico*, 2019, <https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/18/new-acting-pentagon-chief-1538146>

<sup>90</sup> Thomas Gibbons-Neff. Mark Esper, Named as Acting Defense Secretary, Brings Military Background to the Job. *The New York Times*, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/politics/mark-esper-acting-defense-secretary.html>

<sup>91</sup> Zachary Cohen. Former Bolton Deputy who was on July 25 Ukraine Call Caught in Middle of Impeachment Fight. *CNN*, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/27/politics/charles-kupperman-impeachment-testimony/index.html>

<sup>92</sup> Heather Timmons et al. How money and influence flows between the US government and Boeing. *Quartz*, 2019, <https://qz.com/1572381/the-relationship-between-boeing-trump-and-the-federal-government/>

<sup>93</sup> Jeff Mason. Ties Between Boeing and Trump Run Deep. *Reuters*, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airlines-trump/ties-between-boeing-and-trump-run-deep-idUSKBN1QT2MQ>

## VI. Other Impacts

### A. Lobbying on the Cares Act and the Tax Cut and Jobs Act

Notably, these firms do not singularly lobby on bills directly relating to aviation standards. For example, in 2018 Boeing primarily lobbied on the Trump Administration's tax cut plan; "But by far their most frequent topic, according to 2018 filings, was the 'Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,' the Republican and Trump-backed bill that slashed corporate income tax from 35% to 21%. (The bill passed in late 2017, and most of Boeing's lobbying work on it in 2018 was around "implementation issues.") Boeing also spent more than \$3 million on a bill that would make the Clean Air Act weaker."<sup>94</sup> Boeing, and many of these firms, work to make sure their influence is applicable in many areas of both foreign and domestic policy through this extensive lobbying and outreach. Their contribution on bills unrelated to their sector, in fact, expands the definition of what "their sector" is – and emphasizes the impact that manufacturing has on all aspects of the economy and policy.

### B. INF Treaty

It is possible that another casualty resulting from the military-industrial complex is the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a Cold War era treaty between the United States and Russia initially negotiated by President Ronald Reagan. In September 2019, the Trump Administration completed the formal withdrawal from the INF Treaty, one of two remaining treaties limiting the nuclear weapons of the two nations (the other being New START).<sup>95</sup> The

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<sup>94</sup> Heather Timmons et al. How money and influence flows between the US government and Boeing. *Quartz*, 2019, <https://qz.com/1572381/the-relationship-between-boeing-trump-and-the-federal-government/>

<sup>95</sup> Shannon Bugos. U.S. Completes INF Treaty Withdrawal. *Arms Control Association*, 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news/us-completes-inf-treaty-withdrawal>

Biden administration has, up until this point, not attempted a reentry into the INF Treaty, but has extended New START.

Further, there is also evidence that an uptick in stock value of military-industrial companies correlated with the withdrawal from this agreement because Raytheon, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin would be primarily responsible for manufacturing the missiles now allowed.<sup>96</sup> This ingrained correlation between the number of weapons in the world and the profits of these weapons-producing companies might create incentives for these companies to advocate for the withdrawal from such agreements, although no reporting has yet surfaced of any lobbying on behalf of withdrawal. More likely, the bureaucratic appointments of people sympathetic to anti-regulation and pro-military policies in the Department of State and others bear more of the responsibility for this policy reversal.

## VII. The New Military-Industrial Complex: Foreign Arms Sales

As the military-industrial complex has shifted its priorities from domestic innovation to foreign arms sales, these sales and agreements have become increasingly important and a higher priority for these companies. Below will detail some of the typical, and controversial, arms sales that have occurred over the past four years, some of which have been antithetical to United States foreign policy goals, demonstrating influence from the military-industrial complex.

The Trump Administration, along with many administrations before it, has funded and approved many arms sales to allied nations around the world. These arms sales, often advocated for by major weapons manufacturers, are a huge source of revenue for these companies: they

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<sup>96</sup> Aparna Narayanan. Defense Stocks May Be Tapped For New Missiles After INF Treaty Exit. *Investor's Business Daily*, 2019, <https://www.investors.com/news/defense-stocks-lockheed-raytheon-inf-treaty-boeing-northrop/>

monopolize the market of international weapons production, and they guarantee future revenue with years-long contracts. In the following sections, recent Foreign Military Sales (FMS) will be described, as well as the respective manufacturers to whom those contracts went. Importantly, these contracts do not go singularly to allies, and are thus topics of much consideration for anti-corruption advocates, as it is unclear why the United States is selling arms to foes and human rights critics.

The history of FMS begins with the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which required that the White House inform Congress of any foreign arms sales within 30 calendar days.<sup>97</sup> However, in particular, the military-industrial complex has benefited greatly from the Trump Administration's decisions to subvert this congressional authority and sell arms to a number of disagreeable nations. The following section will be a description of many of these arms agreements, including the companies and countries who have benefited from the Trump Administration's decision-making on this front. Notably, President Trump followed an unusual foreign policy by dealing with, and at times praising, dictators throughout the world, so this series of arms sales should not be taken as a trend for the current Biden Administration.<sup>98</sup> Although many, if not most, presidents have signed onto foreign arms sales, the Trump administration increased the number of sales substantially compared to the previous Obama Administration: "Exports of major arms from the US grew by 23% in comparing the periods 2010–14 and 2015–19."<sup>99</sup>

Regionally, the Trump administration has also increased military weapons exports to the Middle East, as demonstrated in the following graph:

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<sup>97</sup> Congressional Research Service. Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process. 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31675.pdf>

<sup>98</sup> Dominique Montarano. 6 Strongmen Trump has Praised – and the Conflicts it Presents. *NPR*, 2017, <https://www.npr.org/2017/05/02/526520042/6-strongmen-trumps-praised-and-the-conflicts-it-presents>

<sup>99</sup> John Haltiwanger. Trump accuses military leaders of exactly what his administration is doing — helping US weapons companies profit off of wars. *Business Insider*, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-fueled-war-arms-sales-attacks-military-leaders-for-it-2020-9>




Figure 16. Importers of Major Arms by Region and Era.

This increase might be due to a number of reasons, it is certainly an increase that has frustrated many domestic politicians because often these deals are antithetical to stated American foreign policy.

These deals have also been a source of corruption in this administration. A State Department inspector general, Stephen Linick, was fired under the Trump Administration in mid-2020, while he was investigating various arms deals.<sup>101</sup> Per the New York Times, “The State Department inspector general fired by President Trump on Friday was in the final stages of an investigation into whether the administration had unlawfully declared an ‘emergency’ last year to allow the resumption of weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for their air war in Yemen.”<sup>102</sup> The Trump Administration regularly failed to follow protocol on this issue, often with the end goal of pushing through these arms sales; as will be examined below, this was at times at the direct request of military-industrial complex officials.

<sup>100</sup> SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database. *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, 2020, <https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-and-military-expenditure/international-arms-transfers>

<sup>101</sup> Stephen Wong et al. State Dept. Investigator Fired by Trump Had Examined Weapons Sales to Saudis and Emirates. *The New York Times*, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/pompeo-trump-linick-inspector-general-firing.html>

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.



## A. Saudi Arabian Arms Deals, May 2017

In May 2017, President Trump first announced the proposed arms deal to Saudi Arabia, totaling \$110 billion, which was not approved by Congress.<sup>103</sup> Over the next month, the Trump administration notified Congress of similar deals of missile systems and trainings totaling \$750 million, \$662 million, \$15 billion, \$500 million, \$1.1 billion, and \$1.31 billion between May 2017 and late 2019.<sup>104</sup> The final, approved deals totaled \$8.1 billion.<sup>105</sup> Many of these sums were directed to Raytheon, who produced many of the systems within these contracts.

There has been significant domestic pushback against these deals for a multitude of reasons. In many of these deals, the Trump administration has attempted to circumvent Congressional oversight, leading to many resolutions rejecting these sales. Additionally, there has been evidence that some of these weapons have been used against civilians in the civil war in Yemen.

Because of the Congressional opposition to these sales in the fall of 2018, there was some intervention by Raytheon executive Thomas Kennedy via David Urban, a lobbyist closely connected to President Trump, who then got this executive a meeting with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.<sup>106</sup> Although possibly circumstantial, after this meeting, the State Department issued an emergency override of this Congressional opposition, and the sale continued.<sup>107</sup> This is one example of the interference of the military-industrial complex in the promotion of such arms deals, to the point of causing investigable corruption.

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<sup>103</sup> Forum on the Arms Trade. Trump Administration – Arms Deals to Saudi Arabia. 2020, <https://www.forumarmstrade.org/resource-page---trump--saudi-arms-sales.html>

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Joe Gould. Trump seeks new arms deal with Saudi Arabia, says key senator. *Defense News*, 2020, <https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/05/27/trump-seeking-new-arms-deal-with-saudi-arabia-says-key-senator/>

<sup>106</sup> Kenneth Vogel et al. Trump Vowed to ‘Drain the Swamp’ but Lobbyists are Helping Run his Campaign. *The New York Times*, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/us/politics/trump-lobbyists-swamp-campaign.html>

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

Saudi Arabia has been a major purchaser of U.S. weaponry, despite the accusations of human rights violations against it. Pieter Wezeman of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute stated, “Half of US arms exports in the past five years went to the Middle East, and half of those went to Saudi Arabia.”<sup>108</sup> This deal is currently being reviewed by the Biden Administration for both the ethical ramifications and the security reasons for the deal, particularly due to the claims that these weapons were used in Yemen. They also might be withdrawn as ramifications for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which was recently reported to be approved by Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman.

## B. UAE Arms Deal, November 2020

In November 2020, the Trump administration pushed through an arms sale to the United Arab Emirates, despite pushback from multiple Democratic and Republican U.S. Senators.<sup>109</sup> The Trump administration successfully sold “\$23 billion of drones and other weapons systems” to the UAE in Reaper drones and F-35s, produced by General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon.<sup>110</sup> Because this deal was negotiated so late in 2020, there is a chance that the incoming Biden administration could renege on the sale for national security reasons, including the ongoing Yemeni civil war in the region.

This deal also occurred in conjunction with a peace deal with Israel, called the Abraham Accords, in a last-ditch effort by the Trump administration to gain foreign policy wins. The deal is an important landmark for several reasons, including that it is the second largest arms sale to a single country and it also expands the list of possessors of the F-35 jet in the region from just

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<sup>108</sup> John Haltiwanger. Trump accuses military leaders of exactly what his administration is doing — helping US weapons companies profit off of wars. *Business Insider*, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-fueled-war-arms-sales-attacks-military-leaders-for-it-2020-9>

<sup>109</sup> Patricia Zengerle. U.S. senators seek to stop Trump's \$23 billion in arms sales to UAE. *Reuters*, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-emirates-arms-sales-int/u-s-senators-seek-to-stop-trumps-23-billion-in-arms-sales-to-uae-idUSKBN27Y2YO>

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

Israel previously.<sup>111</sup> In Axios, Dave Lawler makes the point that “massive arms deals with Gulf states will be a controversial aspect of President Trump's foreign policy legacy.”<sup>112</sup> This is another example of arms sales becoming a ‘sweetener’ to other foreign policy goals, often accessory to the policy itself. This deal is currently being reviewed by the Biden Administration for both the ethical ramifications and the security reasons for the deal.

### C. Indian Arms Deals, February 2020

In February 2020, a \$3.95 billion helicopter deal with India was confirmed, including the sale of “24 Sikorsky MH-60R Sea Hawk multi-role helicopters for the Indian Navy and six Boeing AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters for the Indian Army.”<sup>113</sup> This deal followed a \$1.87 billion deal for a defense system earlier in February.<sup>114</sup> These deals were supposedly in exchange for a trade agreement, but that anticipated trade deal failed to materialize before or after this arms deal announcement. These deals also elicited pushback from many Congressional leaders, who cited the religious and human rights issues that India is being accused of in the Kashmir region.

This agreement might achieve numerous goals: it armed India, an ally, that was seeing increasing tensions with China, a foe; it allowed for a dependence on American-manufactured weapons instead of Russian-manufactured weapons, which were also recently purchased by India;

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<sup>111</sup> Dave Lawler. U.S. agrees to sell UAE \$23 billion in arms, including the F-35. *Axios*, 2020, <https://www.axios.com/trump-uae-f35-arm-sales-b70a1665-a3ab-4360-b61e-27d78a3ccf8e.html>

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Sebastien Roblin. More U.S.-India Arms Sales Could Follow \$3.5 Billion Helicopter Deal. *Forbes*, 2020, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/02/26/modi-and-trump-sign-35-billion-helicopter-deal-more-could-follow/?sh=70a5b94423aa>

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

and it strengthened a negotiated trade deal with India.<sup>115</sup> <sup>116</sup> Not only did this weapons purchase aid in some foreign policy endeavors, but it also helped ensure that American manufacturing companies were the primary weapons producers internationally. Enshrining American excellence in this field might be beneficial to U.S. foreign interests, but it is certainly beneficial to Boeing, Raytheon, and the other American companies benefitting from these contracts.

## D. Israeli Arms Deals

As recently as the COVID-19 relief bill passed by the House on December 28, Israeli weapons contracts are often found in American politics because of the strong alliance between the two nations. For example, Israel was earmarked \$500 million for a missile defense system in the most recent COVID relief package, an add-on that many Representatives took issue with.<sup>117</sup> According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, the United States was responsible for \$9.1 billion out of \$9.5 billion worth of arms contracts from 1998 to 2005.<sup>118</sup> Enshrined in U.S. law is Israel's guarantee of a "qualitative military edge (QME)" in the region, ensuring that Israel will have the most advanced American weaponry in the region; all other arms deal the United States participates in throughout the Middle East must adhere to this principle in order to ensure Israel's military advantage.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Vivek Raghuvanshi. India Accelerates Weapons Purchases in Wake of Border Clash with China. *Defense News*, 2020, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/07/06/india-accelerates-weapons-purchases-in-wake-of-border-clash-with-china/>

<sup>116</sup> The Associated Press. Trump Announces \$3B Defense Deal with India. 2020, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/02/25/trump-announces-3b-defense-deal-with-india/>

<sup>117</sup> Ben Samuels. U.S. COVID-19 Relief Package Causes '\$500 Million for Israel' to Trend Online. *Haaretz*, 2020, <https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-u-s-covid-19-relief-package-causes-500-million-for-israel-to-trend-online-1.9391940>

<sup>118</sup> Richard Grimmett et al. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005. *Congressional Research Service*, 2006, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33696.pdf>

<sup>119</sup> Congressional Research Service. Israel's Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates. 2020, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46580>

## E. Moroccan Arms Deal, December 2020

In December 2020, “President Donald Trump’s administration moved forward with \$1 billion in sales of drones and precision-guided weapons to Morocco,” a deal which coincided with a recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara and a normalization of relations with Israel.<sup>120</sup> According to the reporting Reuters, “The deal includes four MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones made by privately-held General Atomics, and Hellfire, Paveway and JDAM precision-guided munitions made by Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Boeing.”<sup>121</sup>

## F. Taiwanese Arms Deal, October 2020

In October 2020, Taiwan received \$2.37 billion in missiles and other weapons systems, including “up to 100 Boeing-made Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems and 400 Harpoon Block II Surface Launched Missiles.”<sup>122</sup> Additionally, a few weeks prior, they received \$1.8 billion in an arms deal that included “135 Boeing-made air-to-ground cruise missiles, 11 Lockheed Martin-made truck-mounted rocket launchers and six MS-110 reconnaissance pods.”<sup>123</sup>

These deals are particularly interesting because they violate US policy: the One China Policy. In selling arms and other weapons to Taiwan, the US implicitly recognized Taiwan’s independence, drawing disapproval and anger from China. This is another example wherein these foreign arms sales seem to be antithetical to United States foreign policy as explicitly stated, although United States foreign policy towards China can be at times nebulous.

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<sup>120</sup> Patricia Zengerle. Exclusive-Trump administration moves forward with \$1 billion Moroccan arms deal. *Reuters*, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-morocco-drones-exclusive/exclusive-trump-administration-moves-forward-with-1-billion-moroccan-arms-deal-idUSKBN28L2TO>

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> Ellen Mitchell. Trump administration approves \$2.37B arms sale to Taiwan. *The Hill*, 2020, <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/522861-trump-administration-approves-237b-arms-sale-to-taiwan>

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

## G. Summary of Foreign Arms Deals

Foreign arms deals are used as economic and political tools to advance the U.S. and American manufacturing objectives. The names Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman are consistently found in these contracts. These types of sales ensure American exceptionalism in the field of manufacturing, and both the federal government and these companies have financial and political incentives to continue doling out multi-billion-dollar contracts to allies around the world. By allowing these sales to occur to both friends and foes, the Trump administration increased the number of FMS that occurred during his administration, and many of these agreements are being reviewed by the current Biden administration.

Many of these sales were made to advance American foreign policy: for example, the QME in Israel creates a constant need for military sales to that nation. In nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, these arms sales have benefitted these arms manufacturers without explicitly benefitting U.S. foreign policy, calling into question why these deals were completed in the first place. As with so much of the processes described above, even if their goals are not clear, the military-industrial complex benefits.

## VIII. Conclusion

Overall, the military-industrial complex is still influencing, and benefitting from, the current bureaucratic and political landscape in the United States. Through lobbying, campaign contributions, and an integration of industry experts into the highest levels of government, major firms in the military-industrial complex benefit from having the ear of major foreign policy leaders or being those leaders themselves. By gaining both domestic and foreign arms contracts, these firms guarantee future profits, allowing for current research and development. Because of

these guaranteed profits, these firms benefit the entire manufacturing sector and private innovation; the implicit investment of the United States government in this research has led to many productive and useful innovations that might not have been otherwise invested in. These benefits arguably outweigh the costs of this complex, as argued by many prominent authors in the field. However, the inefficiencies created in the political space cannot be ignored, and fundamentally the way that private and public sectors are intertwined in bureaucracy creates issues in creating policy and delineating contracts.

These domestic aspects of the military-industrial complex still exist, but the complex writ large has begun to focus more and more on foreign arms sales as another avenue of profit. As these companies dominate the international weapons market, they benefit from the multitude of other international buyers with whom the United States cuts foreign policy deals in exchange for these weapons. Although the traditional aspects of the military-industrial complex still exist, this shifting landscape has increased the influence of these firms in a new realm of United States policy.

## Appendix – Specifics on Campaign Contributions

As Majority Leader of the 2020 Senate, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) has many more responsibilities than just the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. However, even with this in mind, he still receives substantial sums from many weapons manufacturers, including in the 2020 cycle \$86,858 from Raytheon, \$49,281 from Northrop Grumman, and \$39,746 from Boeing.<sup>124</sup>

Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) retired from the Senate in 2020, but during his last election cycle in 2014 he received \$29,500 in contributions from Raytheon and \$25,000 in contributions from Northrop Grumman.<sup>125</sup> Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) received \$55,828 in total contribution from Raytheon, \$49,443 in total contribution from Lockheed Martin, and \$45,530 in total contribution from Northrop Grumman.<sup>126</sup> Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), in her last election cycle in 2016, received \$56,000 in contributions from Raytheon, \$37,7000 in contributions from Northrop Grumman, and \$15,000 in contributions from Boeing.<sup>127</sup>

Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) received \$100,558 from Lockheed Martin, \$59,833 from Boeing, and \$58,335 from Northrop Grumman in campaign contributions in his most recent election cycle in 2020.<sup>128</sup> Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO) in his most recent election cycle in 2016 received \$75,091 in total contribution from Boeing, \$59,070 in contributions from Northrop

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<sup>124</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Mitch McConnell - Kentucky. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/mitch-mcconnell/contributors?cid=N00003389&cycle=2020&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>125</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Lamar Alexander - Tennessee. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/lamar-alexander/contributors?cid=N00009888&cycle=2014&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>126</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Susan Collins - Maine. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/susan-collins/contributors?cid=N00000491&cycle=2020&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>127</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Lisa Murkowski - Alaska. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/lisa-murkowski/summary?cid=N00026050&cycle=2016>

<sup>128</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Lindsay Graham – South Carolina. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/lindsey-graham/summary?cid=N00009975&cycle=2020&type=P>



Grumman, and \$45,000 in contributions from Raytheon.<sup>129</sup> Jerry Moran (R-KA) in his most recent election cycle in 2016 received \$27,000 in contribution from Raytheon.<sup>130</sup>

Senator John Hoeven (R-ND) in his most recent election cycle in 2016 received \$10,000 in PAC contributions from Boeing, \$28,500 in PAC contributions from Raytheon, \$29,500 in PAC contributions from Northrop Grumman, and \$27,000 in PAC contributions from Lockheed Martin.<sup>131</sup> Senator John Boozman (R-AR) in his most recent election cycle in 2016 received \$35,000 in contributions from Lockheed Martin, \$35,000 in contributions from Raytheon, and \$22,500 in contributions from Northrop Grumman.<sup>132</sup> Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) in his most recent election cycle in 2016 received \$50,7500 from Boeing in contributions, \$40,950 from Raytheon in contributions, \$16,500 from Northrop Grumman in contributions, and \$60,100 from Lockheed Martin in contributions.<sup>133</sup>

Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) in her most recent election cycle in 2018, received \$15,510 in contribution from Lockheed Martin, \$50,348 in contribution from Northrop Grumman, and \$30,010 in contribution from Raytheon.<sup>134</sup> Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) received \$37,500 in contributions from Raytheon, \$22,500 in contributions from Northrop Grumman, \$20,500 in contributions from Lockheed Martin, and \$110,047 in contributions from

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<sup>129</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Roy Blunt - Missouri. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/roy-blunt/contributors?cid=N00005195&cycle=2016&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>130</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Jerry Moran - Kansas. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/jerry-moran/contributors?cid=N00005282&cycle=2016&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>131</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Joe Hoeven – North Dakota. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/john-hoeven/contributors?cid=N00031688&cycle=2016&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>132</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. John Boozman - Arkansas. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/john-boozman/contributors?cid=N00013873&cycle=2016&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>133</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Patrick Leahy - Vermont. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/patrick-leahy/contributors?cid=N00009918&cycle=2016&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>134</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Dianne Feinstein - California. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/dianne-feinstein/contributors?cid=N00007364&cycle=2018&recs=100&type=C>

Boeing.<sup>135</sup> Additionally, because of Boeing's manufacturing centers in her home state of Washington, she did receive a critical endorsement from Boeing in a tough 2010 reelection bid. She primarily advocated for a Pentagon contract for 179 new aerial refueling tankers, over a bid from Airbus.<sup>136</sup>

Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) received \$95,300 in contributions from Lockheed Martin, \$59,710 in contributions from Raytheon, \$43,250 in contributions from Northrop Grumman, and \$40,301 in contributions from Boeing.<sup>137</sup> Senator Jon Tester (D-MO) received \$32,393 in contributions from Raytheon and \$47,584 in contributions from Northrop Grumman in his most recent election cycle in 2018.<sup>138</sup> Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI) in his most recent election cycle in 2016 received \$20,000 in contributions from Lockheed Martin.<sup>139</sup> Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) in 2018 received \$38,665 from Lockheed Martin and \$18,375 from Northrop Grumman.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Patty Murray - Washington. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/patty-murray/contributors?cid=N00007876&cycle=2016&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>136</sup> Hohmann, James. Boeing Helps Murray Play Defense. *Politico*, 2020, <https://www.politico.com/story/2010/06/boeing-helps-murray-play-defense-038178>

<sup>137</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Jack Reed – Rhode Island. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/jack-reed/contributors?cid=N00000362&cycle=2020&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>138</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Jon Tester - Montana. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/jon-tester/contributors?cid=N00027605&cycle=2018&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>139</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Brian Schatz - Hawaii. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/brian-schatz/contributors?cid=N00028138&cycle=2016&recs=100&type=C>

<sup>140</sup> Open Secrets. Sen. Tammy Baldwin – Wisconsin. *The Center for Responsive Politics*, 2020, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/tammy-baldwin/contributors?cid=N00004367&cycle=2018&recs=100&type=C>

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